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Chapter 1:  The Social Politics of Knowledge on Cotton Farms in Telangana, India 
 
 Genetically modified (GM) cotton seeds have been aggressively adopted by Indian 
farmers producing cheap raw materials for the fashion industry.  Such seeds give rise to cotton 
that eventually makes its way to Indian retailers and sometimes even stores like Baked T’s, a 
custom design clothing shop on St. Louis’ commercial Delmar Loop.  By contrast, non-GM 
cotton seeds are planted mainly by organic farmers taking the first step in an international supply 
chain that can produce similar T-shirts sold by Plowsharing Crafts, a fair-trade, organic, and 
handicraft retailer across the street from Baked T’s.  The finished clothing sold by each store is 
not terribly different in quality or form.  The true differences stem from the social relationships 
required to bring these different shirts to consumers.  Participation in GM cotton farming or in 
organic cotton farming requires fundamentally different interactions between technology, 
governments, farmers, plant scientists, corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
and advocacy groups.  When we follow these threads back to the farm itself, behind each shirt 
lies not only a seed with different inherent properties but farmers participating in different kinds 
of agriculture that afford different possibilities for agricultural knowledge.  These differences are 
the focus of this dissertation. 
The cotton growers in Telangana, India with whom I conducted my dissertation research 
often experienced the first and last stages of the textile trade.  They grew the cotton destined for 
new clothing and wore the used cotton clothes resold to poor people in the global South.  Rather 
than focus on the clothes themselves, this dissertation asks about commodity chains in the 
opposite direction:  What are clothing choices doing to farmers?  How are decisions made in 
clothing stores and laboratories within a ten minute walk of my desk at Washington University in 
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St. Louis affecting how farmers grow cotton?  What does this reveal about international 
development, the creation of ecological knowledge, and the adoption of technology in new 
contexts?  This dissertation asks how farmers involved in mutually exclusive GM and organic 
cotton farming regimes are set forward on diverging paths because of the reward structure and 
constraints of these two types of farming.  Because the same farmers are also growing rice, I also 
analyze rice as a comparative lens against which to compare the effects of cotton seed 
commodification and agricultural practice on farmer decision-making.  Because the fundamental 
hinge that these farmers face involves which cotton seed they plant, I focus particularly on the 
ways that farmers create and adapt knowledge about seeds and farming decisions under the 
constraints of different crops, markets, farming strategies, development initiatives, and the social 
hierarchy of their villages.   
 I began this project in 2012, against the backdrop of a rising debate over hot 
environmental topics:  climate change, population, and agricultural production.  As the global 
population surpassed seven billion, fears of resource scarcity and overpopulation repeated a 
familiar spin in public discourse (Eng 2011; Engelman 2011; Kunzig 2011), focusing attention 
on the future of food and farmers.  India has all of the right characteristics to capture a 
development imagination:  high population, hundreds of millions of small farmers, an active 
democracy, an even more active press and civil society, immense wealth, immense poverty, a 
highly educated public, and vast human potential.  Yet despite cries that the world needs GMOs 
to feed its growing population, Indian farmers grow GM cotton, not GM food
1
.  Vested interests 
in the Ayurvedic industry tapped into nascent fears of GM food related to traditional Indian 
                                               
1There are certain exceptions to this rule.  Cotton oil seed cakes from GM cotton plants are a common additive to 
livestock feed, and so people may consume GM plant material indirectly through milk or meat.  Goats, which eat 
almost anything, will eat cotton plants and so people may consume plant material through that route as well.  Cotton 
seed oil is also increasingly used as cooking or processing oil. 
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understandings of food, nutrition, and the body (Kudlu and Stone 2013), blocking the first 
commercial foray into Indian GM eggplant.  Globally, a plurality of GM crops are produced by 
the United States anyway, either destined to become oily and starchy processing ingredients or 
animal feed (Clive James 2010).  
Despite cultivating one third of the land under cotton production globally, India’s small 
farmers still have some of the world’s lowest yields (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2015).  
In controlled field tests, studies have shown that both GM and organic cotton agriculture can 
increase yields (Eyhorn, Ramakrishnan, and Mäder 2007; Forster et al. 2013; Kathage and Qaim 
2012), although some (Crost et al. 2007; Stone 2013) have argued that it is impossible to isolate 
GM cotton’s role in those increases among a suite of other technological change.  Globally, the 
push toward increased cotton production is ironic given that the world has produced millions 
more bales of cotton than it could spin into clothing since the 2010-11 season.  By celebrating 
yield increases that coincide with the adoption of GM cotton, proponents aim to solve a 
production problem that, on a global scale, does not exist.  Organic agriculture provides a new 
market that puts a premium on the producer, but it too is supplying a market that is already 
oversaturated. 
Low yields notwithstanding, India is projected to lead the world in overall cotton 
production in 2015 and produces an astounding 74% of all organic cotton spun (USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Service 2015; Textile Exchange 2013).  Yet, this has not necessarily reaped 
dividends for Indian farmers, who harvest yields less than half of those seen by their major 
competitors in China, Brazil, Mexico, the US, and Australia.  There are many reasons for this 
comparative underproduction, foremost among them including the relative poverty of Indian 
farmers that leaves them vulnerable to environmental and social change and devastating insect 
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pest attacks across the country.  One potential future is offered by the high-tech science of 
genetic modification, which, according to proponents, combats rising pesticide applications by 
building a pesticide into the plant’s genetic makeup.  Organic farming, important for the analytic 
perspective of this dissertation but practiced on only .8 million of the 11.7 million hecatres on 
which Indian cotton is grown (Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. 2014; Willer and Kilcher 2012), 
illuminates another vision, in which farmers diversify crops and minimize inputs to maximize 
security.  Both visions tie farmers to international markets and build on their ecological 
knowledge, and both have claimed widespread success.  Although agronomists and economists 
have surveyed Indian smallholders over the short-term, anthropology is uniquely positioned to 
explore how these two futures affect farmer livelihoods and their sustainability for future 
generations. 
 Cotton’s supply chain is long and complicated, and many of its aspects have attracted 
attention to workers rights and safety.  Sweatshops, child labor, unsafe building conditions, and 
low wages all help to sustain an international trade in cheap clothing.  At the same time that the 
fashion industry faces criticism for these abuses, shortened fashion cycles and a voracious global 
appetite allows the industry to continue a long history of cost-saving practices at producer 
expense (Beckert 2014).  Various regulations and labels refer to different kinds of ethical cotton, 
from private labels like Fairtrade, which emphasizes worker conditions, to state-supported labels 
that identify the manufacturer and country in which the textile was made (Federal Trade 
Commission 2014).  When consumers differentiate between GM and organic cotton, labelling 
can be more about declaring political allegiance than serving an agricultural purpose.  GM cotton 
is produced under the conditions of industrial agriculture (Barlett 1989), and so organic cotton 
advocates would be disinclined to support GM cotton growers regardless of GM technology.  
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However, the additional element of genetic modification allows organic advocates to draw upon 
legal and biopolitical frameworks that oppose organic and GM technology specifically (Jasanoff 
2005; Schurman and Munro 2010).  The distinction between GM and organic cotton production 
systems is more fundamentally legal than agronomic.  GM cotton seeds could be grown without 
the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers if farmers so wished, but because GM products 
themselves violate organic certification farmers have no incentive to avoid the suite of fertilizers 
and pesticides designed to optimize the performance of GM hybrids.  Indeed, the global conflicts 
between biotechnology interests and the environmental left in the 1990s encouraged both sides to 
shore up support and demonize the other camp (Jasanoff 2005; Schurman and Munro 2010).  
Correctly sensing that this polarizing issue would attract a wide audience, international organic 
regulation ultimately banned the use of GMOs.   
 The path of GM cotton marketing fit with the existing agribusiness model for clothing 
production:  in reducing the need for bollworm pesticide applications, GM Bt
2
 cotton technology 
aimed to keep clothing prices low.  The biopolitical resistance to GM food consumption, ranging 
from eating the unnatural to supporting corporate overreach, does not apply as easily to cotton.  
The health benefits of eating organic food, namely a reduced risk of consuming certain 
pesticides, are also less clear in the case of clothing, which is washed and processed in several 
forms after cotton leaves the farm.  Early promoters of Bt cotton rightly credited GMOs for 
initially reducing cotton’s excessive pesticide applications (Qaim 2003; Huang et al. 2003), 
accounting for 34-39% of all pesticide use in India (Kranthi 2012) before Bt cotton’s 
introduction in 2002.  However, few of these production benefits or risks directly affected 
consumers. 
                                               
2 Bt refers to Bacillus thuringiensis, a bacterium from which genes coding for Cry proteins lethal to Lepidopteran 
insects are added to GM crops.  The history of this is further discussed in chapter three. 
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Thus to establish themselves as alternatives and solutions to the problems facing global 
agriculture, GM and organic cotton narratives focus instead on the plight of farmers themselves.  
In this process, the seed became a symbol for their associated agricultural production generally, 
with a GM seed representing commodified farm inputs and externalized knowledge and a non-
genetically modified seed representing an organic, low-cost, non-industrialized alternative.  As 
with worker-centric labeling like Fairtrade, organic agriculture promoters wanted to focus the 
debate on farmer producers.  Such a focus asked consumers what kind of agriculture they wanted 
to support, and in doing so aligned them with competing international debates about agricultural 
futurism and development.  The battle for hearts and minds in these competing visions would 
take place on the grounds of yield, public health, development, and sustainability.  Competing 
short-term and now medium-term yield studies generally indicate an uptick in yield since 2002 
(Herring and Rao 2012; Qaim 2003; Qaim and Zilberman 2003), although the extent to which Bt 
cotton can account for this increase and why yield would drop once Bt cotton became ubiquitous 
by 2009 is unclear (Crost et al. 2007; Gruère and Sengupta 2011; Kathage and Qaim 2012; Stone 
2015).  Organic cotton appears to yield less under most circumstances, not necessarily because it 
lacks Bt cry toxin defenses but because organic cotton lacks many of the fertilizers and 
pesticides that give GM farmers a production advantage.  Furthermore, many organic programs 
recruit impoverished, non-irrigated farmers whom one might expect to have poor yields to begin 
with.  Under the right circumstances, some (Forster et al. 2013) suggest that organic cultivation 
is not too far below that seen with GMOs.  However, I would add two anthropological caveats to 
such studies.  First, the emphasis on yield may provide a benefit to farmers growing cotton, but 
yield increases are a strange goal during a five year cotton glut.  Second, when yield is so 
dependent on socioeconomic resources that enable farmers to provide ideal conditions, yield is 
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less a measure of how farmers are advancing than of where they fit into village or regional social 
hierarchies. 
Therefore, I argue in this dissertation that this discursive separation of GM and cotton 
agricultural methods misses the point.  Explaining agricultural production in terms of 
technological methods, including the ‘hardware’ of GM seeds, chemical fertilizers, or 
vermicompost pits and the ‘software’ of regulatory structures that certify agricultural products or 
allow germplasm to flow between continents, gives the impression that the technology itself does 
the farm work.  In reality, these different technologies are used in very different ways and have a 
wide range of effects on agricultural practice, productivity, and sustainability.  In each case, the 
question of production in agriculture is not an ecological or economic evaluation of a technology 
existing in a vacuum but a sociocultural question of farmer knowledge guiding farmer 
implementation.  The ultimate sustainability of agricultural production is thus an anthropological 
question, hinging on farmer skill (Netting 1993) and the ability to adapt that skill in a dynamic 
environment (Richards 1985; Leslie and McCabe 2013).  While agricultural skill, the flexible set 
of adaptive strategies that facilitates environmental management on small farms (Brookfield 
2001; Richards 1985; Scott 1998), has been well studied, the process by which this skill is 
created remains more elusive.  GM and organic cotton-growing farmers provide an insight into 
what Glenn Stone (Stone 2016), referencing theories of cultural knowledge from Boyd and 
Richerson (1988) and Rogers (2003), has described as three kinds of learning: environmental, 
social, and didactic.  This dissertation investigates these different modes of learning as they are 
experienced by farmers involved in GM cotton cultivation, rice cultivation, and organic 
cultivation.  I argue that the ways in which farmers balance these different kinds of learning, as 
they manage an agriculture defined by the differing social politics of GM cotton, rice, and 
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organic cotton, determines the kind of knowledge that farmers can develop.  As such, that 
balance determines the conditions of each technology’s sustainability.   
 
The Political Ecology of Expertise 
 This study of agricultural knowledge is couched within the broader theory of political 
ecology (Blaikie 1985; Robbins 2004), which presupposes that human/environmental 
interactions are not natural so much as political.  That is, these interactions are based in a social 
history and cannot be reduced to causal relationships between individuals and ecological 
systems.  Poverty or agricultural productivity are thus not problems that can be easily solved 
with new technologies because they do not address the underlying causes of these social ills.  
And yet agricultural development in India, building on modernist trends in the early 20
th
 century 
through the Green Revolution and its aftermath, has focused on a series of technological 
innovations.  Like farmers in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere in Asia, British colonial 
policy and the geopolitics of the Green Revolution had already established a narrative in which 
Indian farmers were poor, ineffective, ignorant, and in dire need of modern expertise (Cullather 
2013; Guha 2008; Gupta 1998; Perkins 1997; Ross 1998).  Proponents of political ecology 
would argue that Indian farmers’ poverty required more systemic solutions than new seeds and 
new fertilizers, which assume that production is a function of the materials rather than a function 
of social relationships.   
Yet technological solutions served many vested interests.  Agribusiness could continue to 
sell discrete elements of agricultural production including seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and 
machines; India could continue providing development infrastructure like irrigation projects, 
roads, or attractive international financing; scientific agricultural researchers could find new and 
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innovative ways to develop technologies ranging from seeds to inputs to planting strategies; 
international development advocates could fundraise for and provide deliverable solutions to 
neo-Malthusian production failures for India as a stand-in for the global South generally; and all 
of this trade and interest would help India generate revenue and exports as a rising economic 
power on the world stage.  The extent to which farmers themselves benefit from such 
technological interventions is less clear, and I seek to problematize the assumption that new 
technology is superior or that it effects change independent of the social relationships in which it 
is embedded.   
Cotton agriculture has a long history in India but by the late 1990s, Indian cotton farmers 
faced an internationally publicized crisis marked by low yields, high pesticide inputs, debt, and 
suicide.  India’s history of poverty, high population density, and famine provided the ideal 
backdrop for an emerging narrative:  India (and therefore developing nations generally) needs to 
use technology to improve agriculture to meet its growing needs.  Although I am writing 
critically about this narrative, Indian cotton farmers certainly faced problems.  Pesticide use 
steadily rose through the 1990s (Kranthi 2012), and although India was and is among the world’s 
top cotton planters by acreage, India had and continues to have low yields (Cotton Corporation 
of India Ltd. 2011; USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2015).  This dissertation focuses on 
seeds as synecdoches, representative elements part of larger regimes of technological and social 
relationships.  Thus do GM cotton seeds, rice seeds, and organic cotton seeds bring farmers into 
connection with a variety of experts, consumers, and opportunities to build local environmental 
knowledge.   
 GM cotton offers farmers a vision of the future that is both radically different and 
completely in line with how farmers have learned to produce.   Far more specific and controlled 
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than traditional population improvement or even public sector plant breeding, GM technology 
gives agricultural scientists exact control over some aspects of certain genetic traits.  For Indian 
cotton, at the present, this trait is pest resistance.  In the larger political ecology of Indian cotton 
agriculture, pest resistance was particularly desirable because the traits could be bred into the 
growing hybrid cotton seed market, further encouraging farmers to adopt hybrids’ associated 
social relationships to authority and expertise.  I will expand on this claim further in chapter 
three.  Farmers who plant monocultures of cotton hybrids bred to respond to the right 
combination of fertilizers and irrigation rely on pesticides to keep their plants safe from the 
combination of bollworms, sucking pests, and other insects that would feed on their crop.  All of 
GM farmers’ key inputs come from experts external to the household:  pesticides and fertilizers 
from shops, machines from local dealers or rich farmers, seeds from laboratories, and even 
planting density from extension services.  Seed selection, arguably the most important choice 
that farmers make, turns out to be socially mediated, with advertisements and the undue 
influence of rich or important farmers swaying villages and even districts to plant seeds with 
great enthusiasm before switching to a different seed the following year (Stone 2007; Stone, 
Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014).  As I will show in chapter five, socially important members of 
the village can sway other farmers to choose particular seeds despite wholly ambiguous results.  
Despite the confusion and anxiety that surrounds and obscures cotton seed decision-making, the 
same farmers show consistency and confidence with their rice seed choices.  Some of this 
difference stems from the inherent properties of rice and cotton agriculture, but far more can be 
attributed to the social dynamics of marketing, herding mentality, and expertise between these 
two crops.  Decisions about cotton, the quintessential cash crop, have devolved into herding 
dynamics subject to the whims of advertising, experts, or sheer circumstance (Stone 2007; Stone, 
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Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014).  Decisions about rice, a more flexible commodity, are less 
swayed by herds or experts.  The differences in social authority for each crop ultimately 
compound in differences in the way they are managed. 
 But what of the social life of seed knowledge on a farm where choices are severely 
limited?  Like GM technology, organic agriculture regimes offered farmers a future both in line 
with the past and radically different.  In a very real sense, the international organic movement in 
agriculture began in India.  After years of service in British India, agricultural officer Albert 
Howard concluded that England could learn much more from India than he could teach South 
Asian peasant farmers.  Howard’s Agricultural Testament galvanized a nascent European  
organic movement that quickly spread to the United States and morphed into a well-regulated 
international network  of certifiers, regulators, producers, and distributors (Conford 2011).  After 
half a century, a heavily regulated version of organic agriculture found its way back to India and 
became nationally institutionalized in 2002, the same year that GM cotton was commercially 
released.  On organic farms, as on all farms, the choices that farmers make pass through many 
levels of social mediation:  caste, farmer holdings size, scientific development and advising back 
at plant science stations, etc.  But on organic farms, farmers must additionally conform to 
organic regulations, perform village life and gratitude to visiting donors or buyers, and provide 
the image of tradition or development that consumers in the international organic cotton trade 
hope to buy (Franz and Hassler 2010).  Various aspects of agricultural knowledge are not merely 
socially mediated, but actively taught on these farms.  Thus, the shifting target of success that 
farmers hope to achieve can depend as much on being a good student as being a good farmer.   
The history and development of these mutually exclusive regimes will be explored further in 
chapter three.   
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To view either organic production or conventional production now including GM seeds 
as technologies distinct from a social context would leave out the most important criteria for 
their success on farmer fields.  Bt cotton’s actual role in pesticide decreases and yield increases 
is disputed (Kranthi 2012; Stone 2011a; Kathage and Qaim 2012; Stone 2013), in part because it 
is difficult to parse out the individual effects of a new seed or a new spray.  GM technology is 
only relevant to farmers in so far as it can be distributed, trialed, and effectively filtered through 
the social politics of shops, extension offices, laboratories, and caste relationships.  Similarly, 
numerous studies of organic production highlight the benefits of household-produced farm inputs 
and diversified planting strategies (Eyhorn, Ramakrishnan, and Mäder 2007; Forster et al. 2013; 
Raghupati and Prasad 2009; Desmond 2013) without considering the ways in which farmers use 
organic initiatives as opportunities to gain social or economic resources.  Studies of particular 
organic programs can posit their success as a technological advancement rather than a successful 
partnership between farmers, consumers, and NGO or corporate promoters.  In focusing on 
practice, on what people do in quotidian life, anthropology gives a complicated answer to a 
relatively straightforward question:  given new technologies, how do farmers respond to different 
relationships of agricultural knowledge and authority? 
  
Knowledge and Authority in Cotton Agriculture 
In this dissertation, I investigate the social politics of knowledge and authority on cotton 
and rice farms in Telangana, India.  I do this by filtering the daily experience of agricultural 
decision-making and farmer experimentation through the lens of Stone’s tripartite framework of 
environmental, social, and didactic knowledge and his comments on agriculture and performance 
(Stone 2016; Stone 2014).  This dissertation is therefore fundamentally about knowledge and the 
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ways that farmers put that knowledge to use.  I use three seeds enmeshed in different social 
politics, GM cotton, rice, and organic cotton, to investigate: 
1. Under what situations conventional and organic farmers use a balance of 
environmental, social, and didactic knowledge  to make agricultural decisions 
2. How farmers learn to perform certain roles, most importantly the role of the 
transformed farmer and the role of the “show” farmer under particular didactic 
conditions 
3. How this agricultural knowledge, and therefore the sustainability of agricultural 
technology, is contingent on environmental learning not being overwhelmed by social 
or didactic feedback. 
 GM seeds were introduced to the Indian cotton market as a solution to low yields and 
high pesticide sprays, but they were soon sold as a technological fix to a more general agrarian 
distress symbolized by farmer suicide – GM seeds aimed to provide sustainable solutions to 
poverty and pesticide overuse (Pearson 2006).  Organic cotton programs conceptualized 
sustainability differently, informed by the anti-GM environmentalist discourse of the 1990s and 
capitalizing on conspicuous, socially-minded consumption. Organic seeds, and more importantly 
organic agriculture interventions, aimed to educate farmers and decrease their dependence on 
multinational agribusiness in favor of alternative and NGO marketing.  When the same farmers 
plant rice seeds, they experience a radically different market and learning process, not the least 
of which because they are often purposively saved and replanted by farmers, requiring a very 
specific set of ecological knowledge.  This is why cotton presents such interesting challenges for 
food and agricultural sustainability writ large – changes in cotton, first as a hybrid and now as a 
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GMO, or cotton as a niche product in organic markets, may portend the current push for hybrid 
and GM rice and the backlash to it. 
GM and organic cotton planting regimes employ different kinds of technologies on the 
farm as these regimes are based within different visions for the future of agriculture.  GM cotton 
growers, of course, use Bt seeds, but their cultivation is also related to a series of integrated 
pesticides and fertilizers, the network of shops and extension agents who advise and sell to them, 
and a prerogative to grow and sell as much cotton as possible on their land.  These farmers often 
cultivate other crops including most significantly rice, which can be saved, is often eaten, and is 
less of a high-risk, high-payout gambit.  Because the agricultural calculus for rice is different 
than that for cotton, a comparison of these two crops allows me to test how conventional farmers 
are learning differently about these two crops and applying that knowledge.  Among 
conventional farmers planting rice and GM cotton, Stone (2007) argued that farmers over-rely on 
social learning when choosing cotton seeds because the seeds are unrecognizable, inconsistent, 
and rapidly changing.  A null hypothesis that would assume economic rationality in cotton 
choices, namely farmers determining seed choices based on good yields, does not make sense in 
an environment defined by poor environmental feedback and unreliable consumer choices.  Rice, 
however, should be a more trialable crop.  My more direct comparison of rice and cotton in the 
context of agricultural institutions like shops and extension services highlights the role that 
expert knowledge plays in farming decisions.  By analyzing how farmers respond to 
environmental and social feedback with rice and cotton, I can better understand how and why the 
same farmers, and farmers as a whole, know more about rice than about cotton.  Just as 
conventional farmers have to deal with didactic expertise in shops and extension services, the 
same environmental and social learning systems are at play on organic farms.  The technologies 
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differ but the same necessity to balance and learn from didactic, environmental, and social 
sources remains.  Conventional farmers plant exclusively Bt cotton and rely on shops or other 
farmers for knowledge about the commodified inputs that they use to help that plant grow.  In 
rice, a narrower set of seed options gives an opportunity for a wider knowledge base about any 
particular seed.  This would suggest that farmers can develop agricultural knowledge in a less 
confusing marketplace.  Organic farmers are restricted to a scant few cotton choices and plant 
either the same rice varieties that conventional farmers plant or a combination of heirloom rice 
and sorghum varieties. However the social and environmental learning opportunities suggested 
by the GM planting farmer analysis are overshadowed by a didactic intervention program with a 
mission to both educate farmers and maintain organic standards.  Because farmers are rewarded 
by organic intervention programs for correctly following project rules and for performing for 
curious visitors, some enter into a feedback loop of show and reward:  charismatic farmers learn 
to act transformed by the intervention, extol the virtues of organic planting methods, are then 
rewarded with extra sales, farming infrastructure, and local fame for their diligence, and become 
more committed to the project.  Thus do farmers learn that to be a good organic farmer means to 
be a good showman.   
By comparing the learning process across several different situations:  rice vs. Bt cotton, 
organic rice and sorghum vs. organic cotton; organic farmers vs. Bt planting farmers; different 
kinds of organic farmers vs. different kinds of Bt planting farmers, I can draw wide conclusions 
about how and when farmers can learn and apply environmental knowledge.  More importantly, 
these lines of comparison also provide insight into the influences that didactic, social, and 
environmental knowledge have on one another, emphasizing that skill, a balance of all three 
types of learning, is contingent on the reward structure of farmers’ social environment.  What 
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farmers learn on the farm is highly variable, depending on the trialability of the technology in 
question, the authorities with whom they work, the rewards for agricultural and social 
performances, and the risks of screwing up within the production regime.  Having introduced my 
guiding research question and conceptual framework, I will summarize the chapters. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 This dissertation is split into four thematic parts.  The first part, chapters one and two, 
introduce the theoretical lens for this research, describe the research site, and detail the research 
methodology used in this project.  In the second section, chapters three and four, I discuss the 
historical, political, and theoretical context of this research.  Chapter three considers both organic 
and GM regulation in India as a function of their political ecology.  Regulation and germplasm 
flowed across the longstanding botanical and political ties between the United States and India, 
especially as regards cotton.  Beginning in the mid-1800s but accelerating after Indian 
independence and the Green Revolution, American and European foreign policy has played an 
important role in agricultural development in India.  Both the spread of GM and organic 
technologies reflect a push for sustainable agricultural development, and the foreign regulatory 
structure of both agriculture systems has been modified by India’s uniquely contestable and 
public regulatory apparatus.  Chapter four provides a theoretical context for this paper within the 
anthropology of knowledge and socio-environmental resilience.  Fundamentally, anthropology 
asks how people live within global trends like capitalism, colonialism, and global development.  
To understand how global initiatives in agricultural development are affecting farmer lives, I 
focus on farmer learning as a lens to understand how people understand, adapt, and react to GM 
and organic agricultural systems.  This section draws heavily on anthropological theory, 
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particularly Stone’s tripartite theory of farmer learning, and the history of transnational 
agricultural development.   
 The third section includes chapters five, six, and seven, and explores the social politics of 
farmer learning in the context of GM cotton, OPV rice, and two types of organic cotton farms.  
Chapter five describes the breakdown in environmental learning and the largescale shift to social 
learning among GM cotton farmers.  While all farmers appear to have difficulty trialing seed 
technologies or even associated cotton management strategies, large, wealthy, and socially 
important farmers appear to exert undue influence on what seeds become popular when.  This 
influence appears because of the social politics of knowledge and seed buying, even though these 
influential farmers see no yield benefits, leaving them to be just as unsure as their smaller, 
poorer, less influential neighbors.  In rice cultivation, discussed in chapter six, farmers are less 
singularly focused on yield while their rice crops are themselves inherently easier to trial and 
learn from, in part because farmers look to the same phenotypic traits for agronomic success that 
buyers look for in the market.  Additionally, many farmers purposively save rice seeds, making 
rice and the knowledge of its management less commodified than GM cotton.  Chapter seven 
discusses the ways in which farmers learn how to work with new kinds of plants, authorities, and 
incentives that underwrite their production on organic farms.  Here, more than among 
conventional GM planting farmers, learning to perform for visiting buyers and learning how to 
work with agricultural institutions is just as important to farmer success as making well-informed 
seed choices.  All three chapters draw heavily on data collected as a participant observer of 
farmer experimentation as well as my survey data.  Each chapter measures yields and seed 
choices with some degree of statistical analysis while placing those numbers in their 
ethnographic context.  
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 Chapters eight and nine address the final themes of show and performance in agriculture, 
drawing mainly on interviews with experts and ethnography of the ways that farmers navigate 
the social politics of agricultural knowledge in Telangana.  Chapter eight explores Stone’s (2014) 
concept of the show farmer, the especially charismatic individuals who chase or attract media 
attention and social recognition for their agriculture.  Many such farmers become skilled 
performers and their personality shapes the narrative of agricultural development, village 
development, organic agriculture, or GMOs generally.  However, such farmers are not 
necessarily representative of the village as a whole.  Chapter nine explores the effects of 
performance and transformation in a development context more broadly, treating these as 
phenomena experienced to some degree by most farmers.  Because these chapters look at 
performance and farmer narratives, they rely most heavily on qualitative ethnography and 
interviews.   
This chapter has introduced my research context and goals.  The following chapter 
introduces my methodology and field site in greater detail.  In this dissertation I contextualize 
qualitative and quantitative data on the farmer learning process within environmental, social, and 
didactic learning to better understand how agricultural technology works on the farm.  Although 
I discuss my research methodology throughout this study, I will briefly summarize my methods 
in the following section.   
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Chapter 2:  Site Description and Methodology 
 
This dissertation focuses on three districts of India’s newest state, Telangana, formerly 
the north-central region of Andhra Pradesh.  Because of funding opportunities (and constraints), 
I structured my research to take place over twelve months and three consecutive cotton-growing 
seasons 2012-2014.  I visited four villages in 2012 June-August, nine villages in 2013-14 July-
February, and seven villages in 2014 May-August.  This diachronic approach allowed me to see 
changes in seed choice, analyze seed recall, and develop long term relationships with the farmers 
that were patient enough to donate their time and energy to my research. 
India has sustained a secular democracy built by countless ethnic and religious factions 
and a population in which hundreds of millions of agrarian laborers had never received formal 
education (Guha 2008).  Muslim Nizam-ruled Hyderabad, independent India’s largest princely 
state, remained independent and defied efforts at unification for over a year as modern India 
coalesced in 1947.  Threatened by a Muslim-dominated, potentially hostile nation bisecting the 
new country, Indian troops stormed the Nizam’s palace in Hyderabad, claiming the former state 
as part of India on September 17
th
, 1948 (Zubrzycki 2007).  On that day, the Deccan plateau, a 
majority Hindu agricultural area dominated by Muslim and British influence for nearly 700 
years, suddenly became part of a Hindu-led secular democracy. 
Outside of Hyderabad city, the politically active citizenry also supported the rising Indian 
communist party, which called on peasants and women to overthrow their oppressive landlords 
and various systems of exploitative bonded labor (Lalita et al. 1989).  In the riots that followed, 
the people of the new state killed thousands of former Muslim and Hindu landlords.  Historically 
dominant ethnic Andhras and historically subjugated tenant farmers and Tribal (Adavasi) 
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peoples in the interior of the Deccan plateau achieved an uneasy peace by making Hyderabad the 
capital of the new state of Andhra Pradesh (Zubrzycki 2007; Guha 2008; Ram 2007).  While the 
state itself was unified on linguistic grounds, a sizable minority in Telangana agitated for a 
separate state.  On July 30, 2013, the central government in coordination with the ruling 
Congress party began plans to bifurcate the state (The Hindu 2014; Vijay 2012; The Hindu 
Business Line 2014).  On February 18, 2014, the legislative assembly, the Lok Sabha, passed the 
Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill to officially split the state on June 2, 2014 (Reddy 2014; 
Joshua and Reddy 2014). 
While Hyderabad has become a hub for India’s IT boom, the surrounding area of the 
Telangana region has remained comparatively underdeveloped with a largely agrarian base, 
poorly irrigated (Vakulabharanam 2004), and home to a disproportionate number of farmer 
suicides in the state (Galab, Revathi, and Reddy 2009).  After bifurcation this agricultural-
industrial divide remains: the Telangana region supports the majority of cotton producers while 
the Andhraylseema region is home to the majority of cotton mills (Kurmanath 2013; Mitra and 
Somasekhar 2013).  To maintain control of a state won by courting rural voting blocs, Telangana 
politicians have to aggressively support policies that please cotton farmers as they incentivize 
links between industry and agriculture:  subsidies on agricultural chemicals like fertilizers and 
pesticides, a continued under-market maximum retail price for cotton seed, a high minimum 
support price for sold cotton, and continued subsidies on electricity and irrigation.   
 
Study Villages and Village Sampling Strategy 
Building off of Stone’s (2007; 2011a) work in the Warangal district, my sampling 
strategy aimed to expand research on GM cotton planting farmers and compare their experiences 
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to two kinds of organic cotton projects.  I surveyed six GM cotton planting villages along with 
three organic cotton planting villages.  Several distinct groups of houses, especially among 
scheduled tribe (ST) farmers, can thus compose one village.  These villages were selected for 
continuity with Stone’s work and reflect the diversity of social, agricultural, and economic 
opportunities that Telangana farmers face.  Stone initially selected these villages to survey 
farmers working with a variety of different soil types amenable to cotton agriculture; differing 
access to village infrastructure including electricity and irrigation; a range of experience growing 
cotton; and different ethnic compositions.  The particular rationale for each village will be 
explained below. 
In each village, I spoke with farmers randomly drawn from a recent census or village 
polling record stratified by wealth.  In villages where I worked with farmers that Stone had 
previously met, I endeavored to meet as many of those same farmers to collect comparable data.  
In cases where people in Stone’s sample had died or moved, I interviewed sons or other relatives 
when applicable to collect data on long term agricultural management at the household level.  
Other farmers moved away or discontinued farming, and so I chose other people from the 
randomized census and voting lists.  I chose these particular GM cotton planting villages as they 
represented a range of villages near regional cities, rural villages with paved roads, reliable bus 
routes, electrical infrastructure, and irrigation, and rural villages with comparatively little 
infrastructure.  These are labelled as town, rural town, and rural respectively in Table 2.1 below.  
These differences in proximity to cities and in-village resources create different agricultural 
possibilities for farmers, including access to off-farm experts and agricultural inputs.  These in 
turn affect farmer management and decision-making.  I chose these particular organic villages 
because they represent farmers working with didactic NGOs as well as corporations.  Using a 
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combination of previously interviewed farmers and others drawn from the randomized lists in 
Ralledapalle
3
, Gongapalle, Kavrupad, Orukonda, and Srigonda, and creating my own random 
sample in Matepalle, I surveyed 60 people in each GM planting village.  In the smaller, rarer, 
and more isolated organic cotton planting villages, I spoke with all or ~90% of the organic 
farmers in the village.   Although my work is in conversation with Stone’s seed choice data 
beginning in 2004, I do not draw on it directly in this dissertation.  I focus specifically on 
structured surveys conducted 2012-2014 (Figure 2.1), in which I asked 394 GM cotton planting 
farmers about 4,599 seed choices and 108 organic cotton planting farmers about 851 choices 
(Table 2.1).   
Figure 2.1: Map of Research Area 
 
 
 
                                               
3 All village names, interlocutors, and NGO names have been changed in the interest of anonymity.  I have not 
changed the name of official government organizations or bureaucratic offices 
Mxd assembled by Corey LaMar
Organic Villages 
 
 
GM-Planting Villages 
 
A – Addabad                  J – Japur               
M – Matepalle                O – Orukonda              
R – Ralledapalle             S - Srigonda 
E – Edaggrineelu            G – Gongapalle       
K - Kavrupad 
  
  
India 
Telangana State 
 
Study Districts 
0 30 60 90 12015
Kilometers
J
S
E
R
O
K
G
A
M
Adilabad
WarangalMedak Warangal City 
23 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1:  Village Distribution of Farmer Respondents 
 
 
 
2012  
farmer n 
2013 
farmer n 
2014 
farmer n 
Ethnic 
composition 
GM or 
Organic 
Village 
Type
4
 
Kavrupad 54 66 63 Caste/Tribal GM Rural Town 
Ralledapalle 49 62 59 Tribal GM Rural  
Srigonda 49 69 61 Caste/Tribal GM Rural Town 
Gongapalle 40 60 60 Caste GM Town 
Orukonda X 60 56 Caste GM Town 
Matepalle X 60 X Caste GM Rural Town 
Edaggrineelu X 33 X Caste Organic Rural 
Addabad X 35 35 Tribal Organic Rural  
Japur X 35 35 Tribal Organic Rural 
 
Ethnic distinctions are a particularly important social variable that manifest in differences 
in village locations and access to resources or infrastructure.  Although caste discrimination has 
been officially outlawed since the 1950s, historical disenfranchisements ripple into the present in 
the form of generational wealth and status.  The Indian census is broken into three caste 
categories and a category reserved for tribal farmers not belonging to the formal caste system:  
scheduled castes (SC), the lowest castes of people formerly called untouchable or harijans; 
backward castes (BC), less disenfranchised people historically working in commerce and 
agriculture; and open castes (OC), who do not receive caste-based benefits or reservations in 
government or university settings.  Members of Scheduled Tribes (ST) in rural Telangana live 
outside the village on more marginal land, follow different customs, and often speak a different 
language than the majority Telugu.  Many OC farmers would have previously been primary 
landowners or skilled workers in the village.  These differences have a contemporary impact on 
                                               
4Rural town here refers to rural villages at least 40 minutes to the nearest minor city but with reliable electricity and 
transportation routes.  Town refers to villages within 20 minutes of the nearest minor city.  Rural refers to villages 
lacking reliable transportation or electricity, where population density is lower.  The differences and meaning of 
those differences between village types and ethnicities will be explained in greater detail below.  
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the infrastructure and resources available to these communities.  Kavrupad, Srigonda, 
Edaggrineelu, Gongapalle, Orukonda, and Matepalle are villages primarily populated by people 
who belong to the caste system.  These villages have paved roads, reliable electricity, small 
restaurants and shops, schools, public resources like toilets, and most houses tend to be concrete 
or brick with tin or concrete roofs. 
Kavrupad, Matepalle, and Edaggrineelu are all rural caste villages at least an hour from 
regional cities where one will find fully equipped hospitals, commodity markets, transportation 
hubs, shopping malls, air-conditioned movie theaters, and other amenities common to major 
cities worldwide.  Farmers in Kavrupad and Matepalle are almost exclusively GM cotton and 
rice farmers while Edaggrineelu farmers farm primarily organic cotton and rice.  Close to the 
mandal headquarters of Parvatagiri, Kavrupad benefits from a well-regarded NGO run school 
and junior college (equivalent to US 10-12
th
 grade).  Due to the influence of a wealthy family 
from the village now based in Hyderabad, Kavrupad has benefitted not only from a series of 
construction project improvements but also from foreign interest and investment spurred on by 
the school.  In 1996, this family, former major landowners, transformed some of their land and 
their former home into a large primary school complex.  I myself taught at Kavrupad’s school 
twice a week while conducting interviews and have donated to their programs.  Similar to most 
Telangana caste villages, SC, BC, and OC people tend to cluster near others of similar caste, and 
each caste area has kiosk shops and minor temples.  Kavrupad has one seed and agricultural 
input shop, although most farmers view it and the owner with some suspicion and prefer to buy 
seeds from Warangal when given the chance.  Kavrupad farmers grow cotton on mostly red 
clayey soil and reflect a diverse caste and socioeconomic spectrum.  Kavrupad provides a 
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particularly interesting comparison to nearby Ralledapalle, discussed below, because of the 
similarity in agricultural conditions and the dissimilarity in ethnicity and infrastructure. 
Matepalle village in the Medak district also benefits from the same NGO and foreign 
investments as Kavrupad and in 1998 began accepting students into its own school, which was 
building a new and much larger space in 2013.  Housing and electricity are comparable to 
Kavrupad, although many young Matepalle men seek work in the Middle East, especially as part 
of Kuwait- and Qatar-based construction teams.  Unlike Kavrupad, which sees several buses 
each day to nearby cities, only one bus in the morning and evening connects Matepalle to urban 
resources.  Matepalle has no input shops around which farmers congregate as in Kavrupad, but it 
does have a popular tea shop/bar where farmers will gather to read the newspaper and discuss 
farming problems.  It is thus especially rural when compared to Kavrupad.  Matepalle farmers 
similarly grow cotton on mostly red clayey soil and reflect a diverse caste and socioeconomic 
spectrum, although they are relatively more rural than Kavrupad famers. 
Edaggrineelu, an organic-growing village, is technically closer to the nearest city, but is 
several kilometers away from any bus routes.  Residents (and visiting anthropologists) rely on 
autorickshaws or passing trucks and tractors for transportation, in addition to walking or riding in 
bullock carts.  Edaggrineelu is much smaller than either Matepalle or Kavrupad villages, each of 
which are home to hundreds of households.  Edaggrineelu has only a few dozen households, all 
but one of which are involved with organic agriculture.  Edaggrineelu’s farmers are thus more 
closely related and socially intertwined.  Caste differences are also less pronounced in this 
village, where almost everyone is either SC or BC and so former OC landowners exert less social 
influence within the village.  Unlike Kavrupad or Matepalle, Edaggrineelu’s small size precludes 
functioning schools and shops.  Edaggrineelu’s relative lack of infrastructure, low caste status, 
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and isolation made this village all the more appealing to PANTA, the NGO that initially 
promoted first integrated pest management (IPM) and later uncertified organic agriculture.  By 
establishing Edaggrineelu and other such organic communities as underdeveloped in their 
promotional materials, NGOs promoting organic or Fairtrade agriculture establish two important 
marketing goals.  First, they pull on the heartstrings of urban or international consumers by using 
images of poverty when selling clothing at higher rates.  Second, they position their own work as 
a necessary and effective form of development in need of support by conscientious consumers.  
While establishing the underdevelopment of such villages is an important companion to certified 
organic programs seeking to attract attention in the marketplace, these efforts are even more 
important for an uncertified village like Edaggrineelu, where trust in the development efforts of 
the NGO are the main justification for adding value to Edaggrineelu’s agricultural products. 
The village of Srigonda is just as far from the nearest city as Kavrupad, but benefits from 
a large OC population of ethnic Kamma caste people who migrated to this region from 
comparatively better developed and richer coastal Andhra.  Srigonda benefits from an 
agricultural cooperative that works to obtain high-quality chemical inputs and seeds at a slightly 
reduced price, saving farmer members anxiety and travel costs.  This cooperative was established 
in cooperation with the Warangal plant science station, which added agricultural scientists to the 
mix of high-caste farmers and reliable technology.  Although agricultural conditions are roughly 
similar in Kavrupad and Srigonda, although farmers from both villages report that Srigonda has 
greater access to fertile black soil that supports high cotton production, Srigonda farmers are 
locally famous for being skilled cultivators.  The cooperative, which provides loans and 
equipment in addition to input reliability, helps to address farmer concerns and provides a 
congenial meeting ground for Srigonda farmers, many of whom are related to the shop manager. 
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Gongapalle and Orukonda are both much closer to Waranagal and benefit from more 
highly developed town infrastructure and more regular bus transportation.  Both villages are 
within 20 minutes of urban resources and agricultural extension services.  Due to their proximity 
to the city, these villages are more reliably electrified, offer more robust local markets, can more 
easily do business with urban sellers and buyers, and are larger and more densely populated than 
Kavrupad, Edaggrineelu, Srigonda, or Matepalle.  Real estate values and job opportunities are 
both comparatively higher in these villages as well, affording Gongapalle and Orukonda more 
opportunities for wealth and construction.  Like Srigonda, these villages benefit from black soils 
suited to cotton cultivation. 
By contrast, ST communities living in my research area live in hamlets (thandas) 
adjacent to villages with poorer infrastructure and poorer access to shops and transportation 
routes.  Roads tend not to be paved, buses have no stops in the thandas, electricity is less 
reliable, businesses do not set up shops, and houses are a mix of concrete, brick, mud-brick, tin, 
wood, and thatch.  Thandas throughout Telangana were established on more marginal hilly or 
red clay soil and so ST villagers typically travel to towns for most services and for transportation 
to nearby cities.  There, ethnic ST people who speak the state language of Telugu as a second 
language, may face derision from shop owners or higher-caste residents who see them as 
unwelcome, lower class others.  During my observations in agricultural input shops, sales 
representatives were often dismissive or openly hostile to ST buyers, who largely sought to 
finish their transactions as quickly as possible and leave the shop.   After they left, shop owners 
would often turn to me and make disparaging remarks about ST farmers, calling them ignorant 
and backward.  Ralledapalle’s cluster of thandas, Munjala Kunta thanda outside of Kavrupad, 
and Champla thanda outside of Srigonda are almost exclusively populated by ethnic Lambadi or 
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Banjara people.  Categorized as a criminal tribe under British leadership, speaking a different 
language, and with a different set of religious and social traditions, Lambadi people settled 
outside main Telangana villages after migrating from the state of Rajasthan in the early 20
th
 
century (Naik 1983; Naik 2000).  Like other marginalized communities, ST people are given 
special consideration for government and university positions.  Because many ST people live on 
more marginal farmland in hill areas or near forest areas, many also benefit from special 
allowances to use those forest resources and work land that would be illegal for non-Tribal 
farmers to use. 
Socioeconomic differences exist within the thandas, but Lambadi farmers do not 
distinguish by caste in the same formal way as found in the villages.  Because they lack this 
particular form of social differentiation and because members of a particular thanda often share 
kinship through the few settling families who founded each particular hamlet, thandas tend to be 
more socially egalitarian.  While relatively poorer and without deep social roots in Telangana, 
Lambadi farmers have historically remained within thandas and farm the areas immediately 
around their hamlets rather than joining villages.  As village temples have particular caste rules 
attached to how one worships, important rituals in thandas took place in thanda shrines and in 
Tribal languages rather than in the religious context of Sanskrit spoken by trained Brahmins.  
Villagers from Kavrupad, for example, almost never participated in Lambadi rituals or festivals 
while Lambadi people almost never participated in the religious rituals or festivals practiced by 
the inhabitants of Kavrupad.   
 Stone initially selected Ralledapalle as a comparison village to Kavrupad, as the villages 
have virtually identical soil conditions and lie just two kilometers apart.  However, Ralledapalle 
and the surrounding thandas offer dramatically different socioeconomic possibilities.  
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Ralledapalle has a smattering of brick and concrete houses where some BC and SC farmers live, 
but most of Ralledapalle’s population comes from Matya and Sitya thandas, named for the 
patriarchs who settled them.  Schoolchildren walk or ride buses and autorickshaws to Kavrupad 
and Parvatagiri for school, as the schools in the thandas are poorly attended by either teachers or 
students.  The same is true for Munjala Kunta thanda, which has no paved roads and only a few 
concrete homes amidst thatched roof mud-brick houses.  Several years before this study Munjala 
Kunta thanda residents convinced the local government to build passable bridges and stretches 
of road, but these have since fallen into disrepair.  In Ralledapalle, Munjala Kunta, and Champla 
thandas, buses, cars, and autorickshaws avoid these routes in part because they would not be 
capable of travelling on them.   
 While Lambadi farmers as a whole often face difficulties in villages and cities because of 
ethnic and linguistic differences that cause shop owners to treat them callously, the Champla 
thanda farmers near Srigonda avoid this by taking part in the Srigonda cooperative.  Ethnic 
Kamma caste immigrants, the OC farmers of Srigonda are less invested in local Reddy and 
Velama caste politics that would make social life difficult for Lambadi people, although they are 
often casually discriminatory toward Lambadi farmers.  As members in the cooperative, 
Lambadi farmers have an economic stake in supporting this business and can feel more assured 
that they are treated with respect in the shop.  This is not to say that casteism does not play into 
quotidian life in Srigonda or into interactions at the Srigonda Cooperative – it certainly does.  
However, Lambadi farmer members are more socially integrated with their fellow cooperative 
farmers than they otherwise would be living on the village margins.  The differences in 
opportunities for travel, school, and infrastructure are extreme across these ethnic boundaries 
even when the actual distances are quite close. 
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 Just as Edaggrineelu’s isolation and low caste status made it an attractive village for 
organic NGOs to promote their development efforts to ethical consumers, so too do the isolation 
and ST status of Japur and Addabad make them attractive to certified organic programs.  Farther 
north in the Adilabad district, these farmers belong to the Gondi tribe.  Gondi people have much 
deeper roots in Telangana than Lambadi migrants (Mehta 1984), but like Lambadis their 
language and customs are different and their thandas tend to be well removed from villages and 
their infrastructure.  I worked with two thandas, Madhyaguda (~10 households all practicing 
organic agriculture) and Mopalle (~40 households half of which practice organic agriculture) 
peripheral to the town of Addabad.  Addabad is a small city with a lively market and bus station, 
but the thandas themselves have only intermittent access to buses and autorickshaw.  It can take 
over an hour during the rainy season to reach the thandas from Addabad, and local buses often 
refuse to make the trip citing a lack of interest.  
 Sompalle (~10 households all practicing organic agriculture), Sampalle (~10 households 
all practicing organic agriculture on some of their land), and Ranaguda (~20 households 
practicing organic agriculture in 2013 but not 2014) compose the Japur thanda and are similarly 
difficult to reach by bus or autorickshaw.  In both villages in the Adilabad district, farmers work 
hilly, rocky soil that pools water and erodes quickly.  Their proximity to forest areas provides an 
additional risk of pig and parrot predation, which farmers manage by sending family members, 
often but not exclusively young men, to sleep in bamboo stilted houses (manda) from which they 
sling stones at attacking pests.  These Adilabad district organic farmers additionally lacked 
irrigation facilities and so relied entirely on rain for crop watering, with the exception of a few 
farmers who rigged motors to nearby seasonal streams.  Farmer cotton yields in this area are 
predictably lower as a result, regardless of their organic imperatives to grow without chemical 
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inputs or GM seeds.  Farmers tended to grow heirloom sorghum rather than wet rice, although a 
few farmers cultivated a dry, non-irrigated rice variety.  Due to their close relationship with 
organic NGOs as well as their geographic and social distance to input shops, most Addabad 
district organic farmers procured seeds through organic programs or their own stores.  Tribal 
organic farmers in the Japur and Addabad thus had a very different relationship to infrastructure 
and agriculture than other Tribal farmers or caste farmers in the Warangal and Medak districts.  
Having briefly introduced the sites in which I collected farmer seed data, I will discuss the 
methodology I used to collect data on farmer decision-making. 
 
Methodology 
My research investigates the ways in which farmers develop and adapt agroecological 
knowledge within their global, local, political, social, and economic context.  To understand how 
farmers made seed choice decisions and to place these decisions within village and global power 
structures, I employed a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods that allowed me to track 
different types of learning.  Qualitative data methods include interviews, focus groups, and 
participant observation.  Quantitative methods included ethnobotanical counts, geographic 
information system (GIS) data collection, household surveys of demographic variables, and seed 
surveys.  Surveys for all data collection are appended (Appendix A-D).  Data from these survey 
and spatial instruments provided information that could be statistically analyzed and give 
measurable weight to environmental feedback and social influence. 
Such quantitative data in anthropology is necessarily messy because I relied on farmers to 
give accurate details for their fields and lives in areas where the farmers themselves do not keep 
accurate records.  The surveys that I administered required that farmers develop justifications for 
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their seed choices although they often have very poorly reasoned rationales for their seed choices 
because such information can be difficult to gather and even more difficult to trust.  When asked 
to dredge up reasons for their seed decisions, many farmers respond that they are navigating the 
new rules of input-intensive agriculture by learning to take advantage of new incentives and 
social avenues to success, however they define success at the moment.  Success was largely 
articulated as a good yield (Telugu:  manci digabatu), a way to measure a return on one’s 
investment and a visible indicator of one’s farming prowess.  Others are, most likely, ‘just’ 
making do – earning and working without the imperative to carefully document and analyze and 
improve every aspect of farm management as if these small farms were factories attempting to 
increase profit margins or prepare quarterly reports.  Many farmers appear to be driven by a 
more anxious desire for success in an agricultural economy where the means to and meanings of 
success are not always clear.  Wanting more can be very far from knowing how to get it and 
taking a series of clearly defined to steps to achieve it. 
  Although I only rarely conducted true participant-observation in the sense that I rarely 
picked cotton or plowed soil with bullocks, I relied heavily on the ethnography of these places to 
contextualize the data I conducted.  In addition to the conversations that inevitably arise when 
getting to know people, I typically spent at least an hour with each farmer discussing aspects of 
life beyond the survey questions.  Armed with this qualitative information I critically examined 
the quantitative seed choices that farmers mentioned during the survey, and vice versa.  The gaps 
between farmers’ professed logic and the three years of seed choices that I collected inform my 
ultimate conclusions on the social politics of cotton and rice choices, how these differ, and how 
organic farmers make decisions against the backdrop of conventional agriculture.  Living in 
these villages, teaching school children, photographing weddings, planting seeds alongside 
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farmers, and harvesting the crops gave me insights into daily life and the ways in which farmers 
approach their work that I would not have been able to document otherwise.   
 Although each survey was likely to turn into an extended structured interview depending 
on the farmers’ time and patience in that particular moment, I also conducted and transcribed 
more formal interviews with shop owners, NGO officials, plant scientists, key informants on 
conventional and organic farms, and with five focus groups of five or more farmers (Table 2.2).  
I relied on these experts to provide an insider or entrepreneurial perspective on farmer seed 
choices and the influence of institutions like plant science centers or shops.   
 
Table 2.2: Interview Structure  
 
 2012  n 2013 n 2014 n Interview type 
Plant scientist 3 5 7 Semistructured 
NGO representative 2 10 6 Semistructured 
Foreign cotton buyer X 5 1 Unstructured 
Shop owner 7 15  Semitructured 
Farmer focus group 2 X 5 Semistructured 
Conventional farmer 
key informant 
8 10 8 Informal 
Organic farmer key 
informant 
X 5 4 Informal 
 
 These qualitative observations and discussions informed the quantitative meat of my 
analysis, which I conducted in the form of various surveys.  The primary survey was a relatively 
simple one-page survey asking:  what cotton and rice seeds farmers planted in the given year, 
where they procured these seeds, how many years they had planted these seeds, and all of these 
details for the previous year along with yield, pest, and pesticide spray information.  This survey 
design allowed me to follow up with farmers to check seed recall in subsequent years, compare 
yield data over time, and track rice and cotton seed choices.  When analyzing this data, I 
separated seed choices into those recalled from the previous year, suitable for discussing farmer 
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responses to yield and pesticide applications; and those chosen in the current year, assumed to be 
more accurate and better suited to discussing decision making and seed faddism.  Each year the 
survey questions changed slightly in the interest of better wording or more complete 
demographic or seed information, although the core questions of seed choice, yield, seed 
vendors, and years planted remained the same.   
 In 2014 I additionally asked farmers to answer questions about phenotypic characteristics 
of their rice and cotton seed choices so that I could measure their degree of consensus for these 
seed qualities.  During my shop surveys, I asked similar questions to determine if shop managers 
believed that any particular seed had an inherent edge over others as well as questions that asked 
for shop owners’ opinions on seed fads, marketing strategies, and farmer motivations.  Finally, 
during the 2013-14 season I asked 65 Kavrupad and Ralledapalle farmers, half of the larger 
sample and representative of all castes, landholding quintiles, and representing the range of 
variation in cotton and rice yield productivity in the total sample, about demographic variables 
including income, debt, assets, education, and labor relationships.  I draw on these numbers in 
coordination with ethnographic research when talking about such household demographic 
information for caste or tribal farmers generally. 
 I asked organic farmers and farmers in Kavrupad and Ralledapalle to freelist non-crop 
plants that they used, managed, or cultivated in their cotton and rice fields.  This, in coordination 
with participant-observation and key informant interviews allowed me to generate an 
agrobiodiversity checklist.  Because Telangana cotton farmers often find gaps (Telugu: 
poguntalu) in their field after they plant cotton, those farmers regularly fill those gaps in their 
agricultural land with home vegetables, flowers, and medicinal plants.  They also manage trees 
or wild plants on their field edges for firewood, shade, fruit, medicines, and other purposes.  By 
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asking farmers about these non-crop plants, I was able to better see how commodification of 
knowledge and different kinds of seed markets were affecting farmer choices. 
   All organic farmers received the full seed, household demographic, and agrobiodiversity 
surveys, and I took GPS points for as many organic farmer fields and homes as possible given 
timing constraints.  Because so much of Telangana organic cotton farming on the two kinds of 
organic farms where I worked is centered around marketing the farmers as much as the cotton 
product, I accompanied several foreign or non-Telangana business people and NGO officers on 
tours of organic farms to see how farmers presented themselves to various audiences (myself 
included).  Having introduced my methods, I will now introduce the key social and agricultural 
institutions that impacted the daily life of the farmers in these areas. 
  
Institutions 
 As important as the particular geographic and ethnic qualities of my research sites were 
the institutions that helped villagers make a living.  The Rural Development Foundation (RDF), 
active in Matepalle, Kavrupad, and Ralledapalle, runs schools and professional training 
programs, to which I have contributed both time and money.  RDF eased my access to farmers in 
many villages both because I could affiliate myself with this well-liked institution and because I 
could hire English-speaking graduates of the program.  RDF’s education programs have allowed 
more young people to move to and work in cities like Hyderabad.  Many such farm children then 
send remittances home to their families, who stay in the villages.  Through RDF and their more 
cosmopolitan children, farmers in these villages also gain exposure to agricultural science and 
agricultural economics.  As these young people learn more about agricultural efficiency and 
scientific approaches to farming, they encourage their parents to have more faith in agricultural 
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experts.  As educated children leave the farms, lean on their parents to modernize, or take over 
family farms, their experience in RDF’s education and empowerment initiatives teaches them to 
farm differently and to interact with agricultural authorities differently. 
 In Warangal, the nearest and most important urban center for Kavrupad, Ralledapalle, 
Srigonda, Orukonda, and Gongapalle farmers, the Archarya N G Ranga Agricultural University 
(ANGRAU) plant science station educates young scientists in plant breeding, conducts research 
in new plant strains, and occasionally releases new hybrids and open pollinated varieties (OPVs) 
of rice, pulses, and cotton.  In addition to their scientific research, the station sends extension 
scientists to nearby villages, especially Orukonda, Guddpead, and Srigonda, promotes various 
agricultural technologies including Bt cotton, Non pesticide methods (NPM), Integrated pest 
management (IPM), and optimal growing strategies including fertilizing and plant density.  
Similarly, researchers at the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) study planting 
strategies, hold agricultural interventions, breed new varieties of crops, and aid in GM 
development in their missions to breed new and more productive strains of rice and subsistence 
crops respectively.   
 ANGRAU, ICAR, and ICRISAT all work with farmers directly to test new interventions 
and management strategies.  Through this collaboration, farmers are instructed in new techniques 
and their production risk is often underwritten to encourage participation in the program.  
Participating farmers gain a combination of new skills, new tools, strengthened relationships 
with scientists who might control access to current or future resources, and social recognition as 
leading, modern farmers.  In addition to these sources, universities also conduct intervention 
programs.  One such program, the E-Digu advice program run through the International Institute 
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of Information Technology, Hyderabad, provides expert electronic advice to participating 
farmers.  While initially popular due to its usefulness, free (grant-funded) services, and seeming 
conquest of the social gaps between farmers and plant scientists (Stone 2011b),  this program has 
since restructured and diminished in scope. 
 My work in organic villages was facilitated primarily through an NGO that sponsors non-
certified organic farmers (PANTA), which works with Edaggrineelu farmers, the Prakruti 
Organic and Fair Trade Cotton Intervention program, which works with farmers in the Adilabad 
district, and an NGO (MATCH) that works with organic, NPM, and desi
5
 (Gossypium arboreum 
L.) cotton growers.  PANTA, working with a Secunderabad-based umbrella organization for 
sustainable agriculture (SUS), has been instrumental in publicizing Edaggrineelu farmers’ efforts 
since the late 1990s, connecting them to government or international funds, sells their produce in 
a Secunderabad shop, and has given farmers direct investments in loans and farming equipment.   
 Prakruti, also based in Secundarabad, works with farmers in Telangana, Orissa, and 
Maharastra.  Prakruti works as a two-tier program.  As a development NGO and cooperative, 
Prakruti secures international funding, applies for grants, partners with national and interantional 
development initiatives, and promotes education and local entrepreneurship in addition to 
farming workshops.  As a corporation and cooperative, Prakruti organizes farmers into village, 
district, and state buying and selling groups that partner with other cooperatives and companies 
to buy and sell certified organic cotton.  The corporate arm of Prakruti’s work asks that farmers 
turn profits and sell to organic buyers.  The NGO arm of Prakruti’s work ensures that grants and 
government loan programs can help to soften profit imperatives while providing avenues for 
                                               
5 Desi refers to products that are locally understood to be traditional or otherwise distinctly Indian.  In this instance, 
desi cotton signifies varieties of cotton grown before the introduction of hybrids or GM hybrids.  More specifically, 
desi cotton is a different botanical species than the fertilizer-intensive hybrids and is native to India.  For more on 
the differences between varieties of cotton, see chapter 3.   
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more general development.  The corporate and development motivations of Prakruti are often 
synergistic, as organic cotton buyers tend to publicize the ways in which their products 
contribute to socioeconomic growth, education, modernization, and village livliehoods (broadly 
defined).  Because Prakruti farmers sell certified organic cotton, they must submit to periodic 
field inspections for organic compliance and they procure seeds almost exclusively through 
Prakruti and its partner groups.   
 I worked briefly with Maharastra-based MATCH, an NGO committed to farmer 
development and empowerment generally.  Farmers involved with the programs that I was 
investigated planted desi cotton under a variety of IPM strategies designed to reduce external 
chemical inputs.  As an NGO, MATCH helped farmers find buyers and encouraged farmers to 
plant certain crops (like lower yielding desi cotton), but was not involved directly in sales like 
PANTA or Prakruti.  Rather, MATCH focuses on recruiting and training farmers to participate in 
development programs as well as alternative agriculture programs.  Their funding structure is 
based in the NGO model of winning grants and connecting farmers to government funds.   
This chapter has introduced my methodology and research site.  Because of the sampling 
design, these farmers represent a typical range of variation in GM cotton and rice farmers while 
the organic villages provide an insight into certified and non-certified organic agriculture.  There 
was a conscious effort in triangulation in this methodological design:  use quantitative data from 
these different surveys or GIS, with statistical power to describe typical farmer decision-making 
through the sampling strategy as a way of bolstering qualitative data gained through participant 
observation, focus groups, and interviews.  As a scientifically-minded anthropologist, I believe 
that this approach allows me to tell a more holistic and better supported story of how people 
learn on these farms.  The following chapter discusses the history of cotton and development in 
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India generally, paying special attention to the contexts in which GM and organic technologies 
were developed and then translated to the Indian context. 
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Chapter 3:  The Translation of Regulation and Technology from an American to Indian 
Context. 
 
This chapter discusses the history of cotton and development in India generally, paying 
special attention to the contexts in which GM and organic cotton technologies were developed 
and then translated to the Indian context.  I begin with cotton cultivation in the mid-1800s to 
illustrate the deep history of globalized cotton production and the longstanding agricultural links 
between the United States and India, especially referencing the industrial and postcolonial 
political economy that established a flow of resources and expertise between these nations 
(Johnson 2013; Guha 2007; Guha 2008; Perkins 1997).  I then compare the spread of organic and 
GM technologies out of the United States and Europe to show how both are being forwarded as 
potential sustainable futures in India because of their universal applicability rather than their 
potential for local variation.  This chapter draws on development theory, particularly Escobar 
(2011), Tsing (2005), and Gupta (1998), and uses Jasanoff’s (2005) theory of civic 
epistemologies to contextualize the Indian regulatory environment.  This sets the stage for later 
discussions of local variations as the seemingly un-changed regulations and technology are 
encountered by Indian farmers.  It also illustrates the botanical, economic, regulatory, and 
political links that have connected cotton production in the United States and India since the 
nineteenth century. 
Indian agricultural development since 1947 has aimed to cast off former colonial 
associations with poverty and famine and present India as a global power on par with advanced 
industrial capitalist nations, especially Britain and the United States, with whom it had close ties 
through food aid and colonialism (Bagla and Stone 2012; Gupta 1998; Perkins 1997).  Noticing a 
consistent national inferiority complex in the first twenty years after independence, Gupta (1998) 
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calls this sense of underdevelopment and backwardness the condition of postcoloniality.  Being a 
nation of small farmers, India has largely pursued this agenda through an agricultural 
development that aims to both promote mechanized commodity crop farming and move people 
from agricultural to industrial sectors.  First addressing the problematic linearity of neoliberal 
development, Gupta contends that development is “Orientalism transformed into a science for 
action in the contemporary world” (Gupta 1998:37), notably in that it is a progress narrative 
based in Said’s reading of a Hegelian Other/Self dialectic.  This gives birth to the endemic sense 
of underdevelopment that Gupta describes: people must be underdeveloped to be developed, 
turned into subjects requiring control, dependence, and outside expertise (Kothari 2005; Escobar 
2011; Agrawal 2005).  Under this definition, agrarian development occurs when farmers can be 
made to see that their actions are destructive and counterproductive to the goals of the state.  
Describing the Western development imaginary, Pandian (2011) likens this process to one of 
maturation, in which Indians cease to be immature children on the world stage and join their 
former colonial parents. 
However, it would be inaccurate to claim that all Indian development has been directed 
from outside groups pushing capital intensive agriculture on an unwilling populace to wrench 
them from an agricultural good life into violence and industry.  Like Appadurai’s (1996) and 
Tsing’s (2005) critiques of a monolithic capitalism, Gupta reminds us that “modernity may have 
been instituted as a global phenomenon through colonial capitalism, but it was, in the process, 
resisted, reinvented, and reconfigured in different social and historical locations” (Gupta 1998:9).      
Denying this anthropological perspective (Shiva 1993), in which global processes are locally 
reconfigured, ignores the agrarian populist movements that vigorously adopted Green Revolution 
technology (Robbins 2004) and welcomed a hybrid version of outside influence in an attempt to 
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promote local interests.  Farmer field schools recruit and rely on local farming leaders to promote 
alternative agricultural technology packages as well (Braun and Duveskog 2008; Godtland et al. 
2004; Van den Berg and Jiggins 2007).  With new technology comes new knowledge, and the 
authority to claim expertise in that knowledge characterizes the relationships between farmers 
and developers. 
 
The Social History of Cotton in India  
Cotton cultivation is at least 5500 years old in the New World and at least 4300 years old 
in the Old World (Brubaker, Bourland, and Wendel 1999; Dillehay et al. 2007).  The 
longstanding human interest in Gossypium species stems from their unusual epidermal seed 
hairs, a trait shared by all members of the Gossypieae botanical tribe (Wendel, Brubaker, and 
Seelanan 2010).  Unlike other useful fiber plants such as flax or hemp, which require a time-
consuming and relatively labor intensive rotting process called retting to extract economic fiber, 
cotton fiber can be harvested and processed directly from the plant.  While many species of the 
Gossypieae tribe are referred to as “cotton”, that agricultural moniker is technically vague as four 
distinct species have evolved, been domesticated, and undergone parallel evolution at different 
times and places to become agricultural cotton.  Ancient cultivators, likely in the Indian 
subcontinent and East Africa or the Levant, domesticated G. arboreum L. and G. herbaceum L. 
(Zohary, Hopf, and Weiss 2012).  Use of cotton fibers in the Indus valley 8000-6500 years 
before present (bp) predates domestication, and wild and semi-cultivated cottons were used 
throughout Asia, the Levant, and North Africa.  Although it is unclear if G. arboreum L. or G. 
herbaceum L. was domesticated first, the earliest evidence for domestication appears 
approximately 4300 years bp in the Indus valley region before spreading to the Levant and the 
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circum-Mediterranean region first as a traded fiber commodity and later as a domesticated plant 
(Brubaker, Bourland, and Wendel 1999; Zohary, Hopf, and Weiss 2012).  Both of these Old 
World cottons are diploid, meaning that they contain two full sets of chromosomes.  This 
differentiates them from New World tetraploid cottons, which contain four sets of chromosomes. 
Cotton across the world can be divided into nine genome types.   Five to ten million years 
ago, species of the A genome type developed ribbon-like fibers that would allow early 
cultivators to spin the threads into yarn.  In the New World, the spinnable A genome type 
crossed with D genome species to create five tetraploid spinnable species.  The range of wild, 
domesticated, and feral Gossypium species indicate that New World cottons diversified and were 
domesticated in tropical regions.  G. barbadense L. was domesticated in South America West of 
the Andes while G. hirsutum L. was domesticated independently in Mesoamerica (Piperno 
1998).  Subsequent work has shown that G. barbadense L. was likely domesticated in 
southwestern Ecuador and northwestern Peru, providing a technological basis for a fishing 
culture 4500-3500 years bp.  Because these areas are not domestication centers, cotton's 
archaeobotanical use suggests that domestication must have been elsewhere before 5500 years bp 
(Dillehay et al. 2007).  Early cotton use was associated with gourds (Cucurbita pepo L.) among 
fishing populations, where cotton fibers were spun into nets while bottle gourds were used as net 
floats (Piperno 1998).   
After millennia of separation, New and Old World cottons were reunited in the 18
th
 
century when tetraploid cotton became valuable to the British Empire and its textile industry.  To 
clothe the empire, British entrepreneurs established North American cotton production in the 
American Southeast that would feed mills in Manchester.  North American cotton growers 
benefited from hardier Mesoamerican AD tetraploid cottons, as well as from the legally enslaved 
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workers that did the actual cotton field management, and outcompeted British production in 
Australian, Indian, and African cotton-growing regions.  Frustrated with American dominance in 
the cotton market and the political instability of the 19
th
 century United States, British landlords 
attempted to grow the American variety, G. barbadense L. (Guha 2007) in India throughout the 
1800s.  Small-scale experimentation eventually produced an Indian variety of the new world AD 
tetraploid G. hirsutum L. and opening the door for this species to be grown in 90% of 
commercial cotton fields (Brubaker, Bourland, and Wendel 1999).   
Gandhi would later make cotton a cornerstone of the independence movement by rallying 
weavers using homelooms, asking them to refuse to sell to British buyers and instead focus on 
becoming self-sufficient villages (Guha 2007).  Such socialist-inspired, self-sufficient village 
republics ultimately found themselves at odds with the capitalist-tilted modernist industrial 
vision promised by India’s five year plans.  This tension resolved itself as Indian agricultural 
policy in the late 1960s and 1970s shifted decisively toward capital-intensive agriculture under 
the auspices of the Green Revolution (Perkins 1997).  Hybrid cotton breeding efforts began at 
public research stations in the 1930s to coax heterosis, a desirable response to fertilizer and water 
inputs in second generation plants.  The resulting G. hirsutum L. and G. barbadense L. blend 
provided longer staple fiber and greater quantities of cotton bolls.  Commercially viable hybrids, 
a combination of a Gujarat and US cultivar, were released in 1970 from a joint international-
national public research effort of the Cotton Research Station Surat in Gujarat State of India, the 
All India Coordinated Cotton Improvement Project, and the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research.  By 1995, 36% of cotton area in India was under hybrids, bred to respond to a regimen 
of chemical fertilizers and water provided by irrigation facilities.  These hybrids were developed 
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using facilities at public institutions and provided free of charge to private seed companies for 
commercialization. 
By 1995, about 55% of hybrid seeds were provided by private sector distributors, and 
private breeders were monitored by the public breeding institutions.  Hybrid seed production 
nearly tripled in the time that hybrids were adopted from 1970-1993, a success that FAO-
affiliated Asia-Pacific Association of Agricultural Research Institutions (APAARI) attributes to 
an organized public research sector, efficient distributors in public and private sectors, market 
intervention to secure cheap labor, minimum prices on seeds, fertilizer and pesticide subsidies, 
and incentives for the textile industry to use the new supply and fuel new demand in the global 
fashion industry (Basu and Paroda 1995).  The hybrids, bred to have a high yield of long staple 
cotton when thoroughly nourished with chemical fertilizers and irrigation, encouraged cotton 
growers to steadily increase production 1970-1995, albeit at a higher investment in fertilizers and 
pesticides.  By 1998, Indian cotton farmers were applying between 30,000-35,000 metric tons of 
pesticide (Kranthi 2012), representing as much as 45% of the total pesticide applications in India.  
This, despite the fact that cotton was cultivated on only 5% of the land (Shetty 2004).  
 
The Development and Regulation of American Cotton Technology in a Transnational 
Context 
India has gained a reputation for famine, poverty, and underdevelopment on the frontier 
of empire and capitalism.  This is ironic, as India has been a testfield for agricultural 
development including the colonial exportation of raw products across the Indian Ocean 
(Chaudhuri 1985), the Green Revolution shift to growing input intensive crops (Ross 1998; 
Perkins 1997), and now the spread of GM crops and organic agriculture.  This need for 
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development has ideological roots that reach into the 18
th
 century.  Thomas Malthus blamed 
underdevelopment on India’s population and frugal nature, claiming that India “must necessarily 
be subject to famines. Where a country is so populous in proportion to the means of subsistence 
that the average produce of it is but barely sufficient to support the lives of the inhabitants, any 
deficiency from the badness of seasons must be fatal. It is probable that the very frugal manner in 
which the Gentoos [sic] are in the habit of living contributes in some degree to the famines of 
Indostan” (Malthus [1798] 1976:53).  Thus were bad seasons, rather than exploitative colonial 
policies to blame for hunger.  By 1960 this perception persisted, in the writing of neo-Malthusian 
Paul Ehrlich and his description of the overpopulation he experienced one stinking hot night in 
Delhi (Ehrlich 1971). 
Cotton agriculture in India has passed through three crucial phases since its 
commercialization by the East India Company and their attempts to coopt cotton technology to 
clothe the British Empire (Beckert 2014).  The colonial, hybrid, and current genetically modified 
stages of cotton agriculture have been characterized by a push toward profit, export-based 
production, foreign technology, and the consolidation of knowledge within off-farm experts.  
With the loss of the American colonies, the British turned to cotton sources in Africa and India to 
stoke the fires of the textile industry back in the metropole.  Irritated by competition from the 
genetically more versatile New World varieties, the East India Company hired American planters 
to teach Indian peasants to farm with new varieties for mass production in 1840, although this 
production would not gather global market shares until a cotton drought during the American 
civil war showed that cotton could be grown without slave labor (Beckert 2014).  British-Indian 
cotton strains yielded 25% more, but only with 200% higher cost in production capital.  As such 
their use was a tough sell to Indian laborers.  To make matters worse, American and British 
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growers tried to replicate the plantation system with Indian smallholders who lacked the coercive 
labor of slavery, reliable roads, or storage necessary to maintain the kind of cotton monocultures 
seen in the United States.  However, with the onset of the American civil war, Northern naval 
blockades interrupted British access to the high-quality fiber.  Panicked British farm 
administrators flooded the Indian market with new seeds, allowing farmers to plant new varieties 
where the climate suited them.  Faced with a confusing array of germplasm, farmers likely mixed 
local varieties with foreign cultivars to hedge their bets on the new seeds (Guha 2007).  By the 
late 19
th
 century, Indian farmers had developed a successful cultivar of Gossypium hirsutum L., a 
variant of the cotton that now accounts for 90% of our clothing (Brubaker, Bourland, and 
Wendel 1999).  That local strain “flourished” under the name Dharwar-American (Guha 
2007:315).  That is, viable cotton production had to be discovered through farmer 
experimentation at the edge of British-American cotton capitalism rather than 19
th
 century 
development schemes.  Only after farmers surreptitiously bred their own varieties within their 
extant agroecological system did they come to dominate the global textile industry in the late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 century.  Indeed, this dominance made Gandhi’s Quit India and handloom 
campaigns so economically and politically successful.   
Following independence in 1947, India’s long, politically embarrassing, and public 
struggle with population and famine linked failures in production to failures of national 
autonomy and agricultural modernity (Bagla and Stone 2012; Perkins 1997).  1950s Indian 
geopolitics were largely based around pitting Soviet and American development interests against 
each other (Cullather 2013; Perkins 1997).  That is, Soviet and American governments saw 
large-scale development projects as a competitive field in India, and the Indian government 
largely encouraged this nonaligned strategy as a means to secure food aid or large infrastructure 
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projects.  Seeing an opportunity to woo India away from Soviet influence, the United States sent 
Green Revolution crop scientists, strains of wheat appropriated from post-war Japanese farmers, 
machinery, agrochemicals, and subsidized the grain imports that facilitated a massive shift in 
production (Kloppenburg 2004; Perkins 1997).  The collaboration and goodwill inspired by the 
Green Revolution helped to strengthen ties between the two nations at a time when American 
geopolitics necessitated friendly relationships through South and Central Asia (Cullather 2013; 
Guha 2008; Ross 1998).  Indian wheat and rice yields climbed, but only after farmers 
incorporated chemical inputs into their extant views of healthy field ecology and came to terms 
with a farm budget that saw fertilizer as a commodity distinct from animal production.  As with 
the spread of 19
th
 century cotton cultivars, the implementation of this American technology 
required local reworking.  Farmers came to see the resultant crops as ‘weak’ (Gupta 1998; 
Vasavi 1999), in need of pesticide and fertilizer protection.  Wealthier farmers disproportionately 
benefitted from purchasable inputs and new forms of irrigation (Shiva 1993), an inequality that 
the Indian state was willing to accept if it ended grain imports and famine scares (Perkins 1997; 
Ross 1998).  With respect to cotton, the changing logics of Indian agriculture enabled Indian 
scientists at public institutions to breed cotton hybrids that responded well to the system of 
pesticides, fertilizers, and irrigation that farmers adopted throughout the country in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
19
th
 century agribusiness drew farmers deeper into commodity production through new 
seeds and production goals, but farmers themselves created the varieties that made this 
agriculture possible.  By the mid-20
th
 century, wealthy farmers integrated themselves into 
emerging global commodity grain and textile markets, learning to turn state supported cash-
cropping based in high debts and high production to their advantage.  Poorer farmers did their 
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best to emulate that success, whether that meant using combinations of fertilizer and manure to 
hedge bets on new seeds, or voting for politicians who would keep input subsidies in place that 
mitigated the risk of new technology. 
By the 1990s some learned to turn the opportunities of the Green Revolution to their 
advantage, while others grappled with new problems of debt and chemical overuse, including a 
well-publicized wave of farmer suicide (Galab, Revathi, and Reddy 2009; Gruère and Sengupta 
2011; Pandian 2011; Scoones 2006).  In rural Telangana, farmers previously engaged in 
reciprocal finance relations with local landlords and ecological relationships with homemade 
inputs (Ludden 1999; Gupta 1998; Vasavi 1999) had to navigate landscape of credit, labor, seeds 
and inputs.  Two potential futures gained popularity as solutions to the chemical and capital ills 
of the Green Revolution.  Like their predecessor, both GM crops and organic production aimed 
to solve agricultural problems through new products:  on one hand, a GM hybrid seed that would 
work within the existing system of chemicals, debts, shops, and plant scientists; on the other, a 
non-Bt seed that would call upon international green marketing and farmer education. 
The use of American GM technology required a regulatory policy that would satisfy 
countries in the textile commodity chain, international businesses, Green activists, foreign 
investors, and a poorly educated but democratically active rural population.  Sheila Jasanoff 
(2005) notes in her study of biotechnology regulation that the dynamics of GM regulation 
depend on a nation’s unique civic epistemology.  Although both Argentina and Brazil plant more 
genetically modified crops than India by acreage (Clive James 2010), India serves a more 
important geopolitical role in the spread and regulation of genetically modified crops in the 
developing world.  South American GM soy farmers tend to own larger farms unrepresentative 
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of small farmers globally, and their images do little to further the argument that GM crops are 
helping resource poor farmers.   
With hundreds of millions of citizens dependent on agriculture (Sainath 2013), India has 
served as a barometer and trendsetter for both high-tech industry and neoliberal development, 
especially as regards smallholding farmers (Newell 2003; Scoones 2008; Shiva 1993).  India’s 
economic information technology boom, its highly educated science sector, its colonial past, and 
its extremely active civil society encourage debates on the future of agriculture to occur in a 
highly public forum (Guha 2008).  In the late 1980s, the USA was the only country with a 
working regulatory framework regarding gene patenting and GM safety, and so those legal 
decisions were largely adapted to service Indian needs  (Heinemann 2012; Newell 2003).  
Cognizant of the risks of upsetting rural voting blocs, and India’s Green NGO sector, Indian 
policymakers adopted GM regulation in 1989 to obviate potential objections, thirteen years 
before it would be approved for farmer use. 
Because regulation had already been written in the United States, Indian biotechnology 
policy preceded any actual products.  Transgenic material would not be officially imported until 
1995 or commercially released until 2002, but regulation began in 1989 with the Rules for the 
Manufacture/Use/Import/Export and Storage of Hazardous Microorganisms, Genetically 
Engineered Organisms or Cells through the Notification No. G.S.R.1037(E).  The Department of 
Biotechnology (DBT) wrote the Recombinant DNA Safety Guidelines in 1990 as a preemptive 
measure anticipating genetic modification and then updated these rules in the 1998.  The 
regulations that initially determined field testing, laboratory conditions, and sales, along with the 
technology itself, were drawn directly from American policy decisions (Heinemann 2012; 
Newell 2003).  The authority of the American bureaucracy was quickly diluted during the pro-
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business Reagan administration, especially that of the Environmental Protection Agency.  
Beholden to different political interests, the Indian bureaucracy retained more power over the 
spread of GM technology.  Their authority to restrict field trials and the spread of GM seeds 
frustrated multinational industry stakeholders in biotechnology and seed distribution, leading 
them to form loosely connecting lobbying groups to clarify the industry’s needs to the regulators. 
The resulting set of complicated rules separated foreign firms, domestic seed companies, 
regulators, and importers, restricting foreign multinational companies (MNCs) from direct 
investment or management.  To circumvent this, major agricultural producers like Pioneer Hi-
Bred, Monsanto, and Syngenta bought subsidiary Indian companies, licensed their technology, 
and acquired shares in Indian distributors.  Especially regarding the sale of genetically modified 
and hybrid seeds, Indian law is sensitive to a history of peasant exploitation and India has seen 
some spectacular theft of patented GM seed technology (Jayaraman 2001). DeKalb and Cargill, 
both American agricultural MNCs, had Indian branches that were acquired by Monsanto, 
allowing it to import seeds.  Monsanto negotiated commercial approval for Bt cotton in 1995 and 
subsequently purchased a 26 percent share in the Indian company Mayhco to create the Mayhco-
Monsanto Biotech India Ltd company in 1998, acquiring not only another established Indian 
company but a company executive with key government connections (Newell 2003:4). 
While GM regulation preceded GM production, India’s organic regulation did not 
coalesce until 2000, sixteen years after the first NGO-sponsored organic conference (Narayanan 
2005).  As with GM seeds, organic proponents tout organic agriculture’s potential to cure India’s 
chemical overuse, reverse nutritional deficiencies, stop poverty, and bring Indian products to 
new markets (da Costa 2012; Panneerselvam et al. 2012).  Seeing that environmental 
organizations received groundswells of support during GM debates in the 1990s (Schmid 2007), 
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Green policymakers in the United States saw the advantages of positioning themselves as an 
alternative to genetic modification and the kind of production it represented to consumers 
(Jasanoff 2005).  This opportunistic alliance would lead American regulators to outlaw GMOs 
from organic production, thus banning them in all subsequent national and international 
legislation in the name of global consistency.  To maintain equivalency with these standards, 
India’s organic guidelines have been adopted directly from USDA protocols, themselves the 
legal coalescence of more than thirty years of minor regulation by international networks of 
organic farmers (Conford 2011).  As such they deny certification “when use of [GM] products is 
detected at any stage” (Department of Commerce 2005:92).  In aligning themselves with extant 
American regulation, GM and organic cotton producers became legally opposed and have come 
to represent two mutually exclusive alternative agricultures because of the ways that farmers use 
or avoid chemical pesticides and fertilizers in the management of those seeds.  This opposition is 
especially ironic for Bt cotton biotechnologists, some of whom were Rachel Carson enthusiasts 
who selected Bt specifically because of its longstanding use as a certified organic pesticide in the 
US (Charles 2001). 
 Beginning with the colonial period, development seeking to bring India into a modern 
age has been a specific process of commodification and knowledge consolidation.  By the mid-
19
th
 century, cotton technology including cultivars suited for Manchester factories, Green 
revolution state-subsidized fertilizers, pesticides, and hybrid seeds, became successful only after 
farmers incorporated them into their systematic agricultural knowledge and found support in 
government assistance (Appadurai 1996; Gupta 1998; Vasavi 1999).  For the most recent 
agrarian crisis of the mid 1990s, brought on by the new logics of globalized cash cropping, states 
and corporations again targeted farmers for a new round of agrarian development.  Because of 
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laws decided in the US and Europe, cotton farmers were asked to choose between a high-tech 
GM version of development and a low-tech organic version.   
  
Cotton, Development, and Commodification 
With regulation in place after 2000, both GM and organic cotton production have 
continued in India, each receiving billions in public and private support (The Economic Times 
2010; The Economic Times 2012).  As India’s first successfully commercialized GM crop, Bt 
cotton came to symbolize one possible future of agricultural development there, leading organic 
agriculture promoters to define themselves as an alternative development.  Success in both 
instances hinges on the regimes’ potential to increase income and decrease chemical use.  
Through scientific studies and public discourse, both regimes have tried to claim this success.  
Much maligned and praised, Bt cotton represents many of India's agroenvrionmental 
paradoxes:  the promise of high-tech modernity as well as the threat of eroded past values 
(Paarlberg 2001; Pearson 2006; Scoones 2008; Shiva 1997; Stone 2002); the influx of new 
capital and technology amid the danger of increased corporate control (Bagla and Stone 2012; 
Jasanoff 2005; Newell 2003; Schurman and Munro 2010; Scoones 2006); and the acquisition of 
new farming methods at the risk of interrupting the farming learning process (Kloppenburg 
2004; Pollan 2002; Stone 2007).  The model of technological integration and increased external 
expertise coalesced on American farms through a process that Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 
(1987) call appropriationism, the discrete commodification of different parts of the farming 
process by agricultural industries.  The farming industry as a whole resists commodification – 
after all, farmers reproduce seeds, the means of their production (Kloppenburg 2004).   
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However, a GM hybrid seed, which must be replanted each year to maintain hybrid vigor 
and satisfy license agreements, presents the latest addition to a steadily commodified investment-
intensive agriculture, which encourages the purchase of whole technology packages:  the hybrids 
respond best to a regiment of chemical fertilizers while the GM seeds require specific pesticides 
for non-target pests, and all of this specific knowledge rests in experts external to the farmer 
community.  “You have to change seeds each year”, Arun, a cotton farmer from Kavrupad who 
has planted fad seeds nearly every year since 2004 tells me - “the new seeds have the best 
science”.  He is correct: seven different constructs of the Bt gene have now been released, with 
more coming soon to counter the omnipresent threat of insect resistance.   “After three years”, he 
continues, “the companies become lazy” having won consumer confidence, and so they sell only 
“duplicate” or fake seeds.  The trouble, however, is knowing which new seed to choose.  With 
more than 90% of farmers (The Hindu Business Line 2013) now planting hundreds of brands of 
GM cotton, non Bt seeds are now virtually impossible to find in the Telangana region.   
For organic farmers, commodification comes less through products consumed by farmers 
than out of the need to conform to international regulations in organic agriculture.  The need for 
regulatory compliance has created a market for NGOs and organic corporations to translate that 
process to interested farmers.  Designed for American farms struggling to stand out to consumers 
shopping in supermarkets (Guthman 2004), USDA-equivalent certification can be expensive for 
Indian organic projects.  Producers and farmers lack the infrastructure and access to markets that 
would make organic farming easy and profitable while the benefits of this time-consuming 
agriculture are perceived to be limited (Eyhorn, Ramakrishnan, and Mäder 2007; Panneerselvam 
et al. 2012).  Additionally, because the government has spent the last 50 years integrating 
agriculture and industry (Perkins 1997), inertia and farm subsidies are slow to shift from 
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conventional to organic production.  Therefore, farmers in India cannot simply decide to grow 
organic products and market them as such.  Rather, organic NGOs play a crucial role in 
promoting organic agricultural practices in the country because of their ability to commit time 
and energy required for transition and troubleshooting (Kolanu and Kumar 2003).  To take a 
more critical view, these NGOs devote time and energy to training farmers in a new mode of 
production, politically engaging them as stakeholders in an international movement that is 
mutually exclusive with GMOs.  The government’s lukewarm support for organic agriculture 
suddenly became a vote of confidence for anti-GM activists, a group that has been described as 
“based on weak alliances [with national and international anti-globalization and anti-neoliberal 
groups]; it is dependent on the relationships of key individuals who are often or (some would 
say) wildly egotistical; and the alternatives being offered are often vague, small-scale and easily 
ignored” (Scoones 2006:333).  With organic production, anti-GM activists made a useful ally. 
  
GM and Organic Cotton as Sustainable Technologies 
Even though more than nine out of ten farmers were in the process of sowing GM seed, 
protests across five states heralded the tenth anniversary of Bt cotton’s commercialization in 
India (Parsai 2012).  Protestors have marched continuously since 2002 and continue to march in 
2014, as Monsanto is finishing field tests for the next generation of herbicide-resistant Bt cotton.  
In their discussion of the vitriolic disagreements between organic activists and pro-GM 
scientists, Schurman and Munro (2010) argue that the public loggerheads stem from an act of 
interpretation in which activists consciously promoted a different set of meanings than the 
dominant apolitical pro-science view of GMOs held by policymakers and biologists.  In doing 
so, they sought to disrupt a public predisposition to define technoscientific views of the world as 
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positive.  The argument was less scientific and more geared toward mental, moral, social, and 
intellectual collective action.  Recalling Habermas, the authors refer to a lifeworld (Fultner 2011) 
that describes so-called natural attitudes that define ideas, values, and interaction, generalizing 
and naturalizing collective experience. While Jasanoff (2005) highlights the economic benefits 
that flowed to green interests after they sought to make GMOs and organic production mutually 
exclusive in the USA, she similarly contends that pro- and anti-GM voices often talk past each 
other, often seeking politically expedient, emotional arguments.  VG Ramesh of SUS regularly 
speaks out against GMOs and sees their introduction in Indian development.  Despite 90% 
adoption of GM cottonseeds, he told me during an interview that he remains convinced that: 
 
GM at this point and time is not a viable technology.  There are biosafety issues with it.  
So, [other development agencies and I] don’t agree on that.  It’s not about whether 
[organic groups] are certified or they don’t certify.  If somebody wants to put [GM 
technology] in organic agriculture it doesn’t matter for us, as long as the biosafety issues 
associated with GMO are resolved, that’s all.  That’s what I would say.  
 
Andrew:  Concerns about gene escape, cross contamination, these things? 
 
Ramesh:  No actually gene escape is one problem.  You look at the impacts on soil 
health, impacts on people’s health, it’s huge.  See the process of gene transfer itself is not 
yet precise.  So in the gene transfer process, knowledge is not precise. Obviously it will 
have biosafety implications.  This is one part of the story.  The second problem is [GM 
seeds] have patents already.  It has legal controls on it so obviously it gives monopoly 
rights for some, so we are opposed to that as well.  Both need to be addressed.  So as long 
as both are not addressed we are not for it.  The issue is not about, we are not opposing it 
because it is GM.  It is not because certification agencies do not accept [GM seeds].  So 
tomorrow certification agencies may accept [GMOs], what does it matter?  The problem 
remains. 
 
Ramesh has no interest in working with GM developers, not only because GMOs are 
incompatible with organic regulatory structures but because he disagrees with the heavily 
corporatized kind of agriculture that genetic modification represents.  Such development is, for 
him, inherently dangerous from a legal and ecological point of view. 
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For his part, G. Shankar of Monsanto India has grown frustrated with what he sees as an 
unscientific criticism of his work.  Rumors of animals dying from eating GM crops persist 
despite any conclusive evidence of Bt’s harm and Bt’s longstanding use as an organic pesticide.  
The opposition has led Shankar to a similarly aggressive stance against organic agriculture: 
 
I’ll tell you, I think we have to be a little more real in life.  I think that people confuse 
organic and inorganic in many ways.  To me, field crops have to be looked at from a 
different perspective.  As I said now soil is important.  First you have to understand 
whether soil is good in organic content or not.  Right?  And in fact I believe in integrating 
[some organic methods]…The moment [many farmers] see the pest, they don’t have a 
good knowledge, and then I would say that organic methods can work with us in a nicer 
way and say we will work on integrated pest management, integrated useful management.  
I would be very open to those ideas.  In fact you know our experiments in agronomy, 
because we educate, we tell farmers and give as much of organic sources as are available.  
The challenge is: so you talk about sucking pests. Suppose sucking pests are a problem.  
Is there a good sucking pesticide available which is of organic sorts?  The answer is no.  
Is it available in sufficient quantities, is it affordable.  My feeling is that the hardcore 
organic lobby believes farmers are fooled which I think they are not.  If anything works 
on their farm they will adopt it…If you have to think of improving only organic cotton 
you need 20 tons of farmyard manure per year.  Do we know what we are talking here?  
So where are you going to bring that much of organic manure…how many cows do we 
need, who’s going to, if we get food for them so they can produce so much of organic 
matter.  They have to be, you know, a little more practical about such things. 
 
Each high level manager is casting the other side as unwilling to listen to reason, whether it be 
biosafety concerns or the practical realities of farming.  Despite, or perhaps because of, Bt 
cotton’s massive adoption, GM and organic farming systems must present themselves as 
alternative visions of India’s agriculture. 
International and domestic NGOs have begun promoting organic agriculture as an 
alternative development resonating with the paradoxes above.  However, many of the same 
issues relating to an uncertain knowledge base can affect organic farmers as well.  In aligning 
themselves with international organic suppliers and markets, Indian farmers must learn organic 
standards and production practices.  This often takes the form of farmer field schools, 
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development initiatives designed to teach farmers to use input un-intensive methods.  These 
farmer field schools take place under the onus of foreign agricultural development, and share 
root assumptions about underdeveloped subjects, the superiority of outsider knowledge, and the 
creation of new experts with new technologies, broadly defined (Escobar 2011; Pandian 2011).  
Viewed as technologies, genetically modified crops and organic production offer 
potential solutions to South Asia’s agricultural woes:  chemical treadmills, famine, suicide, 
poverty, and development.  Ultimately both forms of production seek a measure of 
socioecological sustainability, but our understanding of that term has shifted toward one based in 
flexible, resilient relationships between people and the systems they manage (Berkes 2012; 
Leslie and McCabe 2013), it has become clear that the sustainability of environmental systems 
hinges on the skill required to apply that management.   
Unlike the health benefits promised to consumers of organic produce, the consumption of 
organic cotton rests solely on perceived benefits for growers and the environment.  As such, 
organic cotton producers in India market farmer field schools have an explicit mission to 
improve farmer empowerment, a decidedly moral mission that also seeks to build self-
confidence, problem-solving skills, and encourage empowerment (Chetna Organic 2013; Franz 
and Hassler 2010).  Low input technology field schools do not commodify knowledge in the way 
that Bt cotton commodifies pest resistance through a purchasable seed.  Instead, the international 
NGO network and neoliberal organizations that fund these projects rely on success narratives, 
morally “transformed” (Duveskog, Friss-Hansen, and Taylor 2011) farmers, and triumphant 
photographs for donor money or added value products.  On the production side, farmers must use 
particular organic inputs or methods that conform to organic regulations.  On the consumption 
side, the farmers themselves become commodities sold to donors or ethical buyers wishing to 
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invest in alternative development projects that generate new, developed subjects (Franz and 
Hassler 2010). 
 Beginning with the colonial period through the Green Revolution and contemporary GM 
seeds, development seeking to bring India into a modern age has been a specific process of 
commodification and knowledge consolidation.  However, these processes have never been 
smooth or one-sided.  Thanks to a flood of postcolonial scholarship on the consequences of 
global modernist development we know that commodities are always reinterpreted and 
reappropriated by consumers (Appadurai 1996), be they goods or technological systems. The 
seemingly inevitable spread of this development is slowed by local friction that causes it to be 
reproduced in a culturally acceptable form or generates an informal economy to accommodate 
those who do not benefit (Tsing 2005).  On 19
th
 century Indian cotton farms farmers likely mixed 
local varieties with the British cultivars to hedge their bets (Guha 2007), a practice still seen 
when farmers buy a swath of  different kinds of GM seeds to insure themselves against seed 
failure.  In fact it was only after the colonial cotton project was declared a failure and oversight 
decreased that Indian farmers developed the successful Indian cross of Gossypium hirsutum x 
Gossypium barbadense, that led Indian cotton farmers to dominate the global cotton market 
(Wendel, Brubaker, and Seelanan 2010).  The same hedging and adaptation was widely prevalent 
as the modernist, market-capitalist goals of the Green Revolution were promoted by the Indian 
and American governments.  Early GM farmers likely stole seeds from test fields to trial the 
technology on their own terms (Herring 2007).  Even on current certified organic farms, Indian 
cotton farmers diversify their fields with Bt cotton to reduce the risk of solely cultivating an 
unknown crop (Makita 2012).  Engaged with the Green Revolution, organic development, GM 
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cotton agriculture, farmers have been adding their own trial, hedging their bets, and translating 
the new demands of markets and regulations. 
 This chapter has examined the social, botanical, and historical context of cotton in the 
Telangana region and in India generally.  Since the colonial period, cotton law and technology 
has largely been translated from an American to Indian context.  The most recent iteration of this 
translation manifests in the push to create a sustainable, resilient agriculture through foreign GM 
or organic technology.  Farmers and policymakers are in the process of deciding if this will 
manifest as high-tech GMOs or low-tech organic agriculture, which have been mutually opposed 
by laws prohibiting cross-contamination, as well as by the rhetoric of GM and organic promoters 
who promote their own products by calling their opponents dangerous, ignorant, and impractical.  
Thus is India experimenting with two legally and socially exclusive forms of sustainable 
agricultural technology – GM crops engineered to lower pesticide sprays and organic crops 
designed to reduce overall chemical inputs.   
 I argue that skill, farmer knowledge and the ability to perform that knowledge in the 
dynamic farm environment, is the true determinant of sustainability.  The next chapter overviews 
perspectives on skill, its importance to socio-environmental resilience, and the ways that social 
and environmental learning have been privileged in theoretical discussions of the anthropology 
of knowledge.  My claim that farmers use what Stone (2016) terms a combination of 
environmental, social, and didactic learning  sets up the empirical discussions that follow, which 
center around the observation that farmers draw unevenly on these sources of information as a 
function of their social status, wealth, prowess as farmers, or the resources offered to them by 
institutions. 
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Chapter 4:  Divergent Agricultural Regimes as Tools to Explore the Creation and 
Adaptation of Agricultural Knowledge  
 
 
This dissertation investigates the creation and adaptation of agricultural knowledge under 
three different agricultural regimes:  GM cotton, rice, and organic cotton.  Each regime carries a 
particular set of incentives, risks, and avenues for success.  Each reward structure is also 
dominated by a different social politics, a shifting labyrinth of those with knowledge and 
influence and those with uncertainty and anxiety.  In this dissertation I focus particularly on seed 
choices.  Therefore knowledge, management, and reward structure are bound up in the different 
commodity forms that these seeds take on.  In turn, the social constraints under which farmers 
generate knowledge, ranging from caste to debt, are tied to the seeds. 
Varyingly a commodity to be consumed and a means of production, seeds place a 
particularly interesting set of demands on Telangana farmer knowledge.  In the introduction to 
The Social Life of Things, Appadurai observes: “Commodities represent very complex social 
forms and distributions of knowledge” (Appadurai 1988:41). The vast historical interconnections 
of regulation, production, consumption, and genetics along cotton’s commodity chain were 
discussed in the previous chapter.  Moving forward I am concerned with the ways in which 
complex social forms and distributions of knowledge manifest as farmers navigate GM cotton 
seeds, rice seeds, and organic cotton seeds.  If commodities have life histories, careers, or 
biographies in a meaningful sense as Appadurai and later Kopytoff suggest in The Social Life of 
Things, then the distribution of knowledge at each stage can reveal how learning is related to the 
social politics and reward structures of different versions in agriculture.  
Before moving on to a review of innovation theory and the anthropology of knowledge as 
they relate to Telangana farmers, I would like to situate this current study of the social politics of 
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commodified seed knowledge within work by Stone (2007; 2016), Kloppenburg (2004), and 
Fitzgerald (2003).  Numerous researchers have documented how farmers in the 20
th
 century 
experienced unforeseen upheaval as they traded household labor and knowledge for expert 
guidance and purchasable inputs including chemicals, machines, and seeds (Brookfield 2001; 
Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987; Magdoff, Foster, and Buttel 2000; Netting 1993; Pollan 
2006; Stoll 2002).  Of these, Stone, Kloppenburg, and Fitzgerald pay special attention to the new 
risks and rewards that arose as a result of these new relationships to land, inputs, and labor.  The 
transnational pathways that would bring Indian farmers new seeds and new reasons to grow them 
redefined the parameters for agricultural success.  In doing so, they necessarily changed the 
content of what farmers needed to learn in order to be successful. 
For sociologist Jack Kloppenburg (2004), this process began with the seeds themselves.  
Kloppenburg traces the routes by which 19
th
 century American military officers transferred plant 
genetic resources from the tropics to land-grant universities.  Improved plant varieties and later 
hybrids were easier for farmers to buy than breed themselves, leading to the ultimate 
privatization and sale of this publicly developed seed technology.  In a process repeated 
throughout the Green Revolution, Kloppenburg shows how state breeders around the world 
created plant varieties that would respond well to particular methods of harvesting and capital-
intensive plant management. In dissociating that management knowledge from the farmer and 
associating it with a purchasable commodity, Kloppenburg and others (Magdoff, Foster, and 
Buttel 2000) argue that agribusiness used new seeds to encourage farmers to buy a set of 
associated technology.  When that wasn’t enough, state and private breeders incentivized 
production directly through free services, gave out national awards, flooded markets with seed 
varieties, and subsidized production of commodity crops. 
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Fitzgerald (1993; 2003) draws attention to the changes in farm management that 
accompanied these new technology packages.  American farmers buying hybrid maize seeds 
became alienated and deskilled as their specialized crop knowledge was subdivided and 
appropriated by agribusiness managers.  Excluded from labor studies that described this 
deskilling process in industry (Braverman 1998) because farmers and their skills were 
nonhomogeneous, Fitzgerald argues that farmers nonetheless abandoned a complicated producer 
skillset in favor of buying a consistent product.  When saving seed, farmers had to ‘read’ corn, 
translating values of color, texture, or taste into agronomic qualities of yield, quality, insect 
resistance, or other values.  But with the development of higher-yielding hybrid seeds and, 
crucially, new credit demands that encouraged farmers to plant cash crops above all else, farmers 
abandoned this knowledge.  The new system defined success through a seed more aligned with 
scientific modernity and higher yields.  The scale and sophisticated monitoring of these breeding 
programs excluded farmers from the seed production process.  Soon, farmers were belittled by 
crop science experts consolidating knowledge in the corporate sector and trying to “beat the 
farmer at his own game” of seed saving through hybrids that debuted in the 1930s.  Fitzgerald 
(1993) cites one 1936 catalog, in which Funk Bros. Seeds Co. advised farmers not to worry if 
they didn't know which hybrid strain to order:  Funk would supply the hybrid best adapted to 
their land.   This is the industrial logic or ideal applied to agriculture (Fitzgerald 2003), where 
farmers adopted a matrix of interrelated innovations managed by people external to the farming 
household.   
Where Kloppenburg and Fitzgerald describe the conditions under which farmers 
relinquish knowledge of seeds and their management, Stone (2007) picks up this thread in 
describing agricultural deskilling among Indian farmer planting GM cotton.  Cotton agriculture, 
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already dominated by hybrid seeds, was further removed from farmer knowledge with 
widespread planting of GM cotton.  Stone argued that this disconnect was not because the seeds 
were integrated with commodified technology packages.  This had already happened with the 
hybrid market in which the seeds were unrecognizable and inconsistent because of their rapidly 
changing genetic makeup.  GM cotton, sold in India as an unrecognizable, inconsistent, and 
rapidly changing product, exacerbated this existing problem.  For Kloppenburg, farmers learned 
to define success as planting the modernist seeds.  For Fitzgerald, this industrial logic 
encouraged farmers to enter into an agricultural system wherein they became obligate consumers 
of interrelated technologies, none of which farmers themselves learned to produce.  Stone shows 
one possible endgame of this deskilling process, in which Indian cotton farmers unable to 
differentiate cotton seeds instead over-rely on the choices of their neighbors, leading to transient 
seed ‘fads’.  This dissertation is more concerned with how farmers make decisions given the 
reward structures that they do have at their disposal with GM cotton, organic cotton, and rice.   
Each author traces the rippling effects of seed commodification and agricultural 
commodification generally to show how changes in products make possible changes in the larger 
agricultural system.  Seeds are emblematic not only of creeping appropriationism (Goodman, 
Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987), in which discrete elements of the farm production process like 
population improvement through seed saving are transformed into industrial activities like 
commercial seed breeding, but of the entire process by which farmers make agricultural 
decisions.  In changing the ways that farmers receive the seeds that are fundamental to their 
production, different agricultural regimes change the conditions under which farmers generate 
knowledge and value success.  Yet because farmers manage multiple crops, the same farmers are 
often simultaneously building wildly different skillsets.  The next section examines how 
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anthropological theory has examined the process by which farmers develop knowledge, arguing 
that a focus on social and environmental learning has unfairly obscured the institutional avenues 
that define farmer options and determine the conditions for farmer success. 
 
Environmental, Social, and Didactic Learning on the Farm 
Stone (2016) places scholarship on agricultural knowledge within innovation theory, the 
study of how people adopt and adapt new technology.  Initial studies in the 1940s such as Ryan 
and Gross’ (1943) research on hybrid maize adoption sought to model and explain the social 
factors that contributed to farmer seed decisions.  The authors also noted that commercial 
interests and extension offices aggressively promoted the corn.  Early adopters planted hybrid 
corn tentatively, planting it in experimental plots, while later adopters planted larger percentages 
of their holdings with the seed.  Although farmers heard about the new seed first from salesmen, 
they were more strongly influenced by neighbors who bragged about successful seasons.  Social, 
environmental, and didactic forces were all at work in influencing farmer decisions.  While not 
described in a unified way, work on the role of institutions, personal experience, and social 
emulation in the creation of knowledge laid the foundation for the study of the diffusion of 
innovations (Rogers 2003), a socioeconomic model that explained how new technologies 
succeeded or failed to enter our lives. 
 While research in the field at first sought to synthesize tripartite learning, Stone argues 
that research in the diffusion of technology and the creation of knowledge generally has become 
divided by discipline.  Economists, modeling decisions to take place within a more or less free 
marketplace, have emphasized choice, evaluation, and trialing.  By emphasizing environmental 
learning, economists conclude that the diffusion of innovations is the result of superior 
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technology winning out.  Anthropologists and social theorists emphasized social ties as a means 
of denaturalizing the spread of technologies.  Even when examining Ryan and Gross’ hybrid 
maize data, economists (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1998; Griliches 1957) argued that 
rate at which farmers adopted hybrid seeds reflected not a building social consensus but a 
graduated spread of information about the seed’s inherent effectiveness and profitability.  
Griliches and Bikhchandani et al. both acknowledge the early influence of socially important 
actors, but argue that the characteristic S-curve
6
 describing this and other adoptions ultimately 
stems from individuals analyzing their options and making choices that optimize economic 
variables, particularly profitability and yield.  Looking at the same data, Kloppenburg and 
Fitzgerald attributed this spread to the influence of creeping modernism and industrial logic in 
farming.  Influential people and ideas, they argued, not a cost/benefit analysis born of farmer 
trials, led to hybrid maize’s popularity.   
Although they emphasize different factors in the learning process, a wide range of 
disciplines have recognized elements in what Stone (2016) calls a tripartite learning process:  
environmental, social, and didactic or institutionalized learning.  In environmental learning, 
people trial or otherwise evaluate technology and base their decisions on an analysis of the 
results of their efforts.  In some instances this is similar to an economic rationalism that weighs 
costs and benefits with each decision (Griliches 1957; Griliches 1980; Herring and Rao 2012), 
but Ingold (2011) has shown that environmental learning can also be seen when a person learns 
through self-discovery or trial and error from first-hand experience – even when a person is 
shown something, Ingold argues, they must discover it for themselves.  In social learning, people 
defer to the choices of others and ultimately copy or emulate their choices on social criteria 
                                               
6 When modeled as a percentage of adopters, this S-shaped pattern shows minor initial growth as the earliest 
adopters use an innovation, a period of rapid adoption wherein most people jump on the trend, and then a minor late 
adoption as the final stragglers join what has become mainstream.   
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(Boyd and Richerson 1988).  This can lead to transmission biases including prestige and 
conformist biases, in which information carries extra weight because it comes from a socially 
prestigious person or because it is especially popular.  In didactic learning, institutions or people 
exhibit active instruction carried out on the basis of interests external to the farm, often under the 
auspices of a larger group.  Didactic information also carries prestige and conformist biases that 
are rooted in the institutional or figurehead authority and the community’s response to that 
authority.  Each of these will be deconstructed in turn, but it is easy to see how each of these 
three perspectives might bleed into the others.  Environmental concerns, like how a seed 
performed relative to other seeds, impact social concerns, such as how that performance might be 
tested against the purported success of a different seed (Stone, Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014).  
If a didactic program makes any headway in a village, we would expect that the instructors carry 
some social weight, like the domineering early agricultural scientists described by Kloppenburg 
and Fitzgerald.  In anthropology, we further recognize that no social or environmental 
knowledge takes place in a vacuum – institutions structure what knowledge or technology is 
available for farmers to learn and copy in the first place. 
Recent work has emphasized ways in which both emulation and first-hand experience 
contribute to farmer decision-making.  For those trained in economics, the absence of reliable 
environmental feedback can help explain why various kinds of social learning are fragile, such as 
faddish consumer behavior (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992; Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch 1998); they can show the ways in which social learning can ease the 
burden of learning many new things at once, as with Tepic et al.’s (2012) study of the ways that 
Dutch hog farmers learned from one another’s’ experiences with state regulation and new 
production technologies; and they can highlight information networks that spread useful 
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environmental knowledge, like those used by Ghanaian pineapple farmers making fertilizer 
decisions (Conley and Udry 2010).  Those trained to recognize social influence have used 
environmental learning to describe how people learn socially, as observed useful innovations do 
not diffuse because the innovative farmers are of low social status (Henrich 2001; Tripp 2006); 
when conformist bias, or following the crowd, can maintain economic choices that provide 
suboptimal returns in the name of keeping step with popular choices (Richerson and Boyd 2008); 
when people assume that experts can better navigate a difficult or confusing market than they 
can, despite negative environmental feedback (Iyengar, Huberman, and Jang 2004).  The farmers 
in this study, as with farmers participating in a globalized economy anywhere, needed to try to 
stay abreast of changes in their own fields, the myriad changes in the confusing seed market, and 
changes in neighbor fields.  Like farmers everywhere, they succeeded in some ways and failed in 
others.  Relying exclusively on one’s own field in a landscape with a wide range of variable 
input choices that could not be trialed by any individual makes no sense in the economic model 
of the rational evaluator.  Moreover, it would be absurd in the ethnographic model of the socially 
connected subject beholden to cultural conformist biases based around social status. 
In addition to the problem of conformist bias generally and in the specific case of Indian 
farmer decision-making, Telangana cotton and rice farmers face an additional problem of data 
analysis.  As shown by my analysis in chapter five, chapter six, and chapter seven, these farmers 
are not collecting or analyzing high-resolution data.  Their recollections of seed choices and 
inputs may be hazy at best, while the actual differences they observe are barely even noticeable 
by the analyzing anthropologist looking for significant p values.  Such variation is almost 
certainly lost in the cotton field.  Social theories of environmental and social learning, as well as 
empirical study (Stone 2007; Stone, Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014), suggest that influence of 
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authoritative voices, including large farmers, shop owners, scientists, and successful farmers, are 
far more important in a dataset with no clear environmental trends. 
This understanding of knowledge suggests that social and environmental context depends 
on the commodity in question, as different products, technologies, or forms of knowledge with 
different culturally ascribed meanings and didactic forces pushing them will allow different 
kinds of environmental responses.  Farmers’ ability to evaluate new forms of cotton or rice 
seeds, as in this study, would thus depend on how those crops are made locally meaningful.  
Cotton, a cash crop sold as a commodity and produced only for the market, brings a totally 
different set of anxieties about knowledge and production than rice, destined for saved stores and 
cooking pots as well as  markets.  During farmer focus groups, I asked what new seeds farmers 
had heard about.  Farmers might shout out dozens of names, all of which were new seeds and 
thus relied on social knowledge rather than any first-hand information.  One farmer explained, 
“If it is a new seed, we’ll remember the seed name and plant it.  And if we get good yield they 
plant the same next year.  Year after year the seed will reveal itself.  But if it decreases then 
another new one is produced.”  There is no way to keep track of seeds or predict new ones.  In 
cotton, farmers must wait and watch.  Even if farmers were able to stay abreast of all the possible 
changes in cotton seed brands, black market sales and misleading marketing would still stymie 
their attempts at experimentation.  The farmer continued, “the seeds is very good in the 
advertisements, but all the companies sell fake seeds.  When we get them, we’re not even getting 
our investment back!”   
Learning and the local meaning of the commodity are thus intertwined.  As Dove (2011) 
describes, differences in crops determined for market and those that serve a more complicated 
cultural purpose as food or security reflect profound differences in the social worlds of these 
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commodities:  Dove describes Indonesian smallholders who conceived life as a cycle of 
exchange and regrowth within the social and ecological community.  The rubber cash crop killed 
a part of this exchange and harmed the land itself (Dove 2011:171), even threatening to destroy 
the spirit of swidden rice.  Telangana farmers do not see cotton land as a threat to their rice.  The 
threat in this thesis refers to the variable destruction of knowledge because farmers are not 
rewarded for practicing or developing a balanced set of agroecological knowledge.  Rather than 
see cotton as a direct threat, farmers see it in a more banal, neoliberalized form:  the branded 
commodity, something outside of their control.   
 
The Importance of Environmental Learning in Building Knowledge 
Emphasizing any particular element of Stone’s (2016) tripartite system risks ignoring the 
influences of the others.  Yet because it is the most personalized manifestation of learning, or at 
least because it is managed at the household level at which farming labor and knowledge are 
organized, environmental learning is a linchpin for farmer knowledge.  As has long been 
recognized, people who do things know things.  Theorists of smallholder agriculture, notably 
Netting (1993), Brookfield (2001), Conklin (1961), and Richards (1985) maintain that it is the 
active practice of knowledge and its capacity to be change that allows smallholding farmers to be 
successful in a mixed market-subsistence economy.  As the commodification of that knowledge 
has been piecemeal in agriculture, farmers in Telangana have been left with a mosaic knowledge:  
usable and reliable in contexts where environmental learning is rewarded, and dependent on 
social or didactic learning in other contexts.   
Farmers risk losing their knowledge base and treating their fundamental means of 
production as commodities when they have no avenues to or reasons for generating knowledge 
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through environmental learning.  Both element of this process are important:  The avenues by 
which farmers generate knowledge, namely trialing new technology, must provide some pathway 
toward a reward if that knowledge is to be put to good use.  Farmers who cannot use knowledge 
about particular seed performances to inform their seed choices or who develop knowledge that 
does not help them strike a fair price in the market might be learning plenty, but they are not 
learning the skills that reward their farming regimes.  Thus are both the products and the social 
worlds that they inhabit important criterion for generating and adapting knowledge. 
The failure to spread useful technology can be illustrated through the slow diffusion of 
some organic cotton programs.  Numerous economic models have suggested the superiority of 
organic cultivation, especially for resource-poor, small cotton farmers (Eyhorn 2007; Forster et 
al. 2013; Makita 2012; Prashanth, Reddy, and Rao 2013; Panneerselvam et al. 2012).  In each 
case, researchers extol the clear benefits in profit margins and quality of life, and show that 
organic cotton has the potential to yield similarly to GM cotton strains.  The problem, they 
lament, is the farmers.  Farmers are suspicious of the schemes, do not want to learn new 
methods, do not want to abandon their personal cultivation knowledge, and do not want to join a 
kind of agricultural that will separate them from other farmers.  The challenge lies in enabling 
poor farmers to believe that organic production is worth the poor yields of the production period, 
the development of new skills, and the “emotional” ownership of their products and their 
regulation (Eyhorn 2007:17).  For these researchers, the problem is not one of environmental 
learning so much as didactic success.  Farmers in these studies did not want to abandon known 
agricultural logic in favor of a new technique, in part, as each study recognizes, because they did 
not fully trust organic programs to follow through with their promises.   
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With so much attention toward the interactions between individual/household 
environmental learning and the social relationships that give that knowledge meaning, it is easy 
to see how didactic learning gets lost in the mix.  Following Stone, I call this kind of learning 
didactic in the sense that it refers to active instruction that occurs under the auspices of a larger 
institution with a moral or political purpose.  Stone (2016) outlines three kinds of didactic 
situations, corporate, state, and NGO that fall under this rubric.  In the research for this project, I 
observed that various didactic programs sponsored by the Indian government, local shops, 
foreign NGOs, local NGOs, universities, and corporations engendered four different kinds of 
explicit farmer performances in response.  Farmer performances and professed transformations 
are discussed at length in chapter eight and chapter nine.   
As with the prestige bias in social learning, didactic learning appeals to an authority:  
follow the advice of particular experts because of their social status.  In India, the colonial and 
Green Revolution didactic instructors had the benefits of race, wealth, foreign influence, caste, 
and the backing of influential leaders including zamindars and members of the civil service 
(Beckert 2014; Guha 2008; Gupta 1998; Vasavi 1999).  This legacy continues in the current 
didactic landscape of foreign development programs, Indian NGOs, state sponsorships, corporate 
sponsorships, and university programs.  As so often happens, the earliest adopters are those who 
people look to  because they are expected to do well in the first place (Rogers 2003; Stone and 
Flachs 2014).  By obscuring the institutions that set the conditions for environmental or social 
learning, this anthropology of knowledge misses the institutional context in which the conditions 
for success, risk, and reward are set.  Didactic learning, at least initially, determines the future 
course of social and environmental learning for new technologies. 
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Didactic learning here serves as an initial push, in which those recruited farmers are 
meant to field test expert methodology, generate improvements (environmental learning), and 
then use their social influence to convince others to follow suit with the method (social learning).  
The long-term stability of this attempt to influence farmer decision-making is a serious problem 
for programs that rely heavily on didactic learning over an extended period, such as organic 
programs requiring frequent outsider visits and regulatory compliance.  The ways in which 
organic farmers and program managers troubleshoot this issue is discussed in chapter seven.  
Such didactic programs make a concerted effort to construct facts, not in service of shifting a 
larger scientific discourse (Latour 1986; Latour 2010) but to sway local opinions of farmers in 
shops, newspapers, media interviews, and casual shop interactions where individual and 
household farmer decisions are made.   
 
Building Theory in the Anthropology of Knowledge From GM Cotton Farmers, Rice 
Farmers, and Organic Farmers 
Stone’s work (2007; 2016) has stressed the dangers of over-relying on any particular kind 
of learning in agricultural systems.  In his study of GM cotton farmers 2002-2012 (Stone, Flachs, 
and Diepenbrock 2014), Stone has shown how environmental learning became fundamentally 
destabilized as farmers over-relied on social emulation.  In this study, I consider GM cotton, rice, 
and organic agriculture regimes as three exemplars of the different ways that Telangana 
smallholders build tripartite knowledge.  In each system, there are elements of environmental, 
social, and didactic learning.  Yet because of the demands for profitability in an uncertain 
market, reliability in a limited market, and compliance in a market where choice is removed, 
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farmers’ choices for GM cotton, rice, and organic agriculture respectively permit them to 
generate and use varying kinds of knowledge. 
 Studies promoting the early success of GM cotton in India have been attacked on the 
basis of poor scientific rigor, namely in choosing groups of farmers that one would have 
expected to do well in the first place: those farmers who were wealthiest, more adventurous, had 
more land, and had higher yields in general (Crost et al. 2007; Gruère and Sun 2012; Stone 
2011a).  Thus, their work represents a selection bias and is therefore a poor predictor of GM crop 
yields in India generally, despite the claims of pro-GM agricultural economists (Qaim 2009).  
Kathage and Qaim (2012), attempted to refute such insinuations in a paper that used a fixed 
effects analysis to even out farmer selection bias between 2002-2008.  Kathage and Qaim 
claimed that Bt seeds caused a 24% increase in cotton yield and a 50% percent gain in cotton 
profit, while allowing that the cost of production has increased 18%.  Too little too late, claimed 
Stone (2012), who argued that Bt cotton success narratives had already been established by 
initially poor scientific practice of selection bias, extrapolating long-term trends from short-term 
studies, and a cultivation bias in which farmers lavished extra care on the more expensive and 
supposedly transformative seeds.  This lowered the bar in the peer-review process, allowing pro-
GM studies, already inclined to be exciting or controversial and thus attractive to academic 
journals, to flow through publication as the studies cited each other and established a circular 
credibility.  Thus was the institution of scientific inquiry and reporting compromised in its 
analysis of GM cotton. 
Postmodernism and relativism at its worst, replied critics (Herring and Rao 2012; Herring 
2013), leading to an ongoing debate through the widely read Indian journal Economic and 
Political Weekly.  Regardless of triumph narratives and initially biased studies, each study 
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continues to build a scientific consensus that Bt cotton improves lives and crop yields, and the 
presumption that such research stems from a loose alliance between GM manufacturers and 
scientists “are strong claims, even by the standards of conspiracy theories” (Herring 2013:63).  
Herring cites Merchants of Doubt (Oreskes and Conway 2011), an exposé on the manufacture of 
doubt in tobacco and climate science, to argue that science works on empirical consensus by 
qualified experts and accuses Stone of mongering doubt in a settled field.  Citing Latour’s 
Promises of Constructivism (Latour 2003), Herring asks if people like Stone would have 
scientists consider facts to be socially constructed modernist fiction (Herring 2013:63).  Stone’s 
(2013) rebuttal, in which he cites years of ethnographic fieldwork to establish credibility as a 
non-postmodern scientist, falls short of questioning facticity itself, but rather the empirical basis 
of the triumph narrative when so many factors in the analysis are simplifications and abstractions 
constructed within the confines of the research project. 
Ultimately, the argument over the success or failure of GM crops in India is a different 
question from Stone’s criticisms of the skilling process.  Herring and Rao do not engage with 
this theoretical element of Stone’s arguments on deskilling, except to use skill as a stand-in for 
adoption, yields, and profitability (Herring and Rao 2012:52).  As shown by the wealth of theory 
complicating farmers’ abilities to trial and Stone’s argument that Bt cotton is particularly 
difficult to trial, there is no reason to expect that environmental learning is a salient factor in 
Indian farmer Bt cotton choices.  However, this was a testable question:  how do farmers balance 
and fail to balance various forms of learning in their GM cotton choices?  As I show in the 
following chapter, farmers do indeed conduct the kind of evaluations that Herring and Rao, and 
others, claim.  In the mid 2000s, didactic programs were also in place from universities and 
corporate actors asking farmers to grow Bt cotton as part of an IPM system.  The didactics 
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worked better than seed companies could have hoped:  news of Bt cotton’s success spread and 
other farmers raced to copy one another.  Furthermore, pesticide use appeared to fall 
dramatically at first, when Bt cotton was used as an IPM technology (Kranthi 2012).  However, 
more farmers appeared to know less about particular seeds.  The resulting seed fads can be seen 
as a distinctive feature of cotton’s particular commodity form in Telangana.  Building on Stone’s 
model of agricultural deskilling the bewildering cotton seed market leads to deskilled farmers in 
part because the initial didactic pushes, wherein farmers first learned about GM seeds, led to a 
commodity market rather than a new and usable skillset.  Farmers continue to trial, but that 
environmental learning does not inform the following season’s choices because of what  theorists 
(Henrich 2001; Boyd and Richerson 1988; Richerson and Boyd 2008; Boyd, Richerson, and 
Henrich 2011) might term maladaptive conformist bias.  The didactic modernization program 
that was GM seeds succeeded in attracting droves of farmers and likely raised yields somewhat 
(Crost et al. 2007; Herring and Rao 2012; Stone 2011a; Kathage and Qaim 2012), but within the 
specific social world of cotton cash cropping, this is not the same thing as skill.  Skill must be 
based within environmental learning as it is practice-based.  Although celebrated in the village as 
trendsetters, even the wealthiest, early adopting, largest, highest status farmers appear to have no 
means to develop skill.  In this case, the initial didactic learning that characterizes new 
agricultural technologies left farmers no way to wade through the seed market.   
When the same farmers grow rice, they employ a more certain kind of knowledge to 
manage the ecological demands of their crop and to make a profit.  The rice seed market is 
fundamentally different than cotton, giving rise to more favorable conditions for environmental 
learning.  Looking to diffusion and innovation during the spread of high-yielding varieties 
(HYVs) of rice and wheat during the Green Revolution, Munshi (2004) argued that a 
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heterogeneity of rice farming strategies and local agroecological properties inhibited social 
learning so crucical to cotton agriculture in the early 2000s.  Green revolution rice growers found 
it difficult to control for all the variables that would have allowed them to learn from their 
neighbors’ choices.  Munshi concludes that farmers tended to experiment more with HYV rice 
than wheat, in part to compensate for this missing social information.  Telangana farmers are not 
necessarily lacking socially-transmitted information to inform their rice seed choices.  My 
analysis shows that farmers widely agree on important agronomic indicators of rice success and 
compare successes and failures with new varieties across fields.  They just do not allow this to 
serve as their only or overwhelming source of information.  Rice seeds, because they can be 
saved, because farmers and buyers seek the same qualities for growing and selling this crop, 
because the choices are far fewer and more consistent, and because farmers are not necessarily 
trying to maximize their yields and profits above all other considerations, are better suited to a 
balanced interaction between environmental, social, and didactic learning. 
As I detail in chapter six, Farmers gain a tactile knowledge by touching seeds throughout 
their crop cycles.  Like the early American corn growers described by Fitzgerald (1993), they 
can judge their rice seed (in part) by if it ‘looks’ correct.  Farmers 2012-2014 overwhelmingly 
planted the same handful of Open Pollinated Variety (OPV) rice seeds year after year, giving 
them a far surer environmental knowledge base from which to make future decisions.  These 
decisions were reinforced both by the social knowledge of seeing other farmers plant and 
succeed with the same seeds and the didactic knowledge wherein the slowly introduced new 
seeds carried locally specific attributes clearly labelled to solve problems that farmers mentioned 
in complaints to plant science stations.  Some farmers were lured by the didactic and then social 
promise of a high yield with relatively untested hybrid breeding seeds locally called male/female 
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seeds.  Others were not.  That farmers did not abandon their crops in droves to take up the latest 
opportunity for quick cash, as they often do with new cotton seeds, speaks to the greater cultural 
calculus that takes place for farmer rice choices.  Rice seed can be bought or sold but it is not 
reducible to the profit end-game as easily as cotton seed.  Other farmers watched their adopting 
neighbors closely, and saw them fail or grow frustrated with hybrids.  When the didactic push to 
convert farmers to these new seeds failed, social learning did not have a chance to supplant the 
strong environmental knowledge base that characterizes rice.  However, as indicated by the 18% 
of rice choices captured by hybrid seeds 2012-2014, farmers remain open to new rice 
technology.  For now, elements of social, didactic, and environmental learning are balanced here. 
On organic farms, didactic learning must transition from initial education to 
environmental and social learning relatively quickly.  To stay profitable, most farmers try to 
strike a balance whereby they can maintain a positive relationship with their sponsoring organic 
program and still farm in a way that allows them to generate and adapt knowledge.  Farmers take 
up a variety of learning strategies on the certified and uncertified organic farms that I visited.  
Didactic farming education groups often rely on these adapting farmers as spokespeople to 
convince other farmers to follow suit, creating new and fascinating systems of obligation 
between farmers and organic field agents.  This kind of didactic learning is designed to give way 
to social learning.  Environmental learning persists for others who work to locally adapt pest 
control methods to the availability of trees, water, and electricity in the villages.  These farmers 
are then asked to teach modified versions of organic methods in their own words the rest of the 
village.  Didactic learning here is combined with first-hand environmental knowledge, and the 
resulting information is spread to others through social learning.  Other farmers refuse to adopt 
organic methods in total, keeping a diverse skillset in which they work with didactic programs to 
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some extent and ignore them on different fields.  For many farmers, the didactic instruction of 
organic agriculture is ignored in favor of social learning because the programs are uninteresting 
and time-consuming.  Preferring to learn from others in village who attend planning meetings 
and distribute seeds, these farmers treat organic knowledge and inputs as commodities brought to 
them at a discounted price.  As with many GM cotton farmers, the technology’s environmental 
superiority is less meaningful than the social weight of the people promoting it.   
Importantly, all farmers are generating and adapting all of these kinds of knowledge 
because they all grow a variety of crops in a variety of agricultural regimes that permit different 
kinds of learning.  GM cotton farmers grow rice, almost all farmers grow heirloom vegetables 
and flowers in their fields, and several organic farmers grow GM cotton, organic cotton, and rice. 
The knowledge they create and adapt is a function not of their own capabilities but of the social 
and didactic conditions under which they can use these different seed commodities (Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1:  Crops Discussed in this Thesis and their Relationship to Tripartite Learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this diagram, environmental, didactic, and social learning represent the different influences by 
which farmers make decisions.  Numbers represent crops discussed in this thesis.  The closer 
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much direction or social 
imperative to conform 
Learning from 
schemes but not 
continuing them due 
to poor environmental 
feedback 
8 
Initially didactic 
learning gives way to 
social emulation 
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numbers are to the lines, the more dominant that kind of learning in the reward structure of that 
crop’s agriculture, as determined by the analysis in the forthcoming chapters.  Circles indicate 
relative distance from the center, in which all three kinds of learning would be used.  For 
example, farmers use primarily environmental and social learning to make decisions about OPV 
rice, and more occasionally make use of didactic knowledge.  Farmer more consistently favor 
social learning for GM cotton decisions and environmental learning for organic sorghum and 
wild or semi-cultivated plants.  In general, the most heavily didactic or heavily social kinds of 
learning remove farmers the farthest from environmental learning.  This places them at the 
greatest risk for deskilling.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has served to underscore that environmental, social, and didactic learning 
are never really separate.  These three types of learning define the conditions by which farmers 
generate knowledge and thus heavily influence farmer decision-making.  When different kinds of 
learning are emphasized due to differing agricultural regimes, farmers are able to build certain 
kinds of information.  Without these incentives in place, farmers are forced to turn their attention 
to other elements of the production process in the hopes of surviving in this quickly-changing 
agrarian economy.  Knowledge of seed choice, for example may be faddish and transient, but the 
knowledge that one should conform to neighbors and shop suggestions as the best way to 
navigate this uncertainty is widespread.  Unfortunately in that example, abandoning seed 
knowledge to others in favor of a conformist buying pattern has far more benefits for predatory 
seed companies than for farmers.   
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When knowledge becomes relegated to the few, or tied to a didactic effort, knowledge 
itself becomes a commodity.  It becomes a thing with a social life and as such it must be 
recognized and culturally marked.  It is for this reason that I argue that commodity theory is a 
helpful tool for bridging disciplinary divides in this study of the anthropology of knowledge on 
Telangana farms.  Both a means of production and a consumed commodity, different kinds of 
seeds are culturally marked as different things for different farmers.  As such, these seeds or 
rather the agricultural regimes in which they grown allow farmers to create different kinds of 
knowledge and thus make different kinds of decisions.  As shown by anthropological work that 
emphasizes informant opinions and performance, a wide range of commodities come with 
cultural baggage that influences the knowledge that users can create and share:  fertilizers and 
pesticides had to be reimagined in India as part of an Ayurvedic understanding of plant health 
(Vasavi 1999; Gupta 1998); workers invoked spirits when confronted with the cold working 
relationships of foreign-owned firms in Bolivia (Taussig 1983) or Malaysia (Ong 2010); 
McDonalds had to adapt its menu and marketing to local consumers to become profitable in East 
Asia (Watson 2006); and in Telangana, India, genetically modified seeds intended to improve 
environmental sustainability exacerbate problems in the farmer learning process (Stone, Flachs, 
and Diepenbrock 2014).  Seed markets, commodity buyers, shops, didactic programs, 
universities, state and corporate programs, the village hierarchy of social status, and the uses to 
which farmers put the crops provide the cultural context in which farmers make seed decisions.  
Just as the commodity is produced, consumed, and reimagined in each stage, farmers use these 
different crops to produce different kinds of knowledge relevant to markets, seed stores, and 
visitor performances.  Knowledge itself is a function of each crop’s and each regime’s needs.   
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This chapter has placed Stone’s (2016) tripartite theory of farmer learning in conversation 
with social theories of knowledge and ethnographic examples that illustrate social, 
environmental, and didactic learning to argue that: (1) environmental learning is especially 
crucial to the ways in which farmers develop local knowledge and (2) farmer knowledge reflects 
the kinds of opportunities they have to learn about seeds and apply that knowledge as growers 
and sellers.  In practice, farmers draw unevenly on these sources of information as a function of 
their social status, wealth, prowess as farmers, or the resources offered to them by institutions.  
The next three chapters discuss in detail how farmers make decisions about GM cotton, rice, and 
organic agriculture by drawing on quantitative and ethnographic data related to the tripartite 
learning process.  In each kind of agricultural regime, farmer seed-buying and agricultural 
management reflects the possibilities for learning and success offered by the balances of 
environmental learning, social learning, and didactic learning.   
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Chapter 5:  The Social Politics of the Breakdown in Environmental Learning Among GM 
Cotton Farmers 
 
  
 The ability to build agricultural knowledge, or skill, is a balancing act between different 
kinds of learning.  In a balanced tripartite system of agricultural learning (Stone 2016), to over-
rely on any particular kind of information is to shut out new opportunities, say, ignoring the 
potential of a new extension service or turning a blind eye to a neighbor who uses an innovative 
new method.  In this chapter I draw on the experiences of GM cotton farmers to show that 
environmental learning is especially crucial to the skilling process.  When farmers step back 
from environmental learning to rely on information that is not based in their own experience, 
they additionally relinquish a monopoly on knowledge and its execution.  The conditions by 
which environmental knowledge is created thus take on a social dimension as farmers try to learn 
about cotton seeds and their management.  Because knowledge is socially mediated on 
Telangana cotton farms, the most vulnerable small, poor, tribal, and low-caste farmers can 
become the most abused by the uncertainty in this predatory cotton seed capitalism. 
This chapter argues that farmers do not have an equal or free choice in their cotton seed 
decisions and that farmers do not herd toward particular Bt cotton seeds because the faddishly 
popular seeds are superior.  At the level of individual farms as well as the level of the village as a 
whole, no seeds perform demonstrably better than others.  In fact, no farmers be they richer, 
more experienced with the seeds, or older benefitted from yield advantages with cotton seeds 
generally, yield advantages from fad seeds, or yield advantages from with related management 
strategies.  Importantly, the lack of observable advantages with these seeds does not arise 
because farmers fail to conduct experiments designed to generate environmental knowledge.  
Many farmers, especially larger farmers with more land available for trialing, plant multiple 
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seeds and evaluate the results.  However, none of this seems to provide dividends during the 
harvest and farmers appear to be starting each new season with no environmentally-based 
planting rationale. 
Telangana cotton farms are unlikely places to trial for a number of reasons.  First, the 
village is not a random, controlled test site.  Large farmers control more of the available village 
seed real estate, meaning that other farmers who observe their neighbors’ results and see what 
seeds they should plant in the coming season are more likely to see the results of larger farmers’ 
choices than smaller farmers’ choices.  While experiencing no yield advantages, these larger 
farmers enjoy social advantages, such as friendlier access to seed sellers or extension agents in 
addition to a modicum of agricultural advantages that allows them to better manage the uncertain 
seed market.  Furthermore many farmers buy seeds from black market traders or through larger 
neighbors, lacking specific information about these seeds even in the best of circumstances.  
Larger farmers may play a role in helping to drive seed fads, but this is not evidence of any 
seed’s superiority so much as evidence that farmer choices in the context of poor environmental 
feedback, unclear government policies, market saturation, and socially driven agricultural 
decision making are dynamic and fragile.  Farmers are not learning which seeds are best, quite 
the opposite:  they are learning that they should not trust their own results. 
Among conventional farmers, GM cotton seed choice is a high-investment, high-payout 
gambit.  As such, profit margins and yield are paramount.  Almost all farmers planted multiple 
seed brands so that they could evaluate the results.  However, in most cases, these trials proved 
to be meaningless.  Rumor of a spectacular yield in a neighbor’s farm or one seen on television is 
enough to cause a farmer to disregard their own experience and rush to plant the new seed, even 
if the farmer had no personal experience with it – one farmer abandoned a seed he had planted 
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for at least five years because he “heard from a friend that [fad seed] Jadoo gave farmers in [a 
nearby town] high yields”.  Additionally, the recall rate of seeds from year to year is very poor.  
As most farmers keep neither receipts nor seed packets after seeds germinate, last year’s choice 
is often forgotten by the time that farmers buy new seeds.  They may evaluate differences in 
seeds but these differences are often ignored or misremembered when farmers visit the shop.  
Add to this the larger context of seed uncertainty and a social imperative to defer to visiting 
experts, shops, and the advice of large landlords, and cotton choice becomes ironically 
constrained in a marketplace defined by too many choices. 
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Figure 5.1:  Cotton Seeds by Percentage of Households Buying a Particularly Popular 
Brand
7
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the transient, faddish popularity of seed brands in the Warangal 
District.  Lucky brands enjoy, on average, a year of ascension, a year of popularity, and a year of 
decline.  As a whole, farmers are switching brands so quickly that they do not have time to 
evaluate given seed brands on their environmental merits in the farmers’ own field.  This graph 
shows the severity of the fads and the depth of their reach – in 2011, for example, more than 
60% of cotton farmers bought part of the package of Dr. Brent and Neeraja offered by the 
Mahyco Seed Company, only to abandon it in droves by 2013.  The resulting uncertainty after 
                                               
7 For a complete discussion of these fads and their periodicity see Stone, Flachs, and Diepenbrock (2014) 
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fad years leaves knowledge vacuums where the farmers are adrift and unsure which seed banner 
to gather under.  This instability, illustrated as a series of peaks and valleys, reflects an 
interruption of the skilling process.  Stone (2007) blamed this interruption on an overreliance on 
social emulation. By 2014, this pattern was the new normal boom and bust of cotton farming.  
For such farmers, knowledge becomes more fragile in the face of sudden unexpected changes.  A 
fundamental characteristic of transient fads (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992), this 
instability leads farmers to over-rely on experts in the village or behind the desk of a seed shop 
because the farmers themselves are not the stewards of local agricultural knowledge.  A brief 
summary of a seed craze in 2012 illustrates the precariousness of this situation for all farmers. 
 
The Effects of Uncertainty in the 2012 Seed Market 
The government of Andhra Pradesh was not oblivious to faddish spikes in seed demand 
as these drove up investment costs for an already expensive crop that threatens to place farming 
constituents in debt.  In 2007, the populist state chief minister YSR Reddy led a campaign to cap 
license fees for Bt technology in Andhra Pradesh.  Recognizing that a state-endorsed added cost 
would be better than the rampant theft of their technology, Monsanto reduced the technology fee 
for Bt genes to Rs 150 ($3), down from Rs 1250 ($25) (The Hindu 2007).  This protected 
farmers buying Bt seeds in shops from the price demanded by a free market, although seed costs 
have increased more than Rs 300 ($6) since this policy was put in place.  In 2012, a spike in 
demand for three seeds
8
 from the Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (Mahyco) and one seed
9
 
from the Nuzivedu seed company led to shortages across Telanagana.  The seed companies that 
serviced Telangana, and particularly the Warangal district, had failed to allot enough seeds to 
                                               
8 Neeraja (MRC 7201-BGII), Dr. Brent (MRC 7347-BGII), Kanak (MRC 7351-BGII).  The trade name of the seed 
brand is listed first with the hybrid number given in parentheses.   
9 Mallika (Bt-NCS 207). 
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meet projected demand.  The maximum retail price assigned by the state precluded shops from 
legally raising prices in response, and so farmers who could afford to do so rushed to Warangal 
city shops to pre-order seeds.   
To control demand and temper high market prices during this period of seed scarcity, the 
state government distributed permits that guaranteed a given seed’s price and availability based 
on shop pre-orders.  Permits, distributed to farmers from their local government office through a 
lottery system, specified a particular shop, seed brand, price, and the number of packets an 
individual could purchase.   
 
10
 
A Warangal seed permit for one packet of a Mahyco Hybrid. 
 
In this way, one farmer got one permit for one package at one shop.  Prices were (theoretically) 
controlled and sales of those four seeds without a permit were criminalized.  Had Warangal 
district farmers and seed sellers followed these restrictions exactly, farmers who did not receive a 
permit or did not receive sufficient quantities of the seeds they desired would, like any rational 
economic actor, simply switch to another brand.  This solution was, at best, naïve of the 
destabilized learning that led farmers to stampede for specific seeds in the first place, as well as 
                                               
10 All images taken by Andrew Flachs unless otherwise specified. 
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their willingness to circumvent the law.  At worst, the perceived authority given to the seeds by 
government involvement sustained the fads for those seeds and made those popular seeds seem 
even more elusive and desirable.   
“The farmers are like ants”, observed one Warangal shop owner drily when I asked why 
the farmers were seizing upon the fad seeds.  By capping the cost for these seeds far below what 
farmers were willing to pay, the state government unintentionally created a black market to serve 
those farmers without seed permits.  Prices varied, but farmers could expect to pay at least twice 
the shop rate (Rs 2000 or $40) for black market seeds that should cost Rs 930 ($18.60) .  In 
2012, the Mahyco company distributed about 6,000,000 packets
11
 to the state of Andhra Pradesh, 
leaving a deficit of 400,000.  These missing packets arrived from other districts and from the 
neighboring state of Maharastra, where seed supply better matched seed demand (Rao 2012; The 
New Indian Express 2012).  Shop owners and farmers offered several theories on the supply and 
demand mismatch: seed growers had stolen the crop and sold it to a rival company; Mahyco was 
keeping the demand high and supply low in the Telangana region to encourage smuggling and 
extract bribes; agreements between the state government and Mahyco limited supply to increase 
demand for the Mahyco products in coming years. 
Whatever the root cause, the permit system proved to be frustrating for seed shops that 
abided by government rules: permits kept the price artificially low, which benefited farmers 
lucky enough to receive them, but the system also punished shop owners who made a slim profit 
on the most popular seeds and then watched as black market brokers capitalized on the supply 
vacuum.  Preordering Mahyco seeds in 2012 was expensive and required shop owners to take out 
loans with high interest rates – the “more we invest in Mahyco, the more we lose” scoffed a 
                                               
11 One seed packet is sufficient to plant one acre of cotton at a “double lining” in which plants and rows are equally 
spaced, usually about 90cm by 90cm.  Since 2013, many farmers have begun “single lining”, in which the spacing is 
tighter and two packets are required to plant an acre.  Spacing will be discussed later in this chapter.    
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Warangal shop owner in an interview.  To mitigate this loss, some shop owners charged farmers 
extra ‘transportation costs’ that mysteriously disappeared from receipts.  In more extreme cases 
shop owners sold the black market seeds themselves, although agriculture officers made enough 
highly publicized arrests to make shop owners wary of such obvious lawbreaking (The Hindu 
2012).  Frustrated with repeated seed shortages, black markets, and reports of unreliable seeds, 
Telangana’s northern neighbor, Maharastra, first accused Mahyco of selling directly to the black 
market (Wadke 2012) and then ultimately banned Mahyco seeds for several months.   
The government chooses seeds for price guarantee permits based on their projected 
popularity, but in 2012 this became a vicious cycle where people demanded popular seeds, the 
government limited their distribution with a permit scheme, and the resultant scarcity then 
caused those seeds to become even more popular.  Farmers in the Warangal villages where I 
worked dealt with this new wrench in their learning process in different ways.  “Those with 
political connections and money take the permits and the cheaper Mahyco seeds.  Others see 
them [taking the seeds] and want them, and pay high prices for them, and then continue to plant 
Dr. Brent and Neeraja even after the plants fail because the shops sell out,” complained 
Ralledapalle thanda farmer Yakub.    Certainly knowledge of the scarcity, personal relationships 
with the office distributors, and the money necessary to guarantee preorders played a role in who 
was given permits and who was left to scramble in the aftermath.  In Gongapalle and Kavrupad, 
dominated by farmers belonging to the caste system, farmers tended to accept this scarcity and 
the resulting unequal permit distribution.   Other farmers followed a more communitarian 
strategy in which they pooled their subsidized seeds to distribute them equally. In Srigonda, this 
redistribution fell along the lines of a farming cooperative while closely related tribal families in 
the thandas near Srigonda and Ralledapalle distributed seeds amongst relatives.  In the absence 
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of law-abiding shops or kinship ties, farmers turned to unscrupulous brokers, who were restricted 
by neither legal nor familial requirements to supply a good seed at a fair price.  In turning to 
brokers, farmers showed that they were so desperate to get a chance at fad seeds that they would 
risk buying a more expensive seed with no guarantee of its veracity. 
Broker strategies varied between communities with differing levels of access to 
information or transportation.  The most obvious and least difficult way to buy black market 
seeds was to wait until another farmer mentioned an opportunity and go along.  This required 
little special effort on the part of the farmer, but required that the farmer possessed the right 
access to transportation or social connections.  A more proactive approach involved speaking 
directly to shop owners, who sometimes sold black market seeds and offered to connect farmers 
with brokers.  Others pooled their resources with friends and neighbors to send delegates to other 
states or other districts where they could find the fad seeds.  The community paid for their 
smuggler’s transportation and expenses as well as a modest markup for the seeds in exchange for 
a guarantee for their favorite brands.  This could be dicey – if border police apprehended the 
buyer as he crossed into Andhra Pradesh the person would be on their own, receiving no help 
from those who sent him.  Seed brokers contended with police checkpoints on Andhra Pradesh’s 
Maharastra border, leading entreprenurial smugglers to hide seeds in containers for non-permit 
brands, bribe border guards, or even hide seed packets in headscarves and turbans.  After hastily 
assuring me that he only brought small, practically-legal, amounts across the border, one broker 
reminded me that the high risk entailed a high reward: “he who does not get caught will be 
king”, he smirked.  This optimism was tempered by uncertainty.  Farmers rarely knew brokers’ 
names, could not find them after the sale, and even bought the seeds in secret to avoid being 
discovered by police. 
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In addition to the necessarily higher investment cost of purchasing their favorite seeds in 
the black market, farmers stressed two risks when buying seeds from brokers: seed resellers give 
no bill of sale and they sometimes sell spurious or “duplicate” (Telugu = nakkali) seeds.  The 
problem of receipts is significant as receipts give cotton farmers a modicum of security.  Should 
the seeds fail to germinate, as is especially likely in times of drought or unpredictable weather, 
they can present their bill of sale to agricultural officers who may then launch an investigation 
and eventually compensate farmers for lost revenue.  Farmers with receipts at least have a chance 
to recoup their losses.  When farmers buy at extra cost in the black market, they waive their right 
to this recourse and brokers are difficult to track down by the time that cotton germinates.  This 
places farmers with the least access to desirable seeds at the most risk for being cheated.  Poor 
farmers ask wealthier neighbors with connections in other states to bring seeds; they ask the 
higher caste neighbors on whose farms they provide labor to buy seeds; farmers living in tribal 
thandas without regular bus access are especially likely to see these travelling brokers and to buy 
their more convenient but less reliable seeds.  The reverse, that brokers would target high caste 
households or that high caste farmers would ask their laborers to pick up seeds is unthinkable in 
this social landscape.   
 It would be misleading to blame GM seeds themselves for causing farmer uncertainty.  
However, the pitfalls of the subsidy system illustrate how devotion to fad seeds exacerbates 
underlying risk and complicates existing problems with environmental learning as regards seed 
choices – Warangal district farmers in 2012 bought unlabeled seeds from untrustworthy people 
for exorbitant prices even though the farmers had never before planted 30% of the seeds they 
purchased.  This extreme reliance on social learning, the emulation of others as opposed to 
environmental learning from first-hand experience, characterizes Warangal farmers as an 
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aggregate over the last ten years (Stone 2007; Stone, Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014).  Having 
established that farmers go to extreme lengths to get particular seeds, an economist may protest 
that this is because the fads seeds are demonstrably better.  However, as I will show, the fad 
seeds do not give any better yields for any group of farmers.  Furthermore, an overload of seed 
options, deceptive labelling, and poor environmental information about the spread of available 
seeds prevented farmers from making truly free choices when they bought seeds.  Given the 
exhaustive array of seed choices and the uninformed way in which they are purchased, seed 
choices are often more a social choice than an economic choice. The next section discusses the 
initial uncertainty in the GM cotton market and the dramatic rise in GM seed brands over the last 
decade. 
 
Uncertainty in the Seed Market During the Introduction of GM Cotton 
In 2001, as Indian regulators scrutinized stands of Bt cotton in test plots, tragedy struck 
Indian cotton farmers in the form of a sweeping bollworm infestation.  Yet one hybrid brand, 
Navbharat-151, mysteriously resisted the bollworms and saved harvests for farmers in the 
northern state of Gujarat. Ensuing investigations revealed that the Navbharat company had 
developed and sold the seed, containing Monsanto’s Bt gene and conferring resistance to the 
bollworms, for at least three years (Roy, Herring, and Geisler 2007; Jayaraman 2001; Shah 
2005).  Controversy surrounding the Navbharat-151’s well-publicized success led Gujarati seed 
producers (with the understandable exception of Navbharat) to file a suit with environmental 
regulators and uproot existing Navbharat cottons on the grounds of genetic contamination.  The 
stopgap was shortlived, and in the face of state legalization, further hesitancy from the central 
government would have been  “pointless” (Roy, Herring, and Geisler 2007:160).   In March 
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2002, India opened its doors to three provisionally approved Bt hybrid cotton seeds.  The years 
immediately preceding and following GM legalization were characterized by the rampant theft of 
experimental transgenic seeds and the cottage industry that arose to surreptitiously breed and sell 
them, what Herring (2007) and others term Robin-Hooding.  Opportunistic gins, especially in 
Gujarat, saved and illegally sold GM seeds, creating a market defined by a few trusted corporate 
varieties and many more spurious stealth seeds, a kind of agrarian “anarcho-capitalism” (Herring 
2007:135) where counterfeiters and legal distributors vied for market shares.  The same market 
saturation is now experienced among Chinese smallholders, where shakedown streets and 
spurious seed sellers trip over themselves to recruit buyers (Wang and Fok 2014).  Fueled by a 
mismatch between demand and access in both countries, black market vendors’ opportunism 
compounds the already present confusion over what GM cotton is and does.  Citing an official 
within the Indian Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), Herring (2007) suggested 
that the early uncertainty might give way to a greater reliance on and trust in corporate seed 
breeders (although he argues that a ‘Goldilocks’ solution exists where regulation and stealth 
seeds coexist might be more likely).  The enthusiasm with which farmers adopted Bt cotton by 
2008 signified different things to international agribusiness, the NGO apparatus, and the farmers 
themselves.  Agribusiness tried to frame legal GM cotton as an technological fix to curb suicide 
and yield failure;  NGOs warned against the specter of neoliberalism and corporate colonialism; 
cotton farmers heard of yield increases at a time when researchers report that the seeds were 
poorly understood and when a limited number of GM seeds were available to a limited number 
of farmers (Herring 2007; Plewis 2014; Pearson 2006; Qaim and Zilberman 2003; Stone 2007; 
Stone 2002).  By 2013, 92% of cotton planted across India contained Bt genes (Cotton 
Corporation of India Ltd. 2014) 
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In 2002, Indian farmers had the option of buying three legal GM seeds alongside a 
cottage industry of illegal Bt seeds based in Gujarat.  By 2012, the illegally produced Gujarati 
Navbharat 151 had likely disappeared and farmers in the Warangal district appeared to prefer to 
buy one of the 1,000 available corporate seeds, seeing seeds sold by brokers or in unlabeled 
packages as an option of last resort.  Branded, commercially produced hybrids are far more 
popular, triggering the fads, scarcities, and permits.  Facing seed shortages, Warangal cotton 
growers in 2012 turned to riskier, smuggled, unlabeled, seeds sold by brokers only after they 
failed to obtain those seeds legally and always with the hope that the seed they purchased was 
the brand it claimed to be.  Fraudulent, black-market stealth seeds were railed against by farmers 
and corporate interests alike while newspapers carried ads teaching farmers to spot fakes. 
 
 
A 2014 advertisement in a local paper from Ajeet seeds Ltd. shows farmers how to spot spurious seed packages 
 
The stealth market of homemade seeds that persists in China was not a factor in seed 
purchases in Telangana 2012-2014.  More important is the explosion of legal seed brands, many 
of which are duplicitously labeled, contain the same hybrid constructs, and may be mislabeled or 
misleadingly sold by seed brokers.  GM seeds contain one of seven gene constructs, but the vast 
majority (Table 5.1) of these seeds contain the gene construct MON 15985 as of 2013, a second 
generation, Bt-expressing cry gene construct licensed by Monsanto under the trade name 
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Bollgard II ®.  MON 15985 represents the second generation of GM cotton in India, expressing 
two different versions of the insecticidal Cry proteins found in Bacillus thuringiensis.  Although 
I spoke with some Maharastran farmers in 2014 who planted illegally obtained F1 research 
hybrids of the as-yet unreleased next generation of GM cotton, which stacks traits for Bt and 
resistance to Monsanto’s herbicide Roundup ®, the corporate market has little to fear from 
spurious and viciously hated nakkali (fake) seeds.  Nakkali is a broad category and can refer to 
seeds labelled as the wrong brand; seeds containing no Bt gene intended for field refugia; seeds 
that fail to germinate; or even in one instance seeds that were not cotton.  In India, yields have 
increased, farmers have adopted Bt seeds in droves, and seeds have diversified into more than 
1000 brand names in 2014.  Of these, individual shops will likely carry several hundred seed 
brands in any given year.  From a strictly economic rationalist perspective, such brand diversity 
and heavy competition should be a boon for farmers, cutting costs and raising the quality of the  
 
Table 5.1:  Gene Constructs in Indian GM Cotton Seeds 2002-2011   
 
Gene Construct 2002 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Grand 
Total 
(cry 1Ab -cry 1Ac)  
“FM Cry 1A”  G  
   3 10 32 12 7 64 
cry 1 Ab+Cry 1 Ac   1      1 
cry 1 Ab+Cry 1C   1      1 
Cry1C (Event  S9124)      2    2 
Fusion-Bt/GFM Cry 1A        3 3 
MON 15985   7 10 53 130 142 256 598 
Mon 531 3 1 38 50 43 53 34 8 230 
Grand Total 3 1 47 63 108 215 188 274 899 
Numbers reflect the number of seeds approved by GEAC per specific genetic modification.  By 2011 
most new seeds contained Monsanto’s 15985 event, the second generation Bt technology Bollgard II®.  
No new constructs have been approved since 2012.  Source:  (GEAC 2012). 
 
seed products.  As illustrated by the seed fads (Figure 5.1), however, this is not the case (Stone, 
Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014).  First, the Indian seed market is restricted by maximum retail 
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prices, meaning that individual seed brands cannot distinguish themselves on the basis of price 
points and companies have few incentives to develop and sell superior products.  Because no 
GM cotton seeds could be sold for more than Rs 930 during 2012-2014, all seeds with Bollgard 
II® technology were sold for Rs 930.  Second, farmers surveyed for this dissertation and in the 
literature (Herring 2007; Qaim 2009; Stone and Flachs 2014) knew and continue to know 
relatively little about what GM cotton is and does beyond a vague knowledge that it may be 
resistant to some pests.  Nearly fourteen percent of the farmers surveyed in 2014 indicated either 
that the cotton they purchased that year was not Bt or that they did not know for sure if it was Bt 
(Table 5.2), although this information is clearly labeled on every seed packet.  No non-Bt seeds 
were sold at the Warangal shops surveyed 2012-2014 with exception of a cooperative shop in 
Srigonda, which sold no seeds to farmers in the sample.  Shop owners reported that such seeds 
would not be popular among farmers.  Even farmers who know what Bt is and what it does could 
be fooled by the numerous seeds with different brand names but identical hybrid numbers – the 
Nuziveedu company, which sells seeds under subsidiary companies including Fortune 
 
Table 5.2:  Farmer Knowledge of Bt in 2014 Sample (n = 463) as a Percentage of the Whole 
 
 BG II Bioseed Double 
Bt 
Yes Bt II DNK No Total 
Is this seed Bt? 1.9 0.2 0.4 82.5 1.1 9.9 3.9 100% 
Highlighted cells represent that for 9.9% (46) and 3.9% (18) of the 463 seed choices made by 194 farmers in 2014, 
farmers answered that they did not know (DNK) if the seed was Bt or that it was not a Bt seed.  Source:  Flachs 
Farmer Survey 2014. 
 
Hybrid Seeds, Asian Agri Genetics, and Dhanlaxmi Crop Science, is especially guilty of selling 
the same NCS-207 Mallika hybrid and NCS-108 Sunny hybrid type under multiple trade names.   
 
98 
 
 
Left:  seed packet front side.  Right:  seed packet back side.  A Warangal seed and chemical shop pulls down the 
different brands of the NCS-108 Sunny hybrid type that he sells in his shop.  
 
Monsanto supply chain lead C. Rajesh explains how these companies strategize: 
There is a particular hybrid code that you register in the government annals.  You need 
sales permission for each of the hybrids, right?  So there is a particular hybrid code that 
you register with the government regulatory system for a sales license.  It’s also [assigned 
as part of] a testing program in government universities just like anywhere else in the 
world, and you use a specific hybrid code.  It is possible in India to market the same 
hybrid code, same basic thing, under different brand names…Why would you want to do 
it?  You may want to do it partly because the Indian farmer is looking for diversification.  
You know, even if your product is very, very good.  The theory at least doing the rounds 
is that you know the Indian farmer never wants to put one hybrid, all eggs into one 
basket.  Even if he’s got a tiny farm of under five acres, even if it is five acres or ten 
acres, you take that you split it up between two, three, or four hybrids.  That is one part of 
the equation.  The other part of the equation is there’s also trade in between.  There’s the 
retailer, and in the retail channel, if a particular product becomes very popular…in the 
same road there can be twenty, thirty shops all selling the same product.  As the demand 
of a particular product becomes high, people start to compete with each other…now in 
that process you could quickly start dwindling profit and then after having done that, 
themselves they would hate that product because they would say, ‘hey, I’m not making 
any money out of it, I’m not going to push this anymore.’   
 
Rajesh was quick to note that this is not Monsanto’s strategy, as Monsanto makes money 
from GM licenses, not from seeds sold by other companies.  Observing multiple hybrids 
marketed under different trade names, Stone (2007) argued that the destabilization of the local 
farmer knowledge base began with the introduction of hybrid seeds and has intensified with GM 
hybrids.  As available seed brands jumped from four to 51 in 2005 and continued to grow every 
year since (Table 5.1), what manifested first as village-wide fads had become more intense, 
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district-wide fads by 2012, a phenomenon Stone calls herding behavior (Stone, Flachs, and 
Diepenbrock 2014). 
Stone's (2007; 2011a; 2011b; 2014) work in Andhra Pradesh has described this 
uncertainty as agricultural deskilling, after Braverman’s (1998) description of industrial 
alienation.  On the factory floor, workers become deskilled when knowledge is concentrated in 
the hands of managers who use that monopoly of knowledge to control the production process.  
In agriculture, knowledge and the learning process determine how farmers manage their fields as 
both producers and consumers.   Stone’s evidence for deskilling, the cotton fad patterns, was 
largely circumstantial and aggregated seed choice data from several villages.  Indian farmers had 
aggressively adopted the new technology of Bt cotton, especially after 2005, but no individual 
seed has maintained more than a passing supremacy over its competitors.  This led him to argue 
that deskilling had increased alongside an increase in reliance on social emulation, not because 
of uncertain stealth seeds or corporate robin-hooding, but because the GM hybrid seed market 
was so oversaturated with legal brand choices that the differences between seeds were 
unrecognizable; that the deceptive labelling made those differences inconsistent; and the speed at 
which farmers changed brands precluded intimate knowledge of any particular seed’s 
performance.  Having traded the iterative knowledge of seed choice first for public and private 
hybrids in the 1990s and then GM seeds in the mid-2000s, farmers as a whole switched seeds 
rapidly and copied their neighbors’ seed choices rather than basing their choices on their own 
production.  This problem was not caused but exacerbated by GM seeds.  With respect to seed 
choice, Warangal farmers as a whole had become deskilled.  Despite this overreliance on social 
emulation, cotton farmers still conducted field trials of seeds 2012-2014 as experts observe.  And 
yet because of the twisted routes that mediate cotton seed knowledge on Telangana farms, the 
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knowledge about particular seeds’ performance continues to be disregarded.  The next section 
discusses the ways in which farmers conduct trials in the field, arguing that this environmental 
learning, unreliable as it is, is overwhelmed by social learning that is itself biased in favor of 
larger farmers who plant more seeds and work with seed sellers. 
  
Bad Seed Trials in an Uneven Social Landscape 
  Stone (2007) referred to farmers as deskilled in cotton, reflected in aggregate seed fads 
rather than a detailed description of the trialing process.  By examining seed trials I will show 
how farmers make decisions in spite of conditions inimical to informative trialing, and how these 
choices are mediated through the uneven social landscape of the village.  Anthropologists 
generally try to avoid judgmental statements about the people who share their time and 
participate in research studies.  I use the loaded term “bad” here to underscore that cotton seed 
trials are not only conducted with a technology that is inherently difficult for farmers to trial but 
that the trials are themselves conducted in a way that precludes learning about specific seed 
brand qualities and applying that knowledge.  This is not a judgement of the farmers but of the 
conditions of cotton agriculture.  There is nothing inherently wrong with quickly switching 
seeds, explains Warangal agricultural extension (ANGRAU) scientist Ramarao: 
 
If it is good they will continue next year.  If it is not good, they won’t continue.  Here the 
farmers are very intelligent.  Nobody will go blindly for one variety, as you say one 
hybrid continuously for three years.  If it performs well they’ll keep going with that 
hybrid.  Otherwise they’ll throw it in the dustbin…Suppose, based on his previous 
knowledge he may choose three varieties.  Ok, then he will select three varieties for this 
year.  And also based on his relationship with other friends, like other farmer friends, 
we’re all farmers so we have chosen three varieties because in our discussion you might 
have told me other new varieties which have performed very well this year as your 
feedback.  So I will also choose those two hybrids.  So I will take those five hybrids and I 
will go with five hybrids and I will raise them in five acres.  Different acres, one hybrid  
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one acre only…due to our training programs, due to paper reading and by watching TV, 
now they have become more knowledgeable.  So based on all this knowledge, what they 
are doing now, based on the performance of the hybrids they are choosing the hybrids 
and they are going for different hybrids in five acres or three acres or two acres.  They 
won’t go for a single hybrid in all five acres.  Now the trend has changed entirely. 
 
Andrew:  When did that trend change? 
 
R:  Recently you can say in the past four, five years.   
 
C. Rajesh expressed a similar sentiment above that bears repeating: 
 
The Indian farmer is looking for diversification.  You know, even if your product is very, 
very good.  The theory at least doing the rounds is that you know the Indian farmer never 
wants to put one hybrid, all eggs into one basket.  Even if he’s got a tiny farm of under 
five acres, even if it is five acres or ten acres, you take that you split it up between two, 
three, or four hybrids. 
 
As these scientists explain, farmers are planting different seeds in different parts of their farm, 
which allows them to conduct trials and evaluate those results.  This is (to them) economic 
rationalism.  And yet that model poorly describes the fad patterns or the persistent general 
uncertainty on Telangana cotton farms.  If farmers create careful trials and coordinate or 
otherwise use each other to test the wide spread of available seeds for the agronomically ‘best’ 
seed, then the fads would have greater lasting power.  More to the point, if farmers conduct 
reliable trials, shouldn’t the fad seeds give better yields?  At least one of Ramarao’s economic 
criterion is misleading:  five seed trials in five acres is inadequate to test 1,000 possible 
windfalls, to say nothing of the problems with unlabeled, mislabeled, deceptively labeled, or 
aggressively promoted seeds procured from black market brokers.  It is probably better 
understood as an attempt to hedge one’s bets against the risk of a particular seed’s failure than a 
vote of approval for that seed.   
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 Another criterion of Ramarao’s is exactly correct – farmers are trialing seeds.  However, 
the mere presence of trials is not enough to say that farmers are actually generating agricultural 
knowledge.  The trials are flawed, in that they are conducted without good knowledge of seed 
names and under differing agronomic conditions between farmers.  It does not matter that 
farmers are not putting all of their eggs in one basket – they are not paying close attention to the 
eggs.  There are two elements of this trialing problem.  First, farmers respond poorly to their 
trials as shown below by my analysis of their yields and seed choices.  Based on ethnographic 
data, farmers even complain that they do not trust their own environmental feedback.  Second, 
the social emulation that drives farmer choices is biased in favor of what the largest, most 
socially advantaged farmers in the village choose, meaning that village level trials, in which 
farmers look to the village landscape to determine which seeds to plant, are also deeply flawed.  I 
will address the first issue, that of flawed trials, first.   
 
 
Neighbors planting different seeds can compare the relative productivity of their seeds, a way of reducing overall 
seed uncertainty and a means of environmental learning, even when the initial seed choice was made by using social 
emulation.  However, these village-level trials are skewed by the variation in resources available to the farmers and 
the dominance of larger farmers in villages’ real estate. 
 
For farmer trials to be effective, they must be able to successfully differentiate between 
seed brands and recall their own seed choices.  However, a huge percentage of farmers were not 
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able to correctly recall the seeds that they had planted in the previous year.  In 2013, I resurveyed 
141 farmers on 624 seed choices from a 2012 pilot study in four villages. In 2014 an additional 
288 farmers were resurveyed on 845 seed choices.  Low seed recall when switching to hybrids 
has already been observed in India, as found when Tripp and Pal (2000) observed that 73% of 
farmers could not recall the particular millet hybrid in their fields.  This is not the situation with 
cotton, where only 6% and 7% of farmer seed choices were “do not know” in 2013 and 2014 
respectively.   However among the farmers I resurveyed, only 57% and 41% of farmer seed 
choices in 2013 and 2014 respectively correspond to the seed choices they named during our 
interview the previous year – this problematic recall is nonetheless important as it is the 
information that farmers use to make seed choices.  However, it presents significant problems for 
anyone attempting to accurately gage the diachronic success or failure of various seeds 
themselves, e.g. to prove that particular seeds are truly superior germplasm.  This general 
uncertainty and reliance on neighbors is exacerbated by the fact that many farmers do not keep 
receipts year to year and throw away their packets.  Those that keep their packets often 
misidentify seeds, change their answers midway through our surveys, claim to not remember 
seeds entirely, or are contradicted by the packets that they present in interviews.  When farmers 
value buying ‘the popular seed’, individual seed names are less important. 
 Not only do farmers have a great deal of difficulty remembering particular names, they 
rarely plant seeds long enough to associate environmental information with those names (Figure 
5.2).  Many farmers even suggested that regardless of yields, one should switch to the newest  
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Figure 5.2:  Average Number of Years Farmers Plant Cotton Seeds 2012-2014 
 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
seeds every year or at least every three years.  This anecdotal pattern coincides with the three 
year curve of fad seeds, but it can lead to seemingly arbitrary switches.  In one extreme case, a 
farmer who had planted Mahyco’s Neeraja seed and received a decent harvest with it for nine 
years abandoned that seed in favor of Kaveri’s Jadoo seed, which he had never planted but heard 
was successful in a neighboring village.  “Everyone was planting this seed this year”, he 
explained, and it would have been foolish of him to miss out on the widely believed best bet.  
The hope for high yields is paramount, allowing conformist bias to the fad patterns to take 
precedence over farmer knowledge.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
n =   311 
Mean =   1.48 
SD =   1.55 
Min =  0 
Max =  10 
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Farmers discuss yields and inputs in the seed shops, under the shade of Neem trees, at the 
bus stop, in newspapers, in fields – in any place where farmers congregate.  Who talks with 
whom and who feels comfortable approaching whom to discuss farming are matters mediated by 
social distance, caste, and wealth, but May and June are abuzz with rumors about new and old 
seeds.  When I ask why farmers do not stay with seeds that they planted in the previous years, 
Srigonda thanda farmer Ramakoti explains “it is good to switch to new seeds each year or at 
least every once in a while.  The companies start to get lazy after a period of success and farmers 
ourselves get complacent by planting the same thing year after year.  Our switching, keeps the 
farmers and the companies working hard, doing the best work possible.”    In an agricultural 
environment defined by the fates of weather, seeds, and gods, Ramakoti refers to a sense of 
meritocracy - by working hard, one can succeed.  Hard work does not manifest in clean, orderly 
farm spaces as it might in the social signaling found on an American farm (Benson 2012; Stoll 
2002) but rather in the conspicuous consumption of pesticides and fertilizers, applying science 
and sweat to one’s field work and always seeking improvement.  His neighbor, Hatti Singh, 
agrees and explains that agriculture is a zero sum game: “You should always seek to produce 
more than your neighbors. If they spray four times, you have to spray five. That way, you’ll 
always have the best yield.  More than that, you have to treat the crop like your children, 
working hard and being attentive to its food and protection, giving sprays each week.”  More 
pessimistically, a farmer focus group complained:  “If a new company’s seed comes with a new 
name then it will give a good yield only for one year.  Every farmer after that first year ends 
thinks that [that seed] will give a good yield.  Then in the second year [the same company] gets 
duplicate seeds [to provide to farmers].”  “That next year,” I began, asking for clarification, 
“Duplicate aypotundi.  Nakkali,”  the farmers finished:  They will arrive as duplicates, fakes.  
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Even when seeds are bought in shops and the labels are themselves correct, farmers are hesitant 
to trust older brands.  Thus have farmers gained a kind of environmental knowledge that it is 
good to hedge one’s bets and mistrust older seeds, but it is knowledge that helps them avoid old 
seeds rather then choose new ones.   
Confusingly labeled seeds are misremembered year to year and local knowledge contends 
that seeds should not be replanted too often because the companies themselves are not 
trustworthy.  Yet as ANGRAU scientist Ramarao mentioned above, farmers do indeed plant 
multiple seeds in different fields and evaluate the results for a variety of phenotypic and 
agronomic traits.  In focus groups, farmers mentioned looking for  drought resistance, resistance 
to heavy rains at harvest time when cotton bolls are vulnerable to mold and rot, large boll size, 
high numbers of bolls, large plants exhibiting pest resistance – everything one might expect from 
a  farmer trying to maximize their yields. Although they mix seed cotton from different brands 
together when selling at markets, farmers who buy multiple seeds rarely mix the seeds together 
in the field.  Mixing seeds, farmers claim, would prevent them from seeing differences in the 
seeds that they plant.  However, seed knowledge is so unreliable and transient and cotton so 
based in yield as a proxy for profit that farmers are willing to change their seeds in favor of any 
new popular seed:  a tribal farmer with three acres planted five seeds in separate plots to compare 
height and boll size, but had no way of recording this information.  Furthermore, he mixed all of 
his cotton together at the harvest and so could get only a vague idea of relative yields; a tribal 
farmer from a neighboring village planted his seeds separately but couldn’t recall which seeds he 
had planted the previous year.  When I asked how he decided what seeds were good to plant he 
told me that he followed “intelligent people” like his richer neighbors; a caste farmer who 
planted his seeds in separate spaces claimed to be looking for differences in sprays and diseases.  
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He told me in detail about the differences between three seeds that he planted, but he ultimately 
ignored this environmental feedback because his neighbor appeared to do well with two different 
seeds; another caste farmer planted his fields separately to evaluate differences in the seeds, but 
claims that seeds only work well for only one year and so does not factor in these differences 
when buying new seeds.  Farmers are indeed overwhelmingly adopting Bt cotton seeds, jumping 
at fad seeds, and even trialing different seeds, but the social dynamics of the village for choices 
with this cash crop ensure that this adoption says little about farmer knowledge.   
Yield in 100 kilogram bales per acre planted, the ultimate variable for this cotton cash 
crop in the minds of the farmers, responds poorly to factors associated with farmer knowledge 
including time planted, age, acreage, and number of seeds planted (Table 5.3) – all factors that 
should be related to environmental learning.  Without a clear yield payoff for learning about 
seeds, farmers have no real incentive to stress environmental learning.  Regressions that test the 
correlations per seed between age and yield, acreage and yield, and years planted per seed and 
yield show no relationship, while regressions that correlate the number of seeds that farmers 
planted with their yields or that test the previous year’s yield as a predictor of the following 
year’s yield are similarly inconclusive. 
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Table 5.3:  Absence of Relationship between Yield and Elements of Environmental Skill or 
Status 
2012 
 
Yield 
Variable 
Years 
Planted 
Number of 
Seeds Planted 
Per Farmer 
Age Total 
Acreage 
Cotton 
Acreage 
Previous 
Year’s 
Yield 
n = 583 seed 
choices by 
293 farmers 
Linear 
regression 
of variable 
against 
2012 yield 
(r
2
) 
.001 .003 0.005 0.007 0.000 .003 
        
2013 Yield 
Variable 
Years 
Planted 
Number of 
Seeds Planted 
Per Farmer 
Age Total 
Acreage 
Cotton 
Acreage 
Previous 
Year’s 
Yield 
n = 445 seed 
choices by 
226 farmers 
Linear 
regression 
of variable 
against 
2013 yield 
(r
2
) 
.022 .000 0.001 .003 .004 .008 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
 
While farmers do not show any qualitative or quantitative evidence of building 
knowledge related to seed choices, these farmers should be able to systematically trial and 
evaluate other aspects of cotton management, particularly planting density and pesticide spray 
payoff.  However, the anxieties of seed uncertainty in the hierarchical social politics of 
Telangana village life lend special authority to expert advice.  The imperative to do what shops, 
agricultural scientists, and other farmers suggest and what appears to be popular overwhelms 
actual trials of these management strategies.  There appears to be a modest yield advantage in 
single lining, a higher density planting method, but more important are the various cost benefit 
analyses that the farmers apply when making that decision.  Planting density is one kind of 
information that should be easily translated between fields – if I plant more, and have the 
resources to care for a dense crop (including increased weediness, increased water, increased 
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fertilizer, and increased pest attacks), I can yield more.  Between 2012 and 2013, farmers tested 
these methods.  74 changed their planting density and 25 tried a mix of low and high density to 
track the varying inputs and outputs.  Others watched their trials with interest.  Generally 
speaking 2012-2014, farmers tended to move from low density double lining, in which the cotton 
is planted in distinct horizontal and vertical rows, to single lining, in which cotton is planted in 
tighter vertical rows with no regard for horizontal lines.  Forming two even lines, double lined 
cotton is easier to plow with a bullock while single lined cotton uses more of the available land.  
Forty percent of low density farmers switched to higher density planting, compared to 16 percent 
of high density farmers going to low density planting (Figure 5.3).  By 2014 the issue was 
largely settled, with a clear majority of farmers single lining.   
 
Figure 5.3.  Changes in Cotton Planting Density 
 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
Yet higher density itself was not necessarily better yielding.  A simple t-Test revealed no 
significant differences in reported yields of single versus double lining in 2012 or 2013 (Figure 
5.4).  Lining itself does not necessarily provide an advantage.   
 
2012 2013 2014 
Double 132 86 57 
Mix 22 28 4 
Single 73 120 154 
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Figure 5.4:  Yields from Cotton Single and Double Lining Reported for 2012 and 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
 2012 Single 2012 Double 2013 Single 2013 Double 
n 98 136 154 57 
Mean 7.31 7.06 6.94 6.81 
SD 3.45 3.76 2.94 2.63 
Minimum 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 
Maximum 23.33 23.33 18.00 15.00 
 
 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
Single lining is, however, necessarily more expensive in that it often requires a higher investment 
in picking labor, weeding labor, pesticides, water facilities, fertilizers, and seed packets.  And 
yet, as shown above, single lining is increasingly popular for farmers as a whole.  Why follow a 
more expensive planting strategy with ambiguous results?   
 In part, this shift in planting density is being pushed off the farm.  Shops and university 
extension agents promote dense planting as a way to increase overall yields.  The Warangal and 
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Akola agricultural universities servicing Telangana and Maharastra farmers were testing plots of 
various densities in 2014 while extension agents in Warangal were recommending a single line 
spacing of 90 cm between rows and 60 cm between plants to achieve a production boost of 25-
40%.  Farmers in this sample did not achieve this boost, but they appear to be willing to try.  On 
one hand, the influence of universities and shops should be credited, as farmers planting 
unfamiliar seeds ask shops how to plant the seeds, and the extension scientists regularly 
communicate their findings to the shops.  Alternately, single lining may appeal to farmers as a 
risk reduction strategy, as farmers pointed out that in the event of unpredictable weather patterns, 
the sheer number of single lined plants might make up some of the loss felt by a more sparse 
system.  In either scenario, buying more seeds and devoting more resources to these plants is 
easier for farmers who have more of these resources and better access to them.  Larger farmers of 
higher caste can cultivate friendly relationships with shops and extension agents, while it would 
be very unusual for large farmers to follow the suggestions of poorer, lower caste villagers.  This 
speaks to the second problem in seed trials and in cotton agriculture generally:  the social 
emulation that disrupts trialing is itself biased in favor of larger farmers for a variety of 
agricultural and sociological reasons.   
When asked how he might solve unexpected insect problems in his cotton crop, one small 
farmer replied “If I have any problem [with insects] I should try a different pesticide, then take 
that plant to a fertilizer shop, where the shop owner will tell me what to do.”  “Won’t the owner 
just try to sell you something else,” I asked?  “If you spend some money, they’ll help.  If not they 
won’t,” he replied.   “And what if you can’t afford an expensive pesticide,” I continued.  “We are 
poor people,” the farmer explained.  “You could take up a collection if you can’t pay, or you 
could ask a large farmer for help.”  Another farmer was more direct:  “I haven’t studied or gone 
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to school, how can I know what is best – I ask large farmers and shops for help.”  As members of 
a dominant class only sixty years ago and enjoying caste or direct family connections to business 
owners in the current economy, larger farmers are endowed with a responsibility to guide and 
help the rest of the village when possible, making them ideal models for small farmers.  Their 
accumulated wealth also provides a decisive advantage in management, securing and knowing 
about loan programs, and working with new technologies. 
 
The Influence of Pedda Farmers in Social Learning 
Rajaiah wasn’t sure which cotton seed to plant in 2013, and so he did what many small, 
low-caste farmers do in this situation.  As a day laborer (kuli) on the field of a rich farmer, 
Rajaiah assumed that his employer had a good reason to purchase the seed and copied his choice 
of Kaveri’s Jackpot seed in his own field.  In some years, the high caste farmer even buys the 
seed for Rajaiah.  He wasn’t sure exactly what seed he had purchased but after I asked him to 
bring the seed packet he nodded with recognition.  “It’s Jackpot.  All are taking Jackpot this year 
so I am too.”  Why take the popular seed, I asked?  He laughed, half-exasperated and half-joking.  
“Oka gorra bavilo paritha, anne gorralu bavilo paritha,” he answered, a proverb that translates: 
if one goat jumps in a well, all goats jump down the well.  When farmers can’t know that a 
trusted seed will be a better choice than a dozen new varieties, they turn to local experts.  The 
irony is that those farmers with the greatest social prominence are not farming any better than the 
rest of the village. 
Social stratification within small villages in Telangana is readily apparent through 
competitive conspicuous consumption, as in much of rural India (Linssen, Kempen, and 
Kraaykamp 2010).  Manifesting in tractors, satellite dishes, livestock, or fresh paint, farming and 
113 
 
rural life often have a competitive bent to them.  In a day of interviewing it is common to speak 
with both large and small farmers and to hear divergent narratives from each.  The answer to 
almost any question on seed choice is ‘manci digabatu’ (good yield), a frustratingly vague and 
obvious claim that farmers are hoping for a good yield with the new seed.  This good-ness is 
defined by health, boll size, pickability, number of flowers, and insect resistance, but all of that is 
subservient to a seed’s potential to yield a large amount of undamaged, heavy cotton that will 
fetch a good price in the market.  The refrain of manci digabatu can get tiresome for an 
interviewer, but it underlies the fact that farmers are so willing to chase profit margins that they 
are happy to forgo some of the skilling process that affects seed decisions and puts pest 
management in the hands of the seed shops in the hopes that they'll have a great harvest like 
they've seen in newspapers or on television about.  “Good farmers can keep track of prices, sell 
when the time is right, buy new seed each year because the company knows best, and plant 
different cotton seeds to see what is good and what is bad,” explained Narayana, a larger farmer.   
As we walked through his field, he showed me how he is affirming his previous trial with 
Neeraja seeds by comparing how his brother's plants look pitiful next to his own and judging the 
many neighbors whose fields lead the way to his own.  “I am a good farmer,” he bragged, 
“because I have educated sons who help me read and keep track of prices and seeds.  Also, I 
have many of friends in the shops and in the agricultural offices.  Between all of these insiders I 
can continue to do well.”  Although these advantages do not pay dividends in cotton yields on 
the aggregate, they may give help some larger farmers and give them undue influence in the 
social learning pool on the village level.   
In cotton seed market with hundreds of choices, there is a logic to social learning, where 
farmers copy neighbors when making seed decisions.  The question, ‘why did you choose this 
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seed this year’ is often answered with ‘because it is popular’, a circular argument that speaks to 
general uncertainty in seed choices.  Farmers often have no satisfactory answer to that question 
because of the overwhelming combination of rumors, advertisements, and unclear environmental 
feedback from their own fields.  Given that they must make an important decision while 
weighing hundreds of options, farmers have to draw on different types of learning to cut through 
the noise.  There is no way for a single farmer to trial all possible seeds on their own farm, and 
so using neighbors as tests adds breadth to their knowledge base.  By seeing their neighbors and 
comparing those kinds of production, they can build environmental knowledge from that initial 
choice.  Furthermore, farmers know that their neighbors are also testing seeds, and so their 
decisions are based in a calculus of what they themselves know, what shops or intervention 
programs have told them, what they’ve seen on neighbor fields, and the presumably well-
informed decisions of others that they seek to copy – this was Ramarao’s argument.  While this 
argument does not consider the uneven flow or retention of seed information, social learning 
cannot be totally distinct from environmental learning, in the sense that people do not plant 
things that they expect will yield poorly.  A Kavrupad farmer focus group member offered the 
following advice:  “When you’re planting for the first time you should ask all of your neighbors 
about seed choices and what is best.  They’ll let you know about their yields and you can make a 
decision based on the way in which the harvest comes.”  Another farmer added, “you’ll be 
asking about ten neighbors and based on their suggestions you should plant the best one.”  What 
goes unsaid in such comments are the dynamics of who asks whom about planting, a more social 
than environmental set of decisions.   
 Unsurprisingly, larger farmers have access to more land and therefore have a greater 
ability to plant more different kinds of seeds.  However, they cast an influence over seed choices 
115 
 
in more directly social ways.  The Telugu phrase for a large farmer is pedda raytu, which 
connotes that the farmer in question has sizable holdings but also that he or she is of higher status 
and importance in the village.  In South India generally, caste and power are historically linked 
to holdings and relationships of labor whereby poorer farmers in the village work for richer 
farmers with more land (Guha 2008; Mines 2005; Vasavi 1999).  These historical relationships 
ripple into the present.  To be a large farmer is to be well-respected, be relatively wealthy, to 
have the potential to make your land productive, to be trusted by creditors, to hire others to work 
for you rather than vice versa, and to have influence over others in the village as a function of 
these historical and material advantages.  The combination of these factors gives the pedda 
farmers a negligible edge in agricultural capabilities but a large advantage in socially mediated 
access to knowledge and resources.   
 There are three questions that should be asked to see if larger farmers are indeed 
benefitting from more environmental learning: 
1.  Are larger farmers planting more different kinds of cotton seeds 
2. Are they learning about them over a longer period of time? 
3. As farmers report that yield is the be-all and end-all of cotton agriculture, are the 
larger farmers getting some kind of yield advantage from that environmental learning 
advantage? 
I will examine the first question first.  Looking to the largest 20% of farmers in my 
sample, those who stand out in their villages as larger farmers, this group consistently planted 
more different kinds of seeds, planted them over a longer period of time, and planted fad seeds 
along with everyone else; in 2013, an uncertain ‘valley’ year in the fads (Figure 5.1), pedda 
farmers were the biggest replanters of seeds with which they had experience as well as the 
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biggest planters of new seeds.  Additionally, the large farmers have the most income and take on 
the most debt, meaning that they can afford to take better care of and invest more in their fields; 
they are more likely to belong to a higher caste, affording them contacts and respect in extension 
and political institutions; they tend to be better educated and have more livestock and machinery.  
In 2013, this top quintile was above or nearly above the average of the bottom 80% of farmers in 
several relevant social and agricultural categories (Table 5.4).  Differences in yield, education, 
and assets were deemed to be not statistically significant between the top 20% of farmers and the 
bottom 80% at the level of p ≤ .05, although asset scores were close to that value.  The 
advantages in yield, education, and assets should thus be understood as general trends rather than 
statistically significant differences.  It should be further noted as explained below that the 
household data referring to income, assets, and education were drawn from a subset of the 
farmers in Ralledapalle and Kavrupad, and do not represent all farmers.  The five OC farmers in 
the household survey subset had holdings in the fourth or fifth quintile while nine of the ten SC 
farmers had holdings in the first or second quintile.  ST farmers are not stratified along caste 
lines and so exhibited a more even distribution throughout the five landholdings categories. 
Do larger farmers plant more seeds than smaller farmers, giving them more chances to 
trial more technologies?  A related line of questioning asks, do larger farmers plant their seeds 
for longer periods of time, giving them more environmental knowledge about the seeds in 
different weather conditions and different years?  In the periods of uncertainty between fads, 
time is a luxury.  Extended experience with a seed is precludes the planting of a new, potentially 
lucrative seed.  If deskilling is the failure to build environmental knowledge on seeds or an 
interruption of that process, wealthier, larger, higher status pedda farmers might avoid this by 
planting more different kinds of seeds over a longer period.  On average the largest quintile of 
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farmers  planted 3.01 and 2.79 seeds to the smallest  quintile’s 1.43 and 1.55 seeds in 2013 and 
2014 respectively (Figure 5.5).  Three seeds planted by a single farmer may not make for an 
instructive experiment in and of itself, although it is certainly a better experiment than only 
planting one seed.   
Figure 5.5:  Average Number of Cotton Seeds per Farmer per Year by Quintile 
 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
However, when viewed as a direct relationship, the differences in the number of seeds or 
the years that a particular seed will be planted again become lost in the noise of social learning 
on the village level (Figure 5.6).  Size turns out to be a poor predictor of both the number of 
years that farmers will plant given seeds and how many different seeds they might plant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
3.5 
Fifth Fourth Third Second First Average 
M
e
a
n
 n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f 
S
e
e
d
s 
Holdings Quintiles 
2013 Average number of 
cotton seeds per farmer 
by Quintile (n = 674 
seed choices) 
2014 Average number of 
cotton seeds per farmer 
by Quintile  (n = 478 
seed choices) 
118 
 
Figure 5.6:  Number of Seeds Planted per Farmer and Years Planted per Seed as a 
Function of Maximum Holdings Size per Farmer During the 2012-2014 Planting Seasons 
 
Linear regression of maximum acreage 2012-2014 vs. number of seeds planted r2 = .084 
n = 322 
 
 
Linear regression of maximum acreage 2012-2014 vs. mean years seeds planted r2 = .007 
n = 310 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
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Given the large sample size and the very small coefficients of correlation, we can 
conclude that there is no association between acreage, indicative of this pedda status, and the 
years that farmers trial seeds or the number of seeds that they trial on their land.  Large farmers 
thus did not have demonstrably larger yields, did not benefit more from single or double lining, 
and ride the seed fads along with everyone else.  Further, none of these associated environmental 
learning factors or cotton management strategies gave a yield payoff significant to analyzing 
anthropologists or to farmers who would be looking for clear differences in the field.  So why 
does the rest of the village invoke their names when discussing seed choices and expertise?  
Larger farmers do enjoy some benefits related to social access to resources and information, 
especially those at the top of the land holdings scale.  In some instances, such as the yields, 
education, and asset scores, they are best conceived as farmers on the end of a cline, or at least 
farmers who are least likely to be among the lowest group (Figure 5.7).   In others, such as the 
number of seeds they plant each year, their income, or the number of years that they replant their 
seeds (a measure of using a tried and true technology), they are statistically different than their 
smaller village-mates (Table 5.4).  
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Figure 5.7:  Scatterplots Comparing 2013 Land Holdings and Socioeconomic 
Characteristics of the Pedda Farmers 
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Source:  Flachs Household Survey 2013. 
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Not every large farmer will fall on the highest edge of these different spectra, but these 
scatterplots, taken from the 2013 Household survey of 65 farmers in Ralledapalle and Kavrupad 
illustrate that larger farmers tend to have more income, tend to be somewhat better educated, 
tend to belong to higher castes, and tend to have more assets.  Neither household education nor 
asset scores are statistically significant, but as the graphs show, pedda farmers tend to fall on the 
upper register of these scores, and rarely fall on the lower parts of the graph.   
 
Table 5.4:  2013 Social and Agricultural Comparison of top 20% of Farmers Vs. Average 
of Bottom 80% 
 
 Q1 Q2-5 p value 
Mean seeds per farmer 3.06  
SD = 1.63 
n = 72 
2.19 
SD = 1.21 
n = 206 
<.001 
Mean Years replanted  
per farmer 
3.2 
SD = 2.01 
n = 54 
2.77 
SD = 2.01 
n = 129 
.095 
Mean 2013 Yield 6.7254 
SD = 2.51 
n = 48 
7.056 
SD = 2.90 
n = 167 
.780 
Mean Income (Rs) 221,036 
SD = 177,735 
n = 14 
83608 
SD = 70,937 
n = 51 
.007 
Mean Household 
Education 
2.14 
SD = 1.61 
n = 14 
1.71 
SD = 1.49 
n = 51 
.186 
Mean Asset Score 11.07 
SD = 16.5  
n =14 
4.67 
SD =5.32 
n = 51 
.088 
Income, Household Education, and Asset score are derived from a purposive sample of 60 households in 
Ralledapalle and Kavrupad that was representative of the 120 farmer random sample in holdings, wealth, caste, and 
cropping.  Household education was determined by assigning a score of 0 when no farmers in the household were 
educated; 1 when no farmer was educated the 5th class; 2 when someone in the household was educated beyond 5 th 
class; 3 when multiple farmers were educated beyond primary school; 4 when a farmer in the household had 
attended university classes, and 5 when multiple people in the household had attended university classes.  Asset 
score was determined by assigning numerical values for animals and machinery:  1 per goat; 2 per cow, bullock, or 
buffalo; 4 per small machine like rototiller or generator; and 8 per large machine like rice harvester or tractor.  A 
larger asset score indicates that the farmer has more livestock and machinery, with machinery weighted higher on 
this scale. Source:  Flachs Household Survey 2013. 
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And yet, despite having income and assets available to care for their plants larger farmers 
enjoy no yield advantages (p = a staggering .780).  Their advantage is often more social, even 
psychological: “We’re the same caste” explained one pedda farmer when I asked if he could 
trust the advice of a local shopowner.  “He wouldn’t lie to me.”  This illuminates an important 
point.  During the 2012 seed crisis explained at the beginning of this chapter, brokers played an 
important role in securing lines to fad seeds, sometimes providing spurious seeds and always 
adding on extra costs.  Even during other years, vendors continue to supply many farmers.  
When comparing farmers’ cotton seed vendors 2012-2014, smaller farmers, lower caste farmers, 
and tribal farmers were more likely to buy seeds from travelling brokers or to ask larger farmers 
to bring seeds back with them during trips to neighboring cities like Nekkonda, Warangal, and 
Siddipet.  Some of the reasons for this disparity are obvious, historical, and structural:  large, 
rich, high caste farmers hire poor, low caste farmers as agricultural laborers while the reverse is 
unthinkable within the village hierarchy; travelling brokers more often visit tribal thandas 
because those farmers are less mobile due to a combination of poor roads, greater distances from 
public bus routes, ethnic differences from shop owners, and because these thandas lack 
agricultural input shops; wealthier farmers are more likely to have working business 
relationships with shop owners who are, like them, native Telugu speakers and are more 
ethnically similar. 
The first sign of seed vulnerability at the shops comes in the form of the 476 out of 1,370 
(35%) seed choices 2012-2014 for which the farmers answered that they did not know the name 
of the shop or vendor where they purchased their seeds.  Some discarded their receipts or seed 
packets while others were unable to read the documentation they had.  In several of the ‘do not 
know’ cases it is also possible that farmers were hesitant to answer that they had procured seed 
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from a black market broker.  Farmers who do not know where they got their seeds by definition 
have a poor relationship with shops and shop owners.  Much to the amusement of his nearby 
friends and relatives, an elderly tribal farmer once took me to task for asking so many specific 
questions about his seed acreage and shop connections:  “How can I remember how much 
[cotton acreage] I have?  What I take, that much I'll put” he shouted.  When I asked him the 
name of the shop owner where he got his Bt cotton and the name of the seed he rolled his eyes: 
“I ask for cotton, he gives me what he thinks is best, he doesn't ask my name, I don't ask his 
name, I don't say my name, and he doesn't say his - he just takes the money and I take the seeds 
and that's it”.   
Removing the third of seed choices for which farmers did not remember where they 
procured their seeds, an uncertainty well represented among all kinds of cotton farmers, black 
market brokers provided 12% of cotton seed choices 2012-2014 (Table 5.5), the second largest 
vendor after the Srigonda cooperative established in partnership with the agricultural extension 
service to provide reliable inputs to Kavrupad, Ralledapalle, and Srigonda farmers. 
 
Table 5.5:  Seed Vendors Accounting for Greater than 1% of sample 2012-2014 
 
Vendor name Seed choices from Vendor % of total choices 
Mahalakhsmi Cooperative 165 18.56% 
Broker (Black Market) 112 12.60% 
Swathi Fertilizers 108 12.15% 
Bikshapathi Rao (local dealer) 65 7.31% 
From Unspecified Relative 48 5.40% 
Vijay Lakshmi Fertilizers 35 3.94% 
Maruthi Fertilizers 30 3.37% 
Kalpenna 22 2.47% 
Deva Sai 21 2.36% 
Mandal Office 19 2.14% 
Sona Fertilizers 17 1.91% 
Uma Maheshwara 17 1.91% 
Vasavi Fertilizers 17 1.91% 
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From Unspecified Pedda Farmer 14 1.57% 
Vamshi 12 1.35% 
Sri Rama 12 1.35% 
Hanuman Fertilizers 11 1.24% 
Madhavi 9 1.01% 
Venkateshwarlu Fertilizers 9 1.01% 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
Most of these vendors are Warangal seed sellers who have set up dozens of shops on a strip of 
prime real estate near the bus and postal stations.  “From relative” and “from pedda farmer” are 
also common sources of seeds here.  As shown by the discussion of the 2012 seed fad, seeds 
purchased from brokers place farmers at an additional risk for spurious seeds.  There is no direct 
relationship between size and vendor choice, and as indicated in the table above, some smaller 
farmers buy black market seeds from larger farmers who travel to other districts or state to 
procure them.  However, it is interesting to note that: farmers with the largest 20% of 
landholdings bought comparatively fewer seeds from brokers than the other four (8.3% 
compared to 14.54%); all but one of those black market choices by the largest farmers came 
from large tribal farmers and high caste farmers from Gongapalle, a village where large and high 
caste farmers sell to poorer neighbors; and that a combination of black market brokers and pedda 
farmers sold one quarter (49 out of 196) of the cotton seeds planted by the smallest 40% of 
farmers 2012-2014. 
As an aggregate group, larger farmers are somewhat protected from the risks of an 
uncertain seed market by their higher status and greater access to resources.  They are rarely 
among most vulnerable members of the village in using and testing agricultural technology like 
new GM seeds.  This is not to say that any particular social edge be it caste, income, or acreage 
guarantees or predicts agricultural success, in the same way that car or television ownership does 
not make people healthier globally:  these correlates are ways of triangulating the phenomenon 
126 
 
by which large, socially important farmers have a reduced seed choice risk during the collective 
uncertainty that befalls farmers in the wake of seed fads. 
The conclusion that larger farmers tend to be richer, have more assets, and carry more 
weight in the village, or at least that they are almost never among the lowest members of the 
community in these categories, should be obvious.  What is more surprising is that the 
comparison of yields and sprays, lining, income, assets, acreage, seeds planted, age of farmer, 
and experience with the seeds shows that none of these factors are directly related to farmer 
success.  There is too much variability to conclude that the larger and rich farmers have real 
agricultural advantages.  Rather, they benefit from practicing larger-scale agriculture and 
working with agricultural experts.  The confusing seed market fits their particular mix of socio-
agricultural resources only in the sense that it is slightly less important for these farmers to have 
intimate knowledge about their cotton seeds.  That they do not perform better than anyone else in 
this environment is inconsequential because larger farmers can better afford to be deskilled. 
This section has shown that the trials that farmers conduct with cotton seeds, sprays, and 
planting densities are not just unreliable but fundamentally flawed because they are biased in 
favor of larger farmers.  The next section looks for ways in which social learning is uneven on 
the village level, and argues that larger farmers help to drive seed fads by bottlenecking the 
available visual real estate.  Thus when farmers socially learn, they are more likely to learn and 
follow the largest farmers.  On a local level, this helps to drive herding behavior.  This situation 
works well for pedda farmers, who have the resources to match and the social clout to 
investigate potentially lucrative seed choices and management strategies.  It works poorly for the 
smaller farmers who follow larger farmers without the means to replicate the inputs or 
conversations with agricultural extension officers that made large yields possible. 
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The Undue Influence of Larger Farmers in Seed Fads 
The logic of seed fads as justified during a Kavrupad focus group follows a rational 
economic choice on the village level: 
 
So you have planted one seed in one acre.  Another farmer has planted another half acre.  
In the village there are ten acres: one person plants a different variety, one person plants a 
different variety, one person plants a different variety, one person plants a different 
variety, this person here plants a different variety.  In all these varieties whichever gets a 
good yield, all will take and plant that one [kind of seed]. 
 
There are too many seeds for any individual farmer to trial and so the village trials a mix of seeds 
to determine what will work well.  As a whole, this farmer explained, by observing the results of 
annual trials, the village can zero in on the highest yielding seeds, thereby explaining the fads.  
When viewed uncritically, this appears to be more environmental learning, just on the village 
level.  No individual farmer could possibly test all of the potential seeds, and so farmers use the 
village as a giant test plot.  Indeed, GIS analysis in Ralledapalle and Kavrupad suggests that field 
neighbors’ choices in a given year are a better predictor of a farmer’s seed choices in the 
following year than the choices of the farmer themselves (Shaffer and Flachs 2014). However, 
this perspective on seed fads assumes that all of the farmers have an equal opportunity in 
planting seeds, caring for them, and observing the results.  2012-2014, the largest 20% of 
farmers planted nearly one out of every three cotton seed choices available to be emulated.  The 
largest 40% were responsible for more than half of the cotton in the village while the smallest 
40% in any given year controlled a quarter or less of seeds planted in the village.  Farmers 
therefore do not have a representative sample of seeds on which to base their social emulation.  
Rather, their socially driven seed choices are a bottleneck of what the larger farmers prefer.   
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Farmers often comment that they look for “famous” seeds: “E samvacaram andaru 
pettaru” explained one farmer in 2014 when I asked why he chose to plant Kaveri’s Jackpot 
seed: “Everyone was putting this seed this year.”  This is a clear example of social learning, in 
which farmers emulate the decisions that their neighbors make.  Yet there is so much uncertainty 
over which seed is best that even as farmers leap on the seed bandwagon in fad years (Figure 
5.1) they also keep a careful eye on their neighbors’ environmental success for next year’s seed 
choice.  “If we all plant different seeds”, one farmer explains, “whoever gets a good production 
is the person that we will follow next year for a good cotton yield”.  Given the number of 
possible seed choices, farmers try to use their neighbors as tests, sometimes even planning with 
neighbors and relatives to buy different seeds and compare notes.  In a 2014 focus group, I asked 
farmers about Yuva, that year’s fad seed.  Their answers, “Yuva baaga vastandhata” (Yuva will 
yield a large amount) or “Yuva mancigane vastundhata” (Yuva will fruit in a good way) were 
inflected with the Telugu suffix ‘ta’, meaning that this knowledge is secondhand, unwitnessed by 
the farmers themselves.  It is therefore uncertain and unreliable, hoped-for but not yet confirmed.  
In village-level experimentation, farmers try to reconcile their own experiences with certain 
seeds with that of others around them in the name of finding a seed that can deliver a good yield 
and a good return on their investments.   
As yield is the most important criterion in seed quality, fad seeds should yield better if 
they are a trialable technology:  the fads and their shifts should reflect yield advantages.  
However, fad seeds do not seem to have a high yield response.  Instead, fad seeds are slightly 
preferred by larger farmers, who are additionally blessed with higher incomes, more assets, and 
better working relationships with local agricultural experts like shop owners and extension 
officers.  Because any given seed that farmers see in a sweep of fields is as likely as not to 
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belong to a larger farmer, social emulation based in following one’s neighbors would favor the 
choices preferred by large farmers even in a social vacuum, where these farmers did not enjoy 
high status in the village.  However, because of the particular choices that these farmers are 
making, their seed decisions help to build fads and herding behavior.  The rise and fall of 
Mahyco and Kaveri company’s seeds across 2012-2014 helps to illustrate this phenomenon. 
If the social learning phenomenon of village level experimentation worked perfectly in 
2013, many new farmers should have planted Mahyco’s Neeraja and Dr. Brent (labelled in 
green) rather than Kaveri’s Jackpot and Jadoo (labelled in blue), because these seeds performed 
at least a little better for some farmers than the Kaveri seeds (Figure 5.8).   
Figure 5.8:  Mean Yields per acre from Seeds Planted 2012 by Holdings Quintile 
 
 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
In fact, Kaveri seeds saw dips in yield on average for the smallest 60% of farmers. When 
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standard deviation that would cause difficulty for any farmer trying to environmentally evaluate 
the ‘best’ seed based on last year’s performance (Figure 5.9).  Given that smaller farmers did 
worse with Kaveri seeds and farmers as an aggregate did no better with Kaveri than Mahyco 
seeds, there is little environmental reason to explain why Telangana farmers abandoned Mahyco 
for Kaveri with such zeal.   
 
Figure 5.9:  Boxplots for 2012 Fad Seed Yields Per Acre 
  
 
2012 Fad Seed Yield Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Dr. Brent Neeraja Jackpot Jadoo 
n 124 137 54 24 
Mean 7.68 7.89 7.51 7.76 
SD 3.59 3.56 3.29 2.87 
Minimum 1 .58 1 .05 
Maximum 21.25 21.25 15 12 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
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Reasons varied for the switch:  a few especially productive farmers, an advertising blitz 
for a new seed in concert with the unpleasantness generated by the 2012 seed scarcity, and a 
suspicion that seed companies produce subpar seeds the year after they enjoy faddish popularity 
helped push Kaveri’s Jadoo and Jackpot over the edge.  Despite no clear environmental 
feedback, farmers were well on their way to a Kaveri seed fad.   By the harvest of 2013, which 
farmers would in theory use to make seed decisions for 2014, yields stabilized for smaller 
farmers planting Kaveri seeds, although Dr. Brent remained a high yielder (Figure 5.10).  If 
farmers had been following yields alone, Dr. Brent and Jackpot should have risen to the top of 
new choices.   
 
Figure 5.10:  Boxplots for 2013 Fad Seed Yields Per Acre 
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2013 Fad Seed Yield Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Dr. Brent Neeraja Jackpot Jadoo 
n 64 43 51 74 
Mean 7.43 6.57 6.98 6.66 
SD 2.75 2.65 2.84 2.4 
Minimum 1.5 .17 1.7 1.7 
Maximum 15 15 15 12 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
 Those seeds did not rise to the top, and from 2012-2014, farmers herded to Mahyco 
seeds, Kaveri seeds, and in 2014 began moving toward two new seeds, Yuva and ATM, which 
yielded slightly better for the 27 and 25 farmers who planted them in 2013, but well within the 
range of variation (Figure 5.11).  Spurred on again by a new advertising blitz as well as a 
general perception that Neeraja failed (even though that seed was well within the statistical 
norm), Yuva and ATM rose to 107 and 62 farmer choices respectively.  With no clear 
environmental payoff, farmers as a group switched seeds frequently and dramatically in 2012-
2014.  For larger farmers with more space to trial, this general uncertainty at least offered a few 
spaces in which they could evaluate different seeds under similar conditions.  For the smallest 
farmers, the buzz of new seeds, which carried with it a hope for better yields, left them with the 
most uncertain knowledge base. 
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Figure 5.11:  Boxplots for 2013 Fad Seed Yields 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Dr. Brent Neeraja Jackpot Jadoo Yuva ATM 
n 64 43 51 74 20 23 
Mean 7.43 6.57 6.98 6.66 7.5 8.17 
SD 2.75 2.65 2.84 2.4 2.94 3.09 
Minimum 1.5 .17 1.7 1.7 2.86 2.6 
Maximum 15 15 15 12 15 15 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
  
Aggregate seed fads are depicted above but the rise and fall of the six fad seeds 2012-2014 is 
summarized below (Figure 5.12). 
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Figure 5.12:  Summary of Fad Seeds Planted by Household 2012-2014 with Table of Values 
 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
One year of popularity each, followed by steep decline – Yuva and ATM are in for a drop 
in popularity by 2016 if this model holds.  Given their popularity, the environmental-learning 
question asks: 
1. Were Neeraja and Dr. Brent superior to other seeds in 2011, Jackpot and Jadoo 
superior to other seeds in 2012, and ATM or Yuva superior to other seeds in 2013, 
suggesting that these seeds were just better technology? 
2. Were they superior for any particular group of people, suggesting that some farmers 
were driving fads based on environmental feedback? 
3. Were they preferred by any particular group of people, suggesting that regardless of 
any environmental feedback these seeds were preferred by influential people? 
To answer the first question, I plotted the yields of the fad seeds against the amount of cotton 
acreage that farmers planted (Figure 5.13), giving a measure of the yield against the resources 
farmers devoted to their cotton production.  If the fad seeds showed a clear yield advantage per 
acre to the non fad seeds, then this would imply that there was an economically rational reason to 
switch seeds – farmers would be environmentally learning from the village yield feedback. 
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Figure 5.13:  Fad Seeds Yields Vs. Other Seed Yields 
 
2011:  Neeraja and Dr. Brent Vs. Others as Functions of Crop Acreage 
 
Linear regression of Fad Seed Acreage vs. Fad seed Yield:  r2 = .000,  n = 121 
Mean yield = 6.95, mean crop acreage = 3.30 
 
Linear regression of Non Fad Seed Acreage vs. Non Fad seed Yield:  r2 =.001, n = 80 
Mean yield = 6.65, mean crop acreage = 3.24 
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Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012. 
 
Neither differences in the means of acreage (p = .426) nor yield (p = .281) were statistically 
significant in 2011, and the graph is clearly skewed toward a high-yielding outlier in each graph.  
This suggests that fad seeds were not preferred by larger or smaller farmers and did not perform 
better for these farmers. 
 
2012:   Jadoo and Jackpot vs. Others as Functions of Crop Acreage 
 
Linear regression of Fad Seed Acreage vs. Fad seed Yield: r2 =.003, n = 69  
mean yield = 7.54, mean crop acreage = 3.78 
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Linear regression of Non Fad Seed Acreage vs. Non Fad seed Yield:  r2 = .000, n = 272 
mean yield = 7.31, mean crop acreage = 2.92 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2013. 
 
Differences in acreage (p = .002) and but not yield (p = .309) were statistically significant, 
suggesting that larger farmers preferred fad seeds but that the fad seeds did not yield better for 
them.   
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2013:   ATM and Yuva vs. Others as Functions of Crop Acreage 
 
Linear regression of Fad Seed Acreage vs. Fad seed Yield:  r2 = .000, n = 41 
mean yield = 7.68, mean crop acreage = 4.03 
 
Linear regression of Non Fad Seed Acreage vs. Non Fad seed Yield:  r2 = .000, n = 215 
Mean yield = 7.09, mean crop acreage = 2.97, 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2014. 
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Differences in acreage (p = .002) and but not yield (p = .121) were statistically significant, again 
suggesting that larger farmers preferred fad seeds but that the fad seeds did not yield better for 
them.   
 
These scatterplots illuminate two important trends.  First, the linear regression of the 
variables in these plots show a similar, and stronger pattern evidenced by seeds generally:  no 
particular seeds or farmers have yield advantages.  Second, in 2012 and 2013 farmers who 
planted more acres of cotton tended to plant fad seeds ahead of their sweeping popularity when 
compared with farmers who planted fewer cotton acres.  This suggests that the farmers who are 
larger and who are devoting more of their time and energy to cotton farming are drumming up or 
sustaining buzz about fad seeds before they become popular.  They create the perception that the 
seeds in question are of high quality.  During the 2012 fad seed scarcity, this perception was 
further sustained by the implied authority of the seed permit system.  Farmers who devote more 
resources and who have more resources to devote to cotton prefer with the fad seeds, but this is 
more indicative of the farmers than the seeds. 
As the fad seeds do not appear to be higher yielding for any particular farmers or in 
general, the final question asks if these seeds are preferred by any group of farmers.  As large 
farmers control more of the visual real estate in a village, they are prime candidates for fad 
starting.  Stone (2007) has shown how these fads can be arbitrary in villages, dependent on the 
whims of particular influential or lucky people.  But this does not explain the fad consolidation 
and district-level herding.  That fad seeds are planted on greater acreages suggests that those 
farmers with more means prefer the fad seeds before they become popular.  Larger, wealthier 
farmers who tend to belong to higher castes and thus have better working relationships with 
shops and extension agents plant a large number of fad seeds that do well enough and their 
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choices are then emulated in the actual fad year, by which time the original fad seed planters 
have moved on.  Boxplots showing the planting choices of farmers in 2012 and 2013 show that 
larger farmers are more likely to plant fad seeds in the year before they become popular (Figure 
5.14) and that size has no impact on whether or not farmers are likely to plant the fad seeds in the 
year of their popularity (Figure 5.15). 
Figure 5.14:  Boxplots Comparing Holdings Size of Fad and Non Fad Planting Farmers in 
the Year Before They Become Popular 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Fad Farmers Non Fad Farmers 
n 113 1395 
Mean 6.58 5.69 
SD 5.00 3.83 
Minimum .50 .45 
Maximum 28 28 
 
A t-test of the differences in total acreages between fad and non fad predicting planting farmers determined that the 
differences are statistically significant (p = .035), suggesting that larger farmers were more likely to plant fad seeds 
in the year before they become popular. Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Fad Farmers Non Fad Farmers 
n 599 909 
Mean 5.63 5.84 
SD 3.82 4.02 
Minimum .50 .45 
Maximum 25 28 
 
A t-test of the differences in total acreages between fad and non fad planting farmers in the year of the fad seed’s 
popularity determined that the differences are not statistically significant (p = .854), suggesting that larger farmers 
were not more likely to plant fad seeds in the year of their popularity. Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
These slight tendencies in a context where larger farmers plant more seeds around the 
village and where farmers with more land devoted to cotton prefer fad seeds should be seen as 
evidence that larger, and especially the largest farmers have undue influence in the seed choices 
of their neighbors.  That these seeds are not demonstrably better is beside the point because a 
combination of social advantages allows the largest farmers reduce their growing risk while 
trialing new seeds.  These large farmers also have an undue influence on their neighbors not just 
because they control more seeds, but because they are looked to in times of agricultural 
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uncertainty and help to strengthen the ‘buzz’ surrounding each seed.  Pedda farmers often hire 
their neighbors and lower caste, tribal, or poorer village members to labor on their farms.  While 
working on these fields, the smaller farmers see the seed choices of their pedda neighbors and 
often emulate them.  Seed shop owners and extension agents speak more freely and easily with 
these farmers than with lower caste, poorer farmers.  As wealthier and more mobile village 
members, the pedda farmers sometimes even buy seeds for their laborers directly, who only ask 
that these larger farmers bring an extra packet of whatever seed they think is best.   
Size and connection to institutional resources through extension programs are correlates 
or standins for a variety of social and economic opportunity that allows not better trialing but 
better influence.  Large farmers can press their advantage by talking with shop and university 
experts to get the latest gossip and the most encouraging advice.  Smaller farmers, from more 
disenfranchised castes and with less income have less information coming in and less ability to 
improve their situation.  These social differences compound the existing problems in the cotton 
market, leading the most marginal farmers with the fewest opportunities to learn which seed is 
best while the farmers best suited to a competitive and commodity-driven agriculture kick off 
seed fads that they themselves become swept up in.   
In this section I have argued that larger farmers have better access to seed knowledge and 
prefer fad seeds before they become popular, helping to push farmers as a whole toward seed 
herding.  The short-lived fads affect all farmers, as demonstrated by their presence on the district 
level.  For the smaller farmers, who labor on large farms, for whom investment is riskier, and 
who plant fewer cotton seeds, the quick switches indicated by the seed fad patterns are more dire 
because they indicate that these farmers are at the whim of marketing and luck.  Professing to 
follow their neighbors, and having their neighbors be better predictors of their seed choices than 
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themselves, even when they outperform those neighbors with different seeds, farmers in fact 
disproportionately choose to plant seeds that their rich neighbors prefer.  This social emulation 
leads the smallest, most marginal farmers adrift in the learning process.  Large farmers too are 
caught in the fads, and there does not appear to be a strong, direct link between size and any 
single agricultural or social factor.  But the largest farmers benefit from a loose collection of 
social advantages that, combined, reduce their risk during seed uncertainties.  Because of their 
larger land holdings, they can try out new seeds alongside seeds that they know work, and more 
of the visual cotton landscape is dominated by their social peers, who have comparable resources 
and thus serve as good comparisons. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that the agricultural deskilling experienced by GM cotton 
farmers in Telangana has affected different farmers in different ways.  Larger farmers do not 
enjoy particular advantages in yield, spray payoff, lining payoff, knowledge about which seeds 
might be best, or relevant information about the fad seeds.  In many respects they are just as 
adrift, misled by the same patterns of inconsistency, uncrecognizability, and rapid change that 
flummox the rest of the village and exacerbate the ongoing deskilling that Stone (2007) 
describes.  The general trend of seed buying, evidenced by fads, herding, and the tendency that 
field neighbors are better predictors of future seed choices than the farmers themselves (Shaffer 
and Flachs 2014), shows that farmers as a whole have no environmental, first-hand experience 
on which to base their seed choices.  Yet, expanding Stone’s original deskilling metaphor, I 
would argue that the largest farmers have influenced these fads and are sheltered from the most 
devastating and predatory effects of the technological uncertainty that these fads bring.  
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Importantly, no farmers seem to be regularly conducting effective or reliable trials and no 
farmers seem to be benefitting from environmental learning.  The pedda farmers are simply 
better at working with the new managers of cotton knowledge. 
 When seeds become a commodity, and when that commodity becomes difficult to 
distinguish, farmers encounter a space social psychologists and behavioral economists call 
choice overload (Chernev, Böckenholt, and Goodman 2015; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and 
Todd 2010).  This is a problematic term, as it is hard to pin down exactly how many choices are 
overwhelming, but it describes the tendency for more options to lead to fewer actual purchases 
and less satisfaction with them.  Studies of choice overload question if more is actually better.  
As cotton choices have increased over the past decade of GM planting, the inability to reliably 
trial seeds, undue influence of people who have no documented advantage, and general 
uncertainty about seeds have similarly increased.  In the parlance of choice overload thoerists, 
more seed product options led to more poorly informed and anxiety-ridden decisions.  In one 
influential study, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) asked grocery store shoppers, Stanford 
undergraduates, and Columbia undergraduates to choose between a wide or narrow field of jams, 
essay topics, and chocolates respectively.  The results were surprising:  30% of the jam shoppers 
bought jam when presented with six choices, compared to 3% presented with an array of 24 
jams; Stanford psychology undergraduates scored better and were more likely to complete the 
essay assignment when given fewer options; and the Columbia students were four times more 
likely to take chocolate rather than a comparable cash prize when presented with six rather than 
30 chocolate options.  Unlike cotton seed choices, food and essays are low-stakes decisions, but 
Iyengar et al. (2004) also examined choice overload in American 401(k) plans.  Even though a 
401(k) can make or break an employee’s retirement, participation dropped as employees were 
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offered more plan offerings.  Among people who had invested with the management company 
Vanguard, as plans offered more funds, people were less likely to contribute:  every 10 funds 
added was associated with 1.5% to 2% drop in participation. 
 Among social psychologists and consumer scientists, the problem with choice overload is 
a procrastination or lack of choice that would prevent a product from being consumed or the 
demoralization and regret associated with making an incorrect choice.  Most cotton farmers do 
not simply fail to buy cotton because they are overwhelmed, although many in 2014 chose to 
plant maize as a result of projected low prices and late monsoon rains.  Because agriculture is the 
source of their livelihood, choice overload does not stop farmers from buying seeds.  However, 
choice overload, in combination with rapid change and a lack of differentiation, helps create an 
intense anxiety around seed choice as well as sense of regret or profound relief in having chosen 
correctly.  Choice overload does not happen in all cases of large and confusing markets – the 
supermarket where Iyengar and Lepper conducted their initial study itself offered 250 different 
varieties of mustard, 75 different varieties of olive oil, and over 300 varieties of jam.  Rather, 
meta-analyses indicated that it is prevalent when the decision is high-stakes, when consumers 
have problems differentiating between products, when a clearly superior product did not exist, 
when the intended use for the product was difficult and complex, and when it was difficult to 
clearly compare (I might use the word trial) similar products (Chernev, Böckenholt, and 
Goodman 2015; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 2010).  Each of these factors is true in the 
cotton market.  In their original study, Iyengar and Lepper suggest that the anxieties of choice are 
exacerbated when truly informed decisions are difficult and the costs of making the wrong 
choice, or even believing that one has made the wrong choice, are higher (Iyengar and Lepper 
2000:1004).  Indeed, like the farmers who shrug and ask shops or pedda farmers what they think 
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is best, the authors note that “the more choosers perceive their choice-making task to necessitate 
expert information, the more they may be inclined not to choose, and further, they may even 
surrender the choice to someone else – presumably more expert” (Iyengar and Lepper 
2000:1004).  Seeds differ from these products, even from important products like retirement 
plans in important ways.  Cotton farmers who planted hybrids and other GM seeds before the 
study period certainly had some experiences, knowledge, and preferences that were relevant to 
their decisions, even when they could not act on them.  Also, choice overload is often cited to 
explain non-consumption, which does not apply to the situation with Telangana farmers, who 
have adopted Bt cotton seeds in droves.  However, the anxieties of purchasing, the unreliability 
of information, and the deference to experts all ring true for cotton-seed decisions.  Furthermore, 
these studies suggest that cotton’s great number of possible brands and few means of 
differentiating them provide the right conditions for farmers to feel exasperated and even 
overloaded.   
 In numerous contexts, watershed studies in the diffusion of technologies have noticed 
similar trends:  wealthier, larger, more cosmopolitan farmers on better terms with extension 
agents instigated the trend to plant hybrid corn in post-depression Iowa (Ryan and Gross 1943); 
metastudies of the diffusion of innovations show that early adopters tend to have strong 
connections to power and influence (Rogers 2003); Pedda farmers were and continue to be 
targeted by new seed campaigns in Warangal (Stone 2007).  Less understood is what happens 
after the diffusion has spread.  Like any commodity, GM seeds have been socially recognized 
and made relevant to their farmer users, but through that transformation, GM seeds were 
dissociated from intimate knowledge about their production.  Large farmers were able to 
substitute this knowledge for friendly relationships with seed experts and some minimal trialing.  
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They may not have been able to restart the learning process but they are able to cushion the blow 
somewhat.  In the new world of seeds reduced to a brand name, farmers have to learn to be 
different kind of consumers if they will generate knowledge about GM cotton.  Those who 
simply plant what is popular have only hearsay and marketing to rely on, and will remain at the 
highest risk for financial and agricultural ruin.  This is a seed market suited for the needs and 
abilities of larger, richer, better connected farmers. 
 To call GM seed technologies sustainable, either because GM seeds raised yields or 
decreasing sprays on a national level (Qaim 2010; Kouser and Qaim 2011; Kranthi 2012) 
sidesteps the anthropological question:  are these technologies sustainable in the sense that 
people know how to and choose to use them?  The externalization of knowledge from the farm 
field to the managerial office has been stratified by wealth and land holdings among 
conventional farmers.  These economic features are associated with caste and social status in 
rural Telangana.  The large, socially important pedda farmers disproportionately plant more of 
the total seed makeup of the village:  when farmers claim to be following good production in a 
neighbor’s field, they are not merely following the results of a larger farmer with more resources 
that one would expect to produce better.  The seed choices they are capable of observing are 
themselves bottlenecked by the seeds that pedda farmers prefer.  In other cases, opportunistic 
brokers or large farmers simply sell the seeds they bought to small and marginalized farmers.  
The original marketing thrust of GM seeds, which assumed that farmers would not need to do 
anything different to successfully grow cotton (Thaindian News 2008), appears to be false as 
demonstrated by the inability of most farmers to trial and assess the new technology in the time 
required to use their environmental learning to make seed decisions.  Given that intimate local 
ecological knowledge has been shown to be crucial for sustainable endeavors, the GM seed 
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market appears to be eroding, rather than building local efforts at sustainability.  That the farmers 
driving village-level social learning appear to be the wealthiest, highest-status farmers rebuts 
claims that GM crops are a “pro-poor” technology (Qaim 2010).   
If the question of agricultural sustainability rests as much in the knowledge of farmer-
practitioners than in the technology itself, more attention must be paid to the learning processes 
of GM farmers.  As a function of their social connections to extension services or their wealth, 
some farmers are better able to balance didactic, social, and environmental learning.  As I have 
argued, environmental learning, the ability to trial various technologies in your own field and 
respond to the results, is the necessary missing building block of knowledge in GM cotton 
farmers who are being deskilled.  Whether emulating the choices of larger neighbors or deferring 
to experts in a choice overload environment, this analysis argues that knowledge is contingent 
upon farmers’ responses to agricultural risk.  A missed chance taken on a bad seed can ruin a 
GM farmer.  
 Just as this chapter discussed the conditions that lead to deskilling and the ways in which 
some farmers are able to avoid that trap, the following chapter discusses the ways that 
knowledge is more persistent on rice paddies.  The same cotton-growing farmers who follow 
seed fads behave very differently and more in line with a balanced approach to environmental, 
social, and didactic learning when choosing and evaluating their rice seeds.  This has much to do 
with inherent agricultural qualities of rice, but it also rests on the different ways that farmers buy, 
sell, and talk about rice.  Rice knowledge too is socially mediated, but in different and in a much 
calmer market.  Rice’s lower stakes, reduced choices, and greater inherent opportunities for 
environmental learning allow the same farmers to better develop and use agricultural skill.   
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Chapter 6:  Persistent Knowledge in Rice Fields 
 
 
Sitting on the stoop of a thanda house surrounded by burlap sacks of rice, I am receiving 
a lesson in seed knowledge that I never receive when I ask about cotton.  “The seed works for 
only two years, because after that the production starts to drop and the seeds become kalthi 
(rotten and less productive),” Chandya explains.  “Smart farmers keep the harvest and sell when 
the price is high if they can.” Are there differences between rice that you see in the field that 
determines what is sold, eaten, and saved, I ask?  I’m trying to get at variations in the plant’s 
growth habit, color, or some other outward evidence that it would be suitable for saving, but he 
ignores my question in favor of a more meaningful discussion of the seeds themselves.  “There's 
no difference in the field or after it has been winnowed between seed for selling, eating, and 
saving.  All is bagged together.  The difference is in the talu (empty husks without large starch 
grains) and beriki (seeds of other varieties, cracked rice that will not germinate, or seeds that 
otherwise appear different as plants or seed grains), as those seeds can't be replanted.  Choose 
how many [bags of rice] you'll save first, sell the rest, and choose planting rice from the cooking 
stock.  Any that are cracked are bad for both cooking and planting.”  Rice seed has history and 
personality, in part because it passes through so many different stages and can be touched and 
examined at each.  Cotton seed is sterile by comparison, arriving in sealed packages, colored 
with an imidicloprid
12
 treatment that protects the seed from hungry insects, and altogether 
dissociated from the farmers who produced it.  While rice yields
13
 and returns on investment are 
of course important, farmers have a distinctly more complicated relationship with rice seed than 
they have with cotton, which is always reducible to its commodity form. 
                                               
12 Imidacloprid is a neonicitinoid poison applied to cotton seeds, affect insects that eat young cotton seeds before 
they have time to develop much defensive GM Bt toxins or naturally occurring gossypol.   
13 Rice yield is measured in ~50 kg bags 
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Building on Stone’s (2007) explanation of agricultural deskilling, the previous chapter 
showed that cotton seeds provide little meaningful environmental feedback for any aspect of the 
planting regime.  Even when farmers conduct experiments, their seed choices devolve into what 
Stone and others call conformist bias.  Grown by farmers who are agriculturally deskilled by 
cotton seeds’ unrecognizability, inconsistency, and accelerating rate of change (Stone 2007), 
cotton agriculture is additionally stymied by socioeconomic demands in the anarchic market:  an 
overbearing profit motive in cash-cropping, brand saturation, and anxiety over lost opportunity 
costs.  Ultimately, chapter five showed that there is no relationship between yields and any 
aspect of the environmental learning process, but that experts and pedda farmers can jumpstart or 
sustain new seed fads.  However, rice, the other key crop of Bt cotton planting farmers, gives 
farmers more opportunities to build skill. 
I argue in this chapter that agricultural knowledge is built differently with rice because 
choices are fewer, seeds are better known, the seeds change more gradually, and farmers 
generally have the flexibility to eat, save, or sell the product depending on the circumstances.  
Farmer recall is relatively better with rice seed choices and farmers on average tend to have a 
stronger knowledge base and personal planting history with their rice seeds.  Unlike their cotton 
cash crop, yield is not the overwhelming consideration with rice.  Because rice can also be eaten 
it is viewed by many farmers as a safer investment requiring a lower monetary commitment.  
Unlike a cotton harvest, rice harvests can be ‘good enough’ in the sense that an overwhelming 
yield in a neighbor’s field will not necessarily sway a farmer looking for a variety of phenotypic 
qualities that determine suitability for saving, price at market, taste, and suitability for the 
farmers’ field.  Although some farmers are turning to higher-investment, higher-return hybrid 
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seeds or hybrid seed production, the vast majority of seed choices are based on more reliable, 
tested open pollinated varieties (OPVs) that farmers value for their reliability.  
Rice is a more easily trialable technology than cotton because it lacks the 
unrecognizability, fast-paced change, and inconsistency Stone (2007) attributes to cotton.  Rice 
is not a fully commodified technology, and furthermore the knowledge required to manage rice 
on Telangana fields is neither commodified nor the purview of expert authorities.  Additionally, 
the social politics of rice knowledge has a different reward structure than the heavy emphasis on 
yield (as a proxy for net return) and opportunity cost seen in cotton agriculture.  Large farmers, 
shops, and extension agents have less influence on farmers’ choice of rice seed varieties.  The 
one exception to this comes in the form of rice that resembles cotton:   hybrid rice.  This rice is 
rarely eaten, knowledge of its management is the purview of outside experts, early adopters are 
selected by salesmen for their social influence, farmers see it as a means to an end defined by 
yields and heavy investment, and they have relatively little knowledge about what it is.  Like 
American farmers of the early 20
th
 century who surrendered various aspects of the seed 
production process to private and public hybrid seed breeders (Fitzgerald 1993; Kloppenburg 
2004), farmers are learning less about the environmental qualities of hybrid rice itself and 
learning more about how to buy products and  follow expert instructions.  Both this chapter and 
the previous chapter draw heavily on quantitative data from seed surveys that illustrate  
consensus on agronomic properties of seeds, data on farmers’ experiments in the number of 
seeds planted, village level responses to yields, and comparisons of the rise and fall of different 
fad cotton seeds against the more relatively stable rice seeds.  I will begin by demonstrating that 
rice knowledge is more locally nuanced than cotton knowledge, reflecting a greater degree of 
environmental learning. 
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Rice and Nuanced Local Knowledge 
As expressed in focus groups throughout the Warangal district villages, the logic of 
cotton production is simple:  yield.  Farmers describe two phenotypic forms in cotton, each of 
which can bring a high yield.  In one variation, increased branching leads the plant to produce a 
higher quantity of smaller bolls, with the upshot that the larger quantity will compensate for the 
size.  The other variant takes the opposite approach, producing fewer but larger bolls that house a 
heavier and thus pricier seed cotton.  More occasionally farmers mention qualities related to 
management such as resistance to sucking pests or increased height to facilitate denser planting.  
For all farmers’ transient insistence that particular brands will be superior, they are watching for 
yield, nervously subtracting labor, input costs, market price at the time of sale, and uncooperative 
weather from their future profits.  Within this calculus, the most visible factor is the yield.  If the 
cotton is growing without sprouting, add fertilizer; if the fertilizer makes the leaves wilt, add 
water; if insects eat away the bolls, spray pesticides.  The seed is only useful insofar as it can 
produce a good yield, and farmers must protect this seed investment if they hope to gain any 
profit from their labor.  
Knowledge is more nuanced in rice, in the sense that it has finer and more agreed-upon 
distinctions, as I will show below.  Furthermore, farmers develop and investigate these 
distinctions by handling rice directly, making this knowledge tactile.  Farmers distinguish rice by 
grain thickness and taste, plant it according to longer-term, non-faddish patterns, use relatively 
fewer chemical inputs, and employ more labor in the planting, harvesting, and saving process 
that requires farmers to touch and inspect their crop.  Rice is additionally a more stable choice, as 
there are fewer rice seed choices to make, private companies control little of the market, and 
comparatively fewer farmers opt to plant rice seeds with which they have no personal 
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experience.   Rice can be eaten, stored, sold, and saved.  Each aspect of this management 
requires a set of specific local knowledge.  Cotton extension scientists and shop owners with 
whom they are friendly are quick to point out that certain seed brands resist particular insects or 
have a particular growth habit conducive to high yields – not so the farmers themselves. 
Within rice choices, farmers generally agree on a particular OPV’s growth habits and 
ecological tendencies.  Because rice can be and often is saved, farmers must also look out for 
beriki and talu.  When rice seeds are carefully inspected before replanting, farmers endeavor to 
catch these dud seeds.  Unlike the cotton seeds, farmers run their hands through rice seeds, 
noting variation and damage.  Planting one beriki seed will produce uneven grains that are less 
desirable to buyers in seed markets.  Thus, by the third replanting, many farmers opt to buy new 
seeds rather than continue to save and continue compounding the risk of errant seeds.  However, 
unlike the changing cotton brands, focus groups of farmers insist that the same rice seeds are 
always good.  “Year after year you can rely on the same ones…but in cotton the companies 
become lazy cheaters and every year you have to switch to new seeds.  After they become 
popular once the companies just stop trying and the seeds are terrible.” 
 The most obvious key difference is that between “thick” and “thin” rice varieties.  
Thickness refers to grain size and although it is a scientific breeder’s category it designates 
several qualities in Telangana farmers’ taxonomy.  Thick rice, which includes popular varieties 
MTU 1001
14
, MTU 1010, and JGL-384, has a thicker and shorter grain, is more resistant to pests 
and disease, takes less time to mature, is better suited to drier rabi (December-March) 
conditions, has a greater yield, and tastes bad.  These are contrasted with thin rice, including 
popular varieties Warangal 14, Warangal 32100, JGL-1798, and BPT 5204, which have thinner 
                                               
14 For public OPV rice varieties, the first three letters indicate the rice’s breeding station and the numbers after the 
dash indicate the particular variety strain.   
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and longer grains but require more delicate care, more time to mature, are better suited to the 
rainy kharif season (late June - November), and yield fewer, tastier grains.  During a lunchtime 
interview with a farmer who was eating MTU 1001, he pointed at it with disgust, saying, “if we 
eat this, we'll be full all day.  With thin rice we'll be hungry again at meal time and the taste will 
be better.  1001 is just substance.”  “1001 is not even fit for cows to eat,” scoffed another.  This 
is a partly social attitude as well.  MTU 1001 and MTU 1010 are purchased by the government 
and sold for Rs 1 per kilogram to the poorest members of society who can produce a ration 
identification card.  Few farmers jump at the chance to eat or celebrate such poverty foods.  
Although the thicker rices tend to yield higher and suffer fewer insect attacks, farmers prefer to 
sell this rice and buy thin rice at the market.  “Nowadays the market preference is for medium 
slender grains,” confirmed Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) senior scientist LV 
Srirama Rao.  “Unlike in the past people used to take coarse grains, the little bold grains.  Now 
people are not preferring the bold grains, there is a lot of preference for the medium slender 
grains, that is, BPT 5204 or JGL types.”  The importance of keeping up with farmer desires for 
thinner seeds is not lost on Srirama Rao, who helps direct extension and breeding programs 
throughout South India: 
 
When we are selecting material we generally go for the physical appearance, like whether it 
is medium slender or not. And then we go for the quality analysis.  [We select] parameters 
like length and width and then LV ratio.  The LV ratio, what does it generally talk about?  
The shape of the grain.  Whether it is a long slender grain or a long bold grain or a medium 
slender grain or a medium bold grain or short slender or short bold.  Gone are the days 
people used to eat the medium bold or the long bold.  Now everybody prefers medium 
slender grain, the fine grain varieties, which are having lot of demand in the market because 
consumer wants these varieties.  So the breeding programs are also tuned in such a way to get 
these qualities incorporated into the new varieties that are developed. 
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 Thin rices have an additional advantage in taste.  Not only are they culturally understood 
to be better because they are thinner, many varieties also have a greater proporition of oil and fat.  
BPT 5204, first developed in 1986, has maintained years of popularity (Jonathan 2010) because 
of its reliability and taste despite lower yields and susceptibility to a variety of pests.  The need 
to balance pests, taste, and yield leads farmers to more carefully evaluate the differences between 
different rice seeds while the diminished rice seed options mean that, unlike cotton, there are 
fewer opportunity costs for choosing rice seeds.  In one interview, a smaller farmer more 
concerned with price than taste advised me that one should always go for the thick rices as the 
overall yield is better and thus the price is improved.  Thin rices, he explained, also take longer 
to mature and bear harvest, so farmers can replant fields more often with thicker seeds.  The 
same man did not distinguish between cottons except to say that he heard that one brand, 
Brahma, had small bolls and that he would not be planting it.   
 In the previous chapter, I critically examined seed trials among cotton farmers because 
the farmers did not distinguish between seeds well, did not learn from their trials when they did 
distinguish seeds, and over-relied on cues from the largest farmers who dominated the village 
landscape. As an aggregate, farmers choose cotton seeds in accordance with spiky, fad-like 
patterns.  This is notable over the long term as well as during the 2012-2014 study period.  
However, rice choices manifest differently (Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1:  Popular Rice Seed Choice Patterns 2012-2014 as a Percentage of Households 
Choosing the Seed (varieties accounting for 1% or more of sample) 
 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
This figure shows kharif rice seed choices for the same Warangal district and Matepalle village 
farmers who grow Bt cotton (n = 329 choices). Unlike cotton seed buying patterns, the same rice 
seeds remain popular throughout the sample, their market shares are less dramatic than those 
seen at the height of cotton fads, and their waves of popularity manifest as gentle ebbs and flows 
rather than dramatic peaks and valleys.  Warangal 14, a variety released in 2005 from the 
Warangal agricultural research station, combines the taste and slender grain benefits of popular 
parent line BPT 5204 with an improved resistance to pests and viruses.  This rice, benefitting 
from taste, hardiness, and local breeding has maintained a steady popularity in the research area.   
 Choice overload, an anxiety-producing overabundance of choices in the marketplace with 
no good way to differentiate between them (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 2010; Iyengar 
and Lepper 2000; Chernev, Böckenholt, and Goodman 2015), may be detrimental to cotton 
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decision-making.  But rice’s buying patterns suggest a greater certainty in tandem with the 
greater knowledge base and more complicated calculus that defines rice seed decision-making.  
Part of the explanation for this lies in that rice choices are less overloaded. 
 In focus groups, farmers can recount the waves of cotton seed fads, listing each seed’s 
promise and ultimate failure.  “Okay,” I asked one such group.  “This year Warangal 14 and 
MTU 1001 are the popular rice seeds.  What about last year?”  The farmers thought this was a 
silly question: 
 
F1:  “That rainy season it was Warangal 14 and MTU 1001”.    
 
A:  before? 
 
F1:  “After that we were using the same, some vijaymsuri (BPT 5204) too”.   
F2:  “Then some vijaymasuri, a little bit”. 
F3:  “Only 1001 gives a good yield when compared to others.  I got 40 bags for an 
acre…Even if (insect pests) attack, you’ll get something”. 
 
A:  Before that?   
 
F2:  “Oh, common seeds, some JGL.” 
F3:  “Our batch used to grow this kichidi samba in the village. About 15 or 20  years back 
when NTR (N.T. Rama Rao) was Chief Minister.” 
 
A:  For these 20 years its been W14 and 1001? 
 
F1:  “Yeah, these same”. 
 
Thus stability characterizes not only the few years that I have been working in the region but also 
farmers’ recent memory.  Where farmers will differentiate numerous inconsistent aspects of 
cotton seeds that essentially reduce to rumors of good yield, the same farmers shrug that “all 
[rice seeds] are the same.  There is not much difference between types.”  “But,” I asked, 
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A:  I have one small doubt
15
.  Every year new seed, new seed, new seed is famous.  But every 
year the same rice is famous.  Why are these different? 
 
F1:  “There are two to three favorite seed choices for farmers as far as rice is concerned, so 
we’ll be choosing on those particular varieties most.” 
F2:  “We do not rush to change the crop.  The same kind of [consistent] yielding [that we get 
rice] is not there in cotton.”   
 
At this point crosstalk broke out and a research assistant who was helping run the focus group 
clarified the chatter for me: “They say, the digubati (yield) is good in rice all the time.  In cotton 
it’s not so reliable.”  Cotton’s uncertain rewards and farmers’ laserlike focus on yield ensure that 
cotton choices will always be tinged with anxiety in a way that is irrelevant to rice choices.   
Nationally, cotton planters have more than a thousand possible options through the 
private market.  Of these options farmers in my six sample villages planted 102 during the 2012-
2014 seasons.  Based on my experience in Warangal seed shops, they likely saw at least three 
hundred varieties at any given city shop in any given year.  Rice varieties do not have to be 
approved for release in the same way that Bt cotton must be approved by a GEAC board 
(although that board has not released a new list of approved varieties since 2012).  However, 
ICAR tracks the most widely bred public and public/private partnership produced in Andhra 
Pradesh/Telangana.  Since 1965, public breeders have released only 219 commercially popular 
varieties (197) and hybrids (22) in Andhra Pradesh/Telangana, fewer seeds than Bt cotton 
companies produced in either 2009, 2010, or 2011 alone.  According to ICAR documents, the 
private sector released nine popular hybrids over this same period for a total of 228 popular 
seeds.  Farmers that I met planted 49 varieties of rice, 14 of which account for 93% of all seed 
choices.  It takes twice as many cotton seed brands (31) to reach the same seed choice coverage.  
As the thick/thin divide shows, these seeds are not just released more slowly and in fewer 
                                               
15 This is a common way for school students to address teachers when asking questions 
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numbers, they can be more easily distinguished from one another.  I asked Srirama Rao why the 
same few seeds maintained market dominance in Telangana year after year: 
 
They are highly preferred by the consumers and also by the millers and traders…mainly 
because:  they have good milling quality, good cooking quality, and good keeping quality.  
[Warangal 14, BPT 5204, MTU 1010] are medium slender grains.  Of course MTU 1010 is a 
little long, but it is preferred by the millers because it goes as parboiled rice to other states.  
And they are high yielders, and become ready immediately when the price in the market.  
Whereas other varieties which are bold (thick), and are not preferred by the consumers even 
though they are high yielders.  They yield more than, like, BPT 5204, maybe five bags 
more…they have a very good milling quality, very good cooking quality, and very good 
keeping quality. 
 
I will argue below that farmers conduct better trials with rice than they do with cotton, but 
suffice to say here that rice farmers typically conduct their experiments by balancing social and 
environmental learning over multiple years where cotton farmers tend to plant multiple seeds in 
their fields to evaluate differences, and then ignore those findings.  Farmers have a limited set of 
possible rice choices when compared to cotton and because farmers typically plant fewer 
different seeds at a time in their fields to trial them (Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2:  Comparison of Farmers’ Rice and Cotton Choices per Farmer per season, 
Averaged for each farmer’s choices 2012-2014  
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cotton Choices Rice Choices 
n 324 331 
Mean 4.65 2.13 
SD 3.22 1.09 
Minimum 1 1 
Maximum 15 5 
 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
This difference is significant at p < .001, with a standard deviation that puts much of the 
variation in cotton agriculture between one and eight cotton seeds per farmer but only one and 
three rice seeds per farmer.  The experience of choosing rice and cotton seeds in a shop is 
different as well.  A farmer buying cotton seeds may encounter hundreds of glossy packages in a 
shop, with no clear way to differentiate between them.  The same farmer is likely to encounter 
only a few different varieties of OPV rice seed in a shop, sold in burlap sacks without trade 
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names or impressive packaging.  The same farmers who planted an average of 4.65 different 
cotton brands 2012-2014 only planted 2.13 different types of rice varieties or hybrids over the 
same period.  Rice choice for these farmers was far more stable.  As rice is typically planted in 
both kharif and rabi seasons, planting two seeds geared toward these two different seasons 
makes sense.  That is, even if the same seeds are being planted again and again, one would 
expect farmers to consistently plant about two seeds to take advantage of their fit to each season.  
In cotton, cropped only once, the larger spread of seed choices indicates that each farmer, in 
general, had a more difficult time choosing which seeds to plant. 
Because they are working with fewer seeds in separate fields and the seed choices are 
much more consistent over the 2012-2014 period, farmers can also spend more time learning 
more about particular seeds.  Taken as an average for each farmer 2012-2014, rice choices were 
planted significantly longer (p <.001) than cotton choices and with a range of variation that 
allows most farmers between zero and eight years of experience with rice seeds but only zero to 
three years with cotton seeds.  Zero years in this calculation and figure refers to seeds that were 
never before planted.  Compared with cotton, farmer planting rice seed choices benefit from 
more time (Figure 6.3), more stability, and less choice overload. 
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Figure 6.3:  Histograms comparing average number of years rice and cotton seeds are 
planted per farmer 
 
 
 
 
This histogram shows frequency (Y axis) with which the farmers had planted seeds in the year asked 2012-2014 (X 
axis) for Bt cotton (blue) and rice (red) seed choices. Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
Given these differences in planting experience, it is unsurprising that rice seeds are less 
likely to be novice plantings.  One-hundred and twenty-three out of 585 (21%) rice choices were 
first time plantings 2012-2014.  This is compared to 715 out of 1443 (49%) cotton choices.  
These differences manifest in a farmer population that knows which rices are thick and therefore 
more disease resistant, high yielding, and fetch a lower price in the market; as well as those 
Cotton Descriptive Statistics 
 
n =   311 
Mean =   1.48 
SD =   1.55 
Min =  0 
Max =  10 
 
Rice Descriptive Statistics 
 
n =   313 
Mean =   4.41 
SD =   3.98 
Min =  0 
Max =  50 
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which are thin and therefore more susceptible to disease, lower yielding, but can be sold at a 
higher price (Table 6.1).  They remember rice choices with greater certainty each year than 
cotton, and the differences are easily observed across fields and in the marketplace. 
 So far in this chapter I have been calculating numbers based on seed choices reported in 
the year that I asked about them as this probably gives the most accurate data.  However, my 
surveys also asked farmers to recall seeds planted in the previous year, which introduces a 
problem: rice recall is more difficult to track than cotton recall.  Because farmers most often 
plant two seasons of rice during the kharif the same methods for tracking cotton seed recall do 
not work – farmers asked in the kharif season in 2013 what seeds they plant cannot be 
resurveyed on their rabi seed in 2014.  Cotton, by contrast is planted at the beginning of the 
kharif season and harvested during successive fruitings November through early March.  Data on 
seed choice for the year asked thus has a bias against seeds planted during the rabi season as 
farmers had not yet planted those seeds
16
. 
In 2013, I resurveyed 97 farmers on 217 rice seed choices from a 2012 pilot study in four 
villages. In 2014 I resurveyed an additional 219 farmers on 481 seed choices. Farmers correctly 
recalled 124 out of 217 (57%) seed choices in 2013 and 256 out of 482 (53%) choices in 2014.  
                                               
16
 To triangulate an accurate perspective on farmer rice recall, I compared 2014 and 2013 rice seeds recalled to 
farmer choices given the previous year, looking only to see if that seed was recalled, not counting false recalls in 
instances where farmers recalled more than one seed that may have been planted in the winter season.  For example, 
if a farmer stated that she was planting Warangal 14 rice in 2012 and in 2013 recalled that she had planted Warangal 
14 and MTU 1010, I counted this as an instance of correct recall and ignored the MTU 1010 choice and assumed 
that it was a winter rice choice.  If a farmer stated that she planted Warangal 14 rice in 2012 and in 2013 recalled 
planting only MTU 1010 I counted this as a failed recall.  In cases where some seed choices were recalled and others 
were not, as when a farmer stated that she planted one seed and then recalled several more the following year, I 
relied on common seed choices I observed to treat these on a case by case basis.  For example, MTU 1010 and 
hybrid breeding rice locally called “male/female” rice are almost always winter rice choices and thus 
overrepresented in the recall lists and underrepresented in a given year’s choice list.  In this way I aimed to best 
capture how many recorded rice seed choices were then recalled the following year and not to penalize farmers for 
missing rice choices that had not been planted when we surveyed farmers the previous kharif season.  As with 
cotton, when a seed was reported in one year and recalled in the next year, both choices were counted as a recall; 
when a seed was reported in one year and not recalled in the next but a different seed was recalled, both choices 
were counted as a non-recall. 
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These rates are not wildly different from cotton’s 57% and 41% correct recall rates in these 
respective years, but there are some important differences.  As the most popular seed in the 
sample it is unsurprising that Warangal 14 was in both years the most well remembered seed.  
Many farmers lost points on their recall because they named particular facets of the seed 
(recalling the seed as thick or thin, say) or often by mistaking a variety of Warangal seed for 
Warangal 14.  Many confused Warangal 32100, for example with BPT or with Warangal 14, 
which makes phenotypic sense as Warangal 32100 has less name recognition and credits both of 
these varieties as parent lines.  Farmers tended to misremember the rarer hybrid rice seeds with 
their confusing company and brand names.  The growing hybrid seed market will be discussed 
further below, but the overwhelming majority, 577 out of 704 rice seed choices (82%) are OPVs, 
with hybrids accounting for only nine percent of the sample.  The remaining seeds were either 
identified as ‘do not know’ or were most likely OPVs that farmers misnamed. 
 Another kind of triangulation in the differences between farmer knowledge of rice and 
cotton seeds is their agreement on seeds’ phenotypic qualities.  Using ethnography to inform 
survey questions, I identified important qualities that arose during ethnographic observation and 
focus groups for cotton and rice.  During the 2014 household seed survey, I asked farmers about 
a few characteristics for each seed that they planted that year.  The degree to which farmers 
agreed with each other thus indicated how much certainty existed for various seeds among 
farmers.  While agreement alone does not necessarily mean that the farmers were ‘correct’ about 
a seed’s particular quality, it does indicate that farmers have a widespread understanding that 
something is true.   
 For each cotton seed choice, I asked farmers to predict boll size (small, medium, or 
large), growth habit (bushy, tall, or both) and I asked farmers if seed in question was a Bt seed.  
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For rice seeds, I asked farmers to identify if the seed was thick or thin, how many bags of rice 
could be expected from the seed, and how many days it would take to harvest the crop.  All of 
these factors are important agronomic indicators espoused by farmers and reflect important 
decisions and knowledge about seeds.  They should also be clearly evident when the crops grow 
and at the forefront of farmers’ minds when making seed choices as these factors ultimately 
reflect the yield and management of these crops.  Especially among cotton planters, farmers 
might respond that they had no way of knowing what the agronomic factors were because they 
had not planted the seeds.  I marked this as ‘do not know’ but it clearly reflects a serious 
problem.  The disrupted social pathways that provide knowledge of seed properties were either 
so inconsistent or untrustworthy that farmers were not willing to justify these choices to an 
anthropologist with a survey. 
 Boll size and growth habit, defined by the farmer’s taxonomy of tall, bushy, or both, are 
easy to observe and crucial factors for cotton agriculture, as these reflect yield, fertilizer 
response, and susceptibility to pest damage.  While dependent on a large number of factors 
including inputs, weather, and soil conditions, these phenotypic factors are at the front of 
farmers’ minds when making seed choices and learning about seeds through experiments or 
social emulation.  Yet the spread of this data (Table 6.1) shows a consistent divergence of farmer 
opinions. 
Table 6.1:  2014 Cotton Knowledge Consensus as a Row Percentage 
 
 Boll Size  Growth Habit  
Seed Name Small Medium Large DNK  Tall Both Bushy DNK N 
Yuva 4 18 51 27  31 31 14 24 104 
ATM 5 34 43 18  36 23 12 30 61 
Jadoo 6 36 51 6  26 28 19 28 47 
Jackpot 4 29 64 4  25 18 14 43 28 
Dr. Brent 16 24 48 12  40 28 12 20 25 
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Sarpanch 4 17 33 46  29 33 8 29 24 
Bhakti 0 32 45 23  36 23 18 23 22 
Mallika 6 47 47 0  24 12 35 29 17 
Neeraja 21 50 21 7  36 29 21 14 14 
Ankur 3028 0 17 75 8  50 17 17 17 12 
Padmaja 0 50 25 25  12 62 0 25 8 
Rasi 12 50 25 12  25 38 12 25 8 
Denim 0 50 33 17  33 17 17 33 6 
Bindas 0 0 60 40  40 20 0 40 5 
Tadaka 0 40 60 0  40 0 40 20 5 
Arjun 0 75 0 25  25 25 0 50 4 
Brahma 0 0 100 0  50 0 25 25 4 
Ujwal 0 0 0 100  100 0 0 0 4 
Ambuja 0 33 33 33  67 0 0 33 3 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2014. 
 
For this table, only seed choices with at least three planting farmers are shown.  While 
complicated, this table reveals that more than half of farmers planting a given seed rarely agreed 
on boll size or growth habit.  Indeed, ‘do not know’ often commands as many choices as the 
others.  Few farmers answered that boll size for a given seed would be small, indicating that it 
would be difficult to pick but that the cotton plants would produce a greater quantity of bolls 
more resistant to insect attacks.  This probably reflects a cautious optimism that their plants 
would produce large and heavy cotton that would fetch a higher price and be easier to pick, 
although it would also be more susceptible to insect predation and produce fewer total bolls.  A 
generally understood farmer consensus (above 52%) appears only twice before seed choices fall 
to a handful of farmers:  that Jackpot and Ankur-3028 produce large bolls.   
 Compare this spread to the spread of knowledge represented in rice (Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2:  2014 Rice Knowledge Consensus as Row Percentage 
 
 Thickness  Yield
17
  Duration 
Seed 
Name 
Thick Thin DNK 
 10-
20 
20-
30 
30-
40 
40-
50 
50+ 
 
Short Med Long 
Extra 
Long 
N 
Warangal 
14 
1 97 1  0 9 57 32 2  9 61 23 8 67 
MTU 
1001 
100 0 0  2 10 39 46 2  10 41 39 10 41 
BPT 5204 0 100 0  0 0 48 52 0  0 33 62 5 21 
JGL 9 91 0  0 8 42 42 8  0 67 33 0 12 
3100 0 100 0  9 9 36 45 0  0 82 9 9 11 
Ganga 
Kaveri 
0 100 0 
 
0 25 62 0 12 
 
0 62 38 0 9 
JGL-384 12 88 0  12 12 12 52 0  12 50 25 12 8 
MTU 
1010 
100 0 0  0 0 67 33 0  0 67 33 0 6 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2014.   
 
  
Again focusing only on seeds chosen by three or more farmers, the spread of rice seeds is 
predictably smaller and the consensus predictably more confined.  Thick- and thin-ness of rice is 
almost universally known and there is a high degree of convergence around germination time 
and overall yield.  Only five rice planters in the six village sample claimed in 2014 that they did 
not know enough to offer an opinion on their rice seed choice.  Of these, two planted new 
hybrids and two did not know the name of the seed they had planted.  Almost no farmers ever 
mistake thick seeds for thin seeds, and more than 60 percent agree on their rice duration, the 
number of days it takes from seed to harvest in seven out of the nine seeds listed.  Yield sees a 
greater spread, although most of this is concentrated between 30 and 45 bags per acre.  Even so, 
the spread of estimates remains closer than that found in cotton.  
This section has argued that farmers have a deeper and more nuanced knowledge of rice 
seeds than they do with cotton seeds because of the fewer options in rice seeds, their greater 
                                               
17 I collected both yield and duration as discrete values in bags and days respectively, and summarized them for the 
sake of clarity here.  Similarly to growth habit in cotton, rice yield is not an inherent property of rice but one heavily 
tied to inputs and growth.  However, like growth habit in cotton, farmers type yield as a somewhat predictable 
phenotypic variable.  This is because, in general, farmers agree that thick seeds yield more and thin seeds yield less.   
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experience with those fewer seeds, and, importantly, the more detailed uses that they require of 
those seeds.  The important factors of rice cultivation are thus highly consistent in the minds of 
individual farmers and dependent on their personal needs, in a way that cotton seeds are not.  
The next section will discuss variability among the farmers and the influences that this social 
landscape and environmental learning has on rice seed decision making. 
 
 The Underwhelming Influence of Pedda Farmers and Vendors in Seed Choice 
 In cotton, the social conforming that leads to widespread seed fads is additionally filtered 
through the social hierarchy of the village.  As shown in the previous chapter, this conformist 
bias is not because socially important pedda farmers have better yields, but more because they 
are expected to know best.  Within the widespread uncertainty that characterizes the anarchic 
cotton seed market, travelling brokers and shop owners have an additional extra sway over what 
farmers plant.  However, this influence is far less important to the rice seed market.  The pedda 
farmer, so important to the social dynamics of cotton farming (if not the actual yield responses) 
has negligible impact on rice agriculture because the seeds are more consistent, the information 
more reliable, and the seed vendors less important in the moment when farmers select their seed.  
In cotton agriculture, the firm suggestion of a shop owner can sway acres of planting to a 
particular seed.  In rice, farmers tend to plant what they know.  In fact, the modest relationship 
suggested by rice acreage and yield is a negative relationship:  farmers devoting fewer acres to 
rice tend to invest more in those acres to maximize production (Figure 6.4).   
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Figure 6.4:  Scatterplot of 2012-2014 Warangal 14 Yields Against Rice Acreage  
 
Linear Regression of Acreage 2012-2014 vs. Yield:  r2 = .076, n = 146 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
Much of the data is clustered among farmers who plant between .25 and 3 acres of rice and the 
coefficient of determination reveals that there is no linear relationship between rice acreage and 
yield.  However, there is an important analogy to the trends of farmers in cotton.  While the 
largest cotton planters tended to see slight advantages in yield or slight social advantages at the 
far end of acreage in cotton, the most successful rice farmers tended to plant fewer acres.  When 
asked in focus groups, farmers do not name pedda farmers as a group with unfair advantages in 
cultivation as they suggest in cotton cultivation.  This emerges from the seed survey data as well.  
In 2012-2014, for instance, the largest 20% of farmers planted 27% of the cotton seeds visible in 
the village, more than their share.  In rice, where each quintile plants roughly equal numbers of 
seeds, the same group of farmers planted 21% of the seeds visible to the village.  Yield is not 
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necessarily the most meaningful goal that farmers chase in rice cultivation, and so yield response 
is not necessarily the best test of if and how farmers learn from their rice paddies.  Farmers tend 
to plant thick rices when seeking to minimize pest damage and maximize yield, and plant thin 
rices to maximize price and taste.  That small farmers tend to do somewhat better suggests that, 
in rice, it is sufficient to do “well enough” with rice.  For the larger farmers, maximiz ing 
production is an unnecessary use of resources.  That the relevant knowledge of thick/thin or taste 
is widely known and agreed-upon means that rice knowledge is more in the domain of the 
individual and less in the domain of experts external to the farm or mediated through the village 
social hierarchy. 
 Farmers from Kavrupad, Ralledapalle, and Srigonda, the three villages where my 
ethnographic and quantitative data is strongest, tend to buy from specific, trustworthy, local 
vendors.  52% of the seeds farmers in these villages planted were either saved or from village 
shops, while the rest were purchased from shops in regional cities like Warangal or Nekkonda, or 
from black market brokers.  Unlike cotton seeds, these vendors are not asked to determine 
popular rice choices.  Rather, farmers tend to either ask for specific seed brands or at minimum a 
thick or thin seed.  This tendency is reflected in the sample as a whole.  That experts are trusted 
sources of seed but not necessarily information is reflected in the buying loyalty of farmers in my 
six sample villages (Table 6.3).  Bikshapathi Rao is a small input shop owner in Parvatagiri, the 
mandal
18
 seat.    His is one of three agricultural input shops in the town, and during 2012-2014 
he provided 57 out of 326 (17%) rice seed choices to farmers in the Ralledapalle and Kavrupad 
areas, the single largest vendor.  Srigonda’s farmers additionally purchased 36 out of 130 (28%) 
rice seeds from the Mahalakshmi Cooperative, a trusted shop that serves Srigonda farmers.  Like 
                                               
18 Mandals are municipal conglomerations of villages below the level of districts, analogous to the way that counties 
are subdivisions of states.   
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cotton farmers, rice farmers do not remember where they purchased a large (239/655, 36%) 
percentage of their seeds.  Also like cotton, the number of farmers who did not know where they 
bought their seeds is also spread evenly among farmers of different sizes.  Unlike cotton, 
however, this lack of recall is less detrimental because farmers do not rely so heavily on shop 
owners to determine which rice seeds are best, they rely on these shop owners to provide viable 
seed. 
Table 6.3:  Seed Vendors accounting for more than 1% of Total Rice Choices in All  
Villages 2012-2014 
 
Vendor name Seed choices from Vendor % of total choices 
Saved Seeds 59 14.18% 
Bikshapathi 57 13.70% 
Hybrid Broker 40 9.62% 
Mahalakhsmi Cooperative 37 8.89% 
Vasenta Rao 18 4.33% 
Vijay Lakshmi Fertilizers 16 3.85% 
AP Seeds 10   2.40% 
From Relative 10 2.40% 
Swathi Fertilizers 10 2.40% 
Kankadurga 10 2.40% 
Anil Rao 9 2.16% 
Deva Sai 8 1.92% 
From Pedda Farmer 8 1.92% 
Prem Chinder Rao 8 1.92% 
Sri Rama 7 1.68% 
From Neighbor 7 1.68% 
Laskhmi Reddy 7 1.68% 
Rama Rao 7 1.68% 
Maruthi Fertilizers 5 1.20% 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
Hybrid brokers in this context refer not necessarily to black market seed vendors but to company 
agents who sell hybrid seeds.  As rice seeds are almost always publically developed varieties, the 
government does not place distribution restrictions that fuel a rice seed black market as is seen in 
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cotton.  Bikshapathi Rao, hybrid brokers, the Srigonda cooperative, and Vasenta Rao are all local 
community institutions in the sense that all are located in or near the town where farmer 
consumers live and all have a direct stake in the community.  This distinguishes them from the 
busy and often pushy shop owners of Warangal, although this proximity can lead farmers to view 
them as too provincial when they buy cotton seeds or pesticides.  Shops in nearby cities like 
Warangal or Nekkonda are seen as better sources of high quality agricultural commodities such 
as those.  Interestingly, the most oft-used ‘vendor’ is the farmers themselves.  Rice can be and is 
often saved, giving farmers experience not just with the named OPV but with the specific 
germplasm of their fields.  Rice saving is, of course, its own set of complicated knowledge and 
will be described in greater detail below.  Suffice it to say that farmers who save their seeds 
necessarily know where they came from and have a reasonable expectation of how they will 
perform. 
As with cotton, rice yields did not differ significantly between farmers.  Even between 
the IR-64 and JGL varieties, the two seeds with the largest differences in mean yields, IR-64 did 
not provide statistically greater yields than JGL in an independent two-group t-test (t = 1.58, p 
value = 0.12) (Figure 6.5).  Consistent with farmer narratives, BPT 5204’s range of yield 
variation was comparatively lower and its popularity as a seed choice speaks to its taste and high 
selling price.  That said, no yields of the popular different rice were statistically different.  Like 
the cotton seed yields, the rice yield averages were all well within the range of variation for the 
sample as a whole. 
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Figure 6.5:  Boxplots of Rice Yields for the Most Popular Varieties 2012-2014 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 IR-64 MTU 1001 BPT 5204 JGL(all) MTU 1010 Warangal 14 
n 36 132 101 132 198 216 
Mean 30.44 26.51 25.93 25.12 26.57 26.01 
SD 19.05 15.91 14.96 12.96 17.08 15.21 
Minimum 10.00 1.00 3.18 .40 .00 .00 
Maximum 90 100 100 70 160 120 
 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
 This section has argued that farmers as a whole respond to first-hand environmental 
knowledge in their rice seed decisions.  With fewer choices planted for a longer period of time 
and with a greater knowledge base both on the level of individual farmers and in the widely 
shared consensus about agronomic qualities of rice seeds, farmers are in a better position to 
develop and use environmental learning.  This is partly to do with particular inherent qualities of 
rice and partly to do with the way in which rice knowledge is socially mediated.  In this market, 
farmers are less reliant on vague black market brokers, callous vendors, or large neighbors for 
174 
 
seed choice knowledge – for the most part, farmers agree on the widely understood buzz (Table 
6.2) and their seed choices consistently favor the same seeds (Figure 6.1).  Given that no seeds 
perform better than others, a focus on yield above all else is a poor measure of farmer knowledge 
and management in rice seeds.  If a rice yield is substandard, damaged, contaminated with beriki, 
or if the market price is below what a farmer wants to pay, the farmer can always at least eat that 
product.  Other factors inherent to rice such as its taste, its ability to be saved, and the way that 
farmers must handle the rice throughout its life cycle from nursery to harvest and seed saving 
make rice inherently easier to learn about.  The next section discusses that knowledge in action 
during the decisions and management of saved rice seed.  
 
Rice Saving and Optimizing Knowledge, Reliability, and Performance 
 The decision to save or buy seeds begins with a few easily articulated economic and 
agricultural factors:  is there enough money to buy new seeds, do we need cash more than saved 
rice, is the price good, is this rice suitable for a second planting, or did the crops exhibit any 
characteristics like disease susceptibility that would make them undesirable in the next season.  
Then there are more social reasons to save or replant:  wanting to seize on a new opportunity like 
a hybrid rice rumored to deliver a good yield, emulating a neighbor who performed well with 
other seeds, wanting to appear savvy or modern for working with sales representatives, or not 
wanting to go through the effort of selecting or saving new seeds.  But because farmers do more 
with rice, physically handling and inspecting it at various stages in production, and because cash-
cropped rice is rare, the urge to follow the untested choice of a neighbor is diminished in rice 
cultivation.   
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“Wari same adi” laughed a farmer in a Ralledapalle focus group. “All the rice is the 
same.  The yields, however they will be, will be almost the same in all of the different rice 
seeds.”  “Every year,” I asked incredulously.  “Every year.”  “But in cotton?”  The farmers rolled 
their eyes at this question.  “In cotton there are many differences.  It is for that reason that we are 
changing [seeds]!”  In the wealthier and higher caste village of Srigonda, farmers in a focus 
group agreed:  “Those rice seeds that taste good will not be changed [as with cotton seeds].  The 
taste must be good.  The taste in the rice should be good.”  As in many languages spoken by 
people who subsist primarily on rice, the same word connotes both ‘cooked rice’ and ‘food’ in 
Telugu.  Rice, and rice that is saved or eaten especially, is not simply a purchased commodity 
like cotton.  Maximizing yield is secondary to producing enough, or making do one’s primary 
food crop.  In many instances rice does not need to be outstanding to be selected again by a 
farmer, just good enough to satisfy the common or individual preference.  One can eat what is 
needed and sell the rest. 
 One key informant (and friend), Bikshapathi, is a graduate of the NGO-run school in 
Kavrupad where I volunteer and offered to show me around the area’s fields.  Like many 
Telangana farmers, his family, the children and grandchildren of the patriarch who founded their 
tribal thanda, plants a few separate guntas
19
 of special, thin, BPT 5204 rice where (thanks in part 
to his training as an organic chemist) the family sprays fewer pesticides and devotes fewer 
resources.  This food is not destined for sale at the market, but is just a convenient way to have a 
steady supply of rice that the family likes.  As for the rest of his family’s rice land, intended for 
the market, the family will sometimes save and sometimes buy new seeds.  “It depends how 
much we get,” he explained.  “If we yield thirty-five or forty bags from a rice seed, well save that 
                                               
19 An area of a rice paddy of variable size, about 1/40th of an acre, set downhill such that water flows from one area 
to another.  In India, paddy refers to rice crop rather than to the land itself, and I have adopted this parlance to avoid 
confusion. 
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seed again.”  “And below that point,” I asked?  “That’s when we know we need to buy new 
seeds again.  It’s like a target.”  Rice buying or saving decisions are flexible and contingent upon 
environmental feedback, including field performance.  Rumors of new productive seeds 
therefore hold less sway over farmers’ imaginations, at least not in years when their seeds are 
producing enough.   
 Common wisdom holds that seeds can be saved and replanted for up to two years 
following their purchase.  That is, seeds should be bought new at least every three years.  After 
several years of replanting, farmers believe that yields decrease and it becomes increasingly 
likely that seeds from other varieties will fall into the field resulting in beriki seeds.  By the third 
year, rice plants and their seed grains will have too much variability and thus fetch a poor price 
in the market.  This is in part because the rice varieties that farmers use are OPVs, explained 
ANGRAU scientist Dr. Ranitha.  The risk of inbreeding and yield depression lead people to 
“believe that the new seeds are always better although they should last around three years before 
needing to be rebought.”  Frustrated on one hand with what she sees as an increasing focus on 
commodity farming, Ranitha nonetheless appreciates the logic in buying new seeds to gain a 
better profit margin.  “In the past, people used to save seeds and had some greater knowledge 
and patience for the practice.  Now, they want to buy new seeds and don't want to take the risk of 
saving and ruining the next year’s crop.”  For their part, farmers shrugged at the implication that 
they should be saving seeds more often.  “Well, you wouldn’t wear the same shirt every day,” 
mused one farmer. 
In addition to overall production, farmers evaluating seeds for saving additionally look 
for qualities of beriki, talu, and kalthi.  As explained above, farmers diligently inspect their 
harvest for these defective seeds, as they cause problems for the saving and replanting process.  
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However, these same qualities important for farmer decision-making in the field are also 
important when farmers go to the market to sell their harvest.  Both farmers and traders use their 
eyes, hands, and tongues to test rice seeds for their durability, taste, color, and starch content.  
These qualities are equally prized by farmers looking for high-performing seeds and grain buyers 
looking for any excuse to mark down the price of seeds.  That is, farmers are economically 
rewarded and environmentally rewarded for maintaining the same qualities in their rice fields.   
The market can be a stressful place for farmers, who stand with their piles of newly 
weighed grain as merchants make their rounds.  Seed buyers travel in groups and compare notes, 
sighing with disapproval at each pile of grain and offering prices below the mandatory 
government rate.  Farmers will often accept these discounted prices because the merchants, 
unlike the government, will pay in cash that same day.  Flashing gold rings and chains, they 
reach a hand into the piles of grain to feel for moisture that can lead to mold and rot.  After 
examining a fistful of rice for cracks or discoloration, one or several merchants knead those 
grains with their palms to see how tough the seeds are, and how many are filled with a solid, 
white, healthy-looking starch.  The more variation between grain sizes, consistency, color, 
moisture, and general feel that the merchants perceive, the more they shake their heads and argue 
the price down.  
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Buyers inspect rice seed for color, consistency, and starch content at a Warangal district market.  The farmer, clad in 
a red turban, has been pushed to the back of the crowd while brokers and onlookers render their judgement.   
 
Because they do so in groups, some farmers can play buyers off one another.  Yet this is rare.  
More often, buyers make no effort to contradict the judgments passed by other buyers and 
farmers sullenly accept the prices offered to them.  No one, after all, wants to go home empty-
handed.  Therefore, keeping one’s rice clean, dry, and uniformly healthy is paramount. 
When rice is saved for a farmers’ personal use, the stock must be sifted to remove these 
same undesirable qualities – replant one errant beriki seed and it will yield one hundred grains 
that will bring down your price in the market.  Farmers take care to rid themselves of these seeds 
at harvest and then again when they soak and sprout seeds as preparation to planting them in rice 
nurseries.  When watching the plants grow, farmers take note to see if the plants are becoming 
increasingly susceptible to disease, another sign that the pest cycles are adapting to their 
cropping patterns or that the seed is losing its yield potential.  When the time comes to harvest 
seeds, the entire family along with hired labor looks through their plants.  Telangana farmers 
employ a mix of rented harvesting machines and manual labor, but in both cases they check the 
fields for errant or diseased plants that would preclude replanting.  “You can keep saving and 
replanting until the backbone (the plant’s seed bearing ear) becomes weak and sags”, advised 
one farmer.  Employing a more sobering metaphor, one farmer warned “You can save for a 
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second year only.  If a woman gives birth to four children, one will be sick, and so too impurities 
creep in to the saved rice.” If families are considering saving the seed, someone, usually but not 
exclusively the male head of the household, inspects the rice – one farmer even counted the 
grains on several rice stalks as a proxy for the health of his fields. 
After the rice has been collected, winnowed, and bagged, farmers can calculate how 
much they can save beyond the minimum they need to sell to recoup their losses and gain a 
profit.  Alternately, like Bikshapathi, they set targets for their family’s needs and sell anything 
produced beyond that minimum.  Farmers’ knowledge, and often their personal touch, is required 
throughout each step.  This is because seed saving decisions are often based on a conglomeration 
of subjective agronomic and economic properties.  “There’s no difference between saved, sold, 
and eaten rice,” explained Ralledapalle thanda farmer Ravinder when I asked if farmers chose 
particular seeds for particular fates when working in the field.  “It’s all harvested together and 
bagged together.  The only difference is the presence of beriki which is not really good for eating 
or replanting”.  “Look to see that the rice plants look healthy and that there's no disease in the 
field,” advised another farmer.  “New seeds can be saved twice, but after that the harvest itself 
will not come.  If you have no money you can save a second time but even if you're out of 
money you have to buy new seeds that third time around.  Always save one bag [for replanting 
seed], just in case.”  There is no simple economic cost benefit calculation to saving seeds as both 
rich and poor farmers have incentives to replant rice.  Poor farmers claim that they don’t have the 
money to buy new seeds while wealthier farmers say that they have less to worry about from a 
bad yield or have fewer pressing seasonal debts.  In all cases farmers must make decisions about 
their seeds based on their particular situation at that time, usually not seeking to maximize yield 
but to maximize reliability. 
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This section has shown that the process of rice saving depends heavily on farmers’ 
firsthand knowledge and implementation.  The same factors that influence seed saving decisions 
are also the qualities scrutinized by seed buyers, and so farmers have an economic reward for 
keeping abreast of variation in their seeds.  However, yield is only important to a point:  farmers 
and plant scientists believe that depressed yields that come from continually saved seeds and so 
farmers tend to set yield targets, changing only when their harvest falls below that mark.  Seed 
saving is a strategy not for optimizing yield but for optimizing ‘doing well enough’.  
Furthermore, the process of saving rice requires farmers to constantly use a flexible set of 
knowledge directly connected to economic rewards and the environmental feedback of pests, 
inputs, and plant growth. As an agricultural practice, seed saving is therefore intimately tied to an 
adaptive skillset based in local knowledge.  At the very least, the widespread habit of buying new 
seeds after saving for two years gives farmers a chance to reflect on new possibilities and weigh 
them against seeds they know.  Some farmers opt for new or hybrid seeds in this year while 
others will again choose OPV rices.  Lacking such opportunities to develop knowledge or an 
incentive to use them, cotton seed choices are more connected to capricious rumor mills and 
marketing campaigns.  However, some rice varieties are not designed to be saved.  The final 
section discusses hybrid rice varieties and the ways in which hybrid rice seed decisions mimic 
hybrid GM cotton seed decisions.  
 
Social Politics of Rice Knowledge Between Hybrid Breeder Rice and Other Rices 
 So far I have focused on OPV rice knowledge, the knowledge of at least 82% of the seed 
choices in the sample.  However, since I began working in Telangana a minor but growing 
market for hybrid seeds and for hybrid breeding seeds has become attractive to some farmers.  
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Hybrid seeds provide an interesting analytical bridge between cotton and rice decision-making 
behavior, because hybrid rice seeds resemble hybrid GM cotton seeds in a number of respects.  
Rice knowledge, following suit, begins to resemble cotton knowledge with these seeds.  Hybrid 
rice seeds behave much more like cotton seeds than OPV rice seeds in the sense that they are 
more commodified and are more often sold by farmers like a cash crop rather than eaten.  They 
are marketed by brand name and bought by farmers who have scant knowledge of their specific 
properties; they are bought with one season rather than multiple seasons in mind; they are 
purchased as a new product of private industry rather than chosen time and again because of their 
acknowledged reliability from a public breeder.  Thus does the calculus for rice become 
simplified – fewer considerations of taste, use, or reliability, and more considerations of yield.  
As with cotton, hybrid rice knowledge becomes less tactile and less reliable .   
 Like hybrid GM cotton, hybrid rice is also mostly controlled by the private sector.  When 
I asked ICAR scientist LV Srirama Rao what effects privatization had on farmer seed options, he 
couched his response in the frustrations that many hardworking officials have with corruption 
and inefficiency in the Indian bureaucracy. 
 
L:  Hybrids are all with the private sector.  Though we have a good number of hybrids in the 
public sector, the public sector could not make a dent…In the public sector (of which 
Srirama Rao is a member) they could not make seed production very successful.  You know 
the Indian system, I think by now you are aware of it. If it is a government job, no one can 
take you to task…Here, the government job is the most secure job, even if you are found to 
be corrupt or something like that.  Some action will be taken but you will not lose the job.  
The security point attracts the people who go for government jobs.  In this way, some of [the 
government scientists] could not master the skill of seed production for hybrids.  Only those 
farmers in the Warangal, and then Karimnagar area
20
 have mastered the skill of seed 
production…We get big MNCs. 
 
A:  In cotton the hybrids are in the hands of the companies, and mostly with rice the hybrids 
are in the hands of the companies.   
 
                                               
20 Two districts in Telangana 
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L:  90 percent.  I’d say even 95 percent.  Hybrids in rice are with private industry, Bayer, 
Syngenta, Advanta, Pioneer, that is DuPont.  And local companies like Ganga Kaveri, 
Mahyco, Indo American, Kaveri, or JK.  They’re all popular.  They’re very, very key players 
in hybrid rice.  
 
A:  But still hybrid rice is not so popular [among farmers]. 
 
L:  It is around 2.5 million hectares of area.  It is 43 to 44 million hectares of area in India, 
rice area.  And then if you come to Andhra Pradesh its hardly 40 lakh hectares.  So there is 
no hybrid rice cultivation in Andhra Pradesh, only seed production.   
 
Private, often foreign companies drive hybrid seed sales even as most farmers prefer local 
varieties developed by public state breeders.  Whether this is because the breeding programs are 
ill suited to the demands of hybrid production as Srirama Rao suggests or because farmers are 
less tempted by the promises of hybrid breeders is unclear.  But while farmers tend to eschew 
growing and eating hybrid seeds as a whole, there are two important and growing exceptions.  
The first is Indian hybrid seed company Ganga Kaveri.   
 Since 2012 Ganga Kaveri stationed a representative in Parvatagiri, a municipality central 
to Srigonda, Ralledapalle, and Kavrupad (Figure 2.1).  This agent sells hybrid seeds but also 
rents out a labor-saving rice harvester.  By working closely with farmers and renting out his 
harvester, the Ganga Kaveri dealer built up a trust relationship that encouraged farmers, 
especially the homogenous communities of Lambadi tribal farmers near Ralledapalle, to switch 
to his seed.  “Until last year almost everyone was cutting [rice plants] with their hands,” 
explained a Ralledapalle farmer in a focus group.  “From this year we will all be using that 
machine.”  The machine is cheaper and much more time effective than family labor, especially 
as their increasingly educated children move to the cities.  Farmers in the area were initially 
hesitant to plant hybrid seeds, concerned that they would falter under local conditions.  “There 
are only a few types of hybrids and those hybrid seeds can’t withstand these kinds of natural 
conditions (prakruti).  Normally we use these local seeds, and all the seeds [respond] the same 
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way.  They are not different.”  To woo farmers accustomed to chasing cotton yields but who 
value rice seed reliability, Ganga Kaveri established a social relationship through a cost saving 
and impressive machine.  Following this initial connection, a Ralledapalle farmer centrally 
located to the surrounding tribal thandas was recruited to draw a modest salary as a hybrid rice 
agent.  His locality and personal touch additionally make Ganga Kaveri a popular choice.  That 
the seed itself is inexpensive, rumored to be more pest resistant, and tastes and looks like 
Warangal 14 is additionally appreciated. 
More tenuous has been farmers’ commitment to what they call male/female rice, the 
hybrid breeding stock bought and sold by MNCs like Syngenta or Bayer.  “From next year I 
won’t plant that rice,” said Yakub, a focus group discussant.  “Last year Yakub didn’t get a good 
yield from the male/female rice,” offered the farmer sitting next to him.  Yakub scowled.  Hybrid 
companies ask farmers to plant male/female rice under a very strict regimen of soil tests, 
watering, and chemical applications, so that they can produce viable hybrid rice then sold 
throughout South Asia.  Farmers are not necessarily privy to this supply chain because their 
interactions tend to be quick and to the point with company representatives.  “I heard they are 
used as a high end biryani rice,” suggested one farmer.  Even Bikshapathi the organic chemist 
was at a loss, suggesting that the seeds were ground into powder and used to provide filler 
material for pharmaceutical capsules. 
Hybrid seed producing companies use brokers and advertisements to recruit growers in 
the winter season, and then briefly check to ensure that farmers are willing and able to invest and 
water their lands to the extent that the rice requires.  Usually this involves a soil test as well.  
Hybrid companies then provide the seeds, tell farmers how to space and align their crops, give 
fertilizing suggestions, give pesticide and virus control suggestions as part of regular field 
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inspections, and then buy back the seeds when they have been harvested.  Farmers who often 
believe (or hope) that the entire process is insured, can be shocked to find themselves owing 
money to shops or seed agents in the event of crop failure.  “Companies give different amounts 
but we working for Bayer are sure to give only what they promise,” explained Bayer 
representative Rupesh as he recruited farmers in a Ralledapalle thanda.  “If 80% of the field is a 
loss and the farmer followed the instructions properly, they can receive up to Rs 20,000 per acre 
in that event.” In my own interviews, farmers (wistfully, perhaps) suggest that the correct 
compensation including inputs, seeds, electricity, and labor would be closer to Rs 60,000 per 
acre.  Rupesh laughed: “if we gave Rs 60,000 for an acre no one would work, they'd just lie 
down on their beds.” 
Farmers accustomed to doing ‘well enough’ with rice can find the high-risk, high-reward 
nature of  hybrid rice agriculture exhausting.  Dr. Ranitha suggested that after three years  of 
instructions and inputs the farmers get fed up with the exorbitant investment costs and see that 
their soil has been damaged by excessive fertilizer and pesticide use.  “The hybrid seeds are sold 
to other states and neighboring countries for commercial production, but they are useless in 
Andhra Pradesh where we have better tastes and are accustomed to [the taste of] thin rice.” The 
farmers tended to agree with her assessment.  “A farmer will have one lakh (100,000) different 
kinds of problems,” offered Yakub, the male/female planting farmer.  His friend explained:   
 
Each and every problem is a major problem, like spraying at a delayed time or aphids, 
things like that.  Then the whole crop will be lost.  The bullocks are important, the labor 
is important, the investment of even a single rupee is important.  Chemicals are 
important.  Selling is important.  Weather is important.  All are important.  If anything is 
missed the farmer may face big trouble. 
 
Even though farmers can earn as much as six times the rate for hybrid breeding rice that they 
earn for a thick rice like MTU 1001, the anxieties of rice commodity production can overwhelm 
185 
 
the benefits of more income.  With so much of the planting process directed by seed distributors, 
farmers often feel frustrated and resign management choices to those experts.  That they do not 
know or care much what becomes of the seed they grow after the buyers take it is symptomatic 
of this knowledge imbalance.  “If you don't follow their suggestions they know and give you a 
lower price for your product,” warned one farmer.  As with cotton, farmers direct their energy 
toward learning about more relevant information in hybrid rices – how to contact brokers, 
managing social connections to important resources like insurance contracts or machinery, or 
staying afloat amidst the inputs and experts that dominate hybrid rice management.  Far less 
important are the seeds themselves and their management. 
 
Sticky Knowledge and a Commodification Spectrum 
Hippel (1994) uses the phrase “sticky knowledge” to refer to local knowledge, necessary 
for problem solving,  that doesn’t translate well to other contexts.  Rice and cotton seed trials are 
themselves local efforts to find the best seeds, and so knowledge from seed trials should be 
sticky if they are to be successful.  In the realm of cotton seed choices, seed trials in Telangana 
are particularly un-sticky.  The first-hand knowledge of seeds and their trials is not only 
forgotten, it is replaced by the opinions of others, including local pedda farmers but also shop 
experts and successful farmers profiled in newspapers and television.  Indeed, part of the appeal 
of following this ‘unsticky’ knowledge is its claim to legitimacy through being external – we as 
farmers do not know enough ourselves, but the pedda farmers, the scientists, the NGOs, or the 
lucky people profiled on TV can solve our problems. 
Rice knowledge tends to be distinctly stickier, situated in the inverse market environment 
of cotton:  fewer choices, more agreement about the agronomy of those choices, more experience 
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with those limited choices, far fewer novice choices, and environmental response to widely 
understood seed qualities. These environmental differences resound in the social landscape, 
where experts and large farmers have little impact on the seed choices, where aggregate patterns 
reveal steady trends in seed choices, and vendors tend to be local and less predatory.  The 
imperative to produce greater yields to keep up with greater costs is all-consuming in cotton 
agriculture, creating an environment where farmers copy their neighbors with the hope of staying 
abreast of the newest and best technology.  With rice, knowledge is tactile:  farmers feel their 
grains, inspecting for errant beriki, or nonproductive kalthi and talu as they plan their plantings 
around widely agreed-upon set of phenotypic variables.  Yield is a consideration, but it is 
tempered by the needs of multi-generational plant health, seasonal suitability, and taste.  This is 
especially true of OPV rice that can be saved like the 14 percent of rice seeds planted 2012-2014.  
Knowing that they can sink prices or ruin the next harvest, farmers carefully manage variations 
in plant form or grain shape, analogously unknown among the same farmers’ knowledge of 
cotton GM hybrids. 
As suggested in the section above, the exception to this is, of course, the hybrid rice 
seeds.  Experts external to the farm determine hybrid management and so farmers shift the 
calculus of doing well enough with a reliable seed to optimizing their chance for a good yield 
with a hybrid seed.  Most telling is the sharp difference in the number of years planted between 
OPV and hybrid rice.  As with cotton agriculture, the reward structure of hybrid rice farming 
does not incentivize repeated planting and experience, but yield chasing.  The incentives of 
planting a rice that cannot be saved and whose management is determined by a company 
representative begin to look like those of cotton growing.  Simply getting by with these more 
heavily commodified kinds of germplasm is unacceptable. 
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The relationship between knowledge, management, and different kinds of seeds fits the 
pattern seen generally in Indian agricultural development (Gupta 1998; Vasavi 1999):  as farmers 
adopt new agricultural technologies they also take on their associated management strategies and 
intersect with the social networks that sustain them.  Recently, in cotton and hybrid rice these 
associated social politics have included direct company supervision and a concomitant lack of 
knowledge about specific parts of the production process.  Commodity farmers do not need to 
know these things or do not practice a kind of agriculture in which they iteratively adapt this 
knowledge – if a Bayer employee solves a fertilization or pest problem with a test and a farmer 
learns that success in this crop means following that advice all the way to the input shop, that 
farmer will turn their attention to other matters.  So why does this not happen in OPV rice?  Why 
do many farmers settle for producing enough rice rather than striking out to find the best manci 
digabatu (good yield) as they so often do with cotton? 
The relationship between managers, knowledge, and agricultural commodities on 
Telangana farms suggests a kind of commodification spectrum (Figure 6.6).   On the most 
commodified edge are the experts and outside managers of plant stations and input companies 
working with cotton and hybrid rice.  Management knowledge for hybrid rice and hybrid GM 
cotton, crops on this end of the spectrum, is the purview of those external to the farming 
household while farmers themselves are charged with being better consumers of technology, 
accountants, and marketers.  Investments are high, necessitating high profits.  On the other end 
are the wild, heirloom, or locally purchased varieties of vegetables, trees, ornamentals, and 
medicines that farmers intercrop with their cotton or cultivate on field edges.  
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Figure 6.6:  Plant Knowledge and the Commodity Spectrum  
 
Less commodified           More commodified 
Knowledge more tactile                Knowledge less tactile 
Yield less important        Yield more important 
Branding less important            Branding more important 
 
 
 
Crops Vegetables, 
medicinals, flowers 
OPV rice Hybrid rice Hybrid GM 
cotton 
Average 
Years planted 
2012-2014 
7.46 4.93 .88 1.48 
Branding 91% desi (heirloom) Station/hybrid 
number 
Brand names Brand names 
Brands 2012-
2014 
4 25 24 102 
Role of 
Experts 
Negligible Consulted 
intermittently 
Brokers 
consulted 
Shops, brokers 
consulted 
Saving Almost always Often Rarely Never 
Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2014. 
 
 
Bt cotton field edged with okra adjacent to a rice field, itself edged by a forest area containing some widely used 
wild plants, including Neem (Azadirachta indicaI A. Juss.) and Gum Arabic (Acacia Arabica Lam.) trees. 
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Kavrupad and Ralledapalle farmers cultivate 13 and 20 such plants on their farms respectively 
(Flachs 2015).  Of these, French marigold (Tagetes patula L.), pigeon pea (Cajanus cajan L. 
Huth) and tomato (Solanum lycopersicum L.) were the most commonly planted heirloom crops 
throughout the farmer sample.  Among the 161 farmers who planted these crops, they planted 
saved seeds from the marigold, pigeon pea, and tomato for an average of 7.63, 7.48, and 7.28 
years respectively.  Farmers reported that 17 of the 398 non-crop plants were hybrid varieties 
while 364 were desi, heirlooms saved or bought from relatives or local vendors.  Flowers were 
used for local festivals and cultivated competitively; tomatoes and pigeon pea were saved for 
their taste and their total production never measured or compared like the other crops.  Their 
management and specific non-economic qualities of taste or beauty fell entirely within the hands 
of the farmers. 
OPV rice lies in the middle of this spectrum, a semi-commodified good in a highly 
controlled and limited marketplace.  Yield and economic payoff cannot be completely ignored or 
beside the point as they are in the non commodified flowers and vegetables.  But they are not the 
be all and end all of rice agriculture.  The relationship is complicated, depending on what each 
household decides they need and on their individual preferences.  Experts tend to be local and 
consulted only when it is time to buy new seeds, such as rural shop owners and farmers rarely 
consult experts at plant science stations like Dr. Ranitha.  Farmer knowledge persists in rice for 
all the social and political reasons that it fails to do so in cotton agriculture.  Linking them across 
the commodification spectrum is environmental learning.  When growing OPV rice, farmers still 
need to differentiate carefully between different seed varieties and between different plants in 
their field to make everyday cultivation decisions.   
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 This chapter has shown that knowledge about rice seeds and rice management is more 
persistent than the knowledge of cotton agriculture because of the different ways that farmers 
navigate knowledge and reward for these crops.  When farmers treat rice as a pure commodity 
and additionally surrender knowledge of the production process to corporate experts, the 
situation with rice knowledge begins to resemble cotton.  Chapters 5 and 6 have discussed 
environmental and social learning as a function of the reward structure and inherent trialability of 
cotton and rice agriculture.  Although these farmers interact with didactic instruction in the form 
of shops and extension agents, the following chapter discusses the social life of knowledge in the 
more extreme didactic form of organic farming.  While many aspects of organic agriculture are 
directly regulated by organic instructors, these programs also rely on farmers to field test and 
locally modify certain elements of the production process (environmental learning) and to 
convince other farmers to follow their lead (social learning) and join the program.  However, 
social and environmental learning are complicated in these organic schemes by the material 
incentives that subsidize the high costs of poor production and by the social capital that organic 
schemes invest in publicizing their farmers and their methods.   
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Chapter 7:  Overcoming False Starts:  Didactic Learning on Organic Farms in the 
Warangal and Adilabad Districts 
 
  
The social politics of knowledge on GM cotton farms reflects the anarchic cotton market:  
great uncertainty, the oversized role of social emulation, agricultural deskilling (Stone 2007), and 
the undue influence of pedda farmers and agricultural authorities.  The conditions by which 
farmers generally make agricultural decisions about GM cotton cannot be based in 
environmental learning as agricultural economists suggest because this technology is not 
trialable amidst noisy data filtered through the village hierarchy.  Even large farmers with 
socioeconomic advantages become swept up in seed fads that they themselves kick off.  In rice 
fields, those same farmers know more about the seeds that they plant, in part because they prize 
the same agricultural qualities when examining harvested seed that dealers seek when inspecting 
that harvest at the market.  The knowledge that farmers create and adapt about this much smaller 
and more consistent set of rice choices is thus more predictable than knowledge about hybrid 
GM cotton.  Environmental learning builds skill in this environment, where profit margins are 
less important and market demands more aligned with the qualities that farmers use to 
differentiate seeds.  Although experts and institutionalized teachers inhabit their agricultural 
world these farmers make their cotton and rice choices themselves, even when that choice 
amounts to emulating a neighbor.  This chapter discusses what happens when most choices are 
actively, institutionally, taken out of farmers’ hands.   
On organic farms where didactic learning becomes paramount, the creation of skill 
depends on the relationship between farmers and their sponsoring organic program.  Unlike 
organic farms in countries with well-established markets and trusted regulatory apparati, 
Telangana farmers hoping to sell organic clothing cannot simply declare themselves to be 
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organic and sell to foreign buyers or urban elites.  Rather, they most often align with a 
development program that bridges gaps in marketing, regulation, quality control, and 
transportation between farms and buyers.  Thus does organic agriculture require mutually 
beneficial social relationships between farmers and organic programs if it is to last.  On organic 
farms where cotton seeds are provided, farmers may sometimes carefully evaluate the 
differences between seeds.  But that evaluation is meaningless because farmers are obligated to 
take non-GM seeds provided by the program in the following year as well.  When these and 
other production risks are underwritten by the organic program, especially for those farmers on 
whom the program depends to provide a good face for visitors, these organic farmers have no 
need to conduct seed trials that generate environmental knowledge.  In other technologies, such 
as IPM cultivation, organic pesticides, or organic fertilizers, the staying power of the technology 
depends on a shifting calculation of labor, support from the institution, costs, and benefits.  Such 
interventions may be easily trialed but still require social commitment if they are to continue 
beyond the direct instruction that occurs during didactic farmer field schools.  IPM practices in 
one village ended the day the instructors left, largely because the farmers found that Bt cotton 
accomplished many of the same goals with a fraction of the effort.  In a different village, they 
continue because the NGO provides continuing support and allowed the initial instructions to 
evolve as farmers developed easier or more effective methods. 
The roadsides of rural India are littered with the false starts of such projects.  Within 
anthropological development literature, the unintended consequences of development projects 
and the short life-span of alternative development initiatives can fill libraries.  Described most 
eloquently by writers like James Scott (1998) or James Ferguson (1994) such development 
initiatives promoted by states or NGOs often destabilize effective local economic or ecological 
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management by imposing impractical rules.  While failing to provide their ostensible economic 
benefits, these programs often bring development subjects into closer relationships with the state.  
Recipients of such development might provide lip service to new institutional rewards and 
punishments, or they may find their situation unchanged after the development apparatus loses 
interest and moves on to the next project.  This chapter is concerned with the strategies that 
farmers and NGO managers develop to keep donors and cotton-growers engaged in these 
projects over the long term.  Specifically, I examine the ways in which farmers develop 
knowledge that allows them to adapt organic agriculture tools to local economic and 
environmental demands.  Similarly, I also consider the ways in which organic programs keep 
farmer interest in a market overwhelmingly dominated by Bt cotton cultivation. 
Within organic programs, the problem of false starts trigger bad press later in the 
production chain.  In one well-publicized scandal Swedish clothing manufacturer H&M sold 
fraudulent organic clothing revealed to contain Bt cotton.  The resulting inquiry, led by 
Germany’s Financial Times revealed that a as much as 30% of certified organic cotton from 
India contained Bt genes, leading to charges that H&M was cutting regulatory corners and that 
India was not to be trusted (Chua 2010; Deshpande 2010; Illge and Preuss 2012; Graß 2013).  In 
that case, H&M’s attempts to separate itself as a socially responsible supplier backfired when 
reporters and their echoes on fashion blogs accused Indian distributors of providing GM cotton 
to unsuspecting German consumers.  Without the support of such lucrative foreign markets, 
organic cotton initiatives would have to shut down.  As pathways to foreign markets shut down, 
so too would the booming Indian organic production, accounting for 74% of global organic 
production in 2011-12 (Textile Exchange 2013).  In response, H&M and Indian regulators 
redoubled their efforts to crack down on fraud.  The different strategies by which these farms and 
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programs make organic agriculture effective reveal both their promise for long-term 
sustainability and the folly of assuming that these strategies are generalizable to the larger 
phenomenon of organic agriculture in India or worldwide.   
In this chapter I draw on the experiences of farmers involved in two different kinds of 
organic projects.  This difference is important, as I argue in this chapter that organic programs 
with different institutional demands behave differently.  To generalize about all organic 
agriculture because of the experience of one type of organic program ignores the larger reward 
structures that drive regulation, agricultural decision-making, and, ultimately, the social politics 
of knowledge.  Both of the organic programs that I studied worked with entire villages as a way 
of discouraging fraud and building up a village brand for organic consumers.  Edaggrineelu, in 
the Warangal district, is an uncertified organic village.  As such, trust in Edaggrineelu products 
comes not from a certification agency but from PANTA, a Hyderabad-based NGO that directly 
markets to urban consumers.  Edaggrineelu farmers also sell in the conventional market in 
nearby Jenagom.  Because of this structure, Edaggrineelu farmers depend on PANTA for 
logistical and marketing support.  For its part, PANTA depends on Edaggrineelu farmers to 
promote themselves to visitors and donors. 
The Japur and Adilabad clusters of villages in the Addabad district work with Prakruti 
organic, a certified organic corporation.  Their authority comes through an internationally 
recognized organic label that has paved the way for international partnerships with clothing 
companies based in Europe, Japan, and the US.  While Edaggrineelu earns trust through 
performance and assurance, Prakruti villages earn trust by passing regular inspections.  This is 
not to say that Prakruti-affiliated farmers are not frequently called upon to perform for visitors.  
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They are indeed regular performers.  However, this performance is less in the service of building 
a brand, as in Edaggrineelu, than in securing the support of specific buyers and donors.   
 
Didactic Learning and the Commodity Biography 
In the Warangal district villages of Kavrupad, Gongapalle, Srigonda, and Orukonda, the 
pedda farmers growing Bt cotton make use of didactic learning opportunities.  Not only does the 
rest of the village look to these farmers for their seed choices (even when there is no yield reason 
to do so), they are also wealthier and connected by caste to farmers in the extension services.  As 
discussed in chapter nine, some pedda farmers, particularly in Srigonda, work with friends in the 
extension programs to gain new methods and tools at a subsidized rate.  In Kavrupad, 
Gongapalle, and Orukonda, local alternative agriculture schemes are targeted at friends of 
university professors and breeders, who choose caste relatives, especially members of the high 
caste Rao and Reddy groups, as early adopters of this new technology.  Thus, didactic education 
through extension is added to the social and environmental learning used by large, high caste 
farmers. 
The situation is very different for many organic projects, including the three villages 
where I worked with organic farmers.  Prakruti and PANTA affiliated farmers were specifically 
chosen because of their low caste, poverty, poor relationships with agricultural extension, and 
marginal land.  Their poverty and marginality is part of what makes them attractive to urban or 
foreign consumers in the first place, adding value through what Franz and Hassler (2010) call the 
commodity biography.  Much of the added value of organic cotton is not its health benefits to 
consumers but its promise of an improved environment and life for Indian farmers – the more 
marginal the better.  Thus is education and crisis aversion the proximate cause for organic 
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education programs: value added organic cotton consumption supports education and 
improvements for the farmer.  This connection, however contrived, helps forge a story that 
justifies extra costs and keeps buyers or donors engaged with these projects.   
Igor Kopytoff (1988) famously referred to commoditization as a process to highlight the 
ways in which culture defines how and when commodities become culturally marked as 
particular types of things (Kopytoff 1988:64).  For Kopytoff, the cultural biography of a 
commodity provided a means of illuminating the various social relationships that produced, 
alienated, and consumed the thing in question.  The thing’s social status as a commodity in 
different times and contexts, interpreted by different populations, gives rise to its biography:  the 
different social roles that a commodity plays throughout its life.  For organic cotton 
consumption, especially in major cities like Hyderabad or abroad in Japan, Europe, and the 
United States where Edaggrineelu and Prakruti-affiliated farmers sell their wares, labeling and 
branding does the work of cultural marking.  In Kopytoff’s terms, labeling emphasizes a 
particular aspect of the commodity biography, namely its production.  Following this logic, 
Guthman (2009) argues that labels like the Fairtrade and Organic stickers affixed to Prakruti 
clothing or the Edaggrineelu brand serve two purposes.  First, they differentiate commodities in 
the store, emphasizing the links of production in cotton’s long and complicated supply chain that 
are hidden by mass textile marketing.  Consumers buy a labeled shirt because they buy into the 
lives of growers, ginners, and clothing manufacturers and trust that the label guarantees a degree 
of fairness.  Such desires have been shown to be powerful motivators for both growers who want 
to get ahead and consumers who want to buy into morally good products or support morally 
correct production (Benson and Fischer 2007).  Second, the act of unveiling the commodity 
fetish, that is, using a label to reify links between producers and consumers, is itself an added 
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value.  The act of labeling makes the label a consumable commodity even as it is designed to 
combat the alienation of labor and natural resources through the supply chain. 
The correct balance between adding value through the commodity biography and 
providing a viable product can be difficult to reach, even at the highest levels of cotton 
corporations.  “What is the advantage of tracing it back to them?  What value does it add,” asked 
Bindu Gugothal of Fairtrade UK.  Gugothal visited Hyderabad to meet with representatives from 
Prakruti and to check in on producing farmers.  Like many ethical supply chain companies, 
Prakruti leans on the authority of the Fairtrade label, which affirms that Prakruti products were 
produced by people paid a particular wage, without child labor, tend to have an institutional 
return to farmers (such as a cooperative buying and selling structure), and encourage 
environmental conservation practices.  These environmental rules can, but do not necessarily, 
include organic certification.  More important for Indian cotton, Fairtrade bans the intentional 
use of GMO products.  Thus to get non-GM seeds, most Telangana Fairtrade farmers would have 
to be part of organic programs anyway.  Fairtrade products, running the gamut from gold to 
quinoa to clothing, carry a label certifying that Fairtrade meet a set of standards as detailed in 
audits and other reporting.  To incentivize alternative production, Fairtrade also offers a price 
premium to farmers, reflected in a higher consumer cost.   
Part of the Fairtrade process involves regular check-ins to answer concerns from producer 
companies, audit the supply chain, and collect information that can be used in marketing and 
certification campaigns.  About once a month, visitors from foreign companies or campaigns, 
Fairtrade included, visited Prakruti facilities on fact-finding trips to meet the same organic 
farmers I had been interviewing so that they can learn more about their producers.  The 
narratives, stories, experiences, photographs, and videos that they gather while on the ground in 
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India help to inform the conspicuous consumption or awareness that international groups 
including the World Bank and Japanese clothing companies hope to foster.   
As a cotton marketer, Gugothal’s main responsibility is in justifying costs and campaigns 
to buyers.  “It’s a story for a product, that’s what I’m saying,” answered Prakruti CEO Ashok 
Chender, referencing to a unique UK-based buyer who manufactures single garments sourced 
from individuals. 
 
Not all products can bring that story.  But for [UK buyer] Ben, it’s a very good story 
because Ben’s pants are not cheap.  A twenty pound pant is not cheap.  So he’s 
competing with a five pound pant, and on what basis? One, the quality is extremely good, 
I don’t say his quality is bad.  Having said that, he is actually saying [UK clothing 
company] Pants to Poverty is traceable, its actually addressing poverty issues on the 
farm.  And this is what I do.  And so I think people buy it for that.  But the same set of 
people if they go to a Marks and Spencer may not buy that.  They may not be interested 
because they are looking for a five pound shirt. 
 
For organic cotton corporations, who cannot hope to compete with the low costs of the 
conventional fashion industry, shaping and selling the commodity biography is key to staying 
afloat in the market.  The organic cotton commodity biography, seized on by manufacturers like 
the one described above, is defined by development and agricultural education.   
Organic labels or brands allow marketers to emphasize an aspect of production that 
organic consumers particularly want to support.  This desire for development sets the conditions 
for didactic learning.  Organic cotton sales from the Prakruti and Edaggrineelu farms are 
predicated on the trust, guaranteed by the village brand or certifying label, that these more 
expensive clothes contribute to a better life or to development for the farmers in question.  By 
buying organic clothing, wearing it as a form of conspicuous consumption, and donating to the 
NGOs that market it, consumers buy into the kind of development that produced these 
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commodities.  This narrative, that clothing consumption helps to empower or improve the lives 
of particular people, sustains development programs.  Speaking of organic peppercorn farming in 
Kerala, Franz and Hassler (2010) argue that “German buyers are willing to pay a premium for 
the pepper because it is certified organic, but also because of the cultural and social 
embeddedness of production…The added value of the ‘story’, and the knowledge of the fact that 
this biography actually adds value to the product in the market, allows a shift within the power 
structures of the network (Franz and Hassler 2010:32)”.  Franz and Hassler argue that this need 
to connect with the Kerala pepper farmers actually returns some of the power in a global 
production network to agricultural producers.  In the case of these Telangana organic programs, 
the need to connect to poor farmers participating in a particular kind of development creates 
obligations between representatives of the program and the farmers themselves.  Materially, 
these obligations manifest in incentives programs and media used to promote the programs.  
Socioculturally, these obligations are filtered through extant village hierarchies and the shifting 
relationships between farmers and program directors. 
In a didactic learning environment such as a farmer field school or an organic workshop, 
the learning process becomes the most relevant part of the commodity biography: teaching 
farmers according to organic, Fairtrade, or other branded standards.  As such, this story is 
carefully constructed by emphasizing certain parts of the production process (like non-GM seed) 
and choosing particular groups of people to grow it.  The system is built on a series of 
interrelated trusts.  Farmers do not plant GM cotton, they live better lives, and the clothing 
companies allow consumers to support this improvement.  As H&M discovered, failing to keep 
this trust at any stage of the production process can be damaging to the brand as a whole.  This is 
not to say that the communities are fraudulent or imaginary, but that their participation and 
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success is built on maintaining a narrative that capitalizes on their poverty and initial ignorance.  
If the farmers were already rich and well-educated, there would be no need for the development 
initiative.   
The Prakruti and PANTA organic programs began from the assumption that farmers were 
in crisis, drawing on the longstanding model (Ferguson 1994) of crisis of poverty and isolation 
that justifies intervention.  “We choose only the rainfed areas” explains Prakruti program 
manager Sama Vallatha when I asked why all of the farmers that I met lived on marginal land or 
belonged to historically marginalized social groups.  Sama continued: 
 
We work with cotton farmers mainly where there are high suicide rates.  So that is one 
thing.  And we mainly focus on rainfed areas so these are the two things we see.  So, if 
we see suicide rates like, it’s a high area so we know we will be working there.  Adilabad 
is close to there and it’s in the cotton belt, so we are working there.  But specifically 
within Adilabad we are working with Tribal farmers.  But in other places we work with 
other farmers… These people they don’t have access to resources actually.  So, in a way 
they’re resource poor farmers, compared to other farmers in the main places where they 
have access to marketing and all.  So these people face a lot of exploitation.  We want to 
address the issues related to these problems. 
 
Similarly, PANTA’ program in Edaggrineelu was born of a response to a particular pest 
infestation and expanded over time to incorporate other elements of production.  Both programs 
have since grown and connected with government schemes as well as foreign and urban buyers.  
Drawing on the narrative of suicide and agrarian crisis widely reported in India (Galab, Revathi, 
and Reddy 2009; Sainath 2013; Parsai 2012), these and other NGOs positioned organic 
agriculture as an alternative to the corporate-state model of production that favored centralized 
production using agricultural chemical inputs and seeds (Pearson 2006).  By selecting 
marginalized people and marketing textile consumption as a development tool, these organic 
cotton programs make the didactic learning experience central to consumption.  This section has 
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explained the ways in which organic programs build a commodity biography that necessitates 
didactic learning to appeal to consumers.  This appeal keeps buyers engaged but because these 
people are often the farthest removed parties from production, they have the least direct 
influence on overcoming false starts in development.  The following section shows how these 
programs incentivize didactic education for farmers. 
 
The Problem of False Starts and Incentivizing Instruction During Didactic Learning.  
As discussed in chapter three, didactic instruction in India dates to the industrial colonial 
period.  Beginning with an increase in Indian cash cropping during the American civil war in the 
1860s (Beckert 2014; Guha 2007), accelerating with the Green Revolution (Gupta 1998; Vasavi 
1999), and continuing with GM and organic schemes, didactic instruction has been crucial to 
Indian agriculture.  In each instance, a network of agricultural experts, local managers, and 
textile consumers set a series of conditions in which farmers create and adapt knowledge. 
Initially, Green Revolution learning was strongly didactic in the sense that it was pushed by 
extension agents and carried the weight of moral progress with it.  However, the interconnection 
of state or international funds and the economic benefits of a vertically integrated agribusiness 
led Green Revolution-style agriculture to quickly dominate production (Kloppenburg 2004; 
Perkins 1997; Ross 1998).   In addition, didactic Green Revolution agriculture worked especially 
well for influential larger and richer farmers (Shiva 1993), helping to make the system of shops, 
subsidies, inputs, and extension services the ‘normal’ way to farm in India.  Didactic learning 
gave way to social emulation and first-hand experimentation as smaller farmers aimed to copy 
the success of their larger neighbors, a pattern that would be repeated with organic programs. 
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The process of bringing organic farmers into alignment with international standards and 
initiatives that market their marginalization as a selling point similarly begins with a didactic 
push that gives way to social and environmental learning.  In Edaggrineelu and on Prakruti 
organic farms, as well as in other organic and NPM training programs in South India (Eyhorn, 
Ramakrishnan, and Mäder 2007; Mancini, Van Bruggen, and Jiggins 2007), development 
programs working in a new area first endeavor to choose influential farmers.  Their backing 
helps to build rapport in villages, which tend to be chosen because they are poor, isolated, or 
otherwise in need of development in the first place.   
 All of this infrastructure can be difficult to set up and maintain. Glenn Stone (2014) 
recalls Yakub, a farmer near Kavrupad extolling the virtues of his integrated pest management 
(IPM) methods.  The same farmer had discontinued these practices only a few years later once 
support from his sponsoring didactic organization dried up.  In the area, nearly fifty farmers 
came and saw his work.  After speaking with him, they too adopted IPM farming.  But by the 
time I met Yakub in 2012, he was planting fad Bt cotton seeds Dr. Brent and Neeraja.  “Initially 
IPM was less expensive,” he explained sheepishly, “but the overall cost and needs of Bt cotton 
were even lower”.  Mancini et al. (2007) conducted a successful NPM training program well-
liked by participants in Srigonda.  But, a few years later, farmers had stopped following most of 
the intervention’s advice as well.  The ways in which farmers navigate these and other 
interventions designed to improve agriculture will be explored more fully in chapter eight and 
chapter nine.  However, these false starts provide the context for the didactic organic programs 
that I saw, which endeavor to work with farmers over a longer period of time.  When farmers and 
program managers fail to maintain organic management through the cotton supply chain, the 
resulting miscommunications can cause serious problems for clothing retailers, as H&M 
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discovered.  The question is thus one of sustainability:  how to keep up didactic intervention that 
appeals to consumers, farmers, funders, and managers? 
 By definition, these projects begin with a didactic push.  In the case of Edaggrineelu, 
particular farmers sought out expert help and developed a relationship.  On the Adilabad district 
Prakruti farms, as well as among the IPM, NPM, and expert consultancy services, development 
initiatives seek out farmers who may be interested in their programs.  During this initial phase 
the stakeholders feel out the costs and benefits of the burgeoning alliance: farmers must be 
convinced that the program will provide them real and tangible benefits; NGOs carefully 
document these classes to appeal to funders and secure future projects; other villagers watch to 
see if their neighbors participating in the program appear to be benefitting; donors and managers 
abroad or in urban centers rely on NGO-generated and news-generated media to see that their 
directions and dollars are being put to good use.  Early on, organic programs publicize their 
efforts within the village.  A large cistern in the center of Edaggrineelu lists sixteen rules for 
organic production while Prakruti erects signs and murals celebrating the benefits of organic 
farming.  These displays list economic benefits, but they also remind farmers how much better 
organic agriculture is for their children, their health, and for the stewardship of the land.  They 
also make excellent photographic backdrops.   
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Organic signage, Left to right, top to bottom:  Cistern with organic guidelines; Welcoming sign for Edaggrineelu 
village; Sampalle sign with sponsors and organic requirements; Japur mandal sign proclaiming that Prakruti farm 
children are well cared-for. 
 
Farmers learn a great deal during such interventions, ranging from vermicompost 
management to companion crops strategies to attract useful predatory insects.  Farmers may or 
may not already know how to implement some of these methods, but the schools provide a 
refresher course and typically supply necessary equipment like bricks, seeds, or plastic drums.  
As should be expected from didactic instruction, these raw materials and demonstrations are 
accompanied by moral and economic reasons to abandon conventional agriculture.  Subash 
Palakar, founder and barnstorming promoter of the alternative permaculture-based system Zero 
Budget Farming, praised the yield and income benefits of his intervention at a rally in Warangal 
city.  But, like the branding of PANTA and Prakruti, his pitch was as didactic as it was practical:  
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“We have become accustomed to fixing problems only with these chemicals,” he warned. “Just 
as women are taken in by cosmetics, we farmers are being taken in by brokers, consultants, and 
chemical inputs.”  The audience nodded in agreement as he disparaged foreign knowledge sent 
from Europe and the US during the Green Revolution and joined him to celebrate native Indian 
cotton seeds, native breeds of cows, and the life-sustaining power of Indian Neem (Azadiractha 
indica A. Juss.) or Indian yogurt.  “Abandon the foreign Jersey cow,” Palakar lectured.  The 
crowd cheered.  Farmers leave such programs with new enthusiasm and new knowledge about 
the potential of these methods.   
 The didactic pushes of organic programs by Prakruti or PANTA were not so nationalistic, 
but farmers were receptive to the idea that they could earn more by buying fewer inputs and 
selling outside of the normal commodity markets.  However, the initial push itself is not 
sustainable in the sense that infrastructure alone is not sufficient to convince farmers to continue 
with the program beyond the length of the field school or the incentives.  As the faded murals 
and crumbling rice mill built by a Kavrupad NGO attest, didactic instruction must shift into the 
environmental or social realms by which farmers generate knowledge if the alternative strategies 
are to be sustained. 
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Faded NGO mural advising farmers to use non-chemical inputs and non-pesticide methods. 
 
 Initially, didactic programs struggle with motivating or recruiting potential farmers.   
Incentives like a free meal (offered to farmers participating in Palakar’s seminar), expertise with 
particular problems (offered to Edaggrineelu farmers), or natural pesticide-mixing drums 
(offered to Prakruti farmers) can draw farmers in for a season.  But to entice farmers to stay 
beyond the next round of pesticides and Bt seeds, didactic learning must transition into 
environmental learning, in which farmers develop working strategies that improve their yields or 
profit margins, or into social learning, in which farmers can emulate a good model.  For 
Edaggrineelu farmers and Adilabad district farmers affiliated with Prakruti, intervention 
programs targeted didactic instruction not at the village as a whole but at particularly influential 
farmers.  This strategy correctly saw that information and social learning are mediated through 
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the village hierarchy.  The earliest alternative farmers and most vocal local champions in the 
villages where I worked were local political leaders and influential landowners. 
The rules of caste hierarchy that dominate Telangana villages discussed in the previous 
chapters are not directly applicable in low-caste Edaggrineelu or Prakruti’s tribal Gond villages 
of Addabad and Japur in the Adilabad district.  However, interventions targeted larger and 
wealthier landowners with the hope that their support would ease the way for the program in the 
larger village.  “You see, he’s a very knowledgeable person and a good leader who could 
mobilize the village so we always feel such charismatic leaders are important,” explained SUS 
Executive Director VG Ramesh when I asked about a particular Edaggrineelu farmer, discussed 
in greater detail below.  “Most of the people in the village trust us because of Mahesh.”  Using 
these influential people as initial ambassadors to spur social learning, organic programs are able 
to spread to entire villages.  This is more convenient not only for organic project managers, who 
can work with fewer farmers at a time, but also for visitors who can see the village through the 
eyes of a helpful interlocutor.  Once converted to organic production, such villages receive 
funding for schools, signage celebrating their fully organic status, and media attention calling 
them model villages.  However, the promise of these social and material rewards is not always 
convincing enough for cotton farmers. 
 Even with charismatic leaders who can translate a didactic learning experience into the 
more long-term social or environmental learning that farmers regularly employ on their farms, 
organic agriculture suffers from yield problems.  There are several problems directly comparing 
organic farmer cotton yields with the rest of the sample.  The organic farmers were recruited 
because they are more marginal and live on more marginal land, so one should expect them to 
have lower yields anyway.  Additionally, I did not speak to any GM planting farmers in the 
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Adilabad district, and so while the agronomic conditions are similar to Warangal farmers they 
are not exactly comparable.  These caveats aside, the average differences in yield are stark 
(Figure 7.1).  Organic farmers in the Adilabad District and Edaggrineelu are well aware that 
their yields are below those enjoyed by their pesticide-spraying, Bt cotton planting neighbors.  
During one interview with a Prakruti farmer, a neighbor driving a motorcycle stopped to tease 
us.  “Why are you asking about their farms,” he asked me.  “With [Bt cotton seed] Ajeet-155 I 
am getting much better yields than these people.  Besides, with this organic production you have 
to spend time at many meetings!”  Stung, the farmer I was speaking with countered, “Those with 
money can afford to use GM seeds and make large investments.”  The neighbor rode away, but 
not before bragging about his recent impressive harvest with Bt cotton and the pesticide Missile.  
Didactic instruction may help farmers feel better about their planting choices or convince them 
that these choices are correct, but that active instruction can only last so long in the face of 
economic failure or social jousting.  With such low yields, why do farmers not simply leave the 
programs that I studied? 
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Figure 7.1:  Boxplot of Cotton Yields per acre per Household of Organic and GM Farmers    
  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 2012 GM 2012 Organic 2013 GM 2013 Organic (only 
Prakruti Farmers) 
n 293 98 226 94 
Mean 7.64 2.00 7.06 2.45 
SD 3.66 2.38 2.78 3.90 
Minimum 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.02 
Maximum 27.5 13 18 40 
 
 
In each year, these differences were statistically significant at p < .001. Source:  Flachs Farmer Survey 2012-2014. 
 
 
To counteract low yields, the incentives that underwrite the costs of production must be 
sustained as well.  In fact, many farmers in the village benefit from equipment, seeds, and access 
to government schemes (Figure 7.2).  In 2012 and 2013 in these organic villages, organic 
programs provided access to a huge percentage of the seeds that farmers planted.  100% of 
Prakruti farmers receive free seeds, for example.  In doing so, programs save farmers money and 
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time as many of these villages are at least 40 minutes and a 50-100 rupee round trip transport 
fare from the nearest store.  Like typical seed shops, the organic providers give seeds on credit.  
Unlike those shops they provide credit at low interest or often no-interest return rates, and 
programs provide more wiggle room during repayment than the shops.  Such shops are 
additionally hostile to the organic farmers in villages like these because they are populated by 
people of lower castes or who belong to a tribal community that has faced historical 
disenfranchisement from the caste majority in the town – a status used in international ethical 
marketing.  Given that more 90% of the cotton planted in India is genetically modified, programs 
realize that they must provide the seeds they want farmers to plant.  In addition to seeds, many 
farmers also secure equipment or loans through these programs.  While the government has a 
number of schemes designed to appeal to farmers, the inefficient and sometimes inept 
bureaucracy can be difficult to navigate for individual small farmers.  Organic intervention 
programs step in and do the paperwork, as it were, providing the last steps necessary to connect 
farmers with money or infrastructure that they are eligible for.  This helps to underwrite the risks 
of doing a method with which they are unfamiliar, especially at first, and even underwrites the 
fact that yields are relatively quite low for these farmers. 
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Figure 7.2:  Percentage of Households Receiving Material Benefits from Organic Programs 
2012-2013 (n = 101) for Addabad (A), Edaggrineelu (E), and Japur (J) villages 
 
 
Flachs Farmer Survey 2013. 
 
Farmers who can take advantage of these programs turn didactic learning into a material 
safety net against these low yields.  In Edaggrineelu, the Adilabad cluster of villages, and the 
Japur cluster of villages, the initially recruited farmers are called upon to help enforce organic 
methods and work with others to demonstrate new techniques.  Out of necessity, they must learn 
to use the skills from training exercises whether they ultimately use them in their fields or not.  
Many organic farmers report that homemade pesticides are difficult to produce, and I can attest 
that the fermented concoctions of cow urine and leaves smell terrible.  Rather than learn to 
produce these pesticides themselves, most members in the village rely on the zealous early 
adopters to produce the pesticides and distribute them, although they may assist in gathering the 
resources necessary (especially if visitors are present to document the experience).   
 In exchange for these incentives, farmers in the three organic villages I visited were 
asked to use a suite of alternative agriculture methods to improve soil quality and control pests 
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(Table 7.1).  Each method was taught through a demonstration session.  Although farmers 
initially claimed that they followed didactic advice without modification, subsequent interviews 
and field visits revealed that the rules for these alternative strategies were so general that they 
could be easily modified depending on the needs at hand.  Leaf compost and animal fertilizers 
are smelly and do not necessarily need to be applied each year – this is a function of farmers 
checking their soil for moisture and fertility evidenced by plant growth and soil texture.  Other 
methods, like light traps or drip irrigation, depend entirely on what the program provides. 
   
Table 7.1: Counts for Alternative Input Strategies on Organic Farms 2013-14, n = 101 
 
Method Fertility Insect Water Row Total 
Animal fertilizer 100   100 
Cow urine  3  3 
Drip irrigation   4 4 
Green Compost 21   21 
Lake Soil 31   31 
Leaf-based insecticide 1 92  93 
Light trap  1  1 
Neem application 2 30  32 
Nitrogen fixing plants 2   2 
Pipe irrigation   5 5 
Plastic box trap  3  3 
Water conservation  1  1 
System of Rice Intensification (SRI)   21 21 
Trap plants  12  12 
Vermicompost 35   35 
Flachs Farmer Survey 2013-2014. 
 
While the programs sponsor demonstration sessions and meetings, provide spaces for 
demonstration farms, hold workshops, and fund numerous small farmer field schools, these 
interventions can be short-lived, as in Srigonda or on Yakub’s demonstration farm.  SRI provides 
an instructive example of a method viewed by farmers with skepticism.  SRI was a popular and 
publicized method in 2013 in Edaggrineelu, but farmers were beginning to complain that it 
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required too much work:  “We need to have full awareness and work in the nursery,” complained 
Edaggrineelu SRI farmer Srinu.  “It’s like looking after children.  You have to add water three 
times a day in the nursery, spread the vermicompost, make rows and paths when transplanting, 
transplant early and exactly in the ordered lines, keep an inch of vermicompost, mulch it for the 
shade, and have a lot of time and patience for the weeding.  It takes a day to weed an acre!”  
Although Edaggrineelu farmers agree that SRI gives greater yields, the extra work does not 
appear to justify this method.  This may be in part because, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
many farmers are satisfied when rice yields ‘enough’, and do not try to maximize yields in the 
same way that they fight for yield with cotton.  Another Edaggrineelu farmer balked at having to 
do rice work himself:  “I planted one acre of SRI rice last year but only because my son was here 
to push the weeder and do the hard work of it.  It's just not worth the effort otherwise.  I planted 
half an acre this year and while the yields are good from SRI, [myself and my wife] have no 
interest in pushing that machine.  Our son does all of that kind of work as no one else wants to.”  
Recognizing that social learning is a powerful tool because of the staying power of reliable 
members of the community, all three of the organic villages use didactic learning as a tool to 
kickstart social learning that keeps farmers engaged and in line with organic regulations.  As 
other farmers lose interest in the method, those initial adopters can then be tasked with 
demonstrating it to give the impression that all villagers are so engaged.   
Similarly, the demands of village meetings, self-help groups, and cooperative planning 
sessions fall to the most enthusiastic farmers.  Others are happy to avoid this time-consuming 
work.  “I’m not educated, how can I go,” complains Prakruti farmer Mankarao.  “In group 
meetings, everyone else explains what to do, especially the sarpanch
21
 and the educated 
farmers.”  “We don't go to meetings, they’re far away - others go and report back to us,” agreed 
                                               
21 The local elected village leader and liason to mandal authorities 
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his neighbor Shararao.  Such farmers are, as a rule, uninterested in going to meetings and 
participating in tours or lengthy training sessions organized by the organic groups, who in turn 
recognize that many of their farmers are happy to participate but not evangelize for them.  To 
fertilize their soils, they must maintain vermicompost, green manures, and livestock, all of which 
they have been trained to use; to keep pests away they must use a series of homemade organic 
potions that they have been trained to make.  But after the initial demonstration phase, these 
farmers can buy these organic inputs.  Most organic farmers appear content to view the organic 
program as an improved version of the input shops, albeit one that offers a limited choice in 
products. 
Despite these limitations, farmers continue to conduct trials and look to their neighbors 
when evaluating cotton seeds.  This effort yields mixed results.  Prakruti farmer Anil, for 
instance, planted the cotton seed Mallika in 2013 but remembered that Bunny had been good in 
the past and saw that his neighbor did well with it the previous year – an example of a direct 
observation of yield payoffs.  In 2014 he planted both to see which would be better in his field.  
By his recollection, Bunny is smaller and has fewer bolls than Mallika.  His neighbor, Allaram 
Srirao, is copying those choices because Anil is an experienced organic farmer and a Patel, 
meaning that his family owned many acres and was socially important in the past – an example 
of a prestige bias influencing social emulation.  Fourteen of the Prakruti farmers followed suit, 
planting both of the organic seeds offered in 2013 or 2014.  Others, like Ponam Albarao sought 
out Mallika on the recommendation of his neighbors, but because that seed had sold out by the 
time he joined the program, he planted Bunny.  “So far, it’s growing fine,” he offered 
noncommittally.  “We have to wait for the harvest”.  They are free to make careful 
environmental observations about the cotton seeds that they plant, but the payoff for this is 
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unclear.  Organic farmers must buy through programs or their shop affiliates, which provide the 
only source of reliable non-GMO seed.  These seeds are sometimes sold to farmers at favorable 
prices, but more often they are provided for free due to various government and NGO subsidies.  
During 2013 and 2014, farmers in these villages only had access to two seeds through organic 
vendors:  non-Bt Mallika and non-Bt Bunny.  Prakruti and Edaggrineelu secure these seeds from 
the refugia stock of the Nuziveedu company.  Environmental learning is unnecessary as farmers 
have no real need to trial their seeds or methods because the NGO has an active interest in 
helping the farmers solve their problems and keeping the program attractive to them.   
For these farmers, organic agriculture is low-risk.  However, it does not help them build a 
reliable knowledge base because the limited seed choices encourage them to over-rely on social 
emulation of local leaders and didactic instruction from their programs.  Rather than careen from 
seed to seed, organic farmers instead are blessed with an embarrassment of useless knowledge – 
they know about methods and seeds that they have no choice in using and cannot stop using 
unless they leave the program.  If they fail to uphold their end of the bargain with the organic 
program directors either by breaking rules or refusing to pay back loans, or if they choose to 
leave the program, they are just as lost as small GM farmers because they have not yet had to 
navigate the seed market. 
Yet just as larger farmers were able to turn some aspects of the new cotton market to their 
advantage despite unpredictable GM seeds, some farmers are using the organic program as one 
wellspring among many rather than their sole source of agricultural skill.  For some farmers, this 
means working closely with the NGOs as a show farmer and thus best positioning themselves to 
trial new methods at low risk and with help from the NGO.  Ironically, for others, it manifests in 
strategies where farmers cautiously practice organic and non-organic agriculture. 
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The Role of Show Farmers in Jumpstarting Learning on Organic Farms 
I will discuss the category of organic show farmers, those who actively perform and 
profess their organic transformation for NGOs and visitors, in greater detail in chapter 8.  I 
invoke them here to show how their demonstrations reduce agricultural risk, help them avoid 
overreliance on scheme knowledge, and how they teach others in the village about program 
guidelines.  Show farmer refers to a category of farmers most involved with the programs, who 
work closely with program workers and leap to demonstrate their methods to visitors and other 
farmers.  Either because they are especially charismatic or because they are especially good 
farmers, these people get the benefits of the newest trainings and farm equipment.   
Show farmers are often early adopters who develop relationships with the organic 
programs over time.  Those closest to the program learn how to make and use the pesticides, 
taking into account local variations in leaf or cow potency.  They are also better educated and 
wealthier (Figure 7.3), meaning that they have more flexibility to try new products and 
experience less social distance when working with foreign visitors or NGO experts.  In each 
village, I identified four show farmers through ethnographic data including qualitative participant 
observations and interviews.  The farmers I chose were those selected for demonstration plots, 
asked to meet with visitors, were more involved with the intervention organizations, were those 
identified by program officers as helpful people, and were farmers who emphasized their role in 
the program during interviews with me.  They were, in short, the farmers most invested in 
showing off the farm to visitors and to other farmers.  My criteria are therefore subjective but 
centered around those farmers who most embraced or embodied the qualities of the show farmer.  
Show farmers are more fully analyzed in chapter 8.   
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Figure 7.3:  Socioeconomic Characteristics of Show Farmers Compared to Other Organic 
Farmers in their Villages 
 
Addabad (A) n:  show farmers = 4, others = 31 
Edaggrineelu (E) n:  show farmers = 4, others = 29 
Japur (J) n:  show farmers = 4, others = 31 
 
2012 Income as Earned by Show and Other Farmers by Village 
 
 
2013 Acreage as Held by Show and Other Farmers by Village 
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2013 Asset Score for Show and Other Farmers by Village 
 
 
Asset scores were calculated for organic farmers using the same criteria for the GM cotton farmers discussed in 
chapter 5 
 
 
2012-2013 Interventions for Show and Other Farmers by Village 
 
 
Interventions here refers to the incentives listed above:  jobs, seeds, farm equipment, loans, and consultations. Flachs 
Household Survey 2013. 
 
219 
 
In some cases, such as comparisons of income and assets in Japur and Addabad, t-tests 
determined the differences in means between show farmer and other farmer variables to be 
statistically significant.  However, I do not stress the importance of statistics in this case.  An 
analysis derived from a sample of four farmers in each village reflects a small sample size and 
indicates only that the farmers I identified as being particularly involved in the intervention 
program tend to have a range of variation that places them in the most advantaged group of 
farmers with respect to the incentives they take, their holdings, their incomes, and their assets.  
When show farmers go to meetings and report back to the rest of the village, these other organic 
farmers miss out on ethnochemistry lessons and instead treat the leaf-based organic sprays like 
any other commodified input.  Similarly, the work of cotton breeding is difficult due to their 
propensity to self-pollinate and the yield depression in the hybrids that farmers have available.  
Yet in Edaggrineelu and on a demonstration farm in Japur, show farmers are attempting to breed 
their own non-GM cotton strains.  When new infrastructure is available or when the media wants 
to feature a farmer, these show farmers step up to reap their social and material rewards.   
Show farmer P. Mahesh, a respected large farmer and local organic celebrity in 
Edaggrineelu, has been trying to make his own cotton seeds for several years:  “We are the 
farmers,” he explains, we should not depend on others to get seeds.”  How’s it going, I asked?  
“Terrible, the seeds are not coming up, it didn’t work this year,” he answers with a shrug.  It is 
the response of a farmer for whom the stakes of trialing have been removed.  These seeds and 
knowledge about them are, in effect, inconsequential to Mahesh’s livelihood.  However, he 
pursues this knowledge for its own sake and to secure his position as a celebrated show farmer.  
Mahesh explained the process of identifying the best candidates for the second generation by 
their strong leaves and large fruiting bolls; how he would survey the field for uniformity of 
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height and stem thickness; how he would carefully check his seeds for beriki, here referring to a 
lack of weight or cracking that would suggest that the seeds were infertile; how one must time 
pollination carefully to spread desirable pollen while preventing unwanted male stamens from 
dropping their own genetic material; how if you replant seeds too many times in a row the 
production will drop and (he said with a wizened grin) “they will perform like an old man like 
me.”  Designing crop rotations, breeding seeds, and disseminating plant-based pesticides, 
Mahesh epitomizes a highly skilled farmer.  “We can't depend on the companies, because if their 
seeds fail or they mislead you, you have no recourse and no one to blame but yourself.  If you go 
down that road, you just have to keep buying things until you can force success out of the plant.  
With your own seeds you can be sure of what you're planting and better predict how it will 
work.”  And yet Mahesh’s saved seeds account for only 16% of Edaggrineelu cotton seed 
choices 2012-2013, belonging to the most engaged farmers.  While Mahesh continues to develop 
his saved seed and share that knowledge with those who participate in his minor breeding 
operation, most of the village is happy to take seeds from the NGO that helps manage organic 
agriculture and its publicity in Edaggrineelu.  “People aren’t that interested,” he admits with a 
sigh.  “They’re happy to take from others but that’s not correct.”  Other organic farmers in the 
village see have different designs for their time and energy, and have no problem taking the free 
advice and equipment offered by the NGO program.    
Rather than encourage individual farmers to breed seeds, the cooperative that provides 
seeds and manages cotton trading for Prakruti’s organic farmers has built a show farm landscape 
near their Japur cluster of villages (see chapter eight for a more detailed discussion of this space).  
Frustrated with the hybrids available to organic farmers, which are in practice the refuge seeds 
bred by GM companies, Prakruti CEO Ashok Chender procured germplasm from GM breeder 
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Nuziveedu Seeds, as well as from university breeders.  From a potential 42 varieties, he has 
chosen 12 that may be viable for his farmers and is in the process of growing them on the 
demonstration farm.  The show farmers who manage this space, namely Prakruti employee 
Ataram Tulanna, a farmer and organic village leader in Japur, look for desirable traits and use 
their experience with the different varieties to make suggestions for the rest of the farmers in the 
program.  These are the farmers who learn and apply seed breeding and complicated non-
chemical field management methods.  Rather than use this knowledge in their own fields, they 
breed for the demonstration farm, showing possibilities to visitors as they attempt to secure a 
distributable volume of seeds.  As in Edaggrineelu, others in the village skip meetings and take 
seeds or leaf sprays because they are an easy option have no need to generate iterative 
management knowledge about this technology.  For breeders like Tulanna and Mahesh, that 
knowledge becomes part of regular practice for the show farmers who must demonstrate it to the 
rest of the village and to visitors.  Over the years, these farmers have made minor improvements 
where necessary, working with the NGOs to adapt seeds, leaf sprays, and fertilizers to local 
conditions that they can distribute among the less invested majority of villagers.  In coordination 
with organic program directors, these engaged farmers have built agricultural skill. 
 
Rule-Bending and Non-compliance as Strategies for Risk Reduction 
At the other end of the still-skilled spectrum are those farmers who cautiously work with 
organic programs but still make their own environmental or social decisions on other parts of 
their land.  Addabad organic farmer Marskonda Ram has no problem telling me that some of his 
land is reserved for GM cotton as an insurance against organic failure.  As the land is separate 
from his organic field, he assumes that GM crops and chemical inputs present no problem for his 
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organic certification.  Field coordinator Krishna Ram feels differently.  “These people are a 
problem for the certification process,” he says.  “People try to sell their cotton in with organic 
cotton and it becomes expensive for us to do any unnecessary testing.  The certifiers take 150 of 
our 2500 farmers randomly and do checks.  As such it’s better to remove any aberrations from 
our list.”  Nervously, he asked for the names of those farmers who had taken GM cotton from 
outside shops, saying that he needed to check up on them.  I agreed as I had asked the farmers 
earlier if I should keep such action secret and they laughed, saying that Krishna ought to know.  
In accordance with the letter, if not the spirit, of organic regulation, both are correct as Krishna 
clarifies the next day:  “We certify land, we don't certify the farmer.  This way we can register 
husbands and wives separately to take advantage of government schemes for small farmers.”  In 
theory this distinction allows these farmers to maintain separate spaces where they can grow 
higher-yielding GM cotton with non-organic inputs.  When questioned farmers certify that their 
tools do not come into contact with GM material, although this would be hard to police.  In 
practice, as smallholder farming occurs at the level of the household, these separate spaces allow 
farmers to trial different management strategies while leaving the door open to opportunities 
through organic programs. 
An hour’s bus ride away in the Prakruti-affiliated village of Japur, some farmers devote a 
minimum of their land to organic agriculture to benefit from free seeds, access to loans, and 
improvement projects.  Their lackluster commitment is justified somewhere between the low 
yielding organic seeds that villagers remember as being inferior to Bt seeds, and the organic 
insistence on not using any chemical fertilizers, which “everyone knows” (especially the 
village’s skeptical neighbors) work well.  Disgruntled organic farmer Govinder hedges his bets 
with a separate Bt plot of cotton, voicing the concerns of many that the digubati raledu (the 
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yields never come) with the non-Bt seeds.  “The only reason we're still part of organic is because 
Prakruti gives cheap seeds, but the yields are very bad and the profit margins are even worse, 
thanks to Prakruti's small premium combined with the small yield.  Their rules are difficult and 
problematic because they are banning the solution (chemical fertilizers).  If we use the 
chemicals, they won't take our cotton.”  “There is a problem with fertility,” explains field 
coordinator K. Arjuna, shifting the blame to inefficient government assistance programs.  “We're 
looking to increase liquid fertilizers, increase compost and vermicompost programs, but the 
government is not working with us.  We're giving information, whatever they need, we submit 
reports, but they are not helping us…the farmers are selling their cattle, but they need to keep 
them [for fertilizers and plowing].”  Farmers report selling their animals and buying or renting 
tractors to save on farm labor as children leave the farm, to save on the costs of keeping animals, 
or to buy into the promise of modern machine efficiency offered by quick and fun-to-drive 
tractors.  With sharing schemes and diminishing household labor, farmers have come to perceive 
tractors to be as economically efficient as cattle in many instances.  Thus are the role of show 
farmers who keep cattle and maintain manure stocks, especially P. Mahesh in Edaggrineelu, 
especially important in maintaining the image of the idealized rural household in the face of 
emerging economic strategies for field management.   
This is a problem for farmers trying to split their energy between organic and Bt cotton 
cultivation, like Sitaram.  “Now that we have fewer animals,” he explained “the fertility of our 
land is less.  Using the chemicals is better.”  Farmers in his particular Japur hamlet, Sompalle, 
receive the seeds and sprays through more engaged farmers like show farmer Ataram Tulanna of 
the neighboring Japur hamlet of Sampalle.  They plant organic cotton not because they 
particularly like the program but to maintain access to the rest of the organic program’s benefits.  
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Unwilling to learn to use organic methods, farmers like Sitaram or Govindrao in Somgdua don’t 
commit fully to organic or non-organic methods, even though they dislike the organic program: 
“It may be cheaper investment and good for the land but the production is bad now,” offers 
Govindrao.  “I took it just to remain friendly with the group.  We're always willing to cooperate 
and it’s not like organic is a lot of work.  I didn't really have to listen to their instructions - 
people said do like this and that and they wrote some details down but then they left.” “Don't 
they care that you're doing organic?” I asked.  “They don't look closely, they don't come and see 
our farms so it’s no problem,” he answered.  “They just write and sit and leave.  At the 
demonstration farm they only got one quintal per acre, why would I want to follow that?”   He's 
switching from a low density to a higher density planting system as he saw it have good yield 
last year in a neighbor’s field, a move not encouraged by Prakruti as it decreases the overall 
agrobiodiversity of the farms and promotes monoculture farming. 
It is not clear which space in these Prakruti villages is really the insurance for farmers, as 
the low yielding organic cotton has few input costs and the GM seed choices that farmers plant 
follow the same uncertain patterns of shop suggestion or neighbor emulation seen among GM 
farmers.  Local shops have little patience for marginal tribal or low caste farmers buying on 
credit and the often illiterate farmers develop little knowledge of or interest in the confusing GM 
brands, identifying them by the pictures on the seed packet cover.  Instead it is probably most 
correct to interpret their fields as a form of cotton diversification: plant the organic cottons that 
the program has been providing for years that are guaranteed to grow (poorly) and can be sold at 
a premium, while taking shop recommendations for unknown GM seeds in the hopes of a large 
yield.  
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 In Edaggrineelu, this loose relationship to the spirit of organic agriculture manifests 
when farmers simply break rules that do not work for them.  PANTA does not certify their 
farmers, instead relying on the villages’ positive press and reputation to entice buyers and 
writers.  A cost-saving endeavor for the farmers and the NGO, this also allows a margin of fraud 
for frustrated farmers.  After telling me there was no Bt cotton in her village, P. Lachmi showed 
me the cotton she planted this year, genetically modified Dr. Brent from Mahyco.  “This year we 
didn’t get much help from PANTA for our cotton seeds.  They told us to plant what we could 
find,” she said.  Another farmer sheepishly admitted to planting Bt seeds, but asked that I not 
pass on this information to the NGO.  Unlike Edaggrineelu show farmer Mahesh, who carefully 
makes his own seeds and compares them with those that he gets from the NGO, these farmers 
sparingly use purchased chemicals and seeds from local shops.  “They say not to use chemicals 
so I don't,” shrugs Venkanna, but he's not impressed with the seeds from PANTA.  Two years 
ago he switched from them to buying seeds in nearby Jenagom, going for GM seeds that he does 
not know by name.  He also uses endosulfan, a chemical pesticide, qualifying that he only uses it 
“a little, and only because a rice boring insect came in such high amounts last spring.”  
Interestingly, he also uses neem sprays mixed by his organic neighbors as well.  This may be an 
example of what Gupta (1998) would term hybrid technology as it awkwardly combines organic 
and corporate knowledge.  However, I believe it is more accurate to view this occasional rule-
breaking as a necessary hedging.  Like the Sompalle farmers, Venkanna is unwilling to fully 
commit to the new technology and so has constructed an uneasy compromise that he hopes will 
allow him to maintain a maximum flexibility and benefit from a chemical alongside a potentially 
useful NGO connection.   
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Organic program directors are surely displeased with such farmers who commit halfway.  
Yet practicing a variety of management strategies and changing them depending on different 
market, ecological, and institutional incentives allows the farmers to maintain a diverse skillset.  
Rule-breaking is never good press, but it does allow farmers to experiment with all of their 
possible options, easing the transition to alternative agriculture.  This combination of flexibility 
and incentives that underwrite the most serious concerns about yield uncertainty help to keep 
even the most skeptical farmers engaged in the program. The regulation, be it lax or generous 
depending on one’s perspective, allows these skeptical farmers the freedom to conduct long term 
trials of the different schemes and adapt what works to their own farms.   
In this section I have discussed the ways in which organic farmers hedge different kinds 
of farming to capitalize on organic marketing.  The skill fulcrum rests on which farmers are able 
to balance the risks and rewards of trialing various technologies.  Seed choice, a decision that 
dominates marketing and farmer decision-making among the GM farmers, is much less 
important among the organic farmers who have that decision made for them.  Rather, organic 
farming skill is a process of learning from the NGOs, keeping what works, realizing what is just 
for show, and should that fail, maintaining a knowledge base in a backup project. 
 
Learning Under Constraint 
 In chapter five and chapter six, I linked environmental learning to the ability to recognize 
and choose available seeds, the time spent planting particular seeds, yield responses, and farmer 
consensus on seed qualities. Unlike the GM cotton decision process, organic yield response is 
not an all-consuming variable for farmers.  This is not because farmers have a more complicated 
set of variables to factor or because they are more concerned with reliability as with rice seeds, 
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but because the production costs of low yields with organic agriculture are underwritten by the 
program.  Thus yield is less important to the ultimate calculus of which seed farmers choose to 
plant.  Besides, on these organic farms, cotton seed choice is particularly constrained.  2013-14, 
two seed varieties, non-Bt Mallika and non-Bt Bunny accounted for 123 out of 175 (70.3%) 
cotton seeds planted by 84 organic farmers.  Given this severely reduced market choice, it is not 
surprising that these two seeds were each planted for about three years, double the averages seen 
on GM farms.  When the organic seeds are removed from this sample to show only the seeds that 
farmers planted on their non-organic land without the assistance of organic programs, the 
average time that each farmer spends planting particular seed brands, about 1.2 years, resembles 
the time allotted by GM farmers.  Taken as an average for each farmer, farmers planting one of 
the two organic seeds in the organic villages had much more experience with those seeds than 
the Warangal and Matepalle GM farmers following the seed fads (Figure 7.4, Figure 7.5).   
 
Figure 7.4:  Average Farmer Experience with Organic Cotton Seeds Provided by Prakruti 
or PANTA Compared to Average Year Experience with GM Cotton Seeds 2013-2014 
 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 GM Farmers Organic Farmers 
n 293 84 
Mean 1.34 3.33 
SD 1.57 2.01 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 7 10 
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Figure 7.5:  Histogram showing frequency of number of years experience with which GM 
and Organic cotton farmers planted cotton seeds 2013-14 
 
 
 
In this histogram, 0 years would indicate a new seed for the farmer in question.  GM planting farmers are indicated 
in blue while organic planting farmers are indicated in red.  The difference in years of experience between organic 
and GM farmers was significantly significant at p <0.001. Flachs Farmer Survey 2013-2014. 
 
As explained above, a large proportion of farmers received benefits, including at least 
some seeds directly from the organic program.  Like the local vendors who provide most of the 
rice seed choices to the six GM planting villages in my sample, the organic program is a trusted 
source of germplasm.  It is also a cheaper, and often a required source of germplasm – to be in 
the program, farmers must plant at least a little organic cotton, even if they also buy cotton seeds 
Organic Cotton Descriptive Statistics 
 
n =   84 
Mean =   3.60 
SD =   2.47 
Min =  0 
Max =  15 
 
GM Cotton Descriptive Statistics 
 
n =   311 
Mean =   1.48 
SD =   1.55 
Min =  0 
Max =  10 
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from other sources.  After removing the eight percent of choices for which farmers did not know 
the source of their cotton seeds as I did with GM cotton and rice vendors, organic sources 
accounted for a clear majority, 146 out of 203 (72%) of the cotton seeds planted in these three 
organic villages (Table 7.2).   
 
Table 7.2:  Seed Vendors accounting for more than 1% of Total Cotton Seed Choices in 
Organic Villages 2013-2014 
 
Vendor name Seed choices from Vendor % of total choices 
Organic Cooperative 146 72% 
Village Shop 12 6% 
JKS Fertilizers 12 6% 
Broker 10 5% 
PANTA 9 4% 
Saved 8 4% 
Venkatesh 3 1% 
Flachs Farmer Survey 2013-2014. 
 
 Given the fewer choices, more consolidated vendors, and the greater time spent with 
these seeds, I expected Prakruti farmers to know more about their organic cotton seed choices 
than the farmers planting GM cotton.  Choice overload appeared to play a role in the anxiety-
driven choices of GM cotton farmers, while didactic organic programs offer no real choices at 
all.  Alternately, because these farmers have little need to trial their seeds and stay abreast of 
changes while participating in the organic program, they may have very little widespread 
knowledge about cotton seeds.  Using the same consensus questionnaire I used with GM farmers 
in 2014, I asked the 64 Addabad and Japur farmers planting cotton to identify phenotypic 
characteristics of their crop (Table 7.3) 
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Table 7.3:  2014 Cotton Knowledge Consensus as a Row Percentage 
 
 Boll Size  Growth Habit  
Seed Name Small Medium Large DNK  Tall Both Bushy DNK N 
Mallika 8 46 46 0  38 24 0 38 37 
Bunny 20 60 20 0  29 57 0 14 15 
Organic
22
 38 25 38 0  25 75 0 0 8 
Flachs Farmer Survey 2013-2014. 
 
Although organic farmers planted a handful of other non-organic seeds, no more than two 
farmers planted any particular seeds, defeating the purpose of a consensus exercise on those 
seeds.  The organic farmers had nowhere near the high levels of consensus found among farmers 
choosing rice seeds, many of which were above 80% (Table 6.2).  Like the Bt farmers, organic 
cotton farmers do not clearly agree on the particular categories of their cotton seeds.  Where the 
conventional farmers’ confusion stemmed from a lack of experience with the seeds and a 
widespread susceptibility to experts or pedda farmers, organic cotton farmers plant cotton for 
nearly as long as the conventional farmers planted rice.  I argue that in spite of this experience, 
organic cotton farmers participating in didactic organic development recognize that their 
program directors control their choices.  Farmers do not learn about these important phenotypic 
traits because this knowledge does not help them make decisions.  Sometimes, even when they 
try to request a particular seed from the programs, that seed will be sold out – why waste time 
learning about the most important elements of cotton plants when didactic programs remove 
farmer choice.  Far more important is to play the correct part in the development apparatus and 
secure lines to agricultural and social incentives. 
 
 
 
                                               
22 ‘Organic’ refers to seeds that farmers identified as coming from an organic program source but forgot the 
particular brand they chose 
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Conclusion 
While organic farming is characterized by education, different kinds of technology, and a 
mission to improve lives by promoting a more sustainable future, many farmers involved in these 
programs appear happy to turn over management knowledge to the program directors and to 
show farmers in their villages.  However, there are notable exceptions.  Successful show farmers 
balance didactic and environmental learning while the rest of their village copies their choices 
using the same social emulation strategies employed by most GM farmers.  Alternately, the 
organic program is given lip service by farmers who grow a small amount of organic cotton not 
because they think it will provide a good return but because they want to keep open the avenues 
to program assistance. Farmers exercise the opportunity to trial cotton seeds, but as their choices 
are limited to two seeds from their certifying program (at least for their certified land holdings) 
these trials are not particularly useful in helping them make seed choices in the future.  Within 
these choices, they build relatively little knowledge about these seeds and look to their influential 
neighbors, just like GM cotton farmers.   
Yet on both GM and Organic farms there is a disparity between those who drive trends 
and those who follow them.  Interestingly, both agricultural systems find an interruption of 
knowledge creation because of an overreliance on social learning.  Among GM farmers this 
manifests in the seed fads and herds driven by a response to a seed landscape constrained by the 
varieties that large farmers choose to plant.  Among organic farmers, the interruption of skilling 
is found in those farmers who seize upon organic agriculture without developing good 
connections with the program directors or establishing themselves as show farmers.  Organic 
farmers’ general apathy toward adapting the technology given to them in the form of training 
sessions or seeds leads them to follow the leader farmers who stay engaged with the program and 
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who do the iterative work of fitting that knowledge to their local needs.  The organic farmers 
maintaining agricultural skill break into two different kinds of farmers:  those who drive trends 
by working closely with NGO programs and experts, and those who keep organic farms as well 
as GM cotton farms as a way to spread their risk and potential gain as far as possible.  Rule 
breaking is in this sense a way to keep the skilling process alive because it allows farmers to trial 
many different kinds of seeds and management techniques. 
Amidst varyingly successful development initiatives, these programs have managed to 
keep farmer interest in three ways.  First, they capitalize on the social influence of early organic 
adopters, who help to convince the rest of the village of the program’s benefits.  Early organic 
adopters are specifically targeted for their influence in the village.  Organic programs encourage 
them to become show farmers, heavily incentivizing their agriculture, even when these early 
adopters are among the most socioeconomically advantaged in the village to begin with.  Seeing 
these influential farmers succeed then kicks off the social learning so important among non-
organic cotton farmers. Early negotiations with show farmers require some back-and-forth 
during which show farmers adapt program rules to local conditions.  If successful, these 
adaptations then become standard practice for future interventions.  “They sucked my knowledge 
out with a straw,” laughs P. Mahesh.  His knowledge and influence helped tailor organic 
suggestions and infrastructure to local needs.  Similarly, Prakruti show farmers Ataram 
Lakshman and Ataram Tulanna work to keep the villages where they live in line, in exchange for 
preferential access to seeds, jobs, loans, and influence.  These show farmers and their role in 
local social learning will be explored further in chapter eight.   
Second, they incentivize organic production to compensate for the lost opportunity costs 
of planting a higher-yielding cotton and taking their chances in the open market.  Organic cotton 
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farmers in my sample produced much lower yields on average than did the GM cotton farmers.  
To some degree these lower yields might be expected because organic programs recruit poorer, 
marginal, low-caste and Tribal farmers.  However, organic programs like Prakruti and PANTA 
step in and provide a safety net wherein organic farmers do not need to chase yields and profit 
margins like their GM-planting counterparts.  Where GM planting farmers lack a widely agreed-
upon knowledge base for seed brands due to a combination of choice overload, short-term trials, 
deskilling, and the undue influence of conformist bias, organic farmers receive loans, inputs, 
equipment, and social capital regardless of their seed knowledge.  In exchange for coming under 
the socioeconomic safety net, they relinquish a material incentive to develop nuanced knowledge 
about their cotton seeds. 
Third, these programs allow for a degree of flexibility in certification requirements that 
can manifest as fraud or rule-bending.  In some instances, farmers are probably taking advantage 
of lax collection and oversight rules to keep these incentives coming.  In others, such as in 
famers’ considerable stores of heirloom vegetables, sorghum, wheat, and rice, the organic 
program does not monitor or disrupt agricultural decisions.  In Prakruti-affiliated villages 2013-
2014, 134 out of 157 (85%) of rice or sorghum choices came from saved seed.  Further, 130 
(83%) of those choices represented heirloom desi seeds specially adapted to the area and saved 
for an average of 10 years.  This diversity was evident in vegetable, rice, and sorghum fields, 
which stood out to this American researcher used to hybrid corn fields for their non-uniformity.  
As with rice, farmers purposively investigated heirloom crops to find the best tasting, most 
environmentally resilient, and highest yielding varieties. 
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An organic farmer poses with genetically diverse sorghum in his field near Addabad. 
 
By asking farmers to maintain subsistence plots and encouraging them to devote land to sorghum 
and providing free vegetable seeds, Prakruti encourages organic farmers to cast a wide and 
biodiverse net in their agriculture.   
More so than Prakruti villages, Edaggrineelu has emerged as a model for organic 
agriculture.  Among NGO promoters, journalists, and government representatives, its potential as 
a model village is clear and tantalizing.  Such proponents are rewarded with viewers and donors 
for celebrating Edaggrineelu.  But why academics should come to portray Edaggrineelu as 
organic agriculture generally rather than a particular network of actors is less clear.  With titles 
lauding “the road ahead” (Raghupati and Prasad 2009) and invoking Gandhi (Quartz 2010), 
academics threaten to take Edaggrineelu out of context, away from the networks of capital and 
media that sustain them.  In doing so, such studies provide, ironically, a poor explanation toward 
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future development.  The didactic education program that made this village famous is just as 
important to their success as the hard work and innovative methods.   
Reports stressing Edaggrineelu’s potential but downplaying the interaction between 
farmers and NGOs ignore the most important reason for its success.  After acknowledging that 
Edaggrineelu is supported by numerous NGOs reducing cultivation risk, one study compared 
Edaggrineelu cultivation “vulnerability” to two other villages as though all three grew cotton 
under the same socioeconomic conditions (Desmond 2013).  While claiming to show an analysis 
of differential material risks associated with three agronomic conditions, the study ignored the 
political ecology of aligning with an NGO.  Another study, which interviewed 36 farmers in ten 
villages affiliated with a highly political NGO celebrated the agroecological benefits of in situ 
conservation for both poor farmers and for biodiversity (Bradburn 2014).  While acknowledging 
that contacting exclusively farmers associated with a conservation-based NGO may have 
influenced responses, the study concludes “that a large section of agrarian society in the Medak 
district is conserving many diverse landrace crops on their farms that hold important, and 
potentially important genetic resources” (Bradburn 2014:79).  Didactic organic and conservation 
are made to seem as if they are mere technologies rather than elements of a complicated 
agricultural and social system. 
This misses the point that I have highlighted in this chapter:  organic and conservation 
initiatives are successful because farmers learn to take advantage of program rewards, because 
farmer emulate particularly successful show farmers in their village, and because the programs 
provide enough flexibility to allow farmers to maintain a diverse agricultural skillset.  Like GM 
trials conducted under unrealistic field conditions (Qaim 2003), such studies (Bradburn 2014; 
Desmond 2013; Forster et al. 2013; Quartz 2010) disconnect agricultural methods from the 
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people and institutions that make them work.  When summarized by scholars from other 
disciplines (Rieple and Singh 2010 e.g.), organic agriculture appears as a superior agricultural 
technology decoupled from the social politics of development programs. This would be 
especially ironic for farmers affiliated with Prakruti, where the social and economic benefits of 
participation in the organic programs encourage farmers to grow a wide variety of subsistence 
and market crops.  Naturalizing their success as the success of organic methods rather than 
organic institutions would ignore the reason for their success.   
This chapter has discussed the ways in which farmers participating in didactic organic 
production schemes trade farm management decisions for social and material incentives.  
However, as I have emphasized, farmers working with organic projects often take other steps, 
ranging from rule-breaking to separately certified plots to diversify the risk of fully converting to 
organic agriculture.  The following chapter discusses the way in which certain farmers take 
advantage of institutional attention and turn it to their advantage to reap extra benefits, illustrated 
best by the Srigonda cooperative, the personal success of P. Mahesh in Edaggrineelu, Ataram 
Lakshman and Ataram Tulanna, the organic Patels in Addabad, and the farmers most heavily 
involved with Desi production and the MATCH NGO in Maharastra.  Their position is then 
reinforced by media attention and the material benefits of equipment, seeds, loans, access to 
government money, etc.  When pressed, such farmers are not typical of the village as a whole 
and may not even be entirely convinced of the methods themselves, but rather convinced of the 
benefits.  This can be contrasted to the inter-village competition between farmers seeking social 
prestige through good farming defined by profits, high yields, profit margins and autonomy, and 
modernity.  I draw on several different models of show farmers to make this point, showing that 
there are a diversity of ways in which farmers are driven by the need to perform, even at the 
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expense of managing their farms.  I also draw on interviews with Monsanto representatives, 
university extension officers, organic program officers, and E-Digu scientists. 
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Chapter 8:  Show farmers 
 
The border that separates the twin cities of Secunderabad and Hyderabad is arbitrary as 
the two cities have long since merged into one sprawling unit.  The Tarnaka enclave in 
historically British-administrated Secunderabad is home to many of Telangana’s most active 
environmental NGOs, while its proximity to Hyderabad’s Osmania University brings together 
intellectuals and non-profit activists.  The parent organizations for the organic farmers in this 
study, SUS and Prakruti Organic, are both headquartered in this enclave, in fact separated by just 
a few buildings.  SUS’s first floor houses a farm-to-fork organic grocery store that buys rice, 
vegetables, and other produce from Hyderabad’s rural periphery. Through these organizations 
India’s growing middle class can support environmentally minded production from their homes 
in urban centers.   
SUS headquarters, and to a lesser extent, Prakruti headquarters, are spaces that allow 
visitors to see and feel organic agriculture.  SUS’s first floor grocery sets an agrarian tone for the 
office.  Upstairs, visitors are greeted with art woven from rice made in participating villages 
while awards for SUS’s service and production clutter the walls.  A final flight of stairs leads to a 
board room that houses a long table and a glass cabinet full of jars holding organic seeds.  
Visitors not only see the fruits of SUS’s collaborations, they can see a symbolic seed bank that 
shows how committed SUS is to conserving Indian agricultural heritage.  Prakruti’s boardroom 
also features a small seed bank, although the Prakruti offices devote more wall space to press 
clippings, Prakruti pamphlets, and posters.  SUS, which coordinates numerous smaller programs, 
shows the potential of alternative agriculture.  Prakruti, which works to sell its particular model 
to donors or distributors, showcases photos of their farmers and successful campaigns.   
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Although most of my work involved directly speaking with farmers, I had met Prakruti 
Organic’s staff in previous field visits and returned to Secunderabad in May 2014 to speak with 
the higher level staff.  My interview schedule coincided with a visit from Bindu Gugothal, a mid-
level executive of Indian origin now living in London and working for the Fairtrade Foundation 
in the UK.  At a lunch before we were scheduled to leave for a farmer meeting, Gugothal 
explained the way that Fairtrade connected farmers with consumers: 
 
How much you want to ignore that it’s about money, it is still about that . So in a way we go 
over there try to create markets for [the farmers].  So to the extent that there’s a market, there 
is no assurance, even if it’s organic – forget about Fairtrade.  Because the difference between 
Fairtrade and organic is, the way I look at it as a consumer, if I want to buy organic it’s for 
my benefit also because it’s going to touch my skin, blah, blah, blah.  Like for food I try to 
buy organic food as much as possible of course, but Fairtrade has got no value for the 
consumer as such. It’s still the same product.  So it’s the same banana or it’s the same shirt, 
but if you tell people that this is the impact it has, which is minimal in a way what they have 
to pay. Which is like five pence for one tee-shirt which might be extra, but for the farmer it is 
quite a bit.  So we sit there and we create markets and at the same time we campaign about it  
so that people are aware what Fairtrade does and what its impact is. 
 
To find stories that encourage people to pay extra for a product that does not give them 
any extra benefit, Gugothal spent three days touring Prakruti farms for experiences to take back 
to Fairtrade.  As she says above, Gugothal, who holds a master’s degree in development studies, 
knows that these narratives are carefully crafted to elicit a response from consumers.  She herself 
is involved in the crafting and views it as a necessary part of what Fairtrade does.  She is not 
alone. 
Monsanto India’s website celebrates Pradeep Chivane and Daulat Raghoji Ghatod, small 
farmers who used GM seeds to save money for their daughters’ marriages and provide for their 
families (Monsanto Company 2012); NGOs recruit charismatic villagers to stand in front of 
news cameras to extoll program benefits (10TV Telugu News 2013; Prabu 2013); seed and 
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pesticide companies choose farmers living near roads for advertising campaigns, hoping that 
their signage will sway other farmers; whole demonstration farms are raised to show visitors the 
potential, if not the reality, of agricultural technology.  Who are these people?  And why do the 
same farmers keep appearing in these narratives?  Inundated with monthly foreign visitors who 
want to see the effects of their consumption or investment, certain farmers have risen to 
prominence.  Tour after tour, foreign visitors always seem to stop at their houses, or see the 
demonstration fields that they manage.  These farmers take advantage of attention built into the 
intervention programs and turn it to their advantage to reap extra benefits.  These can include 
farm equipment, extra assistance, and the intangible reward of being made into a local celebrity.   
In this chapter I discuss what Stone (2014) calls the show farmer:  farmers who reliably 
perform for visiting funders, scientists, media, NGOs, corporations, and other interested parties 
to demonstrate the viability of agricultural technologies.  Stone refers specifically not to a 
category of people but to a role played by farmers.  I am expanding that definition here to refer 
not just to the contingent role of performing agriculture for audiences but to people who learn to 
succeed in a feedback loop whereby particular farmers gain social and material recognition, enter 
into closer relationships with their audiences, and gain further rewards as a result.  When 
pressed, such farmers are not typical of the village as a whole and may not even be entirely 
convinced of the methods themselves so much as convinced of the benefits of working with 
NGOs.  However, the shows that show farmers perform often allow them to cultivate a local 
celebrity in addition to their material gains.  This can be contrasted to the intravillage 
competition between farmers seeking social prestige through good farming defined by profits, 
high yields, profit margins and autonomy, and modernity.  I draw on several different models of 
show farmers to make this point, arguing that farmers are driven by the incentives of 
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performance in a diversity of ways, even at the expense of managing their farms.  I also draw on 
interviews with Monsanto representatives, university extension officers, organic program 
officers, and E-Digu scientists.  I will begin by placing the show farmer within theories of 
agriculture and performance.   
 
Theorizing the Show Farmer  
As cultural anthropology shifted toward the study of practice (Ortner 1984), what people 
do in response to structures or institutions around them, a number of theorists have viewed 
agriculture as a kind of a performance.  Looking to the ways in which small farmers create a 
series of adaptive, improvisatory strategies, Paul Richards (Richards 1989; 1993) likened 
agriculture to a musical performance: like improvising musicians, farmers draw on a collection 
of agroecological knowledge that forms a repertory system when making agricultural 
management decisions.  Richards calls this system of knowledge and practice a set of 
“improvisational capacities” (Richards 1993:62), reasoning that farmers must call upon a 
repertoire of experience and resources when managing the environmental, social, and economic 
variables of the farm.  Studies focusing on agroecological resilience similarly point to the 
necessity of knowing how to manage agricultural diversity (Brookfield 2001) in long-term 
smallholder farming (Alcorn and Toledo 2000; Sumberg and Okali 1997; Wilken 1987; Leslie 
and McCabe 2013).   
Seminal theorists on the production and improvisation of agroecological knowledge point 
to the disasters that occurred when farmers abandoned these repertoires in favor of poorly 
executed development projects that valued gross domestic production over long term household 
security, or sought to replace farming systems with more legible, taxable alternatives:  Green 
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Revolution rice agriculture was a poor alternative to more efficient temple-based irrigation 
systems in Bali (Lansing 1991; Lansing 2006); development policies in West Africa disrupted 
household labor and cropping patterns, leading farmers to lose their land to capital-intensive 
farms (Netting 1993; Richards 1985); resettled O’odham farmers in the American Southwest 
created more biodiverse conditions on their new farms than those found in the park from which 
they were removed, a park ironically created to restore natural biodiversity (Nabhan et al. 1983).  
These examples collectively point to the danger of relying on didactic, proscribed agriculture to 
produce sustainable, resilient agroecological systems.  These interventions have a tendency to 
disrupt the pathways by which farmers create knowledge and adapt it to their particular 
circumstances, especially when they are coupled with the production demands, including quality 
and capital demands, of a state, NGO, or corporation.  If farmers are the performers, these 
demanding observers compose an audience watching to see how farmers perform their roles as 
environmental managers and entrepreneurs. Building off of Richards’ agronomic metaphor I 
would like to highlight this social aspect of farmer performance as a tool in determining their 
agricultural success.  Social performance becomes especially important when we consider 
didactic and institutionalized agricultural development programs like IPM or organic.   
The interaction between variability, performance, and knowledge is a major theme in this 
dissertation.  Show farmers have been able to leverage the rewards of fame and fortune offered 
by didactic interventions.  While early adopters of new technology generally tend to be more 
cosmopolitan and to have greater resources available that facilitate their experimentation with 
unproven methods (Rogers 2003; Stone and Flachs 2014), the show farmers layer an additional 
level of social performance on top of the qualities that led them to try new things in the first 
place.  Show farmers may be differentiated from other early adopters in that their charisma and 
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success helps them to cultivate a kind of celebrity that they perform in daily life, one featured in 
news reports or informational pamphlets. 
Following Richards (1993), I use performance not in the sense of ritual social dramas 
suggested by Victor Turner (1980; 1970), but to describe a strategic positioning that farmers 
present to outsiders and to members of their village in line with the goals of the intervention.  In 
return for playing the role of a farmer benefitting tremendously from didactic instruction, these 
show farmers are rewarded with various forms of capital (Bourdieu 2010):  economic rewards 
including access to loans, urban consumers, farm equipment, or part-time work with the 
program; social rewards including a network outside of the caste, ethnic, and kin relationships to 
provide support and resources to participating farmers; and the cultural capital that goes with 
being recognized as a successful and progressive person, having qualifications like organic 
certification or innumerable certificates conferred for ‘good’ production, being celebrated in 
media and recognized by various outsiders to the village, and being well respected in the village 
because of this attention. 
I would like to distinguish here between four kinds of performances, in which show 
farms and landscapes give a particular kind of performance in response to a particular set of 
institutional rewards.  These different kinds of show farmers each perform their agriculture to 
visitors, differing in how they present themselves and who shows up to watch.  Closest to 
Stone’s (2014) description of the show farmer as a role that people take up, opportunistic show 
farmers are those farmers who recognize an opportunity to benefit from a new scheme or 
program.  These farmers are the most contingent group, as their willingness to spend time 
performing for visitors or to follow the instructions of off-farm authorities including input sellers 
and NGO representatives is most dependent on their current perception of the benefits.  These 
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are the farmers who jump at a chance to adopt a new planting strategy and extol its virtues to the 
media, only to leave the program once the attention or incentives drop away.  The directors of E-
Digu, an agricultural intervention program that distributed telecommunicated expertise from 
Hyderabad, were displeased to find that almost all of their participants left the program once 
asked to pay a nominal fee for that expertise.  This, despite farmers’ gushing reports to news and 
scientific investigators.  E-Digu had unwittingly relied too heavily on the loyalty of opportunistic 
show farmers. 
Opportunistic show farmers are often first in line to receive the most material benefits 
from didactic intervention schemes.  Out of the thirty-three farming households who live in the 
tiny hamlet of Edaggrineelu, nineteen  reported receiving low interest farm loans or sales help 
brokered through PANTA; nineteen received farm equipment including pipelines, seed cleaners, 
compost pits, and plastic drums; at least seventeen farmers received seeds from PANTA or saved 
seeds given in previous years.  Within that, the ceaselessly self-promoting Edaggrineelu farmer 
P. Mahesh and his family negotiated for thousands of rupees in loans, control four of the 
village’s seven tractors, save seeds and sell them to other Edaggrineelu farmers, and are 
gatekeepers to the village seed cleaning machine.  Of the seventy Prakruti Organic farming 
households interviewed in the Adilabad district, twenty-nine reported receiving low-interest 
loans, all received seeds, and each village was given several communal drums and vermicompost 
pits.   
Over time, an opportunistic show farmer may come to enjoy the success and fame that 
her or she has received by participating with the program.  By this point, the show farmer has 
become so well known as a media personality that he or she to represent the village, the kind of 
agriculture, or even India itself.  P. Mahesh of Edaggrineelu, a familiar face to Hyderabad 
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reporters discussed below, is one such celebrity show farmer.  Visitors are directed to these 
celebrity farmers, who spend a good deal of time with them and seem to really enjoy it.  Like all 
show farmers, their enthusiasm continues to be subsidized by the development initiative in 
question.  But celebrity show farmers take this one step further when they whip out address 
books or their favorite photographs of visiting dignitaries.  Their rewards are as much in social 
capital as in the more calculated logic of opportunism.  Because of this commitment, their 
loyalty to the program is less contingent on reward than other farmers.   
Other show farmers may be thought of as institutional because they claim a direct 
association with shops, programs, companies, or plant science stations.  Their job is to farm in 
the name of the institution, at least while the program is in motion. These farmers, recruited by 
input companies because their farms lie on the sides of roads or because they are considered 
locally influential or trustworthy by other farmers, advertise particular technologies or 
management strategies.  Just as the vague authority of the permit system unintentionally gave 
weight to the fad seeds during a shortage (see Chapter 5), the backing of an institution can make 
the recommendations or management decisions of these farmers seem more reliable.  This 
authority can be vague and weak, as in the case of input companies that hang seed signs on 
farmers’ fields in the hopes that the seed will grow well and that farmers will remember the 
name when buying seeds in shops.  Or, it can be strong, as in the case of a Srigonda shop owner 
and farmer whose seed choices and planting decisions carry the social weight of a man widely 
believed to be trustworthy and who has intimate personal connections with Warangal scientists.   
While not farmers themselves, the last kind of performance is that of the show landscape.  
These are particular spaces set up by intervention programs as demo farms or experimental 
farms.  Often maintained by trustworthy show farmers, these show landscapes present an 
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idealized vision of what agriculture could be, parsing out the messiness or illegibility of daily 
farm life.  Show landscapes can operate to convince visiting buyers of the possibilities of their 
investment, as in Prakruti’s Adilabad-based farms.  Alternately, they can show the potential of 
entire villages as in PANTA affiliated Edaggrineelu hamlet.  Because of narratives suggested by 
the NGOs, farmers, or the reporters and scientists themselves, these spaces can come to represent 
organic agriculture more broadly, masking the hard work ‘backstage’ that goes into keeping 
show farmers happy and keeping this agriculture viable.  Of course, these different show farmer 
types bleed into one another, and particular farmers may perform all of these roles.   
Unlike Turner or other symbolic anthropologists who speak of performance as a ritual 
drama, Ervin Goffman (1956) uses the metaphor of performance to demonstrate that people 
employ a “front” that allows them to perform the kind of self that they assume their audience 
wants to see.  Such performance is not necessarily fundamental to the person’s identity, but can 
be employed strategically.  Thus do show farmers differ from others described in development 
literature (Agrawal 2005; Escobar 2011; Gupta 1998) who become subjectively transformed or 
hybridized.  The contingency of performance on alternative farms is discussed throughout 
Chapter nine.  In the case of the show farmer, performance centers around their unwavering 
enthusiasm for the new technology or agricultural program.  While many farmers participating in 
development projects perform a kind of transformative sentiment, show farmers have mastered 
this art to the point that their performance becomes emblematic of the village or intervention as a 
whole, even to researchers (Desmond 2013).  It is these farmers who accompany reporters on 
tours of organic farms or speak up in group meetings with NGO or corporate representatives, and 
it is to these farmers that visitors are directed when they come to learn about life in the village. 
247 
 
Ethnobotanist Gary J. Martin (1995) relays the experience of Stefano Varese, who 
stepped into a Peruvian village so remote that it was best accessed by plane and was asked if he 
was an anthropologist.  When he answered in the affirmative, the villager said, “Well, I’m an 
informant” (Martin 1995:97).  Just this Peruvian man was happy to play the part of the villager, 
so too are show farmers happy to perform the role of the typical farmer. All such cases should be 
viewed skeptically when used to represent a larger movement.  In this instance, I am arguing that 
show farmers are used to create an image of success in Indian agricultural development that does 
not extend to all participants:  the success of show farmers should not be generalized to describe 
organic or GM farming as a whole.  In the next section I discuss the material benefits that show 
farmers receive in return for their enthusiasm. 
 
The Influence of Audiences on Show Farmers 
Show farmers perform a vital role in the agricultural development process by modeling 
good management behavior so that other farmers can learn from their demonstration and emulate 
their management choices.  However, in doing so, they also play an important role for audiences 
external to the village.  Donors, media, intervention programs like Prakruti and SUS, plant 
science stations, and agricultural input companies benefit directly from show farmer participation 
because their performances create deliverable media, including photographs and testimonial 
stories.  These, in turn, fuel investment and donations for future projects while providing 
evidence that a given intervention, ranging from scientific studies on crop density to NGO 
watershed improvements, has been successful and worthwhile.  Show farmers help such projects 
along by posing for the photographs, giving interviews to media, giving tours of their farms to 
248 
 
foreign investors or visiting people of interest, and by eloquently describing or performing their 
gratitude for the benefits of the intervention. 
Locally, these performances help to generate social and cultural capital in the village.  
India’s numerous aggressive and sensationalist-tilted (Guha 2008) television news and 
newspapers carry daily reports celebrating successful farmers and  sections devoted to 
management advice.  For example, because of their recognition in local newspapers, four of 
which service Kavrupad daily, farmers in nearby Srigonda have a reputation for honesty and 
good management.  Kavrupad farmers in a 2014 focus group celebrated the knowledge and 
connectivity of those farmers, especially Naniram, the manager of Srigonda’s cooperative 
pesticide and fertilizer shop.  According to the taxonomy above, Rao is an institutional show 
farmer, associated with input companies and the Warangal plant science station because he 
manages the cooperative shop.  His products and suggestions take on special gravitas.  Like 
many farmers, Kavrupad growers ask shop owners for advice on the newest seeds, pesticides, 
fertilizers, and pests.  Kavrupad farmer Puligujju Ramulu explains during a focus group 
discussion:  “In Srigonda there is a shop that gives good chemicals.  As [Naniram] is a farmer he 
will be supplying good rather than false (nakkili) chemicals.  He’s a good man… If you go to a 
shop, the owner should say correct things to you.  Naniram will say good words.” “Because 
Naniram has been a farmer for many years,” chimed in Takkalapelli Chinu, “he knows what is 
good and bad.  He has good knowledge in agriculture and provides the right fertilizers, 
pesticides, and information to the famers.”  This is in contrast to Kavrupad’s own shop, in which 
the focus group agreed, “[shopkeeper] Vishnu Rao sells fake products.”  The Kavrupad farmers 
distinguish here between trustworthy and dishonest shops, willing to dispense different kinds of 
knowledge and differentially effective inputs.   
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Srigonda and its local cooperative gains this reputation in part through years of success 
and in part because Srigonda farmers are ethnic coastal Andhras and belong to the Kamma caste, 
having emigrated to this region several decades ago.  “See how nicely they’re answering your 
questions,” prodded one of my research assistants after a particularly friendly interview.  “We 
Telangana people are more rude and less educated.”  Andhra areas have historically received 
better infrastructure and resources from Andhra Pradesh when compared to Telangana areas.  
Indeed, this disparity was a driving factor in the state’s recent bifurcation.  Additionally, they 
were quick to work with farmer field schools in the early 2000s and have developed a working 
relationship with the public research station through cotton specialist Dr. Umesh Reddy, who has 
cultivated a special relationship with Naniram.  In addition to the normal social emulation where 
farmers copy their neighbors’ seed choices (Stone 2007; Stone, Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014), 
Kavrupad or Ralledapalle area farmers would often add that the seed had performed for the 
Srigonda farmers, who really knew about farming.  “Everyone is planting the Jadoo seed,” 
reasoned one Ralledapalle farmer, “but more importantly last year in Srigonda everyone planted 
it and got twelve quintals per acre.”  These yields are reported in the newspapers for all of the 
neighboring villages to jealously read.  As an institutional show farmer, Rao also serves as a hub 
of expert information, a rising tide that raises all boats in Srigonda.  For neighboring villages, 
Srigonda’s success becomes Naniram’s success.  This grain of trust in an anarchic GM cotton 
market may explain why he sold half (152 out of 310) of Srigonda’s cotton seeds 2012-2014.  
Rao uses this success to promote his own shop and works with ANGRAU scientists and 
corporate dealers to stay informed and abreast of new agricultural information.   
Institutional show farmers like Naniram use new methods or inputs and broadcast this 
newness by hanging seed banners.  The dirt roads that lead to Prakruti organic villages or to 
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Edaggrineelu similarly bombard visitors with signs celebrating organic methods and thanking 
funders.  These murals are a large and visible way of advertising organic and conventional 
products (including membership in the program).  They also provide a convenient backdrop 
against which donors and reporters can take photographs.  Here, the audience is more diverse.  
Signs thanking European donors may have little relevance to visiting farmers curious about a 
new agricultural method, but are seized on by reporters or visiting donors as a sign of 
international success.  While these farms can and do serve institutional purposes, they are also 
home to the celebrity, opportunism, and show landscape versions of show farm farmer 
performances.  On my first day in Edaggrineelu, I happened to visit the village at the same time 
as a crew from 10TV Telugu News was filming (10TV Telugu News 2013).  Practiced farmers, 
who appear time and again in news, NGO literature, and in academic papers, stepped forward 
alongside representatives from PANTA to show off their fields and demonstrate good farming 
methods.  P. Srinu, an experienced show farmer happy to show off his system of rice 
intensification (SRI) field, spent the time between takes joking with the cameramen and 
suggesting particular shots.  All this attention has rankled nearby villages, whose teenagers 
accosted me, teasing, “everyone always goes to Edaggrineelu – isn’t anyone ever going to talk to 
us?”  Scheme affiliated farmers in Maharastra proudly showed me their state commendations, 
earned by participating in various field school programs while Prakruti, PANTA, MARI, and 
MATCH offices all boast walls devoted to their local success stories.  Several farmers in 
Edaggrineelu have had the opportunity to travel abroad because of their organic growing, even 
leading Edaggrineelu farmer Anjamma to complain, “we help [PANTA] by talking with people 
like you and going to Delhi to talk, it’s taking up a lot of our time!”  Within the villages, farmers 
that I met for the first time tended to defer, telling me that they did not know enough about the 
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program when compared with the celebrity show farmers.  “You don’t want to talk to me,” said 
one Edaggrineelu farmer, waving me away.  “You want to talk to [local celebrity show farmer] 
Mahesh, he knows everything.” 
Celebrity show farmers often leverage the time and energy they spend with visitors to 
request more equipment or responsibility within their respective programs.  Prakruti affiliated 
show farmer Ataram Lakshman, also his village’s sarpanch, or village head, was tasked with 
distributing free plastic drums and organic spray kits to other villages.  More impressively 
celebrity show farmer Ataram Tulanna (no relation) not only draws a salary from Prakruti, he has 
been given loans for a small poultry farm, perennial tree crops, and signage to ensure that the 
other villagers know exactly what he is planting.  Both farmers sell cotton and food crops 
through Prakruti for a premium, and have been working to convince their neighbors and family 
members to join the program.  When meeting with me or other visitors, these men were celebrity 
show farmers, walking me through technical details of their farming and telling me about recent 
visits by news crews.  When meeting with organic program representatives, they made sure to 
mention their problems and how long they had been waiting for new materials.  When managing 
Prakruti’s show farm landscape Tulanna shrugged his shoulders at the extra work he was asked 
to put in to ensure that the farm would be ready for visitors later in the week.  It was his job to 
plant flowers that day, so plant flowers he would.   
In Srigonda, two families’ close connection with Naniram’s cooperative store and the 
Warangal research station led them to be selected for cost-saving agriculture schemes including 
drip irrigation systems, bird perches, subsidized seeds, and a rice sorting machine that cleans 
grains and filters away dust that can bring down the rice prices in the open market.  Given 
materials but not urged to perform for visitors so much as simply try to do their best, these 
252 
 
farmers were asked to become institutional show farmers.  If positive, their experiences with this 
technology will help research scientists claim that the station is helping farmers and increasing 
yields.  If negative, they will be able to report that the schemes have no benefits for farmers, but 
the farmers themselves will not have to shoulder any additional risks.  This was a mix of 
opportunism and institutional influence.  As with all the show farmers, their agricultural success 
is tied less to the actual success of the farm than to the reliability of a pipeline for fame, farm 
equipment, and risk-free production. 
In the next section I discuss the experiences of show farmers in four different villages.  
These cases will clarify the ways in which the demands of different audiences, incentives, and 
the personalities of farmers intersect to create different kinds of show farmers.  In each case, 
these farmers have also benefitted by becoming local celebrities and working with the 
development programs to gain different resources.   
 
The Intersection of Audience, Incentive, and Personality in Show Farming 
In this section I present two farmers affiliated with Prakruti organic, a GM cotton 
planting farmer working with the ANGRAU research station in Warangal, a farmer planting non-
GM indigenous Gossypium arboreum in Maharastra working with MATCH, and a farmer 
associated with PANTA in Edaggrineelu.  Just as the experience of GM and organic farmers was 
seen to be highly variable depending on the context of the village, show farmers themselves take 
a variety of forms as they cultivate the show farmer persona.  Some show farmers appear to be 
simply playing a role in order to continue the boons given to them by agricultural programs, but 
others adopt the show more fully and consistently, building physical infrastructure and local 
fame.  I will distinguish here between opportunistic show farmers, who take advantage of the 
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infrastructure or social capital opportunities offered by intervention programs, and celebrity 
show farmers, whose advocacy and performance leads them to be more invested in the programs 
and to cultivate the show persona professionally.  I will begin with the opportunistic show 
farmers.   
Many show farmers are selected or rise to the occasion because they share features of 
early adopters (Rogers 2003):  they are more successful farmers, more interested in trying new 
technology, travel to seek out new information, or have connections to agricultural institutions as 
in the case of Naniram.  In the previous chapter I showed that organic show farmers are 
particularly well-advantaged relative to others in their villages (Figure 7.4), and this manifests in 
their daily lives as organic gatekeepers and recipients of various forms of social and material 
rewards. 
Ataram Lakshman is the sarpanch, or local political leader of Mopalle, a tribal hamlet 
that transitioned to organic agriculture in 2007.  Lakshman was not the first person in the village 
to transition to organic agriculture, but he has quickly risen to the fore of their efforts.  In 2012 
Prakruti representatives asked Lakshman to show off  his farm when we visited.  With an Rs 
18,000 ($300) investment, Lakshman was on track to net more than $2000, a wide profit margin 
for the area.  He was especially proud of his intercropping which attracted insect pests to trap 
plants where he could spray them with homemade organic pesticides.  To disseminate 
information and keep the lines of communication open between farmers and the project, the 
organic farmers involved with Prakruti and PANTA develop village councils with presidents and 
secretaries.  This village-level political organization mirrors the Gandhian democracy (Quartz 
2010) inscribed through the sarpanch system:  directly elected officials representing the village 
at regional meetings where they meet with representatives from other villages and bring back 
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new instructions from the program directors.  In 2013, Lakshman agreed to serve as president of 
the Mopalle organic society, leading him to meet with those representatives who wanted to see 
organic agriculture in action.  In 2014, for instance, Prakruti suggested that Mopalle farmers 
plant johnsongrass (Sorghum halpense) and mix nitrogen-fixing pulses with the cotton to aid soil 
fertility, which Lakshman was obliged to demonstrate for other farmers.  He planted 
johnsongrass in half an acre as a test plot, a small sacrifice on his ten acres.  “The program seems 
to continue to have benefits,” he muses.  “Since 2008 it has paid Rs 3000 per year to the school 
teacher out of the premiums, and that's good.  Besides, if we take seeds from outside shops 
they'll be much more expensive.” Lakshman’s authority as sarpanch and as a large landowner 
with fields close to the village center made him an ideal candidate to test organic methods and 
oversee other farmers.  While not the first adopter or most adamant champion, he saw an 
opportunity to benefit from subsidized seeds and has since become a focal point for organic 
success in the village. 
IPM proponents similarly tried to convince farmers to apply new management tools in 
Srigonda.  Rather than work through show farmers, the intervention program was built around a 
farmer field school.  Participants reported being generally enthusiastic (Mancini, Van Bruggen, 
and Jiggins 2007) and adopted IPM methods for a time.  However, after a year or two, “it was 
hard to farm that way,” explained participant Venkateshwarla.  “We followed those methods for 
about two years, but after that we stopped.”  The methods were effective, but the introduction of 
Bt cotton seeds obviated their need for IPM methods.  Furthermore, chemical pesticides worked 
much better against the sucking pests than homemade organic pesticides alone, and the manure 
composting smelled terrible.  Why do all the work of IPM when Bt seeds and herbicides could 
accomplish the same goals with much less effort?  “Gautham gauthaha,” shrugged 
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Venkateshwarla, a Sanskrit aphorism meaning ‘it’s in the past now.’  Additionally, the IPM team 
never checked back with the villagers, leading farmers to make their own environmental or 
social learning discussions with pesticides, fertilizers, and GM cottonseeds.  However, several 
years later, Srigonda farmers again began working with extension services.  This time the 
intervention was mediated through a cooperative agriculture supply store rather than an outside 
group, meaning that the program would feature a more permanent investment in the community.  
SV Rao describes himself as open to new ideas and has worked closely with Umesh, a scientist 
at the Warangal agricultural research center, offering himself up as a test case for the extension 
service’s management advice.  Like Lakshman, SV Rao typifies the opportunistic show farmer: 
cosmopolitan, comparatively wealthy, and willing to try low-risk new methods on a small scale. 
With the introduction of Bt seeds Rao experimented with denser planting, observing that 
the Bt plants were larger and had fewer insects.  He tried closer planting the following year in 
consultation with the research station scientists, observing that he planted double the seeds and 
saw a small reduction in flowers that was compensated by a large boost in production due to the 
sheer increase in planting numbers.  Like other GM farmers in Srigonda, he has stopped planting 
non-Bt refuges, but he has replaced them with johnsongrass as per Rao’s suggestion.  Pest 
insects use the johnsongrass as a refuge in place of non-Bt cotton, he explained, while the grass 
serves the dual purpose of attracting predator birds and feeding cattle at the end of the season.  
Through Umesh Reddy, SV Rao has received cheap consultation, bird perches, and pheromone 
traps, all of which he demonstrates to visitors.  “Those other scientists don’t know anything,” he 
laughs.  “They come trying to solve problems, but they don't listen to the farmers and don't know 
anything, especially when compared to people like him who've been doing this all their lives.  
First of all, they only ask for information at the shop and secondly, at one time, a person came 
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with a question about roots and the shop owner started talking about the tips of the plant only, 
ignoring both the problem and the farmer's wish.”  This attitude is a stark contrast with his 
respect for Umesh Reddy, who not only shows a greater commitment to the village but takes a 
few farmers, including SV Rao, out to see seeds on test farms throughout the district.  If any 
plants have fewer than thirty-five flowers, Umesh Reddy deems them unworthy and recommends 
that the cooperative shop does so as well. 
Fifteen hours north by train in the Vidarbha region of Maharastra, home to some of the 
most productive cotton farming and agrarian distress (Plewis 2014; Gruère and Sengupta 2011; 
Sengupta, Gruère, and Mehta-Bhatt 2008), the MATCH NGO has been attempting to woo 
farmers away from GM cotton.  “The farmers prefer to ask shops rather than talk to us for help,” 
laments director JV Lamedh.  “They don’t believe us.  It took ten years for them to be able to 
trust us and follow our advice.”  Here, where yields are comparatively higher, the land is better 
suited to cotton agriculture, and farmers are comparatively wealthier than in Addabad or 
Warangal, few farmers are willing to take a chance on MATCH advice.  Thus, not only do 
interested farmers face social pressure to use the same methods as the rest of the village, they 
fear in increase in pests as insects flock to their unsprayed fields.  As in Addabad, the situation is 
different with marginal ST farmers working in hilly, marginal land – such farmers are more 
willing to partner with NGOs for the hope of new and better methods.  Yet with a handful of 
wealthy, lowland farmers willing to accept new management, Lamedh is hopeful.  Ultimatley, he 
accepts that he “can't change people, it’s up to them if they should change or not. I can only 
suggest...somewhere the small candle is giving light in a huge darkness.” 
A twenty-minute drive from his office in Anjangaon, two such candles assumed show 
farmer roles by planting Old World desi cotton (Gossypium arboreum L.).  Desi, meaning native 
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or distinctly Indian in Hindi and Telugu, is native to India and has not been genetically modified 
unlike the more common New World Gossypium hirsutum L.  Bhaskar and his friend Motilal are 
the only two desi farmers in the village, and they get their seeds from MATCH.  More 
specifically, their seeds come directly from a foreign researcher free of cost who encouraged 
them to try planting some with chemical inputs and some without, and compare the results.  Desi 
seed underperformed for Bhaskar, which he blames on a personal failure to follow the NGO’s 
spacing directions.  Although they gave management instructions, took soil tests, and provided 
pest traps, “by my own laziness I got a lower yield because I didn't follow the directions 
correctly,” he apologizes.  Bhaskar gained better yields with a cotton that he has more experience 
managing.  Motilal is a smaller farmer at five acres and got a very poor yield from NGO seeds, 
which did not turn him against desi but is making him change seeds.  “MATCH gives 
instructions as farmers can't know everything about everything,” he explains.  “When Bt came 
people were saying it was bad for us, bad for soil, bad for cattle, and so we've been looking for 
ways to test this out through the MATCH programs.”  This testing, of course, is made much 
easier by the fact that these farmers are planting experimental seeds only on their poorest land, 
get the seeds for free, and receive free advice from the NGO when they wish.  They also gain 
respect from their neighbors for being chosen as research participants and gain artifacts of 
cultural capital including certificates and photographs proving their competence. 
Later at the office Lamedh was reading a blog (Stone 2014) on show farmers and voicing 
his appreciation for this expose.  Do you have any show farmers, I asked, innocently?  “We don't 
pay anyone, we don't do any media,” answered Lamedh.  I pointed to the awards and news 
clippings featured in a case in his office, and he rolled his eyes.  “When I got those awards it was 
a huge pain and not worth it,” he said.  “Those people growing desi are rich and have lots of land 
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and are using the desi to get something rather than nothing out of the worst of their land.” Here, 
Lamedh is differentiating between those farmers who are poor enough to be swayed by 
infrastructure or payments, and the desi farmers in his own area, who are not poor enough to be 
interested in such minor payments.  Lamedh’s distinction refers to a more specific and insidious 
class of farmers, those who exist at the behest of intervention groups or who concoct stories to 
raise funds. Like the gifted fabulists of insecurity described in Erica James’(2010) Haitian aid 
economy or who misled New York Times writer Nicholas Kristof (Kristof 2009; Marks 2014), 
such show farmers trick benefactors into believing their stories.  However, given the various 
forms of capital that might act on farmers as they decide how to manage their fields, I disagree 
that direct payments are the only way to classify show farmers.  People trialing new technology 
given to them by intervention groups often become show farmers because of the NGO’s need to 
evaluate success and the farmers’ hopes of keeping resources including expanded social 
networks or extension services, coming. 
While NGOs are often essential in securing government resources, state and federal 
government agencies will sometimes reach out to farmers directly.  Tulannaji, a twenty-eight 
acre holding former school headmaster, has earned commendations from the Maharashtra 
department of agriculture for being a ‘friend to farmers.’  Kharmi was selected as a state show 
farmer to showcase the desi seed AK-7, which yielded 11.5 quintals in one acre – a passable but 
not impressive harvest for this area.  The extension service, through Akola University
23
, advised 
him when to plant, water, spray, and fertilizer, and provided the necessary seeds and inputs.  
During the cotton growing season, his field became a stop on the extension tour circuit, and he 
explained his methods to visiting farmers or researchers.  Kharmi was allowed to keep the profits 
from his sales.  “I tried to save the seeds for next year but the gin didn't return them so lacking 
                                               
23 Akola gives the seed its AK moniker, the seventh in the breeding series. 
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any option in the shops to get desi, I went for [Bt seed] Ajeet 155, which works better anyway.”  
He stopped planting when the government stopped subsidizing his farming, and admits that he 
considers himself to be more of a hobby farmer anyway because of his successful career as a 
headmaster.  “If they want me to demo again I'd be happy to,”  he adds.   
Lakshman, SV Rao, Bhaskar, and Kharmi represent the opportunistic origins of many 
show farmers.  While they stand out amongst their neighbors as charismatic and interested in 
working with interventions, their performance is still directly tied to the intervention and its 
benefits.  In different ways, they also represent institutional show farmers, as each farmer 
participated at some point in a contrived agricultural demonstration project.  They were 
essentially employees of an organization, farming in a particular way to satisfy an agreement 
with a project designer.  Recognizing that social learning is key to Indian agricultural 
management, especially Bt seed choices, interventions through the government, research station 
scientists, or organic programs underwrite the costs of production for these farmers hoping that 
their success or personality will convince other villagers.  However, opportunistic or institutional 
show farmers’ own investment in these programs tends to be shorter lived – these are not farmers 
who necessarily stay with the program over a long term or who work to ingratiate themselves 
with visitors and program officers.  A combination of personal charisma, social capital, and 
cultural capital makes them ideal performers from the program’s perspective because their 
actions carry more weight in the village.  But such farmers do not make special efforts to 
continue performing in the absence of clearly defined rewards.  When the programs end, so too 
does their devotion to the methods suggested.  Such farmers are, in a sense, expensive and risky 
for the intervention programs.  While they can wield a positive influence in the rest of the 
village, if they fail to do so, the investment in their education or infrastructure represents a sunk 
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cost for the intervention.  For programs more interested in one-time field schools or photo 
opportunities, such show farmers can benefit from a year or two of underwritten agriculture at 
very low risk and provide the program with the deliverables it requires.  For programs intending 
to enact more long term change, a different kind of show farmer must be cultivated:  the celebrity 
show farmer. 
While all show farmers are opportunistic in the sense that they seize the chance to benefit 
from the program when offered, the celebrity farmer becomes more personally invested in the 
intervention scheme.  Sometimes they come to be directly employed by the program, but the 
material benefits of enthusiastic participation can result in a positive feedback loop:  charistmatic 
farmers are singled out to demonstrate methods; their success provides them with opportunities 
to gain more equipment from the program and with a platform to gain publicity or local fame; 
this extra attention allows them to be increasingly successful farmers as it results in more market 
options and more subsidized equipment.  Ataram Tulanna of Prakruti’s project in Japur would 
better fit the show farmer decried by JV Lamedh of MATCH:  he is directly paid by his parent 
organization, which relies on him to maintain the image of progressive agricultural production.   
Tulanna draws a salary for his work in maintaining a demonstration farm near Japur and 
for helping to keep track of member farmers in his own village.  As an employee for Prakruti, he 
helps cultivate the image that tours and researchers see.  When I met him for the second time in 
2014 he was in the midst of planting and labeling economically useful palm trees at the Japur 
show farm.  But as a show farmer himself, he is also able to seize upon the best projects offered 
by Prakruti.  He knows all of the eleven households in his own organic-producing village, and is 
related to most of them.  As the second-largest landowner, his decisions carry weight and 
influence his fellow farmers.  His field, which includes an experimental poultry farm subsidized 
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by loans secured through Prakruti, features model cropping patterns and signs for the benefit of 
visitors.  When a contingent of farmers affiliated with a Maharastran NGO travelled to visit his 
village and see how organic agriculture worked, Tulanna helped to lead the tour, explained how 
he was using vermicompost and chicken manure, and ensured that a hot meal was waiting.   
Through Prakruti, he secured fruit trees for his mother, a way of easing her agricultural 
workload.  In addition to guiding visitors through the village, Tulanna’s farm serves as a 
reminder of good practices while his presence in the village discourages unconvinced farmers 
from breaking the rules. 
As his village’s organic president, Tulanna relays information and enforces organic rules 
in the village.  “Tulanna tells us how and what to do,” explains neighbor Prakash.  “By using the 
outside methods like (chemical fertilizers) DAP and urea and (pesticides) sprays, we end up 
spending too much.  We're using [those organic methods] now on the Bt cotton, which did 1 
quintal better, but it’s not worth it.  Next year we're doing all organic.  With that we need only 
cow dung.”  Tulanna was additionally charged with distributing seeds to farmers in his area – as 
a show farmer, he was able to ensure that his village received seeds first and to maintain the 
correct balance of payments back to Prakruti.  Other villages, such as the neighboring Ranaguda, 
which lacked in-village show farmers and the attention of visitors or the NGO, fell behind on 
their payments or lax in their self-regulation.  These villages now face dismissal from the organic 
program, a fate that would harm Tulanna’s social standing in his own village, his salaried 
position, and future opportunities for low risk agriculture if he allowed it to happen where he 
lived. 
Naniram of Srigonda similarly seized upon an opportunity and became a local leader as a 
result of an agricultural development intervention. Naniram managed a local input store and 
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together with help from Warangal plant scientist Umesh Reddy transformed the space into a 
cooperative charged with selling quality inputs, delivering good advice, and pooling money that 
could be used for collective equipment such as seed cleaning machines.  Like the opportunistic 
show farmer SV Rao, Naniram initially used his influence to secure loans and equipment for 
himself and his family, happily participating in development initiatives but not himself leading 
them.  Over time, the success of the cooperative grew, and Naniram has come to be well 
respected in the region as an honest and admirable business leader.  This reputation, combined 
with his access to research station resources, led him to work with Umesh Reddy to test various 
IPM methods, chemical combinations, and ultimately non-Bt seeds.   
Rao, who experimented with non-Bt seeds on a small scale in 2013, planted a larger crop 
of non-Bt cotton with the intent of saving the seeds and selling them next year in the shop.  “Bt 
seeds are becoming worthless,” he contends.  “As for cotton, the owners in Warangal shops 
claim that farmers don't know company names in cotton like Kaveri, but they know the three 
brands [of popular Kaveri seeds] Jadoo, Jackpot, and ATM.  This is a trick by the company to 
make it seem like there is a larger selection than there actually is…actually the Bt seed has a 
germination problem, and dies after the first picking.  Non-Bt lasts longer.” Knowing that I was 
interested in people’s perceptions of cotton seeds, Naniram held that the yield from all of the 
different brands was mostly the same, and that the Mahyco company’s seeds became popular 
because they cornered the market on bus advertisements.  Because of Rao’s connection to 
university extension services, he has been able to field test non-Bt and give the rest of the village 
anecdotal advice on its success. 
In 2014 he procured seed from the university extension service, who in turn got it through 
a Tamil University.  Without these connections it would be very difficult for a farmer to find 
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these seeds by his own volition.  Based on Rao’s suggestion, four farmers planted non-Bt cotton 
in Srigonda up from only Rao himself in 2013, and the rest of the village was watching with 
interest.  Rao, who has a degree of freedom to experiment in agriculture because of his shop 
income, is humble about his effect on the rest of the cooperative, saying that all farmers “follow 
only their own opinions.”  His brother, an engineer who spends half his time in Sweden working 
for Saab, is more blunt: “we are blindly following my brother.”    
While Tulanna and Naniram benefit directly from intervention programs and work to 
perpetuate these, their level of celebrity stops outside the village or their immediate social 
circles.  This is not the case for Edaggrineelu’s most emblematic show farmer, who has been 
featured in international news reports.  “Can I ask about P. Mahesh himself,” I asked SUS 
director VG Ramesh. 
Andrew:  He’s a very charismatic person.  He was telling us jokes and walking us around 
[in Edaggrineelu] 
 
Ramesh:  See he’s a very knowledgeable person and a good leader who could mobilize 
the village so we always feel such charismatic leaders are important for influencing 
communities on a large scale.  Most of the people in the village trust us because of 
Mahesh. 
 
Ramesh argued that the character of Mahesh was key to establishing organic production 
in the village - he was trusted and well liked, leading others to follow him and allowing this 
village of seemingly normal, isolated farmers suffering from pest attacks in the heart of the 
Warangal district, to become famous and capitalize on this unlikely success.  Indeed, P. Mahesh 
can be found in virtually every media piece on the story of organic agriculture in Edaggrineelu 
village (10TV Telugu News 2013; Venkateshwarlu 2006; Express TV 2014a; Express TV 
2014b; Misra 2009).  His fame, and the fame of the village are evident not only in news reports 
but also in academic writing (Desmond 2013; Quartz 2010).  While his expertise makes him a 
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fascinating interlocutor, the way in which Mahesh comes to represent the village or the way in 
which the village is used to represent organic production generally is misleading.  This elision is 
especially troublesome because it hides the show and performative aspects that make these farm 
spaces work.  They are not, in this sense, naturally productive or better, but are sustained by a 
thick social network of expertise and support.  Walking through Edaggrineelu for the first time I 
was told, “you don’t want to talk with me, go talk with Mahesh.  He knows everything.”  Even 
after I explained that I was there to learn from and talk to all the farmers in the village, all roads 
inevitably led to Mahesh. 
Mahesh is the quintessential celebrity show farmer:  He is old enough to have given away 
most of his land, but remains a stalwart and photogenic farmer in his remaining acres; despite 
earning awards from the central government for farming, he spends his days stacking dung, 
inspecting his fields, and telling his story; other farmers in the village urge visitors like myself to 
talk to him and leave them alone.  It is Mahesh who appears in countless news and scientific 
reports.  “Write a book about us,” he demanded one morning over tea.  He says that he 
remembers first gradually switching to chemicals before becoming fully “addicted” to them, 
explaining that he was caught in a kind of trap where he had to borrow money for fertilizers and 
pesticides if he wanted any yield at all.  At the lowest point of desperation in the mid-1990s, 
when he was adding many chemicals to his land and it seemed as though the red hairy caterpillar 
(Amsacta albistriga; bantha purugu in Telugu) would eat his entire yield, he met a PANTA field 
director named Linonda. “I told him, I want to go back to the ways of my forefathers, but I’m not 
sure exactly how to do this and I’m worried about the risk of doing it,” he explained.  Through 
that initial partnership they staved off the caterpillars with light traps, a non-pesticide method, 
and their success gradually convinced the rest of the village.  “For the first eight years we were 
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working so hard that when people came to visit, we had no time to talk with them.  But now we 
have time to talk,” he explains, “because everyone needs to know about this.”  Mahesh has been 
interviewed by scientists, and appeared in stories about the future of India, spoken with movie 
stars, and met MLAs and other politicians. Through these meetings, Mahesh told me that the 
Indian government pays him Rs 3,000 ($50) a month to stay in Edaggrineelu rather than take the 
myriad offers to live elsewhere.  In fact he's been to London, Australia, New Zealand, and North 
and South America to speak about and see farming.  Linonda denied some of this, suggesting 
that Mahesh may be aggregating the not insignificant fees, prizes, and extra sales that he receives 
through his extensive travelling.  “When the visitors come and buy things,” complained his 
neighbors Anjamma and Ranjajamma, “They only ever talk to Mahesh and his family.” 
As we became more comfortable, he shifted his narrative slightly to give his own role 
more importance.  When I asked if PANTA used any of his suggestions, he grinned, saying that 
“they sucked my knowledge out like a straw.  They give good advice and help,” but “it's mostly 
all from me.”  SRI only became popular after Mahesh started using it, even though he was not 
the first person to do so in the village.  Mahesh keeps a book, which I signed, in which he 
collects business cards and contact information from all the visitors he has met.  Just as Mahesh 
relies on PANTA to support his sense of celebrity and to continue providing good opportunities 
for his family, PANTA relies on Mahesh’s celebrity to help spread new methods and to charm 
important visitors.  E. Srinivas, a neighbor farmer, explained that PANTA brings people to see 
his SRI fields as his production is especially successful, but conceded that most information 
flows from Mahesh and PANTA, who hammer out details to the rest of the group. 
Mahesh is also useful to the narrative of the pristine organic village in that he uses non-
mechanical, non-chemical, and non-industrial methods that no one else in Edaggrineelu uses.  He 
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is the only farmer to consistently produce his own seeds, a point rendered irrelevant when 
PANTA provides free non-Bt seeds to the village.  Still, Mahesh argues that “we are the farmers, 
we should not depend on others to get seeds… If you go down that road, you just have to keep 
buying things until you can force a good yield.  With your own seeds you can be sure of what 
you're planting and better predict how it will work.”  Cotton seed breeding is difficult, 
unnecessary work in a village where PANTA gives the seeds away.  What that work 
accomplishes instead is perpetuating the narrative that farmers, symbolized by Mahesh, eschew 
the trappings of modernity (Misra 2009).  When I ask Mahesh if anyone takes seeds from shops 
or PANTA he scoffs, “those with no patience.” In practice, 58 of the 69 cotton seed choices  
reported in 2012 and 2013 were not saved. 
Having discussed the experiences of different kinds of show farmers, I will move on to 
show landscapes in the next section.  In these demonstration spaces, audiences see the 
performance not just of a show farmer but of an entire stage.  I draw on the experience of tours 
moving through show farms in Prakruti villages, media crews working in Edaggrineelu, and a 
cooperative society meeting in the GM seed planting village of Srigonda to argue that show 
landscapes serve to create the impression that the intervention is having the impact that donors or 
supporters want to see.  Such spaces take time away from fieldwork for the farmers who actually 
care for them, but are crucial as demonstrations for other farmers interested in adopting their 
methods and an important part of the show experience for potential investors. 
 
The Demonstration Space 
When we arrived at Prakruti’s Japur field station on Monday, several of the farmer-
employees were hard at work planting trees and vegetable starts.  “We have to get ready because 
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people from the World Bank are coming” said Tulanna, an organic farmer who also takes a 
commission from the program as a field officer.  It was the third time I had visited this field, a 
demonstration and teaching space just outside of the town proper and adjacent to the hilly tribal 
thandas where most ST farmers made their homes.  This is one of the places where foreigners 
are brought when they want to tour a Prakruti facility and meet actual farmers.  By Wednesday, 
the farm was bursting to the seams with plant life and English-language signs detailing each 
plant’s place in the farm ecosystem.  “We had to finish in time for the foreigners,” explained 
Tulanna, who had been working alongside a newly hired warden who lives on site part of the 
year, as well as two additional Prakruti staff members to take plants from local nurseries and 
farmers.  In context with other fields during the late monsoons of July 2014, the demonstration 
farm looked strangely out of place because of its thriving, full grown crops – the village farms, 
floundering due to a lack of water, lay empty. 
Prakruti manages several demonstration spaces near Addabad and Japur.  Managed by 
local famers for a small fee, these demonstration farms advertise the full range of organic 
possibilities.  Tulanna served in one capacity as a show farmer, but he also helped to manage this 
full show landscape.  These demonstration farms are key stops for corporate tours and fact-
finding missions.  Throughout the year, Prakruti employees estimate that one or two foreign 
companies or regulatory representatives per month will come to visit their Telangana operations.  
To encourage transparency and build a relationship between buyers and growers, Prakruti often 
schedules tours where visitors can see various farmers and sites to help them feel good and see 
the product of their work.  The show farm landscapes allow visitors, including other farmers, to 
see high-functioning organic farms without disrupting actual farmwork.  In the case of repeat 
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visitors, especially a Japan-based company, Prakruti has facilitated long-term research and has 
facilitated annual trips to maintain relationships with producers.   
These tours emphasize the need to show donors or clients a good time as they learn about 
every step of their production chain.  A full tour in Telangana most often includes a visit to the 
Hyderabad main office, a trip three hours north to see a cooperative near relatively urban 
Karimnagar, a visit to the Utnoor office near predominately ST Addabad and Japur, and often a 
visit to the Rajalakshmi gin to see the very cotton bales that are destined for their shelves.  Jim 
Digger, co-founder of a San Francisco-based organic clothing company visited Telangana three 
times in 2013 as part of an effort to scale up production of organic socks.  Digger mentions that 
his company’s website features the story of the producers, which he has personally collected on 
trips like these.  “We demand transparency.  I always go through the whole supply chain", he 
says.  As championed by their online press page, the company’s work has been featured in 
typical green forums like Treehugger and Ecofabulous as well as favorably reviewed on morning 
talk shows and fashion magazines, as well as in news outlets like the Wall Street journal and San 
Francisco Business Times, which link it to a new trend of socially responsible corporations 
trying to move away from a traditional business model.  On one trip in January 2014, Chender 
joined five Americans, three from the organic company, and two from a larger organization’s 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) wing.  Like most companies trading in ethical clothing, 
part of their buying power, in this case close to $25,000, is directed at social programs including 
the construction of a science lab in a tribal village.  “They're major potential donors and business 
partners” explained Chender, “so we're doing all this work.”  In Adilabad, the American visitors 
all planted mango trees and then visited a school where they had lunch and saw a traditional 
dance program.  Photos and stories from their experiences, which also included a tour of the 
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science lab that their funding helped build, made its way to company blogs and promotional 
media.  Such promotion, as Gugothal notes at the beginning of this chapter, is in many ways the 
point of organic, fair trade cotton.  Without the image of progress the cotton loses its added 
value, the consumer’s trust that their purchase is better for the farmer and the earth.  The 
following summer, cruelly deprived of monsoon rains, some of the mango trees had died.  Fruit, 
of course, wasn’t the point – the trees had already served their purpose. 
Later in that tour we visited a village that welcomed us with a banner, thanking the 
visiting company representatives by name for their contribution to a poultry farm.  Looking at 
the mud-brick building with hens, food and water troughs, electrical hookups, and a thatched 
roof, the American donors asked Prakruti area coordinator Arjuna how much the operation cost.  
Arjuna answered that the operation cost about Rs 45,000 ($750), which satisfied the Americans 
visitors but left me puzzled.  A. Raji, Prakruti’s finance manager, traveling with the caravan 
encouraged me to ask the farmer directly, in Telugu:  Rs 15,000 ($250), a much more reasonable 
price.  Why the discrepancy, I asked Raji?  You see, he said, “45,000 probably referred to the 
total amount given for the small poultry project.  With 45,000 we have enough to fund three such 
projects…Still, we must be careful about selling poverty, even though in India it happens 
everywhere.”  He laughs and explains that even he took a pay cut to work with Prakruti so that 
he could feel better about giving back to the community.  Such financial alchemy, he argues, is 
necessary to have a large impact with tangible, deliverable results for donors.   
An hour across the valley, Prakruti has helped to build a demonstration plot for visitors 
seeing Addabad.  In January 2014 I joined Prakruti field coordinator Krishna Ram to meet with 
representatives from a German fair trade organic shoe company.  The entourage included the 
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company’s founder, a photojournalist documenting the trip, and an artist-musician who had 
composed a song about organic awareness. 
 
 
Photographers stage a photograph with Prakruti cotton producers holding their product. 
 
The previous day they picked cotton and visited fields, but they had come to Addabad to see the 
full range of organic possibilities demonstrated on the Addabad show farm.  The plot itself was 
impressive:  two acres donated by a local farmer, Ragu, who managed it along with his family, 
selling fruits in the market and earning about Rs 5,000 per month from the orchard alone.  The 
infrastructure and design were themselves donated and built by Prakruti.  I arrived earlier than 
the foreign visitors, in time to see Ragu sweep the concrete walkways, connect a rain cistern that 
would not be receiving rain for months, and brushing cobwebs out of the vermicompost pits.  
The farm contains drums holding organic spray-making materials, a biogas demonstration, a 
fishpond with a hanging gourd terrace, an orchard of biomass trees (Gliricidia sepium), fruit and 
vegetables, vermicompost pits, rain catchment systems, and a small hatchery that will be empty 
until the after cotton money comes in to finance it.  As we waited, Ragu and Krishna told me that 
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the land itself was formerly rocky, erosion-prone, and unproductive, which is why Ragu donated 
it in the first place.   Over several years of soil-building, nitrogen-fixing fabaceae plants, 
especially sunn hemp (Crotalaria juncea) and biomass trees, the land has become more 
productive.  When a car appeared in the distance, my own tour stopped short as Ragu’s family 
lined up to greet the more important visitors.  Accompanied by English-speaking Prakruti 
employees, the potential investors gathered pictures, videos, and fruit.  “We want to make the 
story about organic more fun,” explained the founder.  “We want to show the impacts of the 
commodity chain and make it seem more real to people, not just something for activists.”  In 
practice this involved several staged photographs with their products and a few snippets of 
Prakruti staff and Ragu's family singing a song about organic production, namely the refrain: 
“have a good feeling, have a good life.” Is this a marketing campaign, I asked?  “Not exactly” 
answered the artist.  “It’s more of an awareness campaign for organic itself.  These [songs and 
photographs] will go on the respective websites social media platforms for the company but also 
be promoted on Youtube.” 
A third Prakruti show farm lies near Patelpalle, near Japur.  Still being built, this farm 
features the same English-language signs as the others, a planting strategy that makes it 
impractical for agriculture but very useful for demonstrating organic methods to visitors.  
Patelpalle has the additional advantage of a vocal, female sarpanch who heads the well-
organized female self-help-group (SHG).  Like cooperatives and village societies, self-help-
groups (SHGs) are emerging in India as both a useful democratic village-level political force for 
women and a convenient promotional tool for gender equality oriented NGOs.  During one tour 
with a representative from a World Bank affiliate and a Tamil clothing company, the SHG 
explained that they earn extra money through a tool rental service, which recycles funds back 
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into their cooperative village pot.  While managed by local farmers, the SHG's tools and the idea 
for the cooperative fund came from Prakruti.  In response to a number of leading questions asked 
in English and translated into Telugu, including ‘how has organic improved your life,’ ‘what 
does Fairtrade mean to you,’ and ‘why did you switch to organic production,’ the sarpanch's 
husband noted that organic meant that he made his own fertilizers and used his own resources, 
while Fairtrade was about women's, tribal's, and childrens' rights.  But does this affect your 
health, asked the visitors?  “I want to understand if they really feel it,” Tamil entrepreneur Kehan 
explained, referring to what she called the ‘heart and soul’ of organic.  Finally, her prodding 
resulted in the right answer: “I switched to organic because I could see that it was bad for the 
environment,” offered Patelpalle’s sarpanch.  Finally satisfied, Kehan applauded.    
Back in Hyderabad, I asked Prakruti employee Sama about these tours:   
 
We don’t give any kind of orientation to the farmers.  Since 2004 they are getting visitors 
so all the farmers are versed in the practices and all so of course sometimes there are 
deviations and all, sometimes they don’t want to do it, sometimes they feel that now this 
[Prakruti] support is not sufficient.  But the thing is on the whole people like the program 
so actually when visitors come they explain it…If we have [an event like planting 
mangoes] to encourage the buyers and all, they should feel like they did something 
good…if they do something there they will also feel, they know that something is 
happening there.  So we generally present the progress also to them.  Generally they ask 
for some progress, what happened with that we want to see.  And they come again many 
times people come again.  So even they come again we will, we take them to that place. 
 
Over time the repeated visitation and attention reinforces the roles of the show farmers 
and the show landscape.  These dynamics soon reinforce each other: stages require performers.  
Demonstration farms in Patelpalle, Addabad, and Japur are geared toward tourism first and 
functionality second.  The farmer managers are permitted to keep or sell what they produce, but 
the spaces exist to cater to outsiders who are unable to even meet show farmers in their fields.  
These are idealized farms, devoid of complaining farmers or failed crops.  Instead, visiting 
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farmers or investors see a microcosm of potential, groomed for their pleasure.  As such they 
provide the perfect backdrop for photographs and branding media, even in cases like the 
Japenese company, where a group expresses a commitment well beyond a tour. 
Eight hours south in Edaggrineelu, signs greet the visitor to lead the way to the village 
itself.  Edaggrineelu’s farmers have not set aside land for a show landscape.  Rather, their village 
is itself the show, especially as filtered through their show farmers.  During my first visit to 
Edaggrineelu I coincidentally arrived on the same with a news team who had come to the village 
to film a report on organic methods, especially SRI cultivation.  Edaggrineelu, as an early 
pioneer organic village championed by the eminently filmable and interview-able Mahesh, has 
had an image cultivated around it by PANTA and SUS representatives, news agencies, 
researchers, and government officials who reference it as a model for the rest of the country.  
This image rests on the full participation of the village in organic methods, Mahesh’s leadership, 
and a willingness to evangelize their success.  VG Ramesh of SUS explains: 
 
[There are] many kinds of people.  See, regularly there are a lot of students who come to 
study and understand.  And a lot of farmers who come.  A few entrepreneurs who come to 
make business out of it, to buy and sell it, a few political party leaders so that they can also 
replicate it in their own villages.  So all kinds of people are coming.  But mostly it’s the 
farmers and NGO people and students…When they go through us we see the purpose and 
then based on that we schedule it in such a way that there’ll be somebody there to help them 
to translate and that kind of thing.  Otherwise they’ll go and meet any of the farmers in the 
village.  We told farmers: ‘don’t stop your work and then sit with anyone.  So whenever 
somebody comes, take them to your field or ask them to come to your field and make them 
understand.’  Earlier we also had one more village called Punnukallam, but all of the 
attention from Punnukallam has shifted to Edaggrineelu.  Punnukallam used to get attention 
like that.  In fact people used to come on buses, there used to be two, three buses waiting 
outside the village in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007.  At that time.  Then interest has shifted to 
Edaggrineelu.  Then interest shifts to some other village also.  It’s a kind of development 
process.    
  
When the village becomes a performative space the villagers defer to the show farmers.  They 
know what visitors want to hear and have experience working the system of NGOs, media crews, 
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or foreigners to everyone’s advantage.  When the villagers initially told me that they didn’t know 
anything and that I would get more knowledge from Mahesh, their protestations of ignorance 
were an attempt to salvage the idea of Edaggrineelu that had brought them local fame and 
success.  Only after speaking with all the farmers did a more immediately pragmatic and 
complicated narrative emerge, where farmers bought whatever seeds they had access to, sprayed 
in times of serious problems, or used tractors to plow their fields because it was much easier to 
do so.  This is not to say that many farmers were not using organic methods.  Rather, the show 
landscape of Edaggrineelu serves the image of a model organic village staffed by a model 
organic show farmer.  Not hidden, but not advertised, is that Mahesh is a respected elderly 
person with sons who have land, and no longer relies on agriculture to make his ends meet. 
In Srigonda, the Mahalaxmi cooperative shop served as a space of performance, where 
show farmers and authorities could network and where farmer patrons could learn from them.  
As a cooperative, the shop holds an annual meeting of shareholders, run by Reddy and Rao.  
According to Umesh Reddy, the government has in interest in encouraging these cooperatives as 
they take some of the burden off of farmers by providing better quality materials at better costs 
than other shops.  Such cooperatives also give the government efficient access to a rural voting 
bloc, which has been key to the last several state elections.  The meeting itself followed the 
standard rural NGO meeting format:  several experts, including the local sarpanch, two large 
farmers, two plant scientists, and Rao himself gave speeches on the financial status of the 
cooperative and on their visions for future directions; questions were invited from the audience; 
and the meeting adjourned for a large sponsored lunch.  The cooperative board, despite Reddy’s 
repeated requests for audience members to come forward and speak, dominated the conversation:  
“We need to trust the cooperative,” they said.  “The cooperative gives us good prices and 
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advice,” echoed others, highlighting its expert connections, “it has both businessmen and 
scientists there to help the farmers,” and “it is better than the shops.”  Near the end of the 
meeting, one ST farmer stood to raise a complaint.  The share system based on investment, gives 
more buying power and return to the higher caste members who live in Srigonda proper rather 
than in tribal thandas.  Another objected that shop needed more storage space and was told that 
the board was working on it. 
Caste, always an issue in rural politics, was sidestepped by the panel.  “Stop identifying 
your caste,” complained an exasperated Naniram.  “We're all farmers, there's no need to say I'm 
an ST.”  This brushes aside the differences of wealth and investment capability between the very 
different kinds of farmers who leave near Srigonda and in its marginal thandas.  As to the 
question of influence, Rao reminded the assembled farmers that the cooperative ran on “one 
farmer one vote, so the large farmers do not hold greater power.” Despite these protestations, the 
composition of the cooperative board indicated who was talking and who was being talked too.  
Umesh Reddy concluded by stressing that the cooperative was special and likely to succeed 
because it combined the power of science, embodied by him, and the power of business, 
embodied by Naniram. 
Both show farmers and show farms help to perpetuate the perception that interventions 
are transforming agriculture on the ground by creating the image of success for visitors and 
interested interlocutors.  In the case of the cooperative, part of the performance is targeted at the 
farmers themselves, asking them to buy into the egalitarian idea of the cooperative because of the 
authority and knowledge of its organizers, even when it seems to be un-egalitarian in practice.  
Intervention programs from corporations, government agencies, and NGOs rely on these people 
and places both to prove to outsiders that their methods are working and to convince other 
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farmers that they should follow suit.  The final section of this chapter considers this performance 
in the context of social, environmental, and didactic learning. 
 
Didactic Learning and the Perks of Show Farming 
“Every brand wants a story.” In the conference room of his Secunderabad office, 
Chender, executive director of Prakruti Organic, is explaining how he balances the demands of 
farmers, regulators, retailers, consumers, and his own socio-environmental agenda through 
Prakruti’s production chain.   Bindu Gugothal of Fairtrade UK and myself listened as CEO 
Ashok Chender tells us how much time, money, and logistical difficulty he faces ensuring that 
brands see that their money is well spent and can create a media package that can help to sell the 
product.  Chender himself is most interested in encouraging better practices and a more 
sustainable agriculture: “We need to encourage resilience...and in smallholder farming resilience 
means subsistence agriculture.”  But Chender is also beholden to his consumers, who want to see 
a transformed and developed India from his efforts.  His complicated mission, in some ways at 
odds with the production demands of his investors and regulatory groups like Fairtrade, has even 
led to arguments with local government officials who try to encourage greater market 
participation.  While I generally agree with Chender’s point on resilience, I would add that 
resilience requires a flexible knowledge base. 
Show farmers intersect with the learning process in interesting ways:  they must prove 
themselves to be responsive enough to environmental feedback and prestigious enough to be 
followed with a degree of confidence; they must be amenable to the demands and risks placed 
upon them by intervention programs; and they must be personable enough to charm donors and 
media crews.  These skills are just as important as the social and environmental learning 
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practiced by all farmers as they evaluate seed choices, and in many instances the confounding 
effect of institutional payments or farm equipment overshadows the risks of new technology, to 
say nothing of earning local agricultural renown. 
Through their experience with touring foreigners, farmers have learned when to speak up 
and when to defer to their handlers.  In May 2014, I accompanied Gugothal to Japur, where she 
met with farmers who travelled to the Japur demonstration farm in the dead of summer.  
Recorder and camera at the ready, Gugothal grilled the farmers about their household resources, 
including televisions and school access (not unlike the anthropologist seated next to her).  
Farmers immediately answered that they enjoyed the benefits of extra income and education, an 
answer that failed to satisfy Gugothal – she sought a more complicated and less practiced 
answer.  The farmers, native speakers of a Tribal dialect of Gondi, faltered in Hindi (Gugothal 
did not speak Telugu), leading Prakruti employee Arjuna to summarize the benefits as he sees 
them:  food security, he asks?  All agree.  Seeds and leadership, he asks?  All smile and agree.  
The conversation shifts back to topics they can explain in Hindi, especially human health and 
soil health.  This discussion is encouraged by Gugothal’s probing on environment and body, and 
when she compliments them on their entrepreneurship they agree.  By the time that this 
performance repeats itself in the neighboring town of Patelpalle, Gugothal refused to stop asking 
questions until farmers nervously voiced their complaints.  “As for me I want the truth,”  she 
explained to me later:  “But if a buyer would come, I would want them to be a bit more 
enthusiastic [in their responses]…You’ve been here,” she said turning to me on our long ride 
back to Hyderabad.  “What are the benefits beyond the premium?”  Most visitors do not have 
advanced degrees in development studies as she does, and more readily accept the performance.  
Those investors who want deeper connections with their farmers work with specific villages and 
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projects.  This allows show farmers to continue their performances, subsidized in various ways, 
as representatives of the group, and provides opportunities to the rest of the village to which the 
show farmers have first pick. 
Show farmers and show landscapes are in one sense an extreme and directed form of 
social learning (Boyd and Richerson 1988; Munshi 2004).  Farmers and farms are propped up by 
institutions not necessarily to make that particular farmer successful, but to entice others to 
emulate those farmers’ results.  They are a kind of improvement on the normal social emulation 
of copying one’s neighbors, providing idealized models for other farmers to follow, and serving 
as resources or watchdogs for those farmers who are struggling.  As with any social learning 
situation, farmers make an environmental calculus that these well-respected and successful 
growers must be on to something and are thus worthy of being emulated in the first place.  After 
all, show farmers tend to be bigger, richer, and have more agricultural assets.  Not only are the 
show farmers good people to be copied because of their social standing or farming prowess, their 
participation looks especially enticing because of all of the fringe benefits of their participation.  
Emulation then includes not just the realization that one should copy the successful farmers, but 
also that joining the group might underwrite some of their production risk.  Those farmers most 
skilled in performing, epitomized by P. Mahesh of Edaggrineelu, can accumulate social prestige 
and lay the groundwork for a comfortable future for their families.  Thus do the program 
incentives provide more important feedback than their own environmental success.   
Such performance adds self-promotion and posturing to visitors to the repertoire of 
knowledge that can be drawn upon for improvisation in various ecological situations.  Following 
Richards’ (1993) focus on how farmers develop knowledge by interacting with constraints and 
opportunities, the didactic response, in which farmers respond to the reward structure of the 
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intervention program that butters their bread, becomes just as important as an environmental 
response.  They are, of course related, just as social and environmental learning are related:  
joining with schemes that have no lasting utility results in short-lived schemes.  Thus would 
farmers be, at most, opportunistically showy.  Kavrupad is dotted with the faded murals and 
crumbling facilities of projects designed to create a good photograph.  The 2002 IPM 
intervention in Srigonda similarly gave farmers some interesting ideas that lost their lasting 
power with the arrival of far more accessible Bt cotton. Opportunistic show farmers may hop on 
board with such programs, and if they focus too much on didactic learning to appease a transient 
scheme, they may emerge from it just as deskilled as non-participating neighbors. 
In the case of the most successful celebrity show farmers, individuals can create lucrative 
platforms that put the concerns of farm management on the backburner.  P. Mahesh’s work for 
PANTA and SUS has taken him and other farmers to cities and countries throughout South Asia, 
and he has received direct grants from the National Agriculture Bank for Rural Development as a 
result of his work with PANTA.  As Gugothal says at the beginning of this chapter, Fairtrade or 
organic cotton offers the same product, with the added value of an improved livelihood, not any 
direct benefit to the consumer.  As such, under organic production farmers are themselves turned 
into commodities, show farmers most of all because of their compelling celebrity.  This 
ironically allows the image of the farmer to satisfy the need for unveiled commodities in ethical 
cotton marketing.  German pepper consumers happily overpaid for Indian black pepper because 
of the environmental and social impact that they imagined their consumption was having, what 
Franz and Hassler (2010) call the commodity biography.  Show farmer images, success stories, 
and media from corporate tours, as well as government grants to cooperatives like the 
Mahalakshmi cooperative in Srigonda, sustain organic and alternative production.  That a 
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chicken project did not cost the amount told to donors or that show farmers seen hard at work 
have actually retired to live on the fruits of their celerity is beside the point – their image can be 
bought and sold to further production. 
However, it is too simplistic to suggest that farmers are simply blank slates to be 
consumed by foreign buyers.  Indeed, the beauty of the opportunistic and celebrity show farmers 
is that their commodification is a calculated process that they themselves shape and can 
terminate when the resource well runs dry.  While farmers may not always realize the scope in 
which their images and stories will be used, they recognize that their cooperation can bring 
socioeconomic benefits over the short and long term.  Most importantly, show farmers learn to 
incorporate scheme opportunities into their improvisatory agricultural repertoire.  In doing so, 
the program becomes yet another method by which farmers can reduce their social or economic 
vulnerability. Commodification is, here, a two-way street for active show farmer participants.   
In this chapter I discussed how particular farmers take on the mantle of the show persona 
both in response to short-term gains and as a learned behavior to further a show farmer career.  
Show farmers also illustrate the importance of social learning in Indian agriculture because their 
celebrity or advocacy helps to demonstrate the potential of intervention programs in an 
environment defined by social learning filtered through village hierarchies.  Show farmers may 
have their production risks underwritten, but their professed faith is crucial to development 
programs in the larger village. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the role of performance generally among the larger 
farmer population as it interacts with development programs.  Specifically, I focus on the ways 
in which this performance manifests in farmers as a narrative of transformation.  While show 
farmers take the narrative of the transformed farmer subject to an extreme, all farmers 
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participating in organic projects or GM development must deal with new markets and new 
production methods to some extent.  I draw on the narratives of farmer voice offered by farmers, 
plant scientists, industry representatives, shop owners, and researchers to see how farmers align 
themselves with the notion of their transformation into better farmers as a result of technological 
interventions.  This transformative sentiment is of course strategic and performative as it allows 
farmers to perform the roles expected of them by outside experts or consumers and required of 
them if they wish to reap the benefits of NGO, corporate, or scientific institutions.  But just 
because this sentiment is performed, I do not want to dismiss it out of hand as lip service.  
Farmers are rewarded in a direct feedback loop for performing this ignorance and as such it 
becomes part of their learning process in a socially embedded agriculture.  The idea for this 
chapter was suggested to me by a number of organic farmers who professed to their profound 
ignorance of seeds and management before their program began, just as Escobar (2011) and 
Gupta (1998) observed farmers rushing to declare themselves as new and modern subjects.  
However, I also observed this mentality among farmers who praised Bt seeds and the 
intervention of government or university extension programs, where their transformative attitude 
was more overtly linked to the benefits received from assistance schemes. 
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Chapter 9: Transformative Sentiment in Intervention Programs 
 
 
The hamlet of Edaggrineelu is several kilometers from reliable bus or auto transport, and 
so I found myself walking out to the crossroad to wait for a bus with Kanka on his way to 
Jenagom – he knows all the shortcuts.  His brother, employed part-time by the NGO that 
introduced organic agriculture to this town of forty households, had left us but Kanka offered to 
lead my research assistant and me back to town.  As we walked, he talked about the impact that 
the NGO had on their lives and on the village.  His brother is employed by PANTA, and he takes 
the view that the NGO has been good to the farmers, offering advice that has brought them fame 
and expertise.  But he also speaks with a practiced certitude about his experiences, shaping them 
into a before and after narrative.  He mentions how often he has been interviewed, that he’s 
nearly as famous as the charismatic village leader, Mahesh, who is championed on the NGO 
website and in numerous news reports.  I was goading him, trying to ask if he used any methods 
or materials outside of what PANTA was telling him to do.  He shrugs this off, saying, “If 
PANTA didn't tell us to do something we don’t do it.  They're so good to us, why would we want 
to change that system?”  “What about seeds?” I ask, trying to gauge his opinion on the free 
cotton seeds and accompanying management advice offered by the NGO.  Through the organic 
program, the farmers of this village are only offered two seed types, far less than the hundreds of 
choices they would find in a seed shop.  “Before [PANTA] we spent all our money and we didn't 
know how to plant” he answered dismissively.  “We used to be stupid and plant rice only for 
selling, we never planned according to the seasons…they only give good seeds.” 
I was taken aback at his suggestion that farmers didn’t know how to plant and plan 
according to the seasons – what farmer would know so little about the fundamental agricultural 
input, let alone admit it?  The farmer of course was performing a role, that of the transformed 
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farmer subject.  In the accompanying narrative, the village used to be a place of superstition, 
waste, and poor judgment.  Since the intervention of the NGO, the farmers have learned to save, 
to eat their own products, to plan for the seasons, to be, in essence, ‘good’ farmers.  While the 
show farmers described in the following chapter take the narrative of the transformed farmer 
subject to an extreme, all farmers participating in organic projects or development generally must 
deal with new markets and new production methods to some extent.  Through this interaction 
they encounter a variety of experts who guard the floodgates to farm equipment, seeds, loans, 
and assistance programs.  Thus does knowledge of agricultural production and the authority that 
accompanies its ownership create relationships of deference and obligation between farmers and 
their respective developers. 
This chapter considers the role of transformation in the agricultural development 
experienced by farmers in the Warangal and Addabad districts of Telangana.  Both GM cotton 
seeds and organic agriculture are part of an agricultural development integrated through a series 
of state, corporate, and non-profit incentives:  state subsidies on GM seeds, pesticides, or 
fertilizers; a slew of state and private sector programs that require farmers to navigate a 
confusing and inefficient bureaucracy to gain access to low-interest loans or farming equipment; 
and an extension industry that offers access to these resources and solutions to new problems.  In 
engaging such development, proponents and opponents argue that farmer subjects become 
transformed – like Kanka, they claim to have passed from ignorance to a more conscientious 
understanding of their work.  In this chapter I argue that this well documented and promoted 
transformation is performative and therefore contingent.  In performing gratitude or a 
transformation from ignorance, farmers reaffirm access to extension services or please program 
officers giving tours to interested buyers. 
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It is not new to say that organizations use narratives from people on the ground to show 
how their products or services are changing lives.  However, the anthropological question asks 
what effect this interaction between farmers and intervention programs has on the people 
involved.  Erica James (2010) discusses the way in which Haitian refugees learn to shape the 
experiences of their trauma into legible narratives that can be readily understood and thus smooth 
the path to international aid money.  Like the show farmers described in the previous chapter, the 
best performers can garner more of the available funds.  Following James I use the metaphor of 
performance here to refer to the way in which farmers profess to be transformed in some way by 
organic or genetically modified technology packages.  Like the deference that many informants 
tend to show researchers, this performance breaks down under further investigation and probing.  
Farmer respondents who initially professed that organic programs taught them to fertilize their 
fields or that they chose GM seeds after careful deliberation later admit that these insights 
depend more on the discounts offered by shop owners and program directors.  I will begin by 
reviewing scholarly perspectives on farmer-subject transformation, discuss these dynamics in the 
Warangal and Addabad districts, and then show how different kinds of programs create different 
rewards that farmers learn to perform for.  I conclude by fitting the experiences of performing 
farmers into my larger arguments about the creation of knowledge on different kinds of farms. 
 
Transformation Through Development 
Stories of transformative experience are common in development literature.  As Escobar 
(2011) notes, experts require quantifiable, legible problems that can be analyzed and solved.  
Agricultural development as described by Escobar (2011) and Gupta (1998) seeks to learn 
problems, classify them, formulate solutions, make policy, pass judgment, forecast the future, 
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and cast these solutions and problems as scientific and thus teachable to farmers.  Viewing 
transformation as a role performed by all farmers, I draw attention to the role of didactic, 
moralizing instruction in the organic and GM farmer learning process.  In an environment 
dominated by education, intervention, and interrelated packages of agricultural technology, 
farmers are neither hybridizing tradition and modernity nor fully transformed into new kinds of 
people.  Where hybridity or the creation of a new self suggests a permanent subjective shift, I 
argue that farmers learn to perform certain kinds of roles that provide access to different kinds of 
infrastructure, markets, social capital, or economic safety nets.  Through the learning process, 
they can test the waters of transformation, performing roles that secure short term gains while 
keeping an eye to the future.  Such roles are based in their interactions with a variety of players 
including fellow farmers, field officers, cotton buyers, and researchers. 
Seeing the awkward and uneven adoption of scientific methods and knowledge in 
postcolonial India, scholars (Gupta 1998; Vasavi 1999) suggested that farmers hybridized 
knowledge between a traditional Ayurvedic-based understanding of agronomy and the new 
scientific methods.  But while explaining the persistence of Ayurvedic logic in farm 
management, the notion of hybridity poorly accounts for the role of performance as farmers learn 
to navigate new institutional risks and rewards when working with extension programs.  While 
accounting for the socially embedded logic of technology, such as chemical fertilizers, the 
hybridity lens distracts from the ways in which farmers themselves adapt to new systems of 
knowledge.  Moving away from hybridity, which suggests a collision of rigid forms, Escobar 
(2011) returns focus to the farmer practitioners themselves.  Farmers selected for field schools or 
working with extension officers are given new authority and instilled with the virtue of 
development.  They become transformed by the program and “begin to interpret their lives 
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before the program as filled with ignorance and apathy.  Before the program, they say, they knew 
nothing about why their crops died; now they know that the coconut trees are killed by a 
particular pest that can be combated with chemicals” (Escobar 2011:51).  Escobar, while clearly 
critical of this transformation, observes that farmers do transform, taking on a new sense of self 
promoted by the Colombian state, embracing consumable agricultural products and respecting 
the authority of agriscience experts. 
Although they disagree as to the ultimate effects of such interventions, Escobar agrees 
with pro-intervention authors (Duveskog, Friss-Hansen, and Taylor 2011; Mancini, Van 
Bruggen, and Jiggins 2007), some of whom go so far as to argue that agricultural interventions 
are a kind of transformative learning (Mezirow 2000) that changes farmers’ outlooks on life.  
One study from Kenya highlighted personal transformations including renewed confidence in 
one’s abilities, improved work ethic, improved Christianity (whatever that means), a shift from 
cultural restrictions and taboos to inclusivity and Western rationality, a change from witchcraft to 
scientific crop-management, and the report from one farmer that in the past they “were just 
farming carelessly, but now we are farming for business” (farmer participant quoted in 
Duveskog, Friss-Hansen, and Taylor 2011:1539).  Kanka espoused a very similar sentiment in 
our conversation above.  Such a perspective takes the farmer transformation at face value, an 
almost religious implication that farmers see the light and are converted to the values espoused 
by development discourse (Gupta 1998; Escobar 2011; Pandian 2011; Kothari 2005): the new, 
modern, scientific, consumer, liberal self. 
More critical of the social context of this transformation Agrawal (2005) speaks of this 
transformation as more of a shifting calculation of self-interest, which accounts for the 
contingency of that transformative sentiment:  farmers in the forest areas of North India 
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transformed from forest burners to forest conservators, but only after they came to see 
environmental discourse as in their own economic interest.  Seizing upon an advantage, his 
forest-farmers then internalized that economic interest as a form of conservation self-discipline.  
While I largely agree with Agrawal that farmers come to view their relationship to environmental 
management as a result of the reward structures of the institutions with which they work, I argue 
that the actual transformation is a role performed by farmers as they present a version of 
themselves to navigate everyday life (Goffman 1959).   
Whether they are promoting didactic farmer inventions (Duveskog, Friss-Hansen, and 
Taylor 2011; Godtland et al. 2004; Mancini et al. 2008) or critically placing the assumptions of 
international development within an Orientalist, paternalistic relationship between advanced 
capitalist states and developing nations (Escobar 2011; Gupta 1998; Pandian 2011), authors 
discussing educational interventions in smallholder agriculture accept that farmers are 
transformed by the experience.  The intervention has the effect of reordering the farmer subject 
toward modernity or maturity (Agrawal 2005; Escobar 2011; Pandian 2011), or is perhaps 
hybridized into some awkward new subjectivity when considered in tandem with the previous 
way of doing things (Vasavi 1999; Gupta 1998).  Meeting new visitors, farmers initially espouse 
this view as illustrated by the Kanka above.  However this transformative sentiment appears to 
be strategic and contingent, lacking the permanence implied by Gupta’s hybridization thesis 
described above.  It may be more accurate to call this sentiment performative as it allows farmers 
to perform the roles expected of them by outside experts or consumers and required of them if 
they wish to reap the benefits of NGO, corporate, or scientific institutions.    Just because this 
sentiment is performed, I do not want to dismiss it out of hand as lip service.  Farmers are 
rewarded in a direct feedback loop for performing this pre-transformation ignorance and as such 
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it becomes part of their learning process in a socially embedded agriculture.  I also observed this 
mentality among farmers who praised Bt seeds and the intervention of government or university 
extension programs, where their transformative attitude was more overtly linked to the benefits 
received from assistance schemes.   
What these authors (Agrawal 2005; Duveskog, Friss-Hansen, and Taylor 2011; Escobar 
2011; Gupta 1998), state scientists, private consultants, NGOs, and farmers themselves call 
transformation appears to be an institutional rewarding of a kind of performance in this didactic 
learning environment.  Just as overreliance on social emulation exacerbated agricultural 
deskilling among GM cotton farmers, an overreliance on didactic knowledge appears to be 
further destabilizing farmer knowledge on both GM and organic cotton farms.  Farmers involved 
in such systems are not rewarded for careful long-term environmental management but for 
following the instructions of experts with whom they work.  In this chapter, I draw on the 
narratives of farmer voice offered by farmers, plant scientists, industry representatives, shop 
owners, and researchers to see how farmers align themselves with the notion of their 
transformation into better farmers as a result of technological interventions.   
 
GM and Organic Interventions as Vehicles for Transformation 
Central to the transformative experience is the agricultural intervention, which comes in 
the form of various technologies or educational services.  GM seeds are themselves one kind of 
intervention, and fit well into the pattern development described above:  the problem, insect 
predation in cotton, can be solved by purchasing a foreign technology, a genetically modified Bt 
seed, which responds best to the regimen of fertilizers and irrigation developed during the Green 
Revolution.  The actual management of GM seeds in Indian smallholding agriculture, as has 
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been discussed at length, has had mixed effects for this system.  A farming extension industry 
has rallied around helping farmers use this technology, despite claims that GM seeds would 
require no additional changes on the part of the farmer (Thaindian News 2008). 
The Warangal public agricultural university system, ANGRAU, has a complicated, even 
contradictory set of extension services.  Breeding programs do not fund Bt cotton programs 
because they do not have the corporate permissions required to work with that technology, but 
individual scientists do offer call-in services and consultations for GM farmers.  More of their 
work involves breeding non-Bt hybrid strains, although the client base for this must be small in a 
context of over 90% Bt adoption.  One such ongoing experiment examines the effects of high 
density planting on yield performance and pest insect attacks.  If successful, the research station 
will recommend that farmers plant their cotton seeds more closely, requiring that double the 
amount of seeds be purchased.  In addition to this non-Bt work, the research station also leases 
land to private seed companies for Bt cotton field trials, helping hybrid companies evaluate their 
seeds without having to build separate field facilities. 
  “Scientists?” Raju, a farmer from Srigonda, snorts derisively.  “We call but they never 
come.  The scientists know things that they read in books, but we farmers have all the practical 
knowledge.”  Although farmers lambast the plant scientists as unwilling or unable to give advice, 
the Warangal research station scientists give farmers their personal phone numbers and field 
questions both individually and through a data processing service.  They also provide access to 
government services:  In 2014, the newly elected Telangana government subsidized drip 
irrigation, prompting plant scientists to inform farmer friends and encourage them to adopt the 
technology as a part of a largescale in situ trial.  Other collaborations include the founding of a 
farmer’s cooperative in Srigonda where ANGRAU crop scientist Umesh Reddy served as a 
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scientific and bureaucratic liaison to the resources and expert knowledge of the plant research 
station.  This gave local farmers the opportunity to travel to the regional office of the joint 
director of agriculture, a gatekeeper for state agriculture resources.   
Undeniably, Bt cotton is growing in approximately 90% of Indian cotton fields (Cotton 
Corporation of India Ltd. 2013; The Hindu Business Line 2013).  More debatable are the reasons 
for this popularity and the extent to which it represents a free-market choice of a superior 
technology.  Although the early spread of GM cotton was presented as a solution to an agrarian 
crisis characterized by farmer suicide and pesticide overuse (Pearson 2006), farmers are now 
celebrated for the wisdom of choosing Bt cotton:  “The unprecedented high adoption of Bt cotton 
is due to substantial and significant benefits to farmers, successful control of dreaded bollworm 
pests, benefits to industry…the farmer is wiser than me” claimed Indian agriculture minister 
Sharad Pawar in a 2013 interview (Mohan 2013).  Monsanto India Region lead G. Shankar 
agreed, arguing that farmers had trialed technology, reasoned that Bt rose to the top because 
there were so many viable options: 
 
What happened in a particular area was that if a particular seed did well farmers had a 
tendency to go for that seed in the next year not realizing that in the next year the climate 
might not be same.  But my observation is more that the farmer is not now relying on one 
seed.  He buys three of the most popular varieties and depending on which does well on 
his farm he sees the difference and buys that the next season.  But you’re right.  There is 
a tendency to switch over and also a tendency to have more variety.  But I don’t think, 
you know, that is a big problem because now as a farmer I can get at least one seed.  
What they’re doing is they’re not putting all the acres to one seed.  And in their own way 
they can get to their own experiment to say which will work for their farm. 
 
As plant scientists, representatives from the Warangal plant science station, Monsanto 
India’s farmer outreach programs, and private extension service E-Digu have to manage a 
balance between celebrating the knowledge and wisdom of their farmer clients, expressed when 
the farmers use their technology, and insisting that they can offer consistently useful advice.  
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Monsanto India, which promotes Bt cotton’s high adoption rate as proof of its benefit to farmers 
(Monsanto Company 2012; Monsanto Company 2008) runs its own call center, the Monsanto 
farm advisory service.  “We already have a million corn and cotton farmers and vegetable 
farmers enrolled in our system,” boasts Shankar.  When asked where farmer knowledge was 
strong and where it was lacking, Shankar answered that larger farmers who watched television, 
interacted with scientists, and above all conducted soil tests were better equipped to manage their 
farms.  The challenge, then, is to bring the remaining farmers into the fold.  E-Digu, a remote 
extension service sought to translate this “last mile” of agricultural extension, the last 
communication barriers between farmers and agriculture scientists (Venkata Ratnam Bachu, 
Krishna Polepalli, and G. S. Reddy 2006; Stone 2011b).  To this way of thinking, the technology 
and advice were sound but the farmers were incapable of fully understanding their advice.  “The 
farmers are not educated enough to trust scientists and therefore over-rely on neighbors and 
shops,” echoed plant scientist Dr. Ranitha of the Warangal Research station. 
For all their insistence on educational intervention, E-Digu, Monsanto, and public 
research stations inevitably lead the farmers back to shops.  While no advice is directed toward 
specific shops, and some non-chemical management advice is given, the intervention that these 
services provide largely directs farmers to apply some kind of purchased input.  E-Digu, for 
example, has a policy of providing an example of a brand name pesticide that the farmers could 
use, along with the chemical name in case the farmer chooses to investigate by chemical.  
Development institutions are in this sense pathways to purchased solutions to agricultural 
problems.  Even less commodified suggestions, such as planting density, are not themselves 
requirements to purchase products but would effectively ask farmers to buy a greater quantity of 
seeds. As imagined by officials like Pawar, a farmer purchasing a GM seed or the correct 
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chemical is seen to be transformed from an ignorant and superstitious person at risk in agrarian 
crisis to a rational consumer exercising his choice in a free market. 
Within organic agriculture programs, public and private interventions are more focused 
on bringing farmers into compliance with certification or marketing initiatives.  Rather than trials 
or call centers, organic interventions often take the form of show farms or farmer field schools.  
These development initiatives teach farmers to use input unintensive methods much as former 
officials taught them to use input intensive methods.  While the idea of experiential learning is 
certainly not new, farmer field schools (FFS) emerged as agricultural development tools in 1989 
in Indonesian rice fields to combat overzealous pesticide use that led to resistant pests.  The first 
field schools promoted Integrated Pest Management (IPM), as a means to educate farmers to the 
point that they “became “experts” in managing the ecology of their fields - bringing better yields, 
fewer problems, increased profits and less risk to their health and environment” (Braun and 
Duveskog 2008:3).  Field schools seek to build self-confidence, problem-solving skills, and 
encourage empowerment (Braun and Duveskog 2008; Duveskog, Friss-Hansen, and Edward W 
Taylor 2011; Van den Berg and Janice Jiggins 2007).  In the Warangal district, several teams led 
by Mancini (2009; 2008; 2007) argue that IPM FFS lead farmers to better lives, enhance well-
being, reduce pesticide use and pesticide poisoning, and encourage greater economic resilience. 
 While low input technology field schools do not commodify knowledge in the way that 
Bt cotton commodifies pest resistance, the international NGO network and neoliberal 
organizations that fund these projects rely on success narratives, morally “transformed” 
(Duveskog, Friss-Hansen, and Edward W Taylor 2011) farmers, and triumphant photographs for 
donor money.  In this way, the same farmers who use transformation as a way to get ahead in 
agriculture willingly allow their images to become part of the NGO agenda.  Whether they know 
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the ultimate purpose of the media at the time, farmers accept that their participation involves 
their image becoming a commodity sold to donors who invest in new projects that generate new 
developed subjects.   
 Both Prakruti Organic in the Asifiabd district and PANTA’ Edaggrineelu village in the 
Warangal district promote the transformation narrative through their social media, marketing, 
fundraising, and promotion of their programs.  To justify the intervention, organic programs 
draw on narratives of crisis that give way to an intervention and result in transformed farmers 
making more money, doing better work, or taking better care of the environment.  This is not to 
say that the communities in question do not experience poverty or crisis.  However, I would like 
to draw attention to the way in which this is a necessary predicate for the organic intervention.  
“Mainly its about crisis,” explains Prakruti employee Sama.  “These people they don’t have 
access to resources actually.  So in a way they’re resource poor farmers compared to other 
farmers in the main lands where they have access to marketing and all.  So these people face a lot 
of exploitation.  We want to address the issues related to these problems.  That’s why we are 
working there.”  VG Ramesh, director of PANTA’ parent organization, SUS, agrees:  “We 
choose villages that are in deep crisis. That’s the first target we have.  So all our projects are 
located in areas where there is a high use of chemicals, we don’t go to villages, regions which are 
already low in pesticide use.”   
Prakruti’s Facebook page offers hundreds of photos lauding education programs and the 
donation dollars that make those programs possible.  Visiting donors are offered the chance to 
dedicate mango trees or science labs that will someday help to bring those communities out of 
poverty, as described in the following chapter.  In a promotional pamphlet entitled “Fashion to 
Field”, Prakruti stresses both that their products are of a high quality and that farmers involved 
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have learned through “the unique concept of conducting Farmer Field Schools (FFS) trainings, 
where a technical expert is accompanied by the farmers of a village to their fields.  Knowledge 
from the FFS then spreads amongst the others in the village through regular meetings of the self 
help groups.”  A farmer testimonial on the cover shows that “Over these years with Prakruti we 
have realized the significance of quality…complying to the standards of certification are no more 
a burden, rather a customary practice of our lives.”  Surely, before working with Prakruti, the 
farmers understood that quality was an important factor in their cotton production.  But the 
farmer testimonial underscores the importance of transformative sentiment.  Thanks to your help, 
the farmers seem to be saying, we have changed our methods and mindset. 
Because of its traction in sales and the symbolic work it does in justifying interventions, 
the notion of transformation can be even more important for organic programs than the actual 
technology that they promote.  To make consumers care about the issues of social transformation 
or environmental protections in Edaggrineelu, Ramesh explains that his work is as psychological 
as it is agronomic.  PANTA aims to create “a confidence in the people.  You see, it’s not just 
about giving [the farmers] seed.  By giving them seeds we cannot solve the problem, not unless 
we create an ecosystem where farmers understand and do it on their own.”  Earlier in our 
interview he argues that yields, one of the key tropes in GM cotton adoption, distracts from the 
real work of farming.  “I feel farmers have been fooled into, and they’re driven in terms of, 
adapting technologies in terms of higher yields.  I think that’s a wrong mechanism.  And if 
farmers understand the economics and then plan accordingly [with organic technology] their 
yields should be perfectly fine.”  While representatives from Prakruti or PANTA would probably 
not address their work in such terms, interventions that deliver “confidence” or “understanding” 
fit into the same transformative learning model described above by Duveskog, Friss-Hansen, and 
295 
 
Taylor (2011).  This narrative is then repeated in media reports, where farmers shift from a 
marginal, at-risk population to landscape managers who “realized the importance of natural and 
common resources for sustaining their own livelihood” (Prabu 2013).  Rather than accept this 
transformation at face value, it is illuminating to focus on the way that farmers learned, or failed 
to learn, to perform it, and what kinds of social or material rewards they receive in return.  The 
following section reviews farmers’ experiences as they perform transformed identities, paying 
special attention to what they receive within various programs as a result of this performance. 
 
Performing Transformation 
 I will begin with examples from the organic farmers of Edaggrineelu and then move to 
the experiences of farmers working with the Prakruti Organic villages.  Then I will talk about the 
analogous kinds of performance in GM villages. The vignette that opens this chapter ranks 
among the most dramatic and overt display of transformative sentiment performed by the 
farmers that I observed, but it is not an isolated case.  Because the program is uncertified, 
Edaggrineelu farmers correctly recognize that their continued success with organic programs is 
determined in part by their performance to the more than 10,000 visitors who have come to learn 
from Edaggrineelu’s example since 2006.  As reported in national media and environmentally-
inclined magazines, Edaggrineelu’s origin story begins with a crisis of red hairy caterpillars 
(Amsacta albistriga) in the mid-1990s.  As expensive pesticides stopped working and farmers 
looked down the barrel of crop failure, their desperation drove them to try experimental non-
chemical approaches.  These ultimately proved so successful that by 2006 the entire village had 
transitioned to become fully organic.  When visitors come, they see a place where “mostly 
backward castes” socially regulate the community to “ensure that there are no erring farmers” 
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(Prabu 2013), and “organic farming has created a balance between friendly and harmful pests” 
(Misra 2009).  Thanks to “constant motivation by the NGOs” (Venkateshwarlu 2006) PANTA’ 
work has ensured that Edaggrineelu “stands out as a beacon of hope” (Venkateshwarlu, Balloli, 
and Ramakrishna 2008:171) amidst a sea of agrarian distress.  This publicity and attention helps 
to attract the visitors, who sometimes pay up to Rs1000 (~$17) per person.  Visitors include 
members of the legislative assembly and, more importantly, movie stars, since they declared 
their organic intentions.  Others come simply to buy food.  ‘Want to buy some rice?’ I was asked 
my first day in town. 
 Here, transformation for this relatively isolated village of mostly low-caste farmers 
hinges on their rejection of pesticides in the wake of a mid-1990s insect pest crisis.  “Not only 
are they scientists and know everything”, explains Siddalu, “but [the program director] has 50 
acres and is a farmer.”  Raju, sitting nearby agrees:  “What we had done [before 2003 when he 
switched to organic methods] was totally a waste, we didn’t know how to use hen manure, lake 
soil, or vermicompost.  We were using chemicals and thinking that if our neighbor used one 
spray, we should use two!  We had a lower yield, more diseases, and we had to spend extra 
money on the chemicals.  Before we learned to use [the System of Rice Intensification (SRI)], 
we were putting manure directly into the land because we didn’t know any better.  Now we can 
use our own resources like manure and vermicompost.” 
 Although both PANTA and Prakruti professed that they target farmers in crisis who they 
feel are more amenable to change, Prakruti’s Addabad district organic farmers are additionally 
appealing to the NGO because they belong to the historically marginalized Gond Scheduled 
Tribe (ST).  Tribal farmers in this part of India live in comparatively less developed hamlets on 
more marginal land, and do not belong to the larger caste system.  Such disenfranchised farmers 
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present an appealing image to donors and ethical consumers trying to use their money to have as 
large an impact as possible, hoping to connect to farmers (Guthman 2009) through the long and 
foggy cotton commodity chain. 
 Change and transformation for the Prakruti farmers is more consciously about the 
infrastructure given by the program and the economic opportunities the program offers.  Through 
Prakruti these farmers have become entrepreneurs, consumers of a debt-free technology and 
producers of an efficient product.  Devarao, who manages five acres, argues that Prakruti has 
allowed him to avoid the dependencies that he sees in other villages: 
 
We didn’t know how to do those things before but now we’re planting in a good way… 
Before we didn’t know about sprays or about making our own sprays, and before the 
investment was much more without any big difference in yields.  Those who work hard 
can only ever get good yields, including those who take chemicals, but there the 
investment is so high that the yields must also be high at any cost.  If I use [chemical 
fertilizers] it’ll work for me this year but over time what kind of land will be available for 
my son.  After this year if I put 10 bags, next year I need to put 20.  If I put 20 bags the 
following year I’d need 30.  If you use them one time you must use more in the next as 
the strength of the land decreases.  In my own land I’ve seen it and in others, if you use 
once must always use them for fertility.  Only [cow manure] will fix it and only slowly.  
In this village almost no one ever used it so we were spared from that, but in my ancestral 
village the situation is like that.” 
 
This transformation hinges on the seeds provided at interest-free credit by the organic 
program, the production of home-made organic pesticides, and a regimented fertilizing program.  
“There's no need to change from anything they tell us as Jangu, Krishna, and the Sarpanch (two 
organic field officers and the local political leader) are our organic leaders and tell us 
correctly…With all the investments those sprays and fertilizers aren't really worth it, even 
though we see others with bigger yields.”  The seed choices or management decisions that so 
perplex many GM farmers have no relevance for organic farmers, who are limited in the seeds 
given to them by their program officers.  “Before Krishna came we bought seeds in the shops 
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without any kind of guarantee. Krishna gives only good seeds”, Prakruti farmer Ataram Manku 
informs me, adding that “if we complain [about failed germination] they’ll give us new seeds but 
it’s not necessary yet”.  In the late monsoon of July 2014, Prakruti compensated for failed 
germination first by insisting that farmers wait to plant and then, after the farmers ignored this 
advice and used their usual timetable, providing extra seeds to their constituent villages.  “Before 
organic we didn't know about these leaf sprays, nobody told us,” began Prakruti farmer Sone 
Rao.  “But surely you knew there were insects and that they were eating the cotton,” I 
challenged.  Okay, he conceded: 
 
We knew that the pests were there, but we didn't know what sprays worked for which 
pests and which different pests were doing what.  When I was small there were no insects 
and no facilities like schools or buses, so everyone did the farmwork.  We healed 
ourselves with local medicines from the forests and people weren't sick like today.  Now 
there are hospitals, no one wants to do farmwork.  They want to leave the village and go 
to school, they're sick in hospitals not using our own medicines. Before no crops needed 
fertilizers or pesticides, but now they all need these, these urea and others have made the 
plants weak. 
 
To hear him explain this situation, his transformation has wrought positive and negative changes.  
On one hand, the scientific understanding and the novelty of formal pesticide applications has 
allowed him to increase yields and feel as though he better understands his field’s agronomy.  On 
the other, that scientific understanding has come at the cost of a dependency on purchased inputs 
just as the knowledge and labor base for the next generation is migrating away from the village.   
Like the Colombian farmers that Escobar (2011) describes, the farmers present the past as 
a place of ignorance.  Prayer, offered scathingly by program officers as the default non-organic 
solution, nonetheless appears to influence field management decisions.  “They would just pray to 
the gods whenever something went wrong”, says field officer Krishna, clasping his hands in 
mock prayer, “they did rituals and didn't do any spraying or fertilizing, just hoped that it would 
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work well.”  Yet planting days still coincide with celebrations of gods that bring rain; religious 
songs and dances ask gods for help and are documented for organic promotional materials; as in 
many parts of rural India, village gods hang from trees and roadside shrines.  “Our grandfathers 
worshipped these gods and we can’t forget that tradition”, offers Prakruti farmer Chandansav.   
 Although it can be difficult to differentiate between the performances of transformation 
that I describe and normal interactions in the context of our social distance, the notion that 
farmers were previously incompetent or ignorant of agriculture dissolved under deeper 
anthropological inquiry.  What do you mean you didn’t know how to farm for profit before?  
How did you fertilize without using manure?  What’s wrong with praying to the gods?  And 
most notably in Edaggrineelu, where do you get all the manure you need for you land if you’ve 
sold all your cattle for tractors?  In Edaggrineelu, the PANTA goes so far as to bring seeds and 
inputs to the village, saving close to Rs 100 for each farmer in transportation costs per trip.  More 
than half of the farmers took advantage of this program, explicitly following not environmental 
feedback but PANTA advice.  “PANTA only gives good seeds”, one farmer explained, a 
sentiment expressed by many of the farmers, despite the fact that farmers who received seeds 
from the NGO had almost identical yields (4.33 quintals per acre from outside seeds compared to 
4.48 quintals per acre from PANTA seeds) than those who bought their own seeds.  Despite 
claims that farmers have abandoned machinery (Misra 2009), this small village of forty 
households without autorickshaw stands or a bus route boasts seven tractors, PANTA helped to 
negotiate the heavily subsidized purchase of a seed cleaning machine, and the local government 
school is shuttered because the village sends all of their children to a private school offering 
English medium classes.   
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GM cotton farmers by and large do not perform for or depend on international donors.  
Beholden to shops and agricultural extension officers, they perform transformation for neighbors 
and fellow farmers by extolling the virtues (or shortcomings) of GM seeds and their own 
prowess as seed consumers.  It is common for many farmers to plant more than one different 
kind of cotton seed in their fields, on average 2.41 and 2.32 different cotton seeds per farmer in 
2013 and 2014 respectively.  Farmers report that they do this so that they can gauge the 
difference between different seeds and then make a decision about next year’s planting.  
According to the farmers, such comparisons are possible because almost everyone has the same 
conditions of soil, pesticides, fertilizers, and labor to deal with.  When I said that I was having 
difficulty asking farmers about their seed choices, Kishor of Ralledapalle consoled me by saying 
that that the “other farmers in the village are drunk fools, or that they're rich and don't know their 
own land.”  Unlike himself, such people can't be expected to know the answers of how to solve 
these problems and conduct proper tests of the cotton seeds.  Ironically, he himself works as an 
electrician and laborer in Saudi Arabia, often leaving his wife in control of the farm. 
Other farmers celebrated their close relationships with experts or educated children.  “I 
always know which seed will be best,” boasted Chandraiah of Kavrupad.  “Both [a local shop 
owner] and I are well educated and wealthy, why would he mislead me?”  This class and status 
celebration is mirrored by the uneducated farmers who claim that they are better off listening to 
shops and large farmers because they have no such knowledge.  “If you’re sick, you go to the 
hospital, right?” answered Muramma when asked why she travelled to the seed shop for seed 
advice.  Pesticides, locally referred to as mandulu or medicine, appear to be the purview of shop 
owners.  Many farmers can relate stories of buying a small or cheap pesticide at a local store and 
discovering the morning after spraying that the insects remained on the plants.  In exchange for a 
301 
 
photograph with his prized bullocks, Dasru allowed me to watch as he took over four hours to 
spray his six acre field. Worried that the monsoon rains would wash the pesticide off the cotton, 
he had hastily bought a cheaper generic brand pesticide. “It was a waste”, he told me bitterly a 
few days later. The pesticide had only killed about 30% of the insects and he had to travel to a 
larger town with a better agricultural shop to buy a more powerful pesticide.  What can you do in 
this situation, I asked.  “Go to a shop to get a new suggestion and if the local shops don't work go 
to [nearby larger city] Nekonda for a pedda mandu (more powerful medicine).  If you get an 
injection from the doctor and you don't heal, its not the doctor's fault,” he reasoned.   
Because the farmers knew of my interest in Bt cotton and their experiences with it, some 
relayed transformative experiences that occurred with the new seeds.  One common response 
held that Bt cotton had been good and very successful for the first several years that it was on the 
market.  “I would have committed suicide if not for Bt seeds” recalls Venkateshwarlu, a large 
landowner renowned in Kavrupad as a hard worker.  The cotton helped him reduce pesticide 
sprays and provided several years of consistently improved yields.  “It made my life easier and is 
a big improvement” agrees Dasru.  But recently these changes have taken a downturn.  “The 
bitches are putting less [of a Bt dose] in it each year,” complains Dasru’s neighbor, Ramulu. 
The performance of transformation requires that organic and GM farmers seize upon new 
technologies enthusiastically, claiming that life before the intervention was dark and ignorant.  In 
exchange, organic farmers from Edaggrineelu get to bask in the gaze of thousands of visitors and 
lucrative opportunities.  For the Prakruti farmers, their performances help to cement the media 
produced by Prakruti and foreign visitors who sell their cotton.  The rewards are less overt for 
GM farmers celebrating their seeds and conducting careful, if unhelpful trials of seeds, but these 
farmers associate the new technology with the science and success celebrated in news programs 
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and extolled by their newly educated children.  Even in the face of failure farmers were largely 
unwilling to blame the shops and products themselves, acknowledging that, even if the scientists 
did not have their best interests at heart, they still needed their help to buy products.  In the 
shops, low caste or poor farmers needed to show the necessary deference to the high caste, 
wealthier shop owners.  Wealthier farmers similarly performed their modern, scientific 
knowledge by trusting friends and contacts in shops and universities.  However, as suggested by 
Ramulu’s comment above, all of these social performances are contingent on the benefits of 
working with shops, extension agents, and program officers.  The next section explores the 
consequences of turning one’s back on the stage. 
 
Incomplete Transformations 
 The contingency of this transformative sentiment can be seen among those organic 
villagers that quit organic programs and by the fate of the intervention program E-Digu.  In 
organic villages that do not see the promised yield or infrastructural benefits from their 
participation, farmers often leave the program or bend the rules.  These farmers are by definition 
marginal to the project, less personally invested in its success or less socially connected to the 
program managers.  When such farmers leave the project, their knowledge of seeds and 
marketing is even worse than that of the regular GM cotton farmers because they have no 
neighbors to ask or first-hand knowledge to rely on.  Instead, their information comes from 
impatient shop owners selling seeds who give little, if any, management advice.     
 In 2012, fifteen households in the Gondi Tribal hamlet of Ranaguda began a mandatory 
three year conversion process to transition to certified organic agriculture.  By the following year 
the farmers were generally irritated with Prakruti.  We only do this, one farmer grumbled, 
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“because Prakruti is giving us cheap seeds, but the yields are poor and the profit margins are 
even worse:  a small premium combined with a small yield.  Their rules are complicated, they 
are banning the [fertilizers that would give a] solution [to the yield problem], and if we use them 
they won't take our cotton.” To satisfy the certification requirements of foreign buyers, organic 
farms follow procedures outlined by the United States Department of Agriculture, which have 
become a template for organic production around the world.  As such, Prakruti cannot sell 
organic cotton as such or provide the promised premiums until after the transition period, placing 
farmers in an uncomfortable double-bind where they must suffer comparatively lower yields 
from non-GM seeds grown without chemical inputs and receive no price premium.  Contrary to 
the farmer’s opinion, Prakruti does buy non-organic cotton and sell it on the open market, but the 
farmer is correct to note that his family receives no additional income for the trouble of organic 
production.   
 In 2013, four of the households maintained Bt cotton on separate fields, affirming to the 
Prakruti that they used separate farm tools to manage the Bt and non-Bt fields and kept the 
harvested cotton separated.  In practice this separation is impractically difficult to achieve, and so 
the NGO maintains that they certify land, not farmers.  This can lead to awkward paperwork in 
which members of the same household manage officially separate farms.  An additional five 
households did not know the names of the seeds that they planted, claiming that “Prakruti gives 
the seeds, we take what they give and we don’t use chemicals on that land.”  Returning to the 
NGO office after a day of interviews, I mentioned that a number of Ranaguda farmers were 
planting Bt seeds, an infraction that could violate the letter, if not the spirit, of organic 
production regulation.  Arjuna, the NGO’s district coordinator, grew irritated and advised me to 
try other farmers where I could find “better information.”  “Don’t talk to them, they are only 
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transitioning”, he informed me.  After all, what organization would not rather have visitors see 
their show farmers (see chapter eight) than their most marginal farmers?  “Oh, it’s no problem,” I 
said, feigning ignorance of his discomfort.  “This will help me understand how farmers make the 
jump to organic cotton.” 
 A year later, I was back in the office expressing my surprise that all but two of the 
Ranaguda farmers dropped out of the program.  “They are defaulters”, lamented Arjuna.  For 
three years the farmers took loans, plants, farm equipment including plastic drums, seeds, and 
participated in a government assistance program brokered through Prakruti.  For three years they 
claimed that they could not afford to pay back their debts to the program.  “We couldn't pay”, 
says Saraswathi. “We lost the entire crop last year and there was nothing to be done.”   As a 
farmer of over twenty acres and the owner of a local shop, I have doubts that she could not have 
repaid her debts on four acres of cotton, but she certainly refuses to do so.  “They're still 
interested” mused Arjuna, “but we've stopped giving them things as they aren't paying us back.”  
The combination of heavy rains during last year’s harvest and the late El Nino monsoon of 2014 
led many farmers to question his efforts, and he confides that in such difficult years he must keep 
a closer watch on all the farmers to ensure their compliance.  That is, he must make sure that 
they are following didactic instruction rather than following a more flexible system based on 
what they themselves think is best.  Have you seen the cooperative land, he asks? 
 
We want to make it a better demonstration area but we're having a money problem.  We 
need to show the farmers how to do everything, even after ten years they are still not 
always following our rules and they are getting confused.  These Tribal farmers, you can't 
just say once, you have to say two, three times, and you have to show them everything, 
that's why the land is so important.  They have gotten trainings on insects and sprays and 
soil, and now those things are improving, but we need to give them training in business 
too.  This area is very good for the organic farming because we can show them what to 
do and how to do it.  That support is necessary. 
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In 2014, only four out of twenty-four cotton seed choices in the village, representing two farmer 
households, planted non-Bt seeds from the organic program.     
In 2013, with the continued support from the NGO through government assistance, farm 
equipment, seeds, and training programs, the Ranaguda farmers were willing to humor the 
management demands placed on them.  Yields are bad, the farmers told me, but they were bad in 
the past as well.  “Now we have the sprays from Prakruti and we know how to plow and properly 
prepare the cow manure”, one farmer told me, espousing his transformation.  “The DAP and urea 
hurt the land and cause it to lose energy”, said another, repeating a Prakruti talking point I heard 
in all the villages.  “Now we know better”.  By 2014 that sentiment had evaporated.  “Prakruti 
stopped giving so we stopped taking” shrugged Saraswathi.  “We tried organic for three years,” 
she explains: “In the first time it came very well, but they kept giving the same seed, so the yield 
went from fifteen, then ten, and then last year two quintals per acre.  It's probably a fault of the 
manufacturer rather than Prakruti, but we don't want to take from them anymore.”  In the absence 
of clearly defined rewards, and considering their own poor experience with the seeds, the organic 
farmers in Ranaguda no longer had any reason to talk about their transformation and the 
education they received at the hands of the program. 
Edaggrineelu sits a twenty minute walk past another village, also full of farmers.  “Are 
you going to Edaggrineelu?” asked village teenagers passing on the way to the main road.  When 
I answered in the affirmative they rolled their eyes and laughed.  “Everyone always goes to them, 
no one ever comes to see us.  Please, they spray at night.”  Inter-village jealousy aside, several 
farmers admitted spraying pesticides in extreme situations and I noticed pesticide bottles in 
household trash piles.  In 2013, at least six farmers in Edaggrineelu admitted to planting Bt seeds 
after repeated field visits.  It is worth noting that farmer knowledge about Bt seeds in 
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Edaggrineelu is no better than that seen in the GM farmers sample.  The farmer claimed to plant 
non-Bt and proudly showed me a seed package, labeled Dr. Brent Bt Cotton.  When I pointed out 
that this was a Bt seed, she told me, “Bt, non-Bt – you can read and I can’t, you tell me”.  
PANTA had not provided her with seeds that year and in the absence of their advice she went 
with a shop suggestion.  The whole village, she says, does this when they don’t get seeds from 
PANTA.  Repeating an erroneous but oft-spoken conception that Bt had some kind of poison in 
it that would harm the earth Bua Rajanna fell into interesting double speak:  “It’s a chemical and 
we shouldn't keep it, but it makes the cotton grow well.  It'll poison you if you touch it every day 
even if the production is more.  You have to rotate with Bt as it poisons the field:  if goats eat it 
they lose their hair and the same thing happens to the soil.” “But you just said you put it in your 
own fields,” I protested.  “I was late getting the seed,” he explained, saying that he was planting 
it without telling PANTA.  “Okay,” I said, “I won't tell either,” and he grinned sheepishly. 
The deference to PANTA extends to the people with strong connections, but some speak 
out against them - Anjamma who lives next to Edaggrineelu’s champion show farmer, says that 
PANTA promised many great things but then is merciless when it comes to repaying loans.  
They were led to believe (although told is too strong) that they would not have to pay loans back 
and that the infrastructure was a gift, but that turns out to be untrue.  This was a case of not 
looking a gift horse in the mouth.  Drying rice seed on her front patio she began to criticize 
PANTA, saying that she has taken cow and pipe loans that were supposed to be lower interest or, 
better yet, never repaid.  To her disappointment, she's being hounded by PANTA and despite 
spending her time talking with people like me and going to Delhi to talk about how her life has 
changed, she hasn't seen anything from them.  “Even worse,” she continues, “the equipment they 
give comes from the government and when you don't pay them back you have both people 
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asking you.  It's all hard work, we don't see anything substantive from them.”  What about the 
training, I ask?  “We already knew about almost all of that, what training did they teach us?”  
These frustrations simmer just under the surface, especially when farmers feel that their time and 
energy is being wasted. 
 Conventional farmers in the Warangal district were happy to take free advice from the 
consulting program E-Digu, and to declare the program a success.  E-Digu indicated that they 
had saved farmers money, improved their scientific understanding of agriculture, and helped to 
bring technology from high-tech “Cyberabad” to the impoverished agrarian countryside of the 
Telangana region (Uday Kiran et al. 2010; Stone 2011b).  Frustrated with what they saw as an 
ineffective extension service, computer scientists at the International Institute of Information 
Technology (IIIT) in Hyderabad sought to provide a better service whereby each farmer could 
pay to receive knowledge about their specific problems regularly through the growing season.  
As founder Dr. PK Rao explains, his goal was: 
 
to provide advice to every community in time how to reach the farm.  The advice should 
be regular once again, because we feel that the next week’s advice should be based on 
last week’s advice.  We should help the farmer [such that] the farmer doesn’t even ask 
the question.  That is very important in the Indian context – nobody will ask the 
question…[Government call centers] are unable to reach even 10% of the farmers, and 
nobody is asking questions.  They don’t know what to ask…most of the answers [the call 
center gives] are directions.  ‘I need fertilizers’, ‘okay go to this place and that place, 
those are pesticides shops’...Because society is not developed.  Officially this is 50% 
illiteracy.  The farmers are those who are illiterate, who have not studied at my age.  So at 
my age, what happened was that people have not gone to school.  Those are normal 
farmers…Again, you are reaching only elite farmers, not poor farmers.  And we have 
[Scheduled Caste (SC)], ST, Lambadi farmers, I think you know.  Knowledge is not 
reaching them. 
 
In our interview, Rao emphasizes that his program fills a gap in farmer knowledge, one 
unfilled by lackluster government programs.  Reaching thousands of farmers and winning 
numerous accolades, the project has shifted from a very personalized approach where individual 
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farmers interact with scientists remotely to a more manageable and scalable approach where 
farmers solicit scientists one on one in local villages and pay for that service.  In its current form, 
E-Digu gives generalized advice to a single village via community signs.  This is ironic as their 
original impetus was to be farmer driven rather than top down and generalized.  “We achieved 
the target”, says Reddy, and so “it must be replaced now.”  The reason it must be replaced, to his 
perspective, is in part because “the farmer is overconfident” in his own knowledge and 
experience – in recent years only educated farmers who know best go for E-Digu.  When they 
switched from free advice to a pay system in 2008, official farmer enrollment in the program 
dropped from more than 7000 to just above 1000; the staff dropped from 80 to six workers 
including only one full time field worker; the actual extension work has gone from individual 
consultations to a notice board that informs farmers about general agricultural problems.  The 
same project that won Rao’s team awards and media attention had essentially collapsed due to a 
lack of farmer interest in the absence of free advice. 
 Village coordinator Raji recalls that the current version of E-Digu was first tested in 2007 
in the village where PK Rao had been born, serving 300 paying farmer customers.  But after five 
years Raji concluded that the constituents had learned “too much”, and no one was interested in 
paying to hear things that they already knew.  Last year, only ten people asked for forty discrete 
solutions, totaling Rs 2000 at Rs fifty a pop.  To put this in perspective, Raji’s salary is set at Rs 
4000 per month plus Rs 1000 for petrol expenses, meaning that the project last year incurred a 
net loss of Rs 43,000 during his nine month stint. Why, I asked, did the farmers stop paying?  As 
PK Rao recalled: 
 
In the first year [of large scale payment plans] 200 farmers paid.   The second year it 
came down to 100.  The third year it came down to thirty or forty per village.  That 
means thirty or forty farmers will pay.  Then I called the farmers, these SC, ST poor 
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farmers, I said I am closing the system.  So they said, why are you closing?  Because you 
are not paying!  You are not paying and government is not providing [funds to cover the 
balance].  No sir, we are following your advice.  Everybody in the village is following 
your advice.  How?  How are you following?  We are copying their advice.  Those thirty 
farmers who are paying, we are copying [from them].  
 
Andrew:  But that’s a problem for the whole E-Digu system.  Because you’re saying 
every farm has distinct problems, so if they’re just copying within the village it doesn’t 
solve [those problems]. 
 
P:  Yeah, every farm is having distinct problem, but my results show that some farms are 
facing the same problem.  Again, it’s the anthropological problem.  Basically you have 
perception. Everything is perception.  What do you perceive?  [The farmers] don’t 
perceive the reality. 
 
Farmers were happy to accept the lessons and profess their gratitude to the E-Digu team during 
an initial burst of didactic learning as long as E-Digu provided assistance without strings 
attached.  However, as soon as this learning became expensive and their perceived rewards 
diminished, farmers did what they would do otherwise as evidenced by the seed-buying fads:  
they learned from their neighbors.  Reddy claims that the farmers didn’t perceive the reality of E-
Digu’s continued value, but it is more likely that his interventions were simply overrun by the 
cheaper and equally reliable social learning.   
 
Taking Transformation Seriously 
 The characterization of transformation as a performance is not to suggest that it is 
insincere lip service.  Roles must be learned and practiced, and some farmers, such as the show 
farmers, are much better performers than others.  As illustrated by farmers in various 
intervention programs professing their prior ignorance of field management and business, 
Escobar (2011) and Agrawal (2005) are correct to note that people adjust the way in which they 
talk about themselves and their work to align with the incentives and new knowledge of experts 
when encountering development.  To whatever extent that this performance breaks down under 
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ethnographic scrutiny, farmers must learn to take advantage of the organic program, seed shop, 
extension office, or call center just as they process environmentally learned information about 
seed choices from their own fields and socially learned information from the fields of their 
neighbors.  Farmers have learned that professing transformation is the first step in a positive 
feedback loop:  perform transformation, generate a response from the intervention program or 
media, attract visitors with fame and buying power, secure future assistance in the form of 
consultation, loans, or farm equipment, profess to be even more transformed.  This 
transformative sentiment is strategic and performative as it allows farmers to perform the roles 
expected of them by outside experts or consumers and required of them if they wish to reap the 
benefits of NGO, corporate, or scientific institutions.  Farmers are rewarded for performing this 
ignorance and as such it becomes part of their learning process in a socially embedded 
agriculture.   
 I use performance here not to imply that farmers present a false image of themselves to 
others or pay mere lip service to the interventions in question.  If organic farmers were only 
humoring the intentions of the program directors, the Ranaguda and Edaggrineelu farmers who 
switch to GM cotton seeds would not be so unmoored from their seed knowledge base.  After 
years of learning to take seeds from the NGO and evaluating only differences between the two to 
three varieties that the program provides, farmers are left with no information to draw on except 
for the advice of callous shop owners.  With narratives of transformation and the rewards of 
performing it to visitors removed, farmers are left to perform deference to experts in the shop. 
This performance is inextricably linked to the learning process.  Learning to perform 
roles in this environment rests on the reward structure of the particular program – how farmers 
learn to earn benefits by working with the system – which becomes just as important a 
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knowledge feedback system as learning to manage one’s field or copy one’s neighbors.  
However, if farmers leave an organic program or find that the promised equipment, market 
access, news coverage, or local prestige fails to arrive, they are left with an even less reliable 
knowledge base than the previously described deskilled GM cotton farmers.  Having learned to 
rely on the development scheme for resources and management, such farmers are totally 
dependent on shops or neighbors, in part because they have no first-hand knowledge to draw on.   
Following the work of Erving Goffman (1959; 1956), I use performance here as a 
metaphor to describe how farmers have learned to portray themselves in this heavily didactic 
environment.  The spread and learning curves of technology have a well-established “prestige 
bias” (Boyd and Richerson 1988; Henrich 2001; Rogers 2003), where farmers adopt technology 
in order to emulate socially important people.  Goffman’s theory of performance can complicate 
this by showing how farmers act in the face of active instructions. 
Goffman is useful here in part because his emphasis is not on the individual, which would 
be farmers in interventions, so much as the interaction between the individual and the audience, 
which would include the intervention teachers and other farmers in this example.  Viewing the 
self as a constructed projection allows us to account for the deference required when farmers talk 
about their knowledge (Goffman 1956), which manifests here as the socially expected 
transformation that must be performed if farmers want to stay on good terms with the program.  
Goffman specifically referred to this as a front, a performance given for the benefit of others to 
achieve specific social or material goals.  When an organic program gives farmers seeds or 
subsidizes certain kinds of management, many farmers feel that it is more important to learn how 
to continue working with the intervention than to learn which method or seed is best.  Such 
questions are irrelevant when the production risks are essentially underwritten by the program.  
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However, by learning to perform, a lucky few farmers can find themselves speaking to crowds of 
politicians and movie stars in Delhi or demonstrating their methods to news teams.  By learning 
to present the right kind of self, a transformed, scientific, business-savvy self, farmers can secure 
both economic rewards and social recognition. 
While meeting farmers involved with Prakruti, I asked Bhima, a former employee of the 
program, why he thought the villagers in one hamlet would stick with the program so 
enthusiastically while villagers less than a kilometer away in Ranaguda would reject it.  He 
confirmed my own suspicions:  Ataram Tulanna, a paid show farmer and field officer originally 
from the village.  The presence of a paid educated and zealous field staff in the village, 
especially one who is blood relative of the other villagers, helps to keep people engaged with the 
program.  Field office visits are infrequent and more superficial where the staff don't live and 
where the farmers aren't as invested to begin with.  Former Ranaguda organic coordinator 
Jangu's zeal and bachelor’s degree in science is enough to convince his neighbor Krishna to plant 
organic seeds, but that sway does not extend to the rest of the village.  Not only is his compound 
half a kilometer away from the village, he is less directly related to his fellow villagers.  
Lackluster support from Prakruti led even him to plant some Bt cotton in 2014 when he ran out 
of non-GM seeds. 
Performance is thus highly dependent on the social and economic circumstances, namely 
the rewards that complicate social emulation or environmental learning.  That is, the role that 
farmers play depends on the stage they are given:  in the presence of economic or material 
rewards, as well as the added social recognition and sense of celebrity that comes from being 
regularly interviewed and photographed with visitors, farmers learn to perform and even embody 
the sense of transformation.  This sentiment is then documented by visiting officials and 
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researchers eager to show that their technology is not just improving farms but improving lives.  
But in the absence of reliable and deliverable rewards, or in the absence of consistent and trusted 
oversight, the transformation of the intervention falls aside in favor of the ways that farmers 
learn from each other.  According to a study that purported to document the “emic perception of 
change in people’s livelihoods” (Mancini, Van Bruggen, and Jiggins 2007:110) , Srigonda 
farmers who learned integrated pest management methods as part of an intervention to lower 
pesticide costs reported “an increased ability and confidence in choosing their management 
practices on the basis of field observations, resulting in cash savings and higher yields” 
(Mancini, Van Bruggen, and Jiggins 2007:106).  While the farmers doubtlessly performed this 
transformative sentiment while working with the field school instructors, by 2012 IPM methods 
had largely been abandoned, in the words of one farmer, because “Bt came, and it gives the same 
benefit [of lower pesticide use] with less work.” 
Yet the story does not end there – in 2011, eight years after the initial training, 
agricultural scientist Umesh Reddy became involved with the same village and offered many of 
the same IPM suggestions to farmers.  Unlike the previous short-term interventions, Reddy 
stayed and worked to build a farmer’s cooperative in the village.  As illustrated by the difference 
between the Prakruti organic villages who stayed with and left the program, long-term dedication 
and oversight allows farmers to learn they can successfully respond to didactic instruction.  The 
absence of these rewards and oversight leads farmers to abandon the identity they perform as 
part of that intervention.   
This chapter has argued that participants in didactic environments learn to embody a kind 
of transformative sentiment that is contingent on the reliability of social and material benefits, as 
well as the dedication or personal investment of the program directors.  In performing this 
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transformed sentiment, farmers learn not only agricultural methodology but how to cultivate a 
kind of celebrity that maintains the flow of social and economic resources in tandem with the 
intervention program.  Building on Escobar, Agrawal, and others’ study of the way in which 
farmers reorient themselves to think of their pre-intervention lives as ignorant and wasteful, I 
argue that this transformation is meaningful insofar as farmers can learn to work the system. 
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Chapter 10:  Conclusions and Implications 
 
 Rooted in the theory of political ecology, this dissertation has examined how two legally 
exclusive agricultural regimes have impacted social, economic, and environmental life in rural 
Telangana.  In addition, I have explored the relationship between three different kinds of seeds 
and the social politics of knowledge that they encourage on farmers’ fields.  Despite their 
presumptions to providing universal development solutions to farmers in India and by extension 
in the Global South generally, seeds and farming regimes have been reworked in new and 
unexpected ways by farmer participants.  My research builds on a large body of work 
investigating the unintended consequences of development as technology is integrated into new 
contexts.  Postcolonial anthropology is built around unveiling the reimagining of technology and 
the ways in which people seek out new avenues for success within a changing set of rewards and 
constraints. 
Anna Tsing (2005) has described the impact of capitalism at its margins as an awkward 
friction, giving rise to the myriad contradictions seen when technologies are confronted and 
reappropriated:  the introduction of soap in Zimbabwe requiring new conceptions of hygiene and 
status (Burke 1996); fertilizers and pesticides reimagined in India as part of an Ayurvedic 
understanding of plant health (Vasavi 1999; Gupta 1998); the invocation of spirits when 
confronted with the cold working relationships of foreign-owned firms in Bolivia (Taussig 1983) 
or Malaysia (Ong 2010); and now the widespread breakdown in knowledge regarding seeds 
intended to improve environmental sustainability through decreased pesticide sprays (Stone, 
Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014).  GM and organic methods, like other technologies, must first be 
negotiated at the frontier of capitalism and made meaningful if they are to have staying power.   
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A history of agrocapitalism that sees the adoption of technology as inevitable might argue 
that high adoption rates of GM cotton prove GM seeds’ inevitable success, or at least their 
inevitable integration into Telangana smallholder agriculture.  This is a view of capitalism in line 
with the original marketing thrust of GM seeds, which assumed that farmers would not need to 
do anything differently to successfully grow cotton – simply “plant the seeds and water them 
regularly” (Thaindian News 2008).  But this uncomplicated progression has never been true with 
Indian cotton capitalism, it is a misleading narrative of agricultural modernization in the United 
States (Fitzgerald 2003; Kloppenburg 2004), and an evidence-based progress narrative does not 
accurately describe Bt or organic cotton growers.  Attempting to separate truth from fiction in a 
vast, poorly understood seed market, most farmers are unable to trial and assess new technology 
quickly enough to use their personal environmental feedback to make seed decisions.  Since 
2002, seeds have remained popular for an average of only three years (Stone, Flachs, and 
Diepenbrock 2014).  Given that intimate local ecological knowledge has been shown to be 
crucial to sustainability, the GM seed market appears to be eroding, rather than building local 
efforts at sustainability.  Any instability in the seed market, such as the 2012 scarcity, can drive 
farmers to go to extraordinary and harmful lengths to secure particular seed brands, which are 
abandoned the following year.  As for organic seeds, farmers face much lower yields, justified 
largely by non-agricultural benefits of learning to perform for visitors and officials. 
I have argued that organic and GM development are being made meaningful in ways 
unintended by organic and GM proponents.  Tsing calls attention to such activity as inhabiting 
the margins of capitalism where new meanings of commodities are born.  Intended as an 
uncomplicated agricultural intervention (just plant and water the seed), the GM seed has caused 
“anarchic” (Herring 2007) brand confusion and periodic lapses in knowledge wherein farmers 
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scramble to buy specific seeds for one or two years, abandon them the next year, and then repeat 
the process the following year (Stone, Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014).  Friction appears when 
farmers jump from seed to seed, pro-poor technology benefits the wealthiest, and more marginal 
farmers throw up their hands to demand “whatever’s popular” in the shop.  Intended to teach 
farmers new methods, organic agriculture often teaches farmers how to benefit from foreign 
buyers willing to underwrite their costs.  These ironies are the essence of Tsing’s friction in the 
development process.  Postcolonial anthropology embraces such ironies, ethnographically 
describing the ways in which global modernity becomes “resisted, reinvented, and reconfigured 
in different social and historical locations” (Gupta 1998:9).  Even when the regulation or 
technology arrives unchanged from foreign planners, farmers create new paths toward success 
(or failing that, getting by) within the reward structure of these agricultural regimes. This 
adaptation becomes clearest when we focus on how farmers make seed decisions under the new 
constraints and opportunities afforded to them by GM and organic agriculture. 
 In this conclusion I will summarize the three key contributions of this dissertation.  (1)  
Farming, especially show farming, is a particular kind of social performance contingent on the 
human, ecological, and institutional audiences that farmers have to deal with.  As always, 
performance is contingent on the shifting calculus that weighs social and economic costs in the 
field.  Performance can refer to working closely with a specific organization like the institutional 
organic show farmers, performing a kind of agricultural modernity by conforming to the popular 
seed choices of the year, or satisfying the needs of saved crops, but it is a crucial element in the 
farmer decision-making process.  (2) Farmer knowledge is based around the daily practice of 
environmental, social, and didactic learning in the field.  Over-relying on any particular kind of 
information can lead to unreliable knowledge, but the danger is clearest when farmers stray too 
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far from their first-hand environmental knowledge base.  (3) Finally, like the performances, 
farmer knowledge is contingent.  The same farmers can improperly balance knowledge of one 
crop while maintaining a solid knowledge base with a different crop.  The processes by which 
knowledge is created and adapted are complicated and layered, but they are ultimately functions 
of the commodities or technology used and the social conditions by which the audience evaluates 
the farmer.  In the remaining space I will also give a nod to the insights that such anthropological 
study can have for agricultural development generally.  While I am not qualified to offer 
substantive policy suggestions, I believe this research can help to clarify the means by which 
farmers are pursuing success under GM and organic agriculture.  It is my hope that by taking 
seriously farmers’ responses to the rewards and constraints of organic and GM cotton farming, 
we can implement solutions better tailored to farmers’ needs.   
 
Knowledge as a Particular Kind of Performance 
 The work I have reviewed here, particularly Paul Richards (1985; 1989; 1993), Robert 
Netting (1993), and Harold Brookfield (2001) on the nature of skill as well as Glenn Stone 
(2007) or Deborah Fitzgerald (1993) on the destabilizing of skill, emphasize the necessity of 
local troubleshooting.  Richards likened skill to a musical jam session, noting that farmers must 
draw on a shared repertoire of knowledge and respond to a variety of unexpected stimuli.  
Netting and Brookfield similarly stress that farmers who manage more diverse agronomic or 
labor variables in their fields learn more about their work and are thus better positioned to pursue 
agriculture that is resilient to plant diseases and market fluctuations.  Allowing corporate forces 
to control the production and spread of hybrid seeds, Stone and Fitzgerald have shown how 
farmers became deskilled in the face of un-trialable hybrid and later GM hybrid seed markets.  
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Knowledge in this sense is in the hands of the performer, cultivated and used (or not) through the 
daily practice of environmental and social learning (Stone 2016; Boyd and Richerson 1988) 
As described at length by Habermas (Fultner 2011) the commodification of knowledge 
encourages deskilling by transforming the spread of knowledge and skill from a social 
relationship into a transaction of capital.  In this bleak view, states and the capitalist system seek 
a monopoly on knowledge.  However, this is by no means assured.  Due to its social and 
environmental complexity, much of agricultural work still relies on particular kinds of local 
knowledge.  Looking to an iterative tripartite learning, one key to maintaining knowledge is 
continued use.  This is an Aristotelian conception of knowledge, which sees knowledge as a 
habit and a virtue.  The act of learning is thus an act of practice – because the reward structures 
of learning with different crops and planting strategies discussed here incentivize or constrain 
that practice, they also incentivize and constrain knowledge, and by proxy, sustainability.   
Once acquired, this knowledge persists, with fluidity, in communities and individuals 
where frequent practice is deemed to be a worthy use of time and energy.  Scott (1988) and 
Freidberg (2004) call this practical, adaptable skillset that develops from long term practice and 
manifests as the indescribable feeling that a practice is correct, metis: the Greek concept of 
practiced knowledge, stemming from Aristotelian virtue which understood it as part of the path 
toward eudaimonia, the state of happiness and prosperity of a life in the pursuit of knowledge 
and excellence.  Excellence in human activity, such as metis, is a form of practice, a “coherent 
and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence...with the result that human powers to achieve excellence...are systematically 
extended” (MacIntyre 2007:187).  Weeding does not fit this criterion, as it is a discrete task not 
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necessarily extending the human excellence of plant removal.  Agriculture on the other hand is 
such a practice of complex activity that produces what we understand to be agricultural goods.  
Engaging in such a practice connects with others who do so in the past and present, especially 
those whose achievements resonate in the present and demand study.  Institutions help to sustain 
practices and adaptable metis knowledge functions to prevent the corrupting power of 
institutions on creativity, access, and cooperation.  When agriculture is denied these things, it 
ceases to be a practice and is better understood as a part of a practice, just as weeding is a part of 
agriculture.  Working outside the Greek tradition, Berkes comes to a similar conclusion and 
juxtaposes “the native knowledge of the natural milieu firmly rooted in the reality of an 
accumulation of concrete, personal experiences, as opposed to book-learning” (Berkes 2012:15).  
In each instance one practices a form of knowledge honed by continuous unpredictable 
adaptation within a generalizable framework.  This knowledge is illegible and uncommodifiable 
as it cannot be codified or culturally marked as a certain kind of thing (Kopytoff 1988).  Rather it 
forms an element of an improvisatory script called upon when farmers perform the act of 
farming for themselves, visitors, and each other (Richards 1989; Vanclay and Enticott 2011). 
 By emphasizing interpersonal interactions (Goffman 1959; Goffman 1956) and 
environmental learning I call attention to the audiences of these performers, arguing that metis is 
cultivated through a socially reinforced process of performance – farmers improvise, but they 
also build or lose social capital when their performances are viewed by NGOs, neighbors, family 
members, scientists, even the environment itself.  Show farmers may be the most dramatic 
example of farmers performing roles to a distinct audience, but local village hierarchies 
determine who can talk comfortably to whom and who shows deference to whom.  By extension, 
these channels determine local information flows and the audiences who observe the 
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performance of that knowledge.  Saved rice seeds and garden vegetables or flowers planted in 
the fields grow or die as farmers manage climactic and pest variation.  Farmers have a flexibility 
with these crops, because they can be eaten or saved and because they are less bound to a high 
yield imperative, that is not seen in cotton due to deskilling or underwritten costs.  In both cases, 
skill or metis is determined by a commodity form as it interacts with different audiences.  That 
is, because it relies on a daily practice filtered through the environment, local social hierarchy, 
and institutional rewards, knowledge is a function of farmer performers responding to audience 
feedback. 
 
Tripartite Knowledge as a Balancing Act 
I have argued that audience response is both a danger and an opportunity for farmer skill.  
In a social practice like agriculture, emulating neighbors or listening to didactic institutions 
offers a chance to succeed outside of one’s own environmental experience.  Opportunistic show 
farmers demonstrate how some people can take advantage of new knowledge and new resources, 
while the over-reliance on social learning is a strategy, albeit flawed, for navigating the 
confusing GM cotton seed market.  But in all three seed case studies, the ability to build skill 
rested on the ability to practice environmental learning. 
GM cotton farmers, adrift in the market and overloaded by seed choices have found some 
solace in herding behavior (Stone, Flachs, and Diepenbrock 2014) and state governance that 
makes their choices appear more straight forward.  That they continue to attempt cotton seed 
trials shows that they would be capable of building agricultural skill in a less confusing and 
actively duplicitous marketplace.  Similarly, the knowledge of organic cotton farmers is not 
particularly useful because they are given seeds and told how to plant them.  In both cases 
322 
 
farmers are not rewarded for practicing and building environmental knowledge.  Rather, they 
learn to respond to didactic NGOs, the logic of the herds, and the vague influence of shops or 
pedda farmers.  In rice cultivation, the tripartite balance is skewed toward daily practice, 
privileging environmental learning over didactic or social learning.  Rice cultivation allows 
farmers to maintain more control over their knowledge and its use.  Farmers can test the waters 
of hybrid or hybrid breeding rices that are more pure commodities while still growing a crop 
about which they know a great deal.  In rice cultivation, the yield, taste, and market sale rewards 
are aligned with farmer knowledge, and farmers better understand the seed market.  Cotton 
agriculture takes place in a market that privileges didactic and social learning, thus leaving 
farmers vulnerable to deskilling. 
Ultimately, this interaction between audiences and farmer knowledge ensures that farmer 
performances are contingent.  In one sense, they are contingent on the commodity involved 
because the particular demands of different kinds of cultivation lead farmers to interact with 
different actors and environments.  In another sense, they are contingent on the ways in which 
farmers engage development initiatives and perceive the relative benefits of that relationship.  
The kinds of knowledge built in agriculture fall out of practice without a reward structure that 
incentivizes their practice.  To call show farmer agriculture performative is not to disparage it. 
Indeed, the institutional rewards for performance ensure that their agriculture is quite sustainable 
– for as long as the program supports them.  Lacking that institutional support, cotton and rice 
farmers perform within the constraints established by local social hierarchy, field conditions, 
markets, and their own established knowledge.   
 
Implications for the Future of Farming 
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Ironically, these agricultural technologies are not particularly effective at achieving the 
development goals they set to achieve.  Much to the frustration of technologically-inclined 
proponents, GM and organic cotton seeds are put forward in damaging ways.  Through the late 
1990s, Indian cotton farmers suffered a troubling rise in bollworm pests, pesticide use, debt, and 
suicide.  Depending on disciplinary focus, these problems have been described as acute, with 
plant scientists and some economists pointing to crop failures (Qaim and Zilberman 2003; Qaim 
2010; Vaidyanathan 2006), or chronic, with anthropologists and social historians looking to 
global systems of capital or power (Galab, Revathi, and Reddy 2009; Deshpande and Arora 
2010; Stone 2011b).  Although not necessarily new in India, and despite no clear link between 
suicide and agrarian distress (Plewis 2014), the crisis captured international headlines.  Roitman 
(2013) has argued that a crisis may be thus named to shape a narrative for particular political and 
economic purposes.  In India, agrarian crisis apolitically characterized as an overabundance of 
cotton pests and chemicals opened the door for two legally exclusive technological solutions:  
Genetically modified (GM) Bt cotton and organic cotton. 
 In spite of this, this technology has had decidedly mixed results in practice.  The state 
prices cotton seeds far below what the market is willing to pay, leading seed companies to sell 
the same product under different names to increase market shares and leading seed brokers to 
capitalize on frequent seed shortages in areas where farmers have difficulty getting to local 
retailers.  Similarly, if the purpose of organic cotton cultivation is to produce a viable alternative 
to GM cotton and the kind of agriculture it represents, then low organic yields and the small 
percentage of farmers growing organic cotton indicate that the technology is ineffective in 
practice.   
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When alternative agricultures, which included GM cotton in its early phases, adhere to an 
NGO model of quick implementation, quick study, and a quick narrative of success, it reinforces 
a socioeconomic pattern by which these projects have no staying power or long-term support.  
Like many such development schemes, GM cotton and organic cotton projects are in a sense 
anti-political.  Although show farmers or pedaa farmers perform as role models for other farmers 
and for their intervention generally, the compounding effects of social and didactic learning 
obscure the social and material resources that underwrite their success. Yet despite learning more 
about how to use NGO resources or how to work with extension agents than about agriculture 
itself, their performance fulfills what James Ferguson (1994) has called the development 
objective: their performed transformation from ignorance to development engenders closer 
relationships with project directors and more successful production, thereby encouraging other 
villagers to join.  Ignoring the roles of these intermediaries leads outsiders across the commodity 
chain, from visiting farmers to consumers who read media on ethical cotton, to see these few 
farmers as representative of agriculture or development generally. Their mediation comes to look 
like a simple consumer choice and their success a symbol of the inherent superiority of the 
intervention.  Paradoxically, their work is anti-political even as it is built upon a negotiated set of 
social and material rewards. 
 If publicized, these misleading data can find their way into the scientific literature as well.  
One would expect studies with industry ties to support pro-GM findings and those with ties to 
anti-industry Non-government organizations (NGOs) to support anti-GM findings. Examining 
the studies and their publicity as texts, Pearson (2006) argues "that there are striking similarities 
in the narratives utilized by both Monsanto and [anti-GM NGO] DDS; both seek to deploy 
'objective science' in their efforts to govern smallholder farmers, and both purport to represent 
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transparently the views of farmers and their best interests" (Pearson 2006:307, emphasis in  
original).  Both GM companies and NGOs release studies claiming that one production mode is 
more or less profitable, socially sustainable, productive, or ecological, claims that Stone (2002) 
deems hyperbolic all around.  These narratives even help to shape public perceptions of peasant 
farmers.  Pearson sees the activist narrative as one that holds peasants in low esteem while the 
Monsanto narrative is largely concerned with farmers' ability to maximize their own benefits 
with the superior seeds, deemed to be superior by farmers’ enthusiastic adoption. 
 Finally, this study highlights the potential dangers of overzealous corporate involvement 
in seeds.  Had GM cotton remained as a choice between the three varieties approved in 2002, this 
would likely be a very different dissertation.  Rice hybrids are not as popular now as cotton 
hybrids were in the 1990s, and for a variety of reasons outlined in chapter six having to do with 
the environmental learning process, rice agriculture may be resistant to deskilling.  However, 
cotton’s experience as a GM commodity may foreshadow the spread of a highly commodified 
GM rice.  If GM rice seeds spread in the same way that GM cotton seed spread, namely with an 
initial period of heavy marketing to influential farmers, an explosion of confusing and un-
trialable seed brands, an unwillingness of local retailers to sell non-GM seeds, and the relegation 
of non-GM varieties to specialty markets dominated by didactic programs who must make 
farmer knowledge a secondary concern to marketing, then the rice seed would come to look very 
much like cotton seed commodities.  This would be disastrous for the indigenous knowledge 
now associated with Indian rice cultivation. 
This dissertation stresses the danger of seeking technological fixes for agricultural 
problems.  In part, this is because the practice of sustainable agriculture on the farm, the global 
challenge of feeding or clothing the world, is a social, not technological, question.  In part, this is 
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also because the unintended consequences of a new technology can and do create avenues by 
which some actors in the system can reap benefits at the expense of others:  GM seed companies 
capitalize on the desperation of farmers, organic show farmers engineer the benefits of 
production to their advantage, alternative agriculture programs earn funds based on false starts, 
and green consumers at the end of the production chain consume clothing based on contrived 
images. 
But more simply, danger of technological fixes ignores the daily, social work of 
agriculture.  Farmers do not make simple cost/benefit analyses when evaluating new 
technologies and options.  Their evaluation of development is a complex and shifting calculation 
of social meaning, performance, economics, and personal preference.  Only by understanding 
this complicated intersection can we begin to understand sustainable agriculture.   
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Appendix A:  Conventional Farmer Seed Surveys 2012-2013 
 
2012 Survey 
Village _________________________ Date_____________ GPS (H/F)__________________________ 
Irrigated?_________ Family_____________________ Name_______________________________________ 
2013 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total acres planted___________________ 
Cotton ________________________________________ Acres________Town_________Vendor 
__________ 
Planted before?______________How many times?____________________________Why that seed? 
Rice __________________________________________ Acres________Town_________Vendor 
__________ 
Other Crops and acres_______________________________________________________________________ 
2012 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
How many times sprayed? _________________________________ 
Worst insect problem? ________________________________________________________________ 
Total acres planted __________  Total quintals harvested ___________Subsidy?________ 
Cotton Seed___________________________________ Acres________Town_________Vendor __________ 
Rice ___________________________ Acres______Town_________Vendor __________#Saved bags for eat 
or replant?______________Bags harvested?_______________________ 
Other Crops and acres_______________________________________________________________________ 
Garden/Source of germplasm? 
Ask you? 
You ask? 
Worst problem facing farmers? 
Clever farm experiments? 
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2013 Survey 
Village _________________________ Date_____________ GPS (H/F)__________________________Age_________   
Irrigated?_________ Name____________________________HHID__________________Caste____________________ 
2013 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total acres planted__________________Cotton_______________________Acres_______Town____________Shop 
_______________Planted before?____________________________How many times?_____________________SL/DL? 
Rice __________________________________________ Acres________Town_________Shop __________Planted 
before?_________________________________________How many times?_______________________________ 
Other Crops and acres____________________________([1-3]  Cotton Sureness___________Rice Sureness__________) 
2012 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
How many times sprayed? Worst insect problem Rice/Cotton? Pachcha Purugu Vaccinda? 
Rice:   XXX 
Cotton:    
Total acres planted __________  Cotton Seed__________________________________Acres________ Total quintals 
harvested___________ Town_________Shop __________Planted Before?_______________How many  
times?_____________________SL/DL? 
Rice ________________________Winter rice?__________________Acres______Town_________Shop 
__________#Saved bags for eat or  replant?______________Bags harvested?_______________________ Planted 
before?___________How many times?_______________ 
Other Crops and acres_______________________________________________________________________   
Cotton seeds:  Mixed together or separate this year?  What’s the difference between these brands?   
Rice saved: What is the difference in the field between rice sold, rice for eating, and rice for replanting?  Who chooses 
what rice is saved? 
Rice not saved:  Why not save your seed for next year’s planting? 
Do you plant Kamdulu in your field?  Where do you get the seed? 
Cotton Seed Rice Seed 
Boll size? 
Sucking pests? 
Many branches? 
 
Thick or thin? 
Pest problems? 
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Caste:       
A.  
Economic Assets 
1. Do you own livestock?  Tractor  
Buffalo  Machinery  
Cattle  Others:  
Others:  Soil type:  
B. Income 
Farm income last 
year? 
 Family member name Job 
1.     Non farm 
 income? 
   
 From 
 where? 
    
 Workshare?    
 Debt?  
 From 
 what? 
   
Who in the household worked off farm and 
what did they do? 
  
 
Farmer Name 
 
Sex Age Education For how many 
years have you 
been a farmer? 
How long 
cotton? 
How long 
Bt? 
How 
long 
rice? 
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(If planting a new cotton/rice seed this year)  Is this the first year this seed was available? 
Who was planting this last year?  
What did you yourself see? 
What did you hear?  
Why did you not you try this seed yourself?  
What kind of farmers plant brand new seeds? 
 
 
Are you planting Bt?  What is Bt?  What does it do?  What kinds are available?  Does it work? 
 
 
Any new insect problems/diseases this year?  How do you manage them? 
 
 
If I asked for your help in choosing a new seed? 
 
 
What do I look for and do to make sure that I was growing correctly (I’m stupid, lazy, etc.)? 
 
(if trialing cottons) What do you look for?  What kind of tests do you do? 
 
How can you say that the results of the tests are due to the seeds rather than due to some environmental variable (land, 
water, bad  season)? 
 
(if saving rice) Can you describe the process of saving rice from harvest to replanting?  What do you look for in the field 
when deciding to save rice? 
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2014 Survey 
Village _____________________ Date_____________ Age__________Irrigated?_________ 
Name_______________________________________HHID__________________Caste____________________ 
2014 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total acres planted___________________Cotton_______Acres________Town____________________________ 
Shop_______________Planted before?_____________________How many times?___________________SL/DL? 
Rice __________________________________________ Acres________Town_________Shop __________Planted 
before?_________________________How many times?_______________________________ 
Kamdulu:  Town____________Shop____________Name?_____How many times?________________ 
Tomato:    Town____________Shop____________Name?_____How many times?________________ 
Banti :    Town____________Shop____________Name?_____How many times?________________ 
Other Crops and acres____________________________([1-3]  Cotton Sureness___________Rice Sureness__________) 
2013 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
How many times sprayed? Worst insect problem Rice/Cotton? Pachcha Purugu Vaccinda? 
Rice:   XXX 
Cotton:    
Total acres planted__________  Cotton Seed_________Acres________Total quintals harvested___________ 
Town_________Shop __________Planted Before?_______________How many  times?_______________SL/DL? 
Rice __________________Winter rice?__________________Acres______Town_________Shop__________Total Bags  
harvested?____________ #Saved bags for eat or  replant?_________ Planted before?_____How many times?_________ 
Other Crops and acres_______________________________________________________________________   
Rice saved: How do you know to save rice for next year’s planting?  Who chooses what rice is saved? 
Changing cotton or rice seed:  Why change from last year’s seed to this year’s seed? 
Cotton Seed Rice Seed 
Boll size 1-2-3 
What pest enjoys this? 
Bt? 
Bushy or tall? 
Thick or thin? 
What pest enjoys this? 
Bags per acre? 
Days until harvest? 
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Appendix B:  Ethnobotanical Survey 
 
Agrobiodiversity Survey:  Economic Botany 
Village _________________________ Date_____________ GPS (F)__________________________ 
Name_______________________________________HHID_________________________________ 
Age________________Sex__________________Plant Total_________________________________ 
What plants are used from the farm fields and for what purpose? 
Commodity Crop plants planted (cotton 2012: S/D ||| cotton 2013:  S/D): 
 
Home need vegetables, flowers: 
 
 
Intercropped/Separate________________________________________________________ 
Economic trees: 
 
 
Wild foods (adavi aharam): 
 
 
Wild non/foods (medicine, basketry, thorns, thatch, firewood, fodder, ornamental): 
 
 
 
Notes: 
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Do you use any of the following from your field? (mark planted with checks): 
Y? Crops Y? Kurakayalu Y? Chetlu Y? Other Useful? 
 Patti  Tomato  Vepa chettu  Amundum 
 Wari  Bemdakaya  Toddy chettu  Banthi puwwu 
 Makajuna  Vamkaya  Take chettu  kanakambaram 
 Pesalu  Chikkudu  Mamidi pandu  Gulabi 
 Palli  Palli  Thuma chettu  Tella malli puwwu 
 Nuvullu  Kakkadakaya  Sitapaluka chettu  Kulabantha 
 Michi  Gumadakaya  Tangedu chettu  Tulasi 
 Pasupu  Gongura  Kalimaku chettu  Kagitapu puvvu 
 Mamidi pandu  Dosakaya  Jama/Narenga  Bugladatamara 
 Take chettu  Kamdulu  Chinta chettu  Mandara 
 Shenigallu  Birakaya  Thuniki  Pama chettu 
 Januwulu  Annakaya/Dondakaya  Jumpuda chettu  Gonneru 
   Nallausri  Chendradi chettu  Jilledu 
   Ulli gadda  Modugu chettu  Kalubanda 
   Pesalu  Usiri chettu  Sita Jedda 
 
 
 
Minimulu 
 Sarkar thuma/ 
Mangalagiri 
 
Juna 
   Bubbarlu  Gangaressi pandlu   
   Buddam kaya  Mari chettu   
 Kayalu  Pappada kaya  Cheninga chettu  Chetlu 
 Mulangi  Arati Pandu  Muktu chettu  Ralla Chettu 
 Beetroot  Pullakura  edda lanka/Veduru  Kunkudukaya  
 Sorakaya  Totorkura  Subav chettu  Alla Nerada  
 Pudlu terugudu  Pudina  Regu Pandu  Chi Chintakaya  
 Alum  Danyalu/Kotmir  Ita chettu   
 Brahma jemudu  Mentyalu  Nimba Chettu   
 Velulli  Carrot  Mukta   
     Gumpa chettu   
     Suporta Chettu   
     Mulli Kaya   
Are there any plants that you use that I missed? 
 
 
Any plants that your husband/wife/children use? 
 
 
Excepting the crops, do you sell any of the products of these plants? 
 
 
If not selling, what do you use these plants for (all new plants, trees/other useful)? 
 
(medicinals) How is this prepared?  
 
 
 
Which are planted and which grow on their own?  Do you do anything to help/hinder the non-planted? 
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Who in the household helps with farming?     
C.  
Economic Assets 
2. Do you own livestock?  Tractor  
Buffalo  Machinery  
Cattle  Others:  
Others:  Soil type:  
D. Income 
Farm income last 
year? 
 Family member name Job 
1.     Non farm 
 income? 
   
 From 
 where? 
    
 Workshare?    
 Debt?  
 From 
 what? 
   
Who in the household worked off farm and 
what did they do? 
  
 
Farmer Name 
 
Sex Age Education For how many 
years have you 
been a farmer? 
How long 
cotton? 
Use Bt?  
How long? 
How long 
rice? 
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Appendix C:  Shop Survey 
Shop Survey 
 
Date____________________   Shop Name_____________________________________ 
 
Top 5 seeds sold and number of packets sold? 
 
 Boll 
size 
# of 
flowers 
SL/DL Height Water 
requirement 
Suggested 
number of 
fertilizer 
treatements 
Resistance to 
pests other 
than Pachcha 
Purugu 
Soil 
Type 
Picking 
DB  
 
        
N  
 
        
Jack  
 
        
Jad  
 
        
M  
 
        
Bra  
 
        
What is the difference between these seeds? 
 
 
Many farmers that we talked to confused Jackpot and Jadoo.  Did the company market them together?  
Did farmers come in asking for Kaveri seeds?  If they asked for Jackpot or Jadoo, did you recommend the 
other seed as well?  Why are these seeds so popular this year? 
 
 
 Yield per 
Acre 
Spacing Time to 
harvest 
Suggested number of 
fertilizer treatements 
Resistance to pests 
VJM  
 
    
W14  
 
    
Jejelu  
 
    
1001  
 
    
1010  
 
    
 
Are any of the pesticides you sell chemically the same (like Nagarjuna Mida and Confidor)?  What is the 
difference between these brands?  What kind of farmers buy which pesticide? 
 
 
In the same way, are any of the cotton or rice seeds you sell the same hybrid number or rice variety?  
What is the difference between these brands? 
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Appendix D:  Organic Farmer Seed Surveys 2013-2014 
 
2013 Organic Survey 
Village ___________ Date_____________ GPS (H/F)__________________________ Irrigated?_________ 
Name_______________________________________HHID__________________Caste____________________ 
2013 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Total acres planted___________________Cotton ________________Acres________Town____________Shop 
_______________  SL/DL? ([1-3]  Cotton Sureness___________Rice Sureness__________) 
Planted before?__________________________________How many times?____________________________ Rice 
__________________________________________ Acres________Town_________Shop __________Planted 
before?_________________________________________How many times?_______________________________ 
Other Crops and acres______________________________________________________________________________ 
2012 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Times sprayed Neem mixture Concentration Worst insect problem 
Rice:    
Cotton:    
Total acres planted __________  Cotton Seed______________________Acres________Total quintals harvested 
___________ Town_________Shop __________Planted Before?____________How many  times?__________SL/DL? 
Rice __________Winter rice?_____________Acres______Town_________Shop __________#Saved bags for eat or 
replant?______________Bags harvested?____________ Planted before?___________How many times?______________ 
Other Crops and acres_____________________________________________   
Cotton seeds:  Mixed together or separate?  What’s the difference between these brands this year?  Last year?   
Rice saved: What is the difference in the field between rice sold, rice for eating, and rice for replanting?  Who chooses 
what rice is saved? 
Rice not saved:  Why not save your seed for next year’s planting? 
Spacing:Chettlu__________Row/Row___________ Why?  Since when?  How do you  keep track of the spacing?  Who 
suggested this? 
2013 R:  What do people say about this seed?  What do you 
see in your field? 
2013 C:  What do people say about this seed?  What do you 
see in your field? 
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E.  
Economic Assets 
3. Do you own livestock?  Tractor  
Buffalo  Machinery  
Cattle  Others:  
Others:  Soil type:  
F. Income 
1. Farm income 
last year? 
 3.  Sales at market?  
2. Off farm income  4.  Direct/Contract sales?  About how 
much? 
 
Debt? Reason? 
G. NGO involvement this year, last year 
Training 
programs/help 
 
Sales help  
Loans  
Infrastructure this 
year 
 
 
Farmer Name 
 
Sex Age Education For how many years 
have you been a 
farmer? (head of HH, 
if not interviewed) 
How long 
cotton? 
How long 
Chemical 
free? 
How long 
rice? 
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Cotton Rotation Schedule? 
 
Rice Rotation Schedule? 
 
What do you do to maintain: 
Fertility #Years Insects #Years Water #Years 
Vermicompost  Vepa  SRI  
Penda  Jaggery/Mirchi/Garlic/Cow 
Urine 
 Drip  
Green compost  Traps    
Food compost  Trap plants (which)    
Pond soil      
      
 
Anything new this year? 
 
 
Have you made any adjustments to any CROPS instructions (they show you how to do something and you discover a 
better way to do it)?  Have you  stopped using any of their suggestions (they show you something that doesn’t work for 
you)?  Have they started using any of your suggestions (you show them something that they decide to suggest to others)? 
 
 
 
Impact of all the visitors? 
 
 
 
Who do you ask for help when you have a problem or doubt? 
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What plants are used from the farm fields and for what purpose? 
Commodity Crop plants planted: 
 
Home need vegetables, flowers: 
 
 
Intercropped/Separate________________________________________________________ 
Economic trees: 
 
 
Non-planted foods on field edges or in field (like wild-growing kakkadakaya, etc.): 
 
 
Non-planted non/foods (medicine, basketry, thorns, thatch, firewood, fodder, ornamental): 
 
 
 
Notes: 
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2014 Organic Survey 
Village _________________________ Date_____________ GPS (H/F)____________________Age________________   
Irrigated?_________ Name_______________________________________HHID__________________ 
2014 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total acres planted___________________  Cotton __________________________________Acres________  
Town____________Shop _______________     SL/DL?  Planted before?__________________________________How 
many times?____________________________ 
Juna:  gaurani?  Acres____________ how many years____________      Rice___________Acres________town________ 
shop_________ how many years?_____________ 
Other Crops and acres___________________________________________ 
2013 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Times applied pest management Method used Worst insect problem 
Millet/
Rice: 
   
Cotton:    
Total acres planted __________ Cotton Seed__________________Acres________Total quintals harvested___________ 
Town_________Shop __________Planted Before?_______________How many  times?_________SL/DL? 
Sorghum:  gaurani?  Q harvested_______________Saved bags for eat or replant?____________Acres________________ 
Other Crops and acres_______________________________________________________________________   
Cotton seeds:  What’s the difference between these brands last  year?   
New instructions? 
Why  not take seeds from outside? 
 
2014 Juna 2014 C 
Expected quintals? 
 
Days to harvest? 
 
Which insects are a problem? 
Kaya size 
 
Which insect attacks 
 
Bushy or tall 
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Do you use any of the following from your field? (mark planted with checks): 
Y? Crops Y? Kurakayalu Y? Chetlu Y? Other Useful? 
 Patti  Mirchi  Vepa  Amundum 
 Pesarlu  Kamdulu  Ipa  Banti 
 Minimulu  Tomato  Chimta  Jilledu 
 Nuvullu  Bemdakaya  Regi pandu  Januwulu 
 Shenigallu  Chikkudukaya  Biomass  Mudera 
 Palli  Vamkaya  Jidi  Godayla 
 Makajuna  Palakura  Kanuga  Vavila 
 Soya  Totorkura  Sarkar thuma  Gadilan 
 Gaurani Patti  Beerakaya  Veduru  Vedema 
 Wari  Bubbarlu  Mari  Avu Juna 
 Juna  Anumulu  Adavi Regi pandu   
   Kakkadakaya  Teak   
   Avallu  Thuma   
   Gongura  Muri   
   Sorakaya  Pariki   
     Billopatri   
     Sulimara   
     Valimara   
 Kayalu    Pappadakaya  Chetlu 
     Rama  Mothu 
     Sitapaluka   
     Rampalla   
     Jamma   
     Nimma   
     Modugu   
     Mamidi   
     Ala Neeradi   
     Subabol   
     Thuniki   
Are there any plants that you use that I missed? 
 
 
Any plants that your husband/wife/children use? 
 
 
Excepting the crops, do you sell any of the products of these plants? 
 
 
If not selling, what do you use these plants for (all new plants, trees/other useful)? 
 
(medicinals) How is this prepared?  
 
 
Which are planted and which grow on their own?  Do you do anything to help/hinder the non-planted? 
